Peace as complex legitimacy: Politics, space and discourse in Tajkistan's peacebuilding process, 2000-2005. by Heathershaw, John David
PEACE AS COMPLEX LEGITIMACY: POLITICS, SPACE AND DISCOURSE IN 
TAJIKISTAN’S PEACEBUILDING PROCESS, 2000-2005
By
John David Heathershaw
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree o f Doctor of 
Philosophy (International Relations)
University of London
School of Economics and Political Science
2007
Supervisor:
Mark Hoffman
UMI Num ber: U615880
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL U SER S 
The quality of this reproduction is d e p e n d en t upon the quality of the  copy subm itted.
In the unlikely even t th a t the  au thor did not sen d  a  com plete m anuscrip t 
and there  are  m issing p ag es , th e se  will be noted. Also, if m aterial had to be rem oved,
a  note will indicate the  deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615880
Published by P roQ uest LLC 2014. Copyright in the  D issertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © P roQ uest LLC.
All rights reserved . This work is protected aga in st 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United S ta tes  C ode.
P roQ uest LLC 
789 E ast E isenhow er Parkw ay 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I declare that the w ork presented in this thesis is my own.
John Heathershaw 
7 December 2006
2
i tx n r y o f  Political
t-i-L.'' un i. . • i ..<:
'  £ 3 S s
ABSTRACT OF THESIS
Peace as Complex Legitimacy: Politics, Space and Discourse in Tajikistan’s 
Peacebuilding Process, 2000-2005
By
John David Heathershaw
This dissertation explores the process of building peace in terms of the making of 
complex legitimacy in post-Soviet, post-conflict Tajikistan. Since 2000, Tajikistan’s 
citizens have seen major political violence end, order across the country return and 
the peace agreement between the parties o f the 1990s civil war hold. Superficially, 
Tajikistan appears to be a case of successful international interventions based on neo­
liberal internationalist assumptions. Yet, puzzlingly, the inter-Tajik peace is 
interpreted in a variety o f often contradictory ways and correlates with authoritarian 
government and the tenure of a new oligarchy.
On closer inspection it is evident that neoliberal international interventions in 
Tajikistan have largely failed to achieve the aims o f peacebuilding. However, I argue 
they have served to facilitate an increasingly authoritarian peace and have indirectly 
fostered popular accommodation and avoidance strategies, as well as localised 
resistance. Moreover, this peace is founded upon complex relations of legitimacy. It 
is the product of discourse (the formation of community through communication), 
politics (the acquisition of power and authority in that community), and space (the 
differentiation of that community from other communities). I study the "political 
relations between three discourse/spaces (‘selves’) of Tajikistan from 2000 to 2005: 
those o f subordinates, elites, and the international community. In addition to the 
discourse and spaces o f neoliberal international peacebuilding, are those o f popular 
tinji (Tajik: ‘peacefulness’/ ’wellness’) and elite mirostroitelstvo (Russian:
‘peacebuilding’).
In studying the relationships between subordinate, elite and international 
actors I show how they both accommodate one another via discureiVe-'r^.;'.it;j 
interpretation, and avoid each other by retreating into their own ‘hidden’ spaces and 
transcripts. These intrinsically political practices have specific material impacts on 
people’s lives. Moreover, I show how they have constituted new forms o f authority, 
livelihoods and sovereignty. In each of these cases, subordinates resign themselves to 
power and ‘peacefulness’ and get on with their lives. These practices constitute peace 
as complex legitimacy.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................. 7
PREFACE...........................................................................................................................11
LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................... 12
GLOSSARY OF TAJIK AND RUSSIAN TERMS........................................................14
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS..........................................................................16
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 19
Scope and Significance...............................................................................20
A Research Process.................................................................................... 24
PART I. Investigating Peace as Complex Legitimacy: a grounded approach
Introduction to Part One...................................................................................................30
CHAPTER
1. Peacebuilding: towards the common peace?.........................................................31
1.1. Democratic peacebuilding: peace-as-conflict-management................34
1.1.1. Ethics.................................................................................... 35
1.1.11. Space................................................................................... 37
1.1.111. Time..................................................................................39
1.2. Variations Upon a Theme: justice versus order................................... 40
1.2.1. Humanitarianism...................................................................41
1.2.11. Statebuilding........................................................................45
1.2.111. Inter-textuality, ‘pragmatism’ and peacebuilding...............48
1.3. Critical Discourses...............................................................................54
1.3.1. Moderates and radicals..........................................................54
1.3.11. Three critiques of the common peace................................. 57
1.3.111. Uncommon peace............................................................... 63
Conclusions................................................................................................ 65
2. W ar and Peace in Tajikistan...................................................................................67
2.1. The War...............................................................................................68
2.1.1. The Origins of War............................................................... 69
2.1.11. Civil War............................................................................. 75
2.2. From War to Peace...............................................................................79
2.2.1. Intervention and the Peace Process, 1993-1997 ...................79
2.2.11. Agreement and Implementation, 1997-2000........................82
2.2.111. Emerging Peace: 2000-2005................................................ 85
2.3. Reviewing War and Peace: academic analyses.................................... 88
2.3.1. Hegemony.............................................................................88
2.3.11. Legitimacy, Culture and the State........................................91
2.3.111. Complexity..........................................................................93
Conclusion...................................................................................................97
4
3. Complex Legitimacy: Dimensions of Analysis and Evaluation............................ 98
3.1. Discourse: peacebuilding as practice.................................................... 100
3.1.1 The false dichotomy................................................................ 100
3.1.11. Discourse Analysis and the Study of Peace..........................103
3.1.111. Scott’s hidden transcripts..................................................... 106
3.2. Politics: power and its need for legitimacy...........................................109
3.2.1. Beetham’s concept of legitimacy...........................................I l l
3.2.11. Peacebuilding as legitimation............................................... 113
3.3. Space: locating politics, contesting ‘the state’......................................115
3.3.1. Unbinding the principle of differentiation............................115
3.3.11. Three ‘levels’........................................................................ 117
3.4. The Post-Conflict State: against itself?................................................. 122
3.4.1. Deconstructing the common interest.................................... 123
3.4.11. Representation versus practice............................................ 125
Conclusions................................................................................................. 127
4. Constituting Legitimacy: Three ‘Levels’ of the Tajik peace.................................130
4.1. The Global: peacebuilding and its discontents......................................131
4.1.1. The International Community and the Tajik Other................132
4.1.11. From humanitarianism to statebuilding................................135
4.1.111. Peacebuilding’s discontents.................................................138
4.2. The Local-Subordinate: the ethos of Tinji.............................................141
4.2.1. ‘Society’ ................................................................................143
4.2.11. Ethics and spaces................................................................. 145
4.2.111.Time s.................................................................................... 148
4.2.iv. Dissent and Disharmony......................................................151
4.3. The Elite: mirostroitelstvo and neo-Sovietism.................................... 153
4.3.i..Times.....................................................................................154
4.3.11. Ethics....................................................................................157
4.3.111. Space in ‘the state’...............................................................159
4.3.iv. Cracks in the marble............................................................ 164
Conclusions................................................................................................. 168
PART II. International Intervention and the Making of Peace in Tajikistan. 2000-2005
Introduction to Part Tw o................................................................................................... 170
CHAPTER
5. Political Parties and Elections: Performance, Authority and ‘Opposition’ 172
5.1. Political Transition: from single party rule to multi-party rules?......... 173
5.1 .i. The 2000 Parliamentary Elections......................................... 174
5.1.11. The Parties in 2000............................................................... 175
5.1.111. Reforming elections, 2002-2005......................................... 179
5.2. The 2005 Parliamentary Elections: the spectacle of consent................183
5.2.1. Authorising Elections.............................................................183
5.2.11. Electing Authority.................................................................186
5.2.111. Contrasting international and subordinate representations. 192
5.3. Dialogue with the ‘Opposition’: discourse in an in-between space.... 196
5.3.1. Opposition Discourses........................................................... 198
5.3.11. In-between space:s and the International Community......... 201
5.4. Legitimacy and Authority: re-centralisation and de-centralisation ....205
5.4.1. Re-centralisation under ‘the state’.........................................206
5.4.11. De-centralisation to statesmen............................................. 209
5
5.4.111. What difference has ‘peacebuilding’ made?....................... 212
Conclusions.................................................................................................214
6. Security: Simulation, Sovereignty and ‘Border Management’ ........................... 216
6.1. DDR and Securitisation: From ‘Warlords’ to ‘Statesmen’.................. 218
6.1 .i. Forced demobilisation, 2000-2002.................................... 218
6.1.11. ‘Reintegration’..................................................................... 223
6.1.111. Desecuritisation and the politics of forgetting.................... 227
6.2. Re-securitising the Tajik-Afghan Border: three performances............ 231
6.2.1. International Security/Community........................................ 233
6.2.11. Tajikistan’s National Security/Community......................... 236
6.2.111. Central Asia’s Regional Security/Community...................240
6.3. ‘Border Management’: Simulating and Dissimulating Sovereignty.... 242
6.3.1. International Assistance to Border Management.................. 243
6.3.11. Simulating Sovereignty........................................................247
6.3.111. Dissimulating Sovereignty..................................................250
Conclusions................................................................................................. 257
7. Development and Decentralisation: Livelihoods and ‘Community’....................259
7.1. Democratising the Mahalla or Mahallising Democracy?....................262
7.1.1. Development, ‘Decentralisation’ and Peacebuilding............ 263
7.1.11. Establishing self-government...............................................267
7.1.111. Community decision-making.............................................. 270
7.1.iv. Conducting projects.............................................................272
7.2. Peasants, Migrants and Elites: Re-/De-territorialising Livelihoods.... 278
7.2.1. Re-territorialising peasants....................................................278
7.2.11. De-territorialising migrants.................................................282
7.2.111. The inter-dependence of territory and space...................... 285
7.3. Mediating ‘Community’: Monitoring and Evaluation Stories..... 287
7.3.1. Quantifying success.............................................................. 288
7.3.11. Narrating ‘success stories’................................................... 295
7.3.111. The discursive mediators.................................................... 298
Conclusions................................................................................................. 302
8. Conclusions and Implications................................................................................304
8.1. On Tajikistan’s Peace: objections and qualifications.......................... 305
8.2. On Complex Legitimacy: inductive insights........................................ 308
8.3. Peacebuilding, Politics and Ethics........................................................312
Final Remarks..............................................................................................315
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................... 316
Appendix A.......................................................................................................................... 342
Appendix B.......................................................................................................................... 344
6
ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS
Mark Hoffman has provided consistent encouragement and support for my ideas 
throughout this project. His interventions between the two warring factions -  myself 
and the thesis -  broke new ground in effective third-party mediation. The wider LSE 
community provided me with a dynamic environment for open debate and critical 
analysis. My understanding of space and discourse in international politics developed 
whilst teaching under Barry Buzan. I benefited from the questions, comments and 
historical and regional expertise of Roy Allison, Mick Cox, Jim Hughes, Margot 
Light, Gwendolyn Sasse and Odd Ame Westad among others. The members of the 
Conflict, Peace and Security Workshop were patient enough to tolerate and comment 
constructively on my earlier work. My understanding of critical social and political 
theory grew whilst among friends and colleagues of Millennium and my International 
Relations PhD class, in particular Antoine Bousquet and Douglas Bulloch. I was 
fortunate to be among a peer group of extremely able PhD students working on the 
postsocialist space including Stacy Closson, Steffi Ortmann, and Tome Sandevski. I 
received helpful comments from scholars of peace studies at the Kroc Institute o f the 
University of Notre Dame, where I have been able to get the thesis from first to final 
draft. Particularly insightful have been remarks from Scott Appleby, Jennie Burnet, 
John Darby, David Montgomery, Svetlana Peshkova and Peter Wallensteen.
I am profoundly in debt to the American University Central Asia (AUCA) in 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where I taught from 2001 to 2003. Countless colleagues and 
students provided invaluable comments, questions and responses. I particularly 
benefited from the perceptive observations and encouragement o f Gulnara 
Armanovna Aitpaeva, the advice and patience of Askat Dukenbaev, and the 
prodigious talents of Emilbek Juraev, Timerlan Moldogaziev and Burul Usmonilieva. 
Special mention must go to Bill Hansen without whose presence the Department of 
International and Comparative Politics would have been much less stimulating. Vika 
Lavrova was a talented colleague, whose intelligence, beauty and personality 
departed from us far too soon. Her remarkable mother, Valentina, ironed out my 
considerable errors o f Russian pronunciation and grammar. I pray that her family 
finds peace. The students o f AUCA are an astonishing community and provide the 
single biggest reason why the university was an exceptional haven o f critical inquiry 
in the region. My knowledge of Tajikistan was enriched by participants in my
7
directed reading class in 2001 and 2002, in particular Davlatsulton Dorgabekova, 
Shodi Abdulvasiev, Bakhtiyor Naimov, Boris Pilipenko, Muzaffar Suleymanov, and 
Zamira Yusufjonova. I was also privileged to supervise or read in its formative 
stages the studies of several honors students including those o f Said Akhmedov, 
Abdujalil Abdurasulov, Lena Rotoklya, Tolgonai Berdikiyeva, Anara Karugolova, 
and Nodira Inoyatova.
Across the region I was reminded of the extent of Central Asia’s diversity. In 
Kyrgyzstan, Anatoly Ulianchenko’s knowledge and love o f the mountains facilitated 
life-enhancing and -threatening experiences of Central Asia’s extremes. I 
experienced the events o f the ‘Tulip Revolution’ with many friends including Askat, 
Burul, Elnura, and Emil who battled to preserve human life and dignity whilst others 
battled for power. In Uzbekistan, I was privileged to receive the hospitality and 
protection o f the staff o f Mercy Corps in Ferghana, as many less fortunate souls died 
at the hands of fellow citizens and their own government in the neighbouring town of 
Andijon. These events endowed me with a sense of the dramatic immeasurability of 
events, a disdain for the term ‘expert’, an awareness of the privileges and the limits of 
the foreigner, and a realisation that we are all students o f Central Asia. I am in debt 
to numerous colleagues who have affirmed that genuine expertise demands a 
willingness to listen to the voices o f others. These include, amongst others, Christine 
Bichsel, Tim Epkenhans, Matteo Fumagali, Michael Hall, Alisher Ilkhamov, Morgan 
Liu, Anna Matveeva, Nick Megoran, Madeleine Reeves, Daniel Stevens, Chad 
Thompson, Stina Toijesen, Tomasso Trevisiani, Gert Jan Veldwisch and Gunda 
Weigman. In particular, I owe Nick and Madeleine a debt of gratitude for their 
important comments on the later versions of chapters.
My fieldwork in Tajikistan received supplementary financial support from the 
ESRC and the Cambridge Committee for Central and Inner Asia. I was invaluably 
supported by working, discussing and living with numerous colleagues and friends in 
Tajikistan. Research assistance was ably and punctually provided by Alexander 
Sadikov, Otabek Sindarov, and Bakhtiyor Naimov. Sasha’s insistence at our first 
meeting that he wasn’t interested in ‘just another project which asks young people 
about civil society’ was a breath of fresh air. The staff o f Mercy Corps in Dushanbe, 
Garm, Jirgatol, Tavildara, Khujond and Sharitz, were a pleasure to work with, 
especially Adrian, Amanda, Colin, Faiz, Faizali, Iveta, Jeff, Justin, Kevin, Mohira, 
Rustam, and Zebo. Daniel Passon and Rahmonali Bobokhonov at GTZ in
Dushanbe, along with the Davlatyor Jumakhonov and the staff of MSDSP in Garm 
were equally supportive. The staff of OSCE centres and UN agencies and 
institutions, particularly Bojidor Dmitorv, Suhrob Kaharov, Jan Malekzade and 
Suhrob Shoyev, were unfailingly generous. Together these relationships with 
international workers gave me a greater understanding of the particular ways in which 
the discursive practices of international peacebuilding depart from the formal 
discourses of donors. I benefited tremendously from the insights o f many local 
analysts including Rashid Abdullo, Jumahon Alimi, Turko Dinkayev, Muzaffar 
Olimov, Saodat Olimova, Ibrohim Usmonov and Mukhibullo Zubaidulloev.
The hospitality proffered by Cully and Julie, Jeff and Kate, Heather and 
David, and Ed and Ruth was so generous as to be almost Tajik. Special mention must 
go to numerous citizens of Tajikistan who made me realise the importance o f social 
(as opposed to political) life in the country. Bunafsha taught language and much 
more besides to my wife and me. Rustam’s ‘culture shock’ in the Rasht Valley 
reminded me that one doesn’t have to be foreign to feel on the ‘outside’ o f a 
community or nation, and of the profound differences between urban and rural life in 
Central Asia. Khairullo and the residents o f Kizil Ketmen gave me hope that 
international assistance could ‘work’ if  it was sufficiently reliant on local knowledge 
and experiences. Khurshed, Zarina and Parvina in Kulob welcomed my wife and me 
into their family and taught us the richness of Tajik home-life. The residents of 
Dombrachi truly affirmed that poverty begets generosity. The voters o f the Rasht 
valley’s routine enactment of ‘democratic participation’ provided me with the most 
vivid example o f how little elections actually matter to the course of everyday life in 
Tajikistan. These relationships and experiences enhanced this thesis and reminded 
me of it limitations as a product o f my own limited knowledge.
Finally, my close family and friends provided welcome reminders that there’s 
more to life than writing and research. The Twort family housed us in London for 
the first few months o f my time at LSE and offered both hospitality and friendship in 
abundance. My mum and dad, Pam and Dave, have been unstinting in their love, 
support, and desire to understand what on earth I ’m doing. They embody 
unconditional love. My sister, Helen, reminds me o f the importance o f not taking 
most things seriously. My family by marriage have been tolerant o f me taking their 
beautiful daughter away from them on jaunts overseas, and often provided vital 
practical and moral support. Finally, my wife Julia, has compensated for my failings
9
in so many ways other than merely being a keen editor and critic of my work. Her 
readiness to travel with me on my fieldwork made my experiences much richer and 
more reflective. Our soon-coming baby is the biggest incentive imaginable to 
complete and submit. It is to my family, in the many meanings of the word, that this 
thesis is dedicated.
10
PREFACE
I collected data for this study in five languages -  English, Russian, and Tajik, and, on 
a small number of occasions, Uzbek and Kyrgyz (the latter three largely through 
translation). I use textual examples from Tajik and Russian using the Library of 
Congress system to transliterate foreign words. In addition, I mark foreign text in 
italics. All words are Russian, except for words followed with [Taj.] which are Tajik. 
In cases o f commonly used words -  such as oblast, kolkhoz or mahalla - 1 do not use 
italics. These are translated in their first usage and clearly marked in the glossary.
Some informant names have been changed; sometimes at the request o f the 
informant, sometimes at my discretion (on occasions when I feel the way I am using 
the text -  e.g. to indicate dissenting comment -  might compromise an informant in 
their community). Such cases are clearly indicated in a footnote, e.g. ‘Interview with 
international official, Dushanbe, May 2005’.
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are verbatim. Where marked, they are 
transcribed and translated from recorded interviews. The transcripts and audio 
recordings of these interviews in their original language are held by the author for 
reference purposes. A list of interview transcripts can be found in Appendix A. 
Transcripts are referenced in in-text format with the transcript number indicated by 
square brackets, e.g. (Alimi[Tl]). Other quotes are taken from documentary sheets, 
questionnaires, or hand-written notes of interviews. These were used when tape- 
recording was refused by the informant or was impossible due to technical problems 
or excessive background noise. The original sheets or notes are also available for 
reference.
Press sources are cited with abbreviated references. A list o f sources and 
abbreviations thereof can be found in Appendix B.
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GLOSSARY OF TAJIK AND RUSSIAN TERMS
aksakal [Taj.] 
avlod  [Taj.] 
avtoritet 
biznezmeni 
brigadir 
choihona [Taj.]
dekon [Taj.] 
edinstvo 
goschinovnik 
gosstruktura 
khashar[ Taj.] 
Hizb-ut Tahrir [Taj.] 
khukumat [Taj.] 
khukumati rais 
jamoat [Taj.] 
jangsollor [Taj.] 
kishlak [Taj.] 
kolkhoz 
kommandiri
kompromat
krisha
mahalgeray  [Taj.] 
mahalla [Taj.] 
mahallinski komitet 
Majlisi Oli [Taj.] 
mirostroitelstvo 
mirotvorchestvo 
mullo [Taj.]
nomenklatura 
oblast 
pluralizm 
rais [Taj.] 
raiyon
raznoglasiye
lit. ‘white beard’, term used for village chief or elder
patriarchal extended family
‘authority’
‘businessmen’
foreman, brigade-leader of collective farm
lit. ‘teahouse’, often also functions as a mosque and community 
centre in Tajik villages
peasant, farmer
‘unity’
‘state servant’, civil servant 
‘state structures’, state administration 
communal labour 
Party of Liberation
‘executive organ’, local administration of district or province 
head of the local executive
first level of local administration, literally ‘community’ 
‘commanders’, ‘warlords’
‘village’, ‘settlement’
collective farm, originating in the Soviet era
‘commanders’, used to refer to the military commanders of the civil 
war period
‘Compromising materials’ held against another person
lit. ‘roof, used to denote cover or protection against punishment
‘regionalism’ (Mestnichestvo [Russ.])
used to refer both to the local neighbourhood and its leadership 
‘mahalla committee’, term used to describe community leader ship 
Tajik parliament
‘peacebuilding’ (an elite discourse of ’peacebuilding’) 
‘peacekeeping’ (lit. ‘peacemaking’)
‘mullah’, clergyman or graduate of madrassa, usually head of 
mosque
the soviet-era elite 
province (Veloyat [Taj.])
‘pluralism’
‘head’, ‘boss’
administrative district (Nohiya [Taj.])
‘discord’
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tinji [Taj.] ‘peacefulness’/’wellness’ (a popular discourse of ’peacebuilding’)
sovkhoz state farm
splochonnost ‘cohesion’
spokoystvo ‘peacefulness’, ‘calmness’
stabilnost ‘stability’
vlast ‘power’, ‘government’
zastava border command post
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UNMOT........ United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan
UNODC.........United Nations Office for Drug Control
UNSC............ United Nations Security Council
UNTOP..........United Nations Tajikistan Office o f Peacebuilding
USAID...........United States Agency for International Development
UTO............... United Tajikistan Opposition
VO..................Village Organisation (established by MSDSP)
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IN T R O D U C T IO N
Studying Peace, Studying Tajikistan
Just as political science is about two problems -  the use of power and the legitimation of the 
use of power -  violence studies are about two problems: the use of violence and the 
legitimation of that use.
-  Johan Galtung (1990:291)
The relationship between space, identity, ideology and power still largely awaits investigation 
in the Central Asian context.
-  Nick Megoran (2004:759)
This is a thesis about why peace has held in Tajikistan. As such it seeks to address a 
question of theory as well as a question of empirical research. I reconcile these two 
aspects through a grounded theory approach which denies the deductive/inductive 
dichotomy. Throughout this process of research contextual insights from Tajikistan 
have informed my understanding of peace, whilst conceptual insights about peace 
have informed the questions I ask about Tajikistan.
Scope and Significance
This dissertation was inspired by two puzzles -  one empirical, one theoretical -  which 
provide the origins to my research questions and served as intellectual motivation in 
time when the depth or breadth of the endeavour seemed too much. Both puzzles 
reveal fascinating insights about how knowledge, power and ‘reality’ are produced.
The Tajik Puzzle
Tajikistan is a country at peace. To be more precise it is /?os/-conflict; its war, which 
began in 1992, has ended. However, no one seems to be able to explain with any great 
conviction or credibility how it got there, and particularly how and why it remains there. 
There is no single authoritative account on the civil war; there are no open academic or 
political debates over the whys and wherefores. Most of the military battles, human 
costs, and social and political implications are unknown or over-looked. Ordinary 
Tajikistanis are loath to dwell on the events of conflict. Their leaders merely repeat the
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mantras of peace and stability. Both leaders and citizens often reduce ‘peace’ to the 
June 1997 peace agreement between the government, under President Rahmonov, and 
the opposition, under Said Abdullo Nuri. Building peace here becomes the process of 
achieving and adhering to a formal agreement between leaders. Even those more 
sanguine about the bargains struck behind the scenes are prone to focus on the elite-level 
process for compromise (Barnes and Abdullaev 2001). As I was told by one Tajik 
political scientist, ‘John, it’s all about elites!’ This extremely thin description is then 
posited as an example which the world can learn from (contributions in Seifert and 
Kraikemayer 2003). However, one must ask: what is the world to leam? Are we to 
assume that a common interest, between elites and their followers, was attained and 
maintained throughout? Are we to imagine that a single idea or conception of peace is 
followed, or at least tolerated, by all? Are Tajiks of all ethnicities and ages bound by a 
single identity which shapes their consent to the state? The implicit and at times explicit 
answer to these questions by Tajikistan’s political leaders is in the affirmative -  that 
Tajikistan is united, it has overcome, it is sovereign. Such accounts have a tautological 
quality: we have peace because we have peace.
It is hardly surprising that such discourse seems inauthentic to practitioners 
and analysts o f international peacebuilding who have been sceptical about the 
durability o f Tajikistan’s peace (See Schoeberlein 2002; Lynch 2001; Hall 2002; 
Collins 2003; ICG 2001). Their alternative rendition o f the common peace has a 
distinctly neo-liberal orientation. International, English-language analyses have 
consistently seen peace (in Tajikistan) in terms o f a dichotomy where the peril o f  
further conflict can only be avoided through the promise o f  democratisation (Bertram 
1995; Sisk 2001; OSI 1999: 84).1 Yet Tajikistan’s experience with peacebuilding 
refuses to abide by this peril/promise dichotomy, as its peace has proved durable 
while its government has become increasingly authoritarian. I characterise this as the 
paradox o f  peacebuilding (Heathershaw 2005).
Analysts have proposed various partial explanations for this puzzle or 
paradox. ‘War weariness’ (Schoeberlein 2002), the effects of labour migration 
(Olimova and Bose 2003) and cultural passivity (Olimova and Bowyer 2002) are all 
suggested as reasons why Tajikistan remains without violence yet authoritarian. 
There may be some truth to each of these explanations, yet the success o f Tajikistan
1 Both Bertram and Sisk use ‘peril’ and ‘promise’ with respect to peacebuilding but in terms of the 
challenges it faces objectively rather than the dimensions contained within it as a discourse.
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in avoiding further war is more than a historical anomaly or a temporary reprieve, and 
the lack o f progress in democratisation more than a matter o f impatience with an 
inevitably long-term process. The paradigms used by internationals, leaders and 
citizens in Tajikistan are all faulty as they each fail to capture the character of 
Tajikistan’s peace. The approach I offer below is also not without error. However, I 
have come to realise in the process o f doing this research that popular and elite 
representations cannot merely be cast aside by the social scientist in favour o f better 
explanations based perhaps on economic networks or informal political institutions. 
Rather, a better explanation should take account of the work that discourses do -  their 
reductions, oversights, affirmations and negations -  in producing and reproducing 
social realities o f peace. It is this peace which internationals, elites and subordinates 
together make and remake. This raises questions of peace which go beyond the case 
of Tajikistan.
Fig.1: Topographical map of Tajikistan and neighbouring states2
Almaty
U Z B E K IS T A N
Kashgar
Takta Makan Desert
UADAKKSHAfl ^
2 Available from: http://www.untj.org/files/maps/Overview CA.jpg . accessed: 15/10/06
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The Peace Puzzle
Students o f international peacebuilding have become increasingly aware of how 
actually existing peace departs from the ideal posited in the discourse. A formal 
peace agreement in itself tells us little about how peacebuilding is practised, by what 
means it holds, and by what means it fails under conflict and the resumption of 
widespread violence. Indeed, the latter outcome is often the case as Arusha, Oslo, 
Dayton and countless other examples sadly testily (see Allen 1999). In other cases 
conflict between elites is merely frozen -  as in other post-soviet cases such as 
Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and various conflicts in Georgia (Lynch 2004). 
Even in cases such as Tajikistan where conflict is transformed -  in the sense that a 
return to war around similar issues is unthinkable for the foreseeable future -  the 
discourse of peacebuilding, based around a peril/promise dichotomy, seems to 
provide at best a partial and at times misleading explanation. It remains unconvincing 
and conceptually disappointing.
The concept o f peace has a much longer history. While peacebuilding, 
including the UN’s ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992), only entered 
policy-making and academic discourse following the end o f the Cold War, there is a 
much longer heritage to the concept o f peace. However, peace, like peacebuilding, is 
essentially both normative and analytic. In these terms Johan Galtung (1969) has 
made a profound and lasting if  problematic contribution to the study o f peace with his 
distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace. While negative peace marks the 
end of physical violence, it is positive peace which signifies the end of structural 
violence (1969: 183). Galtung’s work is replete with demonstrations as to how 
ostensibly peaceful societies -  including those of the liberal-democratic states o f the 
international community which export peacebuilding to post-conflict states -  are 
structurally and culturally violent (esp. 1975: 282-304). Critical analysts have 
shunned his positivist methods yet retained the radical impulse o f his definitions of 
positive peace extending it to include, for example, the emancipation of humanity 
from ‘interpretative violence against otherness’ (Patomaki 2001: 723-737), or the 
practising o f ‘communicative action’ which transcends power relations (Jabri 1996).
31 will continue to use ‘peacebuilding’ without quotes to denote discourse and ideal-type models. I 
will continue to use ‘building peace’ and ‘peace building’ without quotes to talk about how I 
understand the process of bringing order and ending violence as a product of contending discourse and 
practices.
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However, both traditional and critical conceptions of positive peace seem far 
removed from the lived experience of ‘peace’ in post-conflict places such as 
Tajikistan. At best, this lived experience is proximate to negative peace. Previous 
studies have argued that the praxis o f peacebuilding, by any definition, is weak and 
inconsistent (Lund 2003; Paris 2004; Junne and Verkoren 2005). Sambani and Doyle 
(2000) found a 43% success rate for the ending of widespread physical violence and 
just 35% for a second-order but still modest (by peacebuilding’s standards) task of 
establishing an accommodative political process with some degree of ‘political 
openness’, but short o f the establishment of functioning government, implying that 
widespread physical violence was more often ended by means alternative to 
peacebuilding. These messy products of peacebuilding interventions are problematic. 
Whilst the division between positive and negative peace has come to constitute the 
last word in both analytical and normative terms, it also seems to have shifted the 
study o f peace away from the ‘positive’ or productive functions o f negative peace: 
how structural and cultural violence emerges, how it is resisted and accommodated.4 
These questions remain valid. How does such ‘violence’ become institutionalised? 
How do beliefs act to justify it? How does it become legitimate? As Galtung notes in 
the quote cited above, legitimacy lies at the heart of the study of violence just as it lies 
at the heart o f the study o f politics (1975: 185). Surely, the study o f peace should 
address both violence and politics. In such a way, we can study peace in terms of 
legitimacy.
The distinct lack o f progress in the study of the concept o f peace (Richmond 
2005) is in marked contrast to debates around security prompted by the development 
of the Copenhagen school of security studies. Peace may benefit from a similar move 
into social constructivist or post-structuralist analysis (Debrix 1999; Fetherstone 
2000; Hansen 2006; Pugh 2003). In the following quote from Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde’s Security: a New Framework for Analysis, I have replaced ‘security’ with 
‘peace’ and ‘securitisation’ with ‘peacebuilding’ to convey what this might mean for 
the concept of peace.
4 In fact, Galtung explicitly stated he wished to avoid a preference of positive over negative peace, or 
vice versa, noting that ‘both values, both goals are significant, and it is probably a disservice to man to 
try, in an abstract way, to say that one is more important than the other’ (1969: 185).
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Whether an issue is a [peace] issue is not something individuals decide alone. 
[Peacebuilding] is intersubjective and socially-constructed: does a referent object 
hold general legitimacy as something that should survive, [...] and thereby get others 
to follow or at lest tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate? This quality is not held 
in subjective or isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of a discursive, socially 
constituted, intersubjective realm (Buzan et al 1998: 31).
The study o f this kind o f peace -  inter-subjective peace or, as I frame it, peace as 
complex legitimacy -  has been forsaken for too long. With this in mind, in this 
dissertation I seek to further our understanding of peace by investigating the case of 
post-conflict Tajikistan.
A Research Process
The focus of this dissertation is peace as complex legitimacy -  a discursive, political 
and spatial phenomenon with attributes of livelihoods, authority and sovereignty. In 
addition to the framework which I have constructed for this analysis, I also make 
reference to the framework adopted in peacebuilding, in terms of three core themes: 
the decentralisation o f powers; the development and consolidation o f political parties 
and elections; and security sector reform. Thus, I seek to analyse peacebuilding both 
on its terms and in terms of my contextual analysis of the case o f Tajikistan.
Research Questions
I started my research process with the following primary questions:
■ Why does neo-liberal peacebuilding cultivate ‘negative peace’-  i.e. the 
absence of violence under authoritarian government?
■ Why has third party intervention in Tajikistan coincided with the re­
establishment o f authoritarian government despite being designed to promote 
democratic institution-building?
Through the process o f research over the last three years these basic questions have 
remained although they have spawned more specific research questions. These 
questions have led to the use of fundamental concepts such as ‘discourse’, ‘space’ and 
‘politics’ -  each o f which need some elaboration. Rather than providing a list of 
questions or definitions at this stage, I will explain the secondary questions,
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theoretical concepts and terminology which I use as they are introduced through the 
dissertation.
Theoretical Approach
This dissertation is a work based very broadly in social constructivism yet its more 
precise methodological approach was largely determined by my experience in 
context. I began my research with a clear focus on the informal institutions of 
peacebuilding. This approach seemed appropriate as it avoided the formalism of 
peacebuilding doctrine and, moreover, began the process o f linking conflict analysis 
to political analysis. However, over time I realised that it was the public and private 
representations of ‘peace’ which were central to any analysis o f how it plays out. I 
became clear that the informal institutions of Tajik politics are endowed with 
symbolic and normative dimensions which serve to legitimate otherwise querulous 
practices. Consequently, discourse analysis became central to my work. I understand 
discourse broadly in terms o f Foucault’s ‘discursive formation’ -  an order or ‘system 
of dispersion between objects, types of statement, concepts or thematic choices’ 
(1974: 38). While this definition demands textual analysis, such analysis must be 
sensitive to the wider dynamics of social and political order. My approach seeks to 
grasp the larger intersubjective context where, ‘meaning and practice arise out of 
interaction,’ and ‘within which moves of one kind or another would be seen to be 
reasonable and therefore justifiable’(Fierke and Jorgensen 2001: 117,125). This 
requires a study of the mimetic processes whereby ‘the individual assimilates himself 
or herself to the symbolic world (Gebauer and W ulf 1995: 2-3), through the creation 
and practising of texts in everyday experiences (see figure two). Thus, my approach 
to discourse involves, where possible, ethnographic explorations of wider private or 
hidden, often oral, practices. Equally, an understanding o f the (global) political 
context, I argue, is essential to critical research in peace studies.
Little research has been done from a discourse analysis perspective in peace 
and conflict studies and thus the researcher is advised, even required, to venture to 
disciplines far and wide whilst trying to make sense o f peacebuilding. I have 
digressed into the literatures of political sociology, social anthropology and critical 
international relations in an inductive theory-building process. The diverse insights 
o f David Beetham, Lene Hansen, James C. Scott, and Cynthia Weber inter alia have
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been o f central importance in developing my theoretical framework. Thus, my 
approach is unashamedly eclectic and will not satisfy theoretical purists who prefer 
thoroughbreds to mongrels.
Fig.2: Mimesis: construction and interpretation of symbolic worlds
Construction
i.e. creating texts, images, 
& sounds
Interpretation
i.e. ascribing meaning: 
creating concepts, or even 
...theories
Experience
i.e. selection of ‘facts’ of life
(Adapted from Flick 2002: 32)
Fieldwork Experience
The challenges o f designing a research process significantly comprehensive to assess 
multiple discourses and spaces of a complex political order necessitated investigation 
o f multiple ‘selves’ in numerous locations across Tajikistan. A gradual process of 
fieldwork over three years allowed me to spend a significant amount o f time 
comparing and contrasting data which emanates from these different spaces. Primary 
research was divided into two phases. The first phase involved three extended trips to 
Tajikistan between June 2003 and March 2005 where I made contacts and tried out 
certain entry points and data collection methods. This allowed my experiences in the 
field to feed back to my research design. The second phase from April-September 
2005, involved an intense six months of fieldwork across the country.
Depth versus breadth
Having lived and worked in Central Asia for most o f the last five years (largely based 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), I was able to gradually build contacts and a degree of
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familiarity with the country and region. Research was divided between the capital 
city, Dushanbe, and the regions. I did between 4 and 6 weeks o f research in each of 
the three regions I studied. Working in three regions, and many communities, I 
certainly felt like I was often sacrificing depth in favour o f breadth. However, this 
concern was mitigated by a number of factors. Firstly, I was able to revisit a number 
o f these villages more than once over many months and began to become very 
familiar with local characters and leaders.5 Secondly, as I spread my time across the 
country I began to appreciate the full extent of both similarities and differences across 
regions. On the one hand, I may have missed some o f this diversity had I not 
observed differences in lived experience of war and peace between, for example, the 
Uzbek areas of the North, or the Kulobi districts of the South. On the other hand, I 
may have been less confident of the common threads of issues such as labour 
migration and community governance had I not been able to see these diverse parts. 
Thirdly, I consoled myself that it is the task of the student of international relations, 
much to the chagrin of our more ethnographic colleagues, to consider breadth over 
depth -  to be ethnographic at the ‘international level’ o f foreign diplomats and aid 
workers, as well as gaining some insight into the ‘local level’ o f villagers.
Entry Points
While I took a broad geographical approach, I felt I was able to get into more depth 
by working and participating with international organisations at work in Tajik 
villages. As mentioned above, they often provided my entry point to the field but 
also provided opportunities for an ethnographic analysis o f the International 
Community. As a consultant, I was effectively a full-time member of staff for Mercy 
Corps for over 3 months, leading a four- to six-person research team in a formal 
evaluation of a major international programme.6 My experience as an election
5 For example, in Humdon village in the Rasht Valley, I first met village leaders whilst pushing 
stranded cars together on a snow-blocked road in February 2005; a few days later I observed the 
polling station and met the same leaders whilst observing the parliamentary elections with the OSCE. 
In April, I returned to the village when evaluating a community development programme there. In 
August 2005,1 cam back again to look at water management issues in the village with GTZ. All these 
occasions involved social contacts such as sharing tea or a meal.
6 My dual role -  as international employee and academic researcher -  presented ethical concerns. I 
was clear to explicate to interviewees my status, and what I would be using the information for, when 
taking testimony or chatting with them. With regard to the organisation, I gained permission to use the 
data collected for the organisarion. In one case (Mercy Corps) this was written into my contract, in 
other cases I gained permission informally ffoma senior person within the organisation.
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observer with the OSCE was another extremely rich participatory opportunity. 
Being given significant autonomy to design the research process in all except one 
case, I felt I was able to discern both the pervasive effect o f international discourses 
and find the autonomy to undertake my own independent research. Formal periods of 
participant observation with these organisations are detailed in figure 3 below. Other 
data collection took place independent of these organizations.
Fig. 3: Work with international organisations
Dates Organisation Activity Theme
[Chapter]
Regional
Location
June-July
2003
DfID Research on Small Arms issues 
and policy vis-a-vis international 
agreements
Security Sector 
[Chapter 6]
Dushanbe
Feb. 2005 OSCE
(ODIHR)
Election observation -  Tajikistan 
parliamentary
Political parties 
and elections [5J
Rasht valley
April -June 
2005
Mercy Corps Final Evaluation of Mercy Corps 
Community Action Investment 
Programme (CAIP)
Community 
Development [7J
Khatlon; 
Rasht valley
June-July
2005
Mercy Corps Internal Evaluation of Mercy 
Corps Peaceful Communities 
Initiative (PCI)
Community 
Development [7]
Sughd
July-Aug.
2005
AKDN/GTZ Assessment of Water Usage 
Associations
Community 
Development [71
Rasht valley
Data Sources and Methods o f Collection
Most of the data I collected was discursive and oral. Interviews of various kinds, 
group and individual, were semi-structured in order to achieve a certain amount of 
focus on the topics in hand. However, I allowed interviewees to speak freely, using 
their own language and forms of expression, attaching their own interpretations and 
meanings, and describing examples of their practices in terms they felt comfortable 
with. Such interviews were conducted at all levels o f Tajik society from ministers in 
the capital to peasants in villages. Textual data was supplemented via observations of 
international programmes and the use o f photographs and a fieldwork diary to record 
images and observations to provide context to what was said or written. Whilst the 
analysis o f data has focused on qualitative approaches to discourse analysis and 
participant observation, it has also involved limited quantitative measurements of 
survey data.
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Research Ethics
The issues which I addressed in my research were sensitive and at times this has 
required that I have used testimonies confidentially to avoid revealing the source (see 
Preface). The larger ethical issue which I confronted in my work was that o f my 
intrusion into Central Asian cultures -  an intervention which was often inseparable 
from the specific practices o f international actors which I describe in this dissertation. 
As Robben and Nordstrom comment,
We depart for the field bowing under the weight of our own culture, propped up and 
propelled by Western assumptions we seldom question, shielded from the blaze of 
complex cultural diversity by a carefully crafted lens of cultural belief that 
determines as much as clarifies what we see. When we purport to speak for others, 
we carry the Western enterprise into the mouths of other people. No matter our 
dedication, we cannot escape the legacy of our culture (Robben and Nordstrom 1995: 
11).
I do not wish to claim that I was able to transcend my cultural perspective but rather 
that I was prepared to acknowledge and seek to better understand this reflexivity. In 
doing so I have sought to represent the voices of others; but these are still my 
representations.
Finally, I was fortunate to experience two momentous events in neighbouring 
countries that helped put Tajikistan’s ‘stability’ in comparative perspective. I 
witnessed violence, looting and gunshots whilst on fieldwork, but not in Tajikistan. 
Staying in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005,1 witnessed the uprising or ‘revolution’ which 
removed the government of Askar Akayev following parliamentary elections which, 
while fraudulent, were considerably less rehearsed than those I had observed in 
Tajikistan. Secondly, on 13 May 2005,1 was evacuated from the town o f Ferghana in 
Uzbekistan following a prison break-out and uprising in the nearby town o f Andijon 
which was put down by the government to the cost o f many hundreds of its citizens’ 
lives. These events served as reminders o f the contingent nature o f political order, the 
dynamic nature o f legitimation and delegitimation, and the precariousness o f peace.
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PART ONE
Investigating Peace as Complex Legitimacy: a grounded approach
Introduction
This first half of the thesis interweaves conceptual and contextual insights to derive 
an approach to peacebuilding in terms o f complex legitimacy. Chapter One 
considers the international, English-language literature o f international peacebuilding, 
charting its development as hegemonic discourse in terms of three contending and, at 
times, conciliating tracks; democratisation peacebuilding, humanitarianism and 
statebuilding. With reference to a growing critical literature on international 
interventions, it then argues that these hegemonic models are adapted in context by 
local actors. It is these adaptations which constitute the nature o f peacebuilding in 
practice. In Chapter Two, I introduce the specific peacebuilding case o f Tajikistan, 
via an historical survey o f war and peace, and provide a descriptive overview of the 
major social and political developments between 2000 and 2005. I also review 
historiographically the more insightful academic literature on Tajikistan -  texts which 
highlight hegemony, legitimacy, and/or spatial complexity. Chapter Three elaborates 
complex legitimacy as an alternative conceptual approach to peacebuilding, in terms 
of its three dimensions of discourse, politics, and space. I go on to outline a 
constitutive framework o f complex legitimacy with three ‘levels’; global, elite and 
subordinate. In Chapter Four, I identify these spatial and discursive ‘levels’ in the 
case of Tajikistan: international peacebuilding, elite mirostroitelstvo, and popular tinji 
[Taj.]. In this complex material and representational environment, I find that 
processes o f legitimation (building peace) are made in inter-textual relations between 
discourses.
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CHAPTER ONE
Peacebuilding: towards the common peace?
Although Francis Fukuyama’s thesis on the ‘end of history’ quickly fell into disrepute, we still 
silently assume that the liberal-democratic capitalist global order is somehow the finally found 
‘natural’ social regime; we still implicitly conceive of conflicts in Third World countries as a sub­
species of natural catastrophes, as outbursts of quasi-natural violent passions, or as conflicts 
based on fanatical identification with ethnic roots.
Slavoj Zizek (2000:10)
How is peace built? Why does a negotiated compromise between parties hold 
following the formal implementation of a peace agreement? These are demanding 
questions addressed in this dissertation. The dominant answer to them is provided by 
the concept o f peacebuilding. This chapter seeks to go beyond normative accounts of 
post-conflict peacebuilding by identifying it as a discourse o f problem-solving which 
represents a neoliberal peace, and via an exploration o f the nature of hegemony open 
up the complexities and contingent possibilities of this process. It seeks to re­
examine international peacebuilding as found in the global spaces o f the
n
‘international community’ -  an emerging identity-group in world politics.
Peacebuilding is an over-worked yet under-developed idea. Lund argues that 
a unified understanding has emerged which is ‘an overarching multidimensional 
concept o f peacebuilding’ (2003: 13). Yet the practice remains ‘a huge, hopeful 
experiment whose results are not clear’ (ibid: 16). Much verbiage is expended in an
O
attempt to define it in sufficient breadth. Ball, for example, remarks that 
peacebuilding ‘requires that conflict resolution and consensus-building shape all 
interactions among citizens and between citizens and the state’ (2002: 37). However, 
despite being used to mobilise significant volumes of resources for increasingly 
intrusive third-party interventions, peacebuilding as a concept remains little more 
than a composite of problem-solving strategies -  a form of praxis rather than a theory 
or concept. Surveys o f the literature typically shy away from political analysis and 
often conclude with a re-statement of fundamental questions about peacebuilding’s
7 Hereafter the idea of ‘international community’ will be capitalised to International Community to 
convey its centrality as an identity signifier in peacebuilding discourse.
8 See Boutros-Ghali (1992); for a wideners’ perspective see Haugerudbraaten (1998); for a reformist 
perspective see Lund (2003); for a more radical perspective see Bendana (2003).
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practices and effects (See Gawerc 2006). Buzan’s critique that peace ‘has failed to 
generate a comprehensive alternative approach to the study of international relations’ 
remains valid (1984: 109-125). Moreover, in Robert Cox’s terms, peacebuilding 
discourses are problem-solving discourses. Cox notes,
Problem-solving theory focuses on existing frameworks of institutions, social 
relations and social meaning, which are often taken for granted, with the goal of 
sustaining this order to make it work efficiently. Critical theory starts by 
problematising this given framework or social order with the aim of considering its 
origins and how it might be changed, clarifying possible alternatives, and providing 
insights into ways of transforming it (Cox 1996: 88).
Cox’s approach was first applied to the study of peace operations by Fetherstone 
(2000). Her excellent article provides the inspiration for the analysis of 
peacebuilding as discourse in this chapter.
However, peacebuilding is more than an analytical device; crucially it is a 
discourse. As a discourse, it is ‘expressive’, in other words ‘a way to stand for and 
promote certain ideals’ (Lund 2003: 22). Therefore, at first sight, peacebuilding 
seems to be the very opposite o f Cox’s problem-solving which takes for granted 
existing frameworks; it is a normative approach to intervention which demands 
structural changes in post-conflict spaces. This dissertation argues that to go further 
we must look at the concept as a form of representation. It is variously both idealist 
and pragmatic, performative yet instrumental, and cannot be understood without 
reference to how its experiments have been and continue to be variously interpreted 
across space and time. However, these experiments are conceived in a particularly 
conservative and normalising fashion, where it is ‘the other’ of a conflict zone, rather 
than international structures, which must undergo change. It thus differs from foreign 
policy and security discourses which exclusively inscribe the ‘the other’ as enemy 
(Campbell 1992; Hansen 2006). Peacebuilding discourse simultaneously constructs 
the ‘enemy-other’ (of the past, fundamentalist ethics and ethnic identity) and an 
‘ideal-other’ (of the future, rationalist ethics and civic identity). This ideal-other is 
similarly reproduced via the ‘us’/ ’them’ boundary where ‘they’ should become what 
‘w e’ imagine ourselves to be. This act o f inscription provides meaning, credibility 
and even legitimacy to interventions. It constructs both ‘us’ and ‘them’ in terms o f an 
ideal-other with ethical, temporal and spatial dimensions (Hansen 2006).
I distinguish three ‘basic discourses’ which constitute ‘the main structural 
positions’ (Hansen 2006) within the debate in the International Community:
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(i) peacebuilding-as-democratisation (hereafter referred to as democratic 
peacebuilding),
(ii) peacebuilding-as-humanitarianism (humanitarianism),
(iii) peacebuilding-as-statebuilding (statebuilding).
This tripartite rendition of peacebuilding is broadly analogous to Banks’ three 
concepts o f peace; conflict management, justice and order (1987).9 Yet the three 
discourses do not stand apart but function interdependently o f one another. I will 
chart their ‘inter-textuality’ (how they constitute each other via their readings and 
writings o f one another [Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989; Hansen, 2006]) and inter­
subjectivity (how they constitute and are constituted by the textual and non-textual 
dynamics o f the International Community). These relationships frequently function 
dialectically to incorporate their differences into holistic strategies and models. I 
denote such inter-textual product or meta-narrative as pragmatic peacebuilding 
(denoted simply as peacebuilding). Thus, I argue that international ‘peacebuilding’ is 
ontologically a trinitarian discourse being three in one. In subsequent chapters I go 
on to discuss peacebuilding in both as both the sum and its parts. Here I outline the 
basic discourses which structure debates within the International Community.
The chapter is divided into three parts. Part one introduces the basic discourse 
of democratic peacebuilding which was developed by the United Nations, major 
donors and analysts in the immediate post-Cold War period. It shows how it is not 
just a practical model but represents peacebuilding as a process o f democratisation. 
Part two considers its two contending siblings, humanitarianism (prominent in the 
mid-1990s) and statebuilding (prominent post-9/11), and shows how they merge with 
and divide from democratic peacebuilding in contemporary international debates. It 
illustrates how contending representations are incorporated into a dominant meta­
narrative, pragmatic peacebuilding. The third part considers critiques of 
peacebuilding and mulls over the limits of its hegemonic power in a given local 
setting. It argues, with Debrix, that peace operations simulate a certain form of order, 
and, via Scott, that this simulation obscures ‘hidden’ practices o f exception. It is
9 In actual fact, Banks’ (1989) piece outlined four concepts including peace as harmony. This fourth 
approach has been excluded here as it does not characterise any approaches to peacebuilding within the 
international community. However, this fourth conception is relevant when the dissertation moves on 
to discuss local Tajik discourses of peace in chapter three.
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these exceptions which must be considered if we are to examine more broadly the 
social and political realities of peacebuilding.
1.1. Democratic peacebuilding: peace-as-conflict-management
The UN approach to ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ emerged amid a reawakening of 
liberal internationalist ideals in the international community in the aftermath o f the 
Cold War. However, the earlier concept o f democratisation can be considered its 
discursive cousin, sharing peacebuilding’s epistemological and ontological roots, and 
being hugely influential in its own right in informing international engagement with 
post-Soviet and post-colonial states.10 This link between peacebuilding and 
democratisation as well as development is explicit in the policy literature (Aklaev 
1999; Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Debiel and Klein 2002). Boutros-Ghali was no 
less totalising in a 1993 speech:
Without peace there can be no development and there can be no democracy. Without 
development, the basis for democracy will be lacking and societies will tend to fall 
into conflict. And without democracy, no sustainable development will occur; 
without such development, peace cannot long be maintained (1993, no pagination).
Peacebuilding texts reflect the holistic imagination of this approach and have served 
to broaden its application across dimensions (e.g. from the security sector to psycho­
social wellbeing) and deployments (e.g. from Mozambique to Tajikistan). Much of 
this literature is itself located within the liberal tradition set by Deutsch, Burton, 
Mitchell, Kriesberg and others (Banks 1987: 271). Reducing these approaches to 
their simplest and thus most promiscuous form, the discourse of peacebuilding 
presents a transition from war to peace via conflict managements techniques 
developed within a liberal-democratic environment.
1.1.1. Ethics: neoliberalism, democratisation and the New Agenda
An ideologically-informed ethical stance lies at the heart o f any form of 
representation, even one which claims to be pragmatic. In the case of democratic 
peacebuilding the ethics of neo-liberalism configure a particular response to violent 
conflict. Developing in tandem with George Bush’s hopes for ‘new world order’ and
10 See, Huntington (1991), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Przeworski (1991).
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with Boutros-Ghali’s aspirations to a stronger role for the United Nations, it was bom 
amid the latter’s Agenda fo r  Peace (AfP) in 1992. The ‘New Agenda’ for the UN 
emerged from a sense o f optimism engendered by the end o f the Cold War and its 
universally accepted ‘positives’: arms limitation and reduction agreements; the 
reunification o f Germany; the emergence of democratic governments in many 
countries o f Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union; the end of 
apartheid in South Africa. Furthermore, the UN Security Council sanctioned war 
against Iraq of 1991 seemed to suggest to some that a new era of liberal relations 
between members o f a genuinely global International Community might be possible 
for the first time in history.
Inspired by a reductive and teleologically informed reading of these events, 
the burgeoning optimism of the post-Cold War period was the defining force in the 
birth o f the concept o f peacebuilding. In the preface to Agenda fo r  Peace Boutros- 
Ghali exclaimed, ‘an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of 
the [UN] Charter -  a United Nations capable o f maintaining international peace and 
security’ (1992: i). A new parlance soon emerged to offer hope of a practicable 
model for this new-found enthusiasm and optimism. Along with concepts of 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, was the 
idea o f ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’. This involved, in explicitly pragmatic terms:
action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (1992: 11).
The UN Secretary General suggested a wide range of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ 
tasks including ‘disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration o f order, 
the custody and possible destruction o f weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and 
training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to 
protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and 
promoting formal and informal processes of political participation’ (1992: 32) Thus, 
despite its veneer o f pragmatism, from its outset, ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ was 
discursively linked to liberal democracy.
I use neoliberalism, in the sense used by Gill (1995), to characterise the 
ideological and ethical orientation o f peacebuilding. Neoliberalism arose as a 
disciplinary critique o f Keynesianism and state socialism and advocates liberal 
practices o f the economy, polity and society modelled on systems most often found in
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Western countries. It was bom in the field of economics in the work o f Milton 
Friedman and others o f the Chicago School of the 1960s. While it was deployed in 
the 1980s to adjust the management of the global economy and certain Western 
national economies, a new generation of economists began to advocate that such 
practices can be fomented in other parts of the world via international interventions 
and institution-building (Ong 2006). It thus developed from its disciplinary origins to 
a form of praxis, adjusted and adapted ‘pragmatically’ in context. Such approaches 
reflect a liberal-rationalist understanding of human affairs, one which embodies a 
universalist ethics. This outlook is conveyed paradigmatically by Francis 
Fukuyama’s End o f  History thesis (1992), a cmde version o f which is implicitly 
accepted in neoliberal practice. The international community’s concepts or 
‘technologies o f governing’ (Ong 2006) such as ‘structural adjustment’, ‘good 
governance’ and ‘civil society’ are bom out o f these ethics. What I call democratic 
peacebuilding has variously been associated by Paris with Wilsonian liberal 
internationalism, the colonial ‘mission civiliatrice’ and the liberal-democratic peace 
(Paris 2001 and 2002; Crocker et al 1997: 54-89). Bertram, for example, defines UN 
peacebuilding in messianic terms.
Designed to address the root causes of conflict, it entails building the political 
conditions for a sustainable democratic peace, generally in countries long divided by 
social strife, rather than keeping or enforcing peace between hostile states and armed 
parties (1995: 388).
Sisk asserts the ethical foundations o f this approach in unequivocal terms. ‘In sum’, 
he notes, ‘there is simply no more just or legitimate way to peacefully manage 
differences among contending social groups than democracy, however difficult it may 
seem to move from violent to electoral competition’ (2001: 786).
The ethics of peacebuilding have proved remarkably resilient in practice. 
Despite the difficulties encountered by UN operations in Africa and the former 
Yugoslavia in the early-1990s, the idea of peacebuilding retained its resonance in the 
international community. Peace operations, noted Boutros-Ghali in the 1995 
supplement to Agenda fo r  Peace, require ‘a deeper commitment to cooperation and 
true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before.’ However, ‘progress,’ 
he asserted, had been made with ‘no reason for frustration or pessimism’ but more 
‘confidence and courage’ on the part of the ‘international community’ (Boutros-Ghali
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1995: 103, 105). Thus, the answer to these critics seemed to be to do more o f the 
same. Consequently, peacebuilding was widened further to incorporate multiple 
agencies, organisations and agendas. Boutros-Ghali’s ‘post-conflict peacebuilding 
tasks’ initially focused on formal, structural change through the establishment of 
democratic institutions, protection of human rights and establishment o f the rule of 
law (1992). Ball’s survey goes further in detailing twenty-eight deficits or ‘priority’ 
tasks, which are ‘simultaneously critically important’ in order to establish ‘good 
governance’ (Ball 2002: 36-38; Miall et al 1999: 203). But it is simply incoherent to 
say that ‘all’ tasks are priorities. Such an approach depoliticises these tasks as 
universally present in a ‘war-torn society’, and so overlooks the power relations that 
underlie them. Those who claim to be pragmatic underestimate the discursive 
construction of what constitutes ‘challenges’ and ‘solutions’. Such representations 
postulate an ethical ideal-other which is implicitly understood in liberal-democratic 
terms.
1.1.iL Space: universalism and the International Community
Such denials of ethical stances or ideological persuasion, and assertions of 
pragmatism, seem barely credible unless we consider the claims made about space 
and time in peacebuilding. Indeed, in discourse, ethics become wedded to space as 
they are intrinsically connected to who we are and who they are. In some discourses 
space is understood in terms o f territory as in the discourses of the Balkans outlined 
by Hansen, or at least linked to a sovereign political space as in those o f American 
identity found in US foreign policy by Campbell. However, peacebuilding is 
different in that it is built around a specifically anti-territorial space and identity; the 
International Community, a ‘boundless political community,’ (Hansen 2006: 48) 
institutionalised most prominently in the UN. The idea o f the International 
Community has been vigorously contested and reproduced among state, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental actors since the end o f the Cold War. Its 
spaces of reproduction may lie more in a chain of airport lounges, secure compounds 
and capital city ex-pat social haunts than in any particular territorial configuration. 
While its neo-liberal ideas may find their origins in ‘the W est’, the international 
community explicitly seeks cosmopolitan symbols which wed East and West, North
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and South -  making global space.11 Democratic peacebuilding is deeply connected to 
this non-territorial identity. As in all forms of identity ‘w e’ are reproduced with 
reference to ‘they’. For the International Community ‘they’ represents the ‘conflict 
zones’ and ‘warring parties’ which require intervention or mediation to bring them 
into membership. Thus, although the International Community is non-territorial as 
such, its representatives have a proselytising zeal to expand to create space in these 
territories of the other.
However, in tracing International Community practices in the 1990s we find 
substantial resistance in practice. Peacebuilding was developed in the many UN 
peace operations o f the early post-Cold War years. Issues of state sovereignty were 
particularly contentious. The post-conflict peacebuilding agenda was institutionalised 
as the UN Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), a habitual element of UN discourse, 
and the key legitimating tool for a variety of economic, political and military 
interventions around the world (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999). Despite 
unprecedentedly strong mandates and high hopes, substantial difficulties were 
encountered in deployments as varied as Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda. Somalia 
perhaps provided the most high profile failure for the new agenda. The United 
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) had received a revised and robust mandate 
in 1992 under Operation Restore Hope (Ahmed and Green 1999:122). However, 
security quickly became the paramount issue for the mission. The US-led United 
Nations International Taskforce (UNITAF) was charged with peace enforcement and 
soon identified the priority of subduing warlords, in particular targeting Mohammed 
Farah Aidid. After eighteen US soldiers and an unknown number o f Somali fighters 
were killed in a 1993 raid against Aidid, the Clinton Administration eventually 
withdrew and placed strict limits on such multilateral intervention with Presidential 
Decision Directive 25. This led to the withdrawal of the United States from the 
position of security guarantor and the eventual expiration o f UNOSOM II.
The discursive mediation o f these events is illuminating. Despite fundamental 
problems, peacebuilders were able to reassert universal conceptions o f space and 
statehood over those arguments for the particularities of a given territory
11 The principle of the UN Secretary General being from a developing country, for example, or the 
policy of ‘equitable geographical distribution’ in the UN are maintained whilst members o f the 
Security Council have a substantial proportion of posts reserved for their representatives, usually 
seconded from foreign ministries. For a balanced discussion of these issues based on experiences as 
Under-Secretary-General in charge of Peacekeeping Operations see Goulding (2003: ch.l).
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(Heathershaw, 1999). For some analysts, including Ahmed and Green, it was the 
failure of international actors to engage with ‘civil society’ that was the problem. 
‘The central tenets of UN-brokered peacemaking,’ they noted, ‘are fundamentally 
different from local peace-making techniques employed in Northern Somalia’ (1999: 
124). For others, including Virginia Luling, UNOSOM’s was a problem of 
management and tactics: ‘a chronicle of muddle, waste o f resources, and pointless 
bloodshed, with the soldiers that had been welcomed as rescuers coming to seem to 
many o f the Somalis as invaders’ (1997: 287). Here the failure is characterised by 
‘us’ becoming like ‘them’ (Heathershaw 1999). However, such conclusions do not 
question the existence of peaceful pockets o f a spatial ideal-other. In both cases the 
idea o f the International Community is reaffirmed, either in terms of efficient state 
institutions o f conflict management (Luling 1997), or ‘civil society’ (Ahmed & Green 
1999).
1.1 ML Time: peacebuilding and progress
The universalism o f peacebuilding inevitably leads to teleological dogma. The 
discourse constructs a dichotomy where the peril o f further conflict (the temporal 
enemy-other o f the past) can only be avoided through the promise o f democratisation 
(towards the temporal ideal-other of the future). In this sense peacebuilding, clearly 
inspired by literature on democratic transition (Huntington 1991; O ’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991), presents a win/lose game with political leaders 
and their citizens standing at a junction with a choice o f two diverging pathways, one 
of which must ultimately be chosen. With a successful agreement, notes Rupesinghe, 
‘it is just one small battle that has been won, not the entire war’ (1998: 92). By 
extension, if  one battle has been lost this presents no necessary evidence that the war 
must be too.
While peacebuilding was seen to have an endpoint much further into the 
future, its starting point was imagined to begin with the entry o f the International 
Community. In the late 1990s, NATO’s Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia 
increasingly assumed sovereign responsibilities, while UN transitional authorities in
i  ^
Kosovo and East Timor took the form of provisional governments. It was assumed, 
spuriously, that in both cases, ‘the UN has stepped into a political and administrative
12 For discussion of international administration of post-conflict spaces, see Caplan (2002).
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vacuum’ (Griffin and Jones 2000: 82) -  there the spatial enemy-other is conceived in 
terms o f an absence o f these rational tasks of government. In consequence the UN has 
increasingly been called on to take a ‘nation-building’ or maximalist role -  asserting 
both the right o f sovereignty and duty of intervention. While the UN was often far 
from achieving this in reality, its quest to represent it led to calls for a political and 
administrative overhaul (ibid).
Importantly, the lengthening of peacebuilding as something which takes place 
over ‘generations’ creates greater confusion regarding the measurement o f its success. 
The re-articulation of democratisation to a longer-term perspective makes it 
increasingly unchallengeable as individual failures are subsumed under a broader 
meta-narrative of progress. A good example of this is the Human Security Report o f 
2005 which argues for the contribution o f the International Community -  in particular 
in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding -  to an improving human 
security environment:
Not one of the peacebuilding and conflict prevention programs on its own had much
of an impact on global security in this [post-Cold War] period. Taken together,
however, their effect has been profound (Mack 2005: 9).
One could argue that it is via ideology of the purest kind that the sum of these rather 
unpromising parts somehow mystically become a cause o f (rather than a correlation 
with) an overall reduction in the incidence of conflict. A teleologically-informed 
notion o f progress is intrinsic to neo-liberal discourse.
1.2. Variations upon a theme: justice versus order
The ethical, spatial and temporal orientations of democratic peacebuilding are to a 
large extent shared by two further discourses; those of humanitarianism and 
statebuilding. Indeed, the inter-textual relations between the three are so voluminous 
that it is difficult to separate them for the purpose o f analysis. Both humanitarian and 
statebuilding discourse conceive of the temporal ideal-other much further into the 
future. Dramatic failures in peace operations in the 1990s led to a growing consensus 
regarding the need to extend the time period required for successful intervention and 
retain the idea o f progress. However, while there is a great deal o f overlap between 
the discourses, statebuilding and humanitarianism offer contrasting emphases in terms
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o f space, and contending ethical stances of order and justice. While in the 1990s, the 
international community rushed to ‘civil society’ as an engine o f social justice, in 
recent years -  particularly since the launch of the ‘war on terror’ -  ‘statebuilding’ has 
gained new currency among many in the international community, particularly the US 
Government. In such a way the subject and object of peacebuilding are contested in 
discourse.
1.2.L Humanitarianism: peace-as-justice
Peace as justice has traditionally been articulated by radical theorists in contrast to 
peace as order (Bendana 2003: 18). Galtung’s (1975) work on positive peace, as well 
as other foundational peace studies work such as Azar’s concept o f ‘protracted social 
conflicts’ (1990) and Burton’s ‘deep-rooted conflicts’ and ‘basic human needs’ 
(1987) have contributed to the peace as justice tradition. A traditional division in the 
field between psycho-social and structural peacebuilding work has been ameliorated 
in recent years as exponents of a justice approach, such as Galtung and Lederach, 
have incorporated a conception of psycho-social healing into their work (Gawerc 
2006: 438). Thus, they have come to focus on ‘relationship’ (Lederach, 1997) or 
‘people-to-people’ peacebuilding (Gawerc 2006). Two commensurable peace-as- 
justice orientations remain hugely influential in the development o f conflict resolution 
theory and practice; Christian humanism and secular humanitarianism. They are 
comparable in their presentation of the subject as victim, a largely or essentially 
benign figure in need o f assistance.
Religious groups, including those of a Christian or Gandhian hue, are often 
among the primary actors in peacebuilding projects (See Miall, Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse 1999: 41). Foremost among the exponents of this Christian humanitarian 
perspective is John Paul Lederach, who acknowledges that his ideas arise from an 
Anabaptist/Mennonite religious-ethical framework (2003). In his work, Lederach 
puts at the centre the individual human being in relationship with others (1997: 17). 
He defines this process as the transformation of ‘conflict toward more sustainable, 
peaceful relationships’ (p. 20). Such relationships, according to Lederach, are held 
together by four ‘social energies’ -  Brother Justice, Sister Truth, Brother Mercy, and 
Sister Peace. This represents an understanding of peace which he takes directly from
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Psalm eighty-five.13 Lederach frequently uses biblical verses and references as the 
inspiration for his writing and reconciliation activities. Rather than advocate grand 
strategies or institutions, Lederach recommends the creation o f social spaces of 
reconciliation (p. 29). Such spaces are brought about in part by the deliberate action 
o f peacemakers and in part by a divinely inspired meeting of minds which is explored 
in most detail in his latest work, The Moral Imagination. ‘Transcending violence,’ he 
contends, ‘is forged by the capacity to generate, mobilise, and build the moral 
imagination’ (2005: 5). Moral imagination is defined as, ‘the capacity to imagine 
something rooted in the challenges of the real world yet capable of giving birth to that 
which does not exist’ (p. 29). Such Christian humanism conceives of the ideal-other 
as local communities or the ‘grassroots’ where transformation towards new, more just 
and merciful relationships, takes place over generations not years. It has spawned 
numerous peacemaking interventions at a local level, particularly from Christian 
peace churches.
The contribution of Christian non-violence is downplayed in contemporary 
secular practice which takes place across a variety of, often multi-faith, contexts. 
However, these religious foundations arguably provide the genealogical roots to the 
values and moral zeal to peacebuilding which, while often unacknowledged by 
secular practitioners, is reflected in its evangelical character and ethics. Much o f both 
Christian and secular humanitarian writing represents the means of engagement in 
peacebuilding as being through ‘civil society’, which is ‘glocal’ (global and local) in 
character (Carnegie Commission 1997: 9).14 The idea o f ‘global civil society’ acts to 
limit the spatial distance between donor and recipient by simulating the existence of 
essentially similar groups, with essentially similar problems and motivated by 
essentially the same values, all over the world. It thus represents diversity in the 
International Community and actively fosters a cadre of polyglot cosmopolitan 
peacemakers. Moreover, the concept is imbued with a ‘critical’ quality, conjuring up 
an image o f the Habermasian public sphere promoting equitable debate and holding 
government to account. Humanitarianism is most strongly represented by the 
international NGO community with its centres in London and New York.
13 Psalm 85 (King James Version) reads: ‘Truth and Mercy have met together, Justice and Peace have 
kissed’. See Lederach (2001).
14 The Carnegie Commission (1997) was one of the first major reports to suggest a key role for ‘civil 
society’ in conflict prevention, arguing for the strategic advantage of non-governmental actors in 
becoming aware of and responding to conflict.
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Humanitarianism, and its subject of civil society, has proved a popular 
alternative with donors when state-centred approaches have fallen out of favour. The 
high-profile failures o f the early-1990s in Africa and the Balkans, led to substantial 
criticism of the UN and third-party intervention more generally (See Barber 1997; 
Luttwak 1999). Within the International Community such criticism has been 
absorbed and, for many, led to an increased interest in ‘civil society’ approaches 
through NGOs. If  the danger was that through heavy-handed state-led intervention 
we may be seen as invaders and thus risk becoming like ‘them’, the solution is found 
by locating and working with ‘they’ who are like ‘us’. Such people and 
organisations, it was increasingly imagined, were found among ‘civil society’ rather 
than ‘states’. Thus, as I have explored elsewhere, the negative experiences and 
‘lessons learnt’ of Rwanda and Somali led to attempts to engage more at the 
‘grassroots’, with ‘civil society’, and avoid ‘state-centric’ approaches (Heathershaw 
1999). Suddenly ‘multi-track diplomacy’15 and ‘local capacities for peace’ 
(Andersen 1999)16 became en vogue in international discourse. Much o f this 
literature was pulled together by Kaldor (2001) to make a distinction between ‘new’ 
and ‘old’ wars.17 New wars require new approaches, it is argued, at the level o f ‘civil 
society.’
The elasticity o f the idea of ‘civil society’ brought humanitarian peacebuilding 
into the mainstream. This was exhibited in an emphasis on the role of the military in 
humanitarian operations from the mid-1990s (See Slim 1996), and the massive 
expansion of the role of international NGOs and their local sub-contracting partners 
in post-conflict settings (Heathershaw 1999: 13-15). However, the relational 
character o f peacebuilding found in Lederach’s work remains only notionally in much 
work to build civil society as contextual approaches are usurped with generalisable 
models focused on SMART targets. Such models deprive civil society o f its political 
potential. The contextual/communitarian versus universalist/cosmopolitan debate was 
recast in international discourse, in terms of transnational versus international (or, 
more accurately, inter-state) conceptions of universal space. The spatial ideal-other
15 For a specific discussion of the need for multi-track approaches in Africa, in the light of Rwanda and 
Somalia see Cousins (1996). For advocacy for multi-track diplomacy in general see, Crocker et al 
(1999).
16 Andersen’s approach became very popular in policy communities and spanned numerous policy 
papers seeking to operationalise its approach for NGOs. See, European Platform (1999).
17 For a critique of Kaldor’s dichotomy see Kalyvas (2001).
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of ‘global civil society’ underpins the humanitarian conception o f transnational space. 
In its most critical forms humanitarianism demands the taming o f power politics for 
humanitarian ends as in Kaldor’s hope for a ‘robust peacekeeping’ where the key 
questions become ‘whether the capacity for regulating violence can be reinstituted in 
some way on a transnational basis and whether barbarism can be checked by an alert 
and active cosmopolitan citizenry’ (Kaldor 1998: 107-109).
The most significant recent text from a secular humanitarian perspective, 
which has explicitly challenged the mainstream democratisation approach’s 
ambiguity with regard to state sovereignty, is the Report o f the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P).18 Like statebuilding, humanitarianism represents sovereignty as 
conditional, and seeks to push the frequency, duration and extent of intervention 
beyond that implied by democratisation by including the responsibilities to prevent, 
react and rebuild (ICISS 2001: xi). However, it places emphasis first on the 
protection of the individual, rather than the constitution o f a system of sovereign 
states. ‘State sovereignty implies responsibility,’ the report notes in its first basic 
principle, ‘and the primary responsibility for the protection o f people lies with the 
state itse lf (p. xi). Furthermore, R2P determines the international space as one 
represented most legitimately by the United Nations rather than a state or states which 
claim to act on the part o f the ‘international community’ (p. 9).19 It demands a just 
cause based on the prevention of Targe scale loss of life’ and Targe scale “ethnic 
cleansing”,’ and adapts the principles o f Augustinian just war as the basis for military 
intervention (p.xii). This secular humanitarian thinking differs from the non-violence 
tradition represented by Lederach. It is an ethical ideal-other conceived o f in terms of 
the pursuit o f just ends.
Such assertions echo the approach of international aid agencies and especially 
the ICRC which lays claims to neutrality and impartiality in its interventions. 
Criticism of this stance has led humanitarian thinkers to restate ‘neutrality’ in terms
18 ICISS was established by the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrietien, in September 2000 in 
response to Kofi Annan’s challenge to the UN General Assembly to unite on the question of 
‘humanitarian intervention’ following the Kosovo military intervention of 1999. See Chandler (2004: 
60).
19 The commission in fact avoids using the term of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in order to respond to 
the concern of self-styled humanitarian relief agencies that the term humanitarian is being militarised 
by such military interventions.
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of ‘do no harm’ (Anderson, 1999). Baron notes that both versions represent a 
‘humanitarian ideology’ which produces a ‘nonsensical apolitical discourse’ (2004: 
no pagination). However, he goes on, far from being the antonym of politics, 
humanitarian neutrality ‘oozes politics’ in its call for a normative response in the 
name o f the vulnerable (ibid.). Humanitarians, he argues, should be prepared to 
make a political argument:
Humanitarianism exists because as humans we, or some of us, are not prepared to 
accept a world where suffering and basic human needs go unheeded -  humanitarianism 
is a normative project. Work intended to bring about a situation of reduced suffering is 
a political project because philosophically it involves a decision about what the good 
life ultimately involves (ibid, no pagination)
This problem is indicative of a tendency of humanitarian perspectives to reduce the 
political to the inter-personal via anthropocentric analogy. The ambiguity o f this 
‘good life’ is what gives humanitarianism its fungibility and breadth. However, the 
focus on justice for ther individual sets humanitarian peacebuilding apart fromother 
discourses of intervention. Gawerc, for example, after considering radical and 
political realist critiques o f ‘people-to-people’ peacebuilding, notes, ‘in many ways, it 
comes down to whether conflict groups trust each other with regard to the purpose of 
integrative/cross-cutting ties’ (Gawerc 2006: 461). Yet this reduction is a discursive 
move. Humanitarian peacebuilding is thus a (largely unacknowledged) political 
discourse for the protection and restitution of individuals and communities through 
civil society.
1,2AL Statebuilding: peace-as-order
Despite the growing strength o f the spatial ideal-other o f ‘civil society’ in the 
peacebuildign discourse of the mid-1990s, the International Community was 
reasserted in terms o f mutual recognition for state sovereignty. In apparent retreat to 
a minimalist reading o f peacebuilding, Boutros-Ghali reaffirmed, in the supplement to 
Agenda fo r  Peace o f 1995, that, ‘respect for [the State’s] fundamental sovereignty 
and integrity are crucial to any common international progress’ (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 
103, 105). Thus, the idea of a space of the International Community remained 
ambiguous, tom between transnationalising and internationalising trends.
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Advocates for state-building insist on the latter track, prioritising the pursuit 
o f the spatial ideal-other of the sovereign state, understood as part of a community of 
nation-states. This peace-as-order approach (Banks, 1987) eschews attempts to 
prioritise ‘civil society’ via a conservative or realist discourse o f politics. 
Explanations o f this kind o f incremental political development bear resemblance to 
those o f a further related body of literature -  that of modernisation. Modernisation in 
turn shares significant ground with democratisation and involves many o f the same 
theoreticians. Samuel Huntington in an earlier influential work, Political Order in 
Changing Societies, utilises an explicitly conservative understanding o f political 
development where modernisation is the institutionalisation o f power relations. His 
1968 study begins,
The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of 
government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy 
and dictatorship are less than those countries whose politics embodies consensus, 
community, legitimacy, organisation, effectiveness, and stability, and those countries 
where politics is deficient in these qualities (Huntington 1968: 1).
Such order-based explanations of change relegate social justice or wider political 
participation to matters of secondary importance. Modernisation as an approach to 
development is less popular today in the West than it was forty years ago. However, 
many similar ideas, and some of the same authors are popping up today to advocate 
an approach for ‘nation-building’ or ‘state-building’.
The enemy-other for this relocation o f peacebuilding is the ‘failed state’. A 
failed state, to state-builders, who are most often so-called political realists, is an 
environment much like international anarchy. Cohen et al’s influential article argued 
that the degree o f anarchy, or ‘the lower the initial level o f state power, the stronger 
the relationship between rate o f state expansion and collective violence’ (Cohen at al 
1981: 905). Hence ‘peace’ requires a state which is relatively strong and 
strengthening, illustrating the interdependence between ending violence and making
20 Although the consolidation of democracy (two turnovers) would seem to require wider political 
participation, democratisation -  according to Huntington (1991) -  can be considered successful short 
of such participation.
21 The futility of attempts to achieve a single, commonly accepted definition of the concept are 
illustrated here by the inability to even come to a single, commonly accepted name for it. On this point 
of the slipperiness of the concepts, thanks are due to Scott Kofmehl o f LSE whose draft dissertation 
chapter, ‘The limits and responsibilities of post-911 U.S. foreign policy in post-conflict state-building’, 
and subsequent discussions have informed this sub-section.
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states. The discursive development of ‘statebuilding’ and its subject o f the ‘failed 
state’ intensified in the early-1990s. Helman & Ratner (1993) and Zartman (1995) 
used the notion to explain the crises o f this period. In 1994, the CIA funded a multi­
year, multi-disciplinary research programme named ‘The State Failure Task Force’ 
(see Call 2006). Yet following the failures of the early-1990s, and the retreat of 
Supplement to Agenda for Peace, ‘state failure’ was cited less in the discourse. 
However, through the late 1990s it continued to have influence through the 
introduction of a security sector reform agenda into development, as discussed below 
(see Chanaa 2002).
In the twenty-first century statebuilding has enjoyed a second wind. As Call 
observes, it was the 9/11 attacks which, ‘drew attention to state failure, bring ‘failed 
states’ into the top tier of US security interests’ (2006: 20-21). This is an interesting 
example of how a pre-existing yet somewhat dormant signifier can be seized upon to 
explain a new and shocking political event and thus rise to underpin a new discourse. 
As a Republican presidential administration hit by an attack which it interpreted as 
emanating from a non-state network centred in Afghanistan sought to make sense o f 
what had happened and what might be the objectives of response, the notion o f ‘failed 
state’ became a convenient and flexible trope in the ‘war on terror’. The subsequent 
2002 National Security Strategy identified ‘failing’ states as a source o f insecurity 
and terrorism (USA 2002: 1). Thus the academic idea o f the ‘failed state’ has been 
incorporated in the grand narratives o f policy-makers, and the laboratory tests in 
Afghanistan and Iraq under the mantra of the ‘war on terror’ (See Khalilzad 2005; 
Tripp 2004: 545-558). In this context, statebuilding is often labelled as ‘nation- 
building’ (Chesterman 2004: 114).
By 2005, statebuilding and its analytical enemy- and ideal-others o f ‘failed’ 
and ‘sovereign’ states had risen to be the dominant theme of peacebuilding 
discussions and had developed a substantial academic, policy-making and even 
popular literature. The number of research projects aimed at identifying variables and 
‘measuring’ the capacity of the state or state sovereignty in quantitative and 
qualitative terms proliferated. Some authors seek direction from literature on 
democratisation (Call 2006: 20-21). One project measured state sovereignty with a 
quantitative index in order, to ‘allow an overall assessment to be made o f whether the 
multiplicity o f interventions by a wide array of international actors is closing or 
widening the sovereignty gap’ (Ghani at al 2005: 5). This notion of ‘sovereignty gap’
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exhibits an objective understanding of what the state should be. ‘As more states 
converge towards sustainable and endurable state structures,’ the authors note, ‘the 
commonality o f their goals and practices would also help to build trust among 
different states’ (p. 9). Such ‘objective’ conceptions o f the state bear much 
resemblance to the Western or neo-liberal model o f the sovereign state (p. 9).
The ethical ideal-other of statebuilding is ambiguous. Despite a conservative 
peace-as-order orientation, the emergence o f a contemporary discourse of 
statebuilding has sought to incorporate much o f the liberal ethics of peacebuilding-as- 
democratisation. This development is best understood in light o f the influence of 
‘neo-conservative’ ideas in the United States, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, and 
the meeting o f minds between ostensibly conservative and social-democratic 
administrations in the US and UK. For example, former US Ambassador to 
Afghanistan and current Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, defines US efforts in 
Afghanistan under this mantra as the effort to ‘establish a legitimate political process 
and rebuild state institutions’ (Khalilzad 2005: 1). Similarly, a recent book by 
Francis Fukuyama defines the process of statebuilding, defined as, ‘the creation of 
new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones’ (Fukuyama 
2004). Military force is seen as intrinsic to this process, as in Dobbins’ definition, ‘to 
use military power in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to 
democracy’ (Dobbins 2003-2004: 87). US government and military representatives 
have come to use the label ‘stabilisation and reconstruction’ to describe this process 
(Scowcroft and Berger 2005). In 2004, the Department o f State established a new 
Office o f the Coordinator o f Reconstruction and Stabilization to manage these efforts. 
This was endorsed by Presidential Decision Directive 44 in December 2005. 
Moreover, despite being a state-centred approach, statebuilding provides a paradox by 
offering an even stronger challenge to the principle o f non-intervention in domestic 
affairs than that implied by democratisation and humanitarian discourses. Respect for 
state sovereignty is thus contingent on the maintenance o f a political order where 
‘terrorists’ are suppressed. Statebuilding thus remains an extremely problematic 
discourse whose practices and ethics are constantly questioned by those who draw 
attention to how it encourages sectarianism and captured resources (Tripp 2004).
1.2AiL Inter-textuality, ‘pragmatism’ and peacebuilding
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While these three discourses are separable, performing differentiated temporal, spatial 
and ethical ideal-others, they are in no sense independent from one another. 
Humanitarianism and statebuilding, whilst articulated against one another, are both 
strongly interdependent with democratic peacebuilding. They are often explored in 
the literature on peacebuilding in terms of bottom-up and top-down dynamics based 
on, respectively, the concepts o f ‘civil society’ and ‘good governance’. For example, 
Prendergast and Plumb argue that, ‘there needs to be, alongside the top-down 
implementation of the peace agreement, concurrent bottom-up processes aimed at 
constructing a new social contract and healing societal divisions’ (2002: 327). Both 
humanitarianism, most notably through R2P, and statebuilding, through recent 
American writing on ‘nation-building’, have sought to refocus the subject of 
peacebuilding. However, in the policy-focused circles o f the international community 
the further clarification o f peacebuilding demands the hegemonic incorporation of 
contrasting orientations into a synthesised concept o f peacebuildng.
This process is both inter-textual and dialectical, where substantial differences 
are reconciled in the hegemonic representations of the international community. 
Indeed those involved in interventions explicitly disregard any theoretical bias or 
ideological bent to their work, claiming simply that it is pragmatic; an application of 
what works. The Brahimi Report of 2000, for example, attempted something o f a 
discursive re-joining o f military and humanitarian intervention through the notion of 
interdependent peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Accordingly, ‘force alone cannot 
create peace; it can only create the space in which peace must be built’ (UN 2000).
A more substantive example of the inter-textuality among basic discourses is 
found in the debate around Security Sector Reform (SSR). The debate had two 
stages. The first was the incorporating o f the language of security by non­
governmental actors into humanitarian discourse; this launched the concept o f SSR in 
the 1990s and made security a humanitarian issue. SSR thus became a conceptually 
credible representation of the hauling of security issues onto the humanitarian agenda. 
The German Development Assistance Agency (GTZ), with reference to the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), equated SSR with ‘guaranteeing human security’ 
as well as ‘national security’ — an approach which has also been adopted by the 
OSCE (Chanaa 2002: 27). Jeong, casts SSR as ‘public security’ -  ‘not only to control 
violence but also to solidify positive peace that centres on the protection of human 
dignity’ (2005: 74). The merging of security/development was a fleetingly powerful
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discourse. ‘Packaged so neatly,’ Chanaa notes, ‘it was easy to present, attracting not 
only attention, but also considerable material support’ (2002: 27). Moreover, the 
focus on governance made it an explicit part o f a neoliberal agenda on peace and 
development. The 2000 Disaster Assistance Committee report of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted that SSR involves ‘the 
transformation o f this sector so that it is managed and operates in a manner that is 
more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles o f governance’ (p. 28). 
Since 9/11, however, a second stage has ensued where SSR has been re-understood 
once more in terms of statebuilding where it can be achieved only via the 
development of strong central institutions.
Pragmatic peacebuilding: ‘In larger freedom ’
Similar attempts to incorporate the three discourses o f the International Community 
are prevalent in major international reports such as the Human Security Report (HSR) 
and R2P. The best example of this is the Report o f the UN High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility and 
the complementary ‘In Larger Freedom’ (ILF) agenda.
The report places the state as the primary subject of peacebuilding but 
maintains the ideal of the universal space o f the International Community, where a 
universal model of state sovereignty must be adhered to in order to preclude 
international intervention.
The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats 
recognise no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global 
and regional as well as national levels. No state, no matter how powerful can by its 
own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be 
assumed that every state will always be able, or willing, to meet its own 
responsibility to protect its own people and not to harm its neighbours (UN 2004: 1 
emphasis added).
While the report’s agenda included collective security in its broadest sense, one o f its 
headline conclusions was the proposal for a Peacebuilding Commission, ‘whose task’, 
wrote Kofi Annan in the foreword to the report, ‘would be to help states make a 
successful transition from the immediate post-conflict phase to longer-term
22 The phrase ‘in larger freedom’ derives from the UN Charter: that the UN was created, ‘to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights’ and ‘to promote social progress and better standards o f life in larger 
freedom.’
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reconstruction and development’ (UN 2004: ix). According to the report this requires 
member states o f the UN, ‘to be much more forthcoming in providing and supporting 
deployable military resources’ especially in sending ‘peace enforcement’ and 
‘peacekeeping’ troops to support peacebuilding (p. 5,70). It also entails a greater 
focus on the security sector and particularly demobilising combatants, ‘the single 
most important factor determining the success o f peace operations’ (p. 72).
This text represents an emerging peacebuilding meta-discourse which 
attempts to reconcile the various ethical, spatial and temporal ideals represented in the 
three discourses outlined above. As such the report seeks to please everyone -  both 
humanitarians who demand that the sovereignty o f the individuals must be placed 
above the sovereignty of the state, and statebuilders who believe that juridical 
sovereignty can be overlooked in the case of ‘failed states.’ It is thus highly 
interventionist. The Peacebuilding Commission is envisioned as a part o f the UN 
system in order ‘to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards 
state collapse’ (p. 83). ‘Today,’ the report notes, ‘we are in an era where dozens of 
states are under stress or recovering from conflict, there is a clear international 
obligation to assist states in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign 
functions effectively and responsibly ’ (emphasis added, p.83). If  institutionalised, the 
Commission would shift the UN further away from principles of sovereign consent 
and blur the distinctions between peacebuilding and peace enforcement. The report 
amounts to the clearest case for a two-tier system of sovereign states since nineteenth 
century advocacy for colonialism.
Such texts represent a discourse of pragmatic peacebuilding. This inter- 
textual construct obfuscates the distinction between humanitarian and military 
interventions which was at one time inviolable in the International Community. In 
this sense interventions such as Kosovo foreshadow pragmatic peacebuilding 
discourse, as captured in Beck’s notion o f it as an example o f ‘militaristic 
humanitarianism’ (Zizek 2000: 56-57). The irony that war is engineered in order for 
peace to be built is apparently lost on political leaders who are able to declare peace 
when embarking on war. Since Kosovo, many liberal public intellectuals have come 
to the defence o f such ‘humanitarianism’. Michael Ignatieff, for example, defends 
the use of military intervention and ‘imperial policing’, which he observed in 
Afghanistan, in an explicit advocacy of what he calls ‘Empire lite’ -  another idea 
which relies heavily on processes of inter-textual relations. He argues:
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Imperialism used to be the white man’s burden. This gave it a bad reputation. But 
imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes politically 
incorrect. Nations sometimes fail, and when they do outside help -  imperial power -  
can get them back on their feet. Nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in 
an human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of 
small nations to govern themselves and their own right to rule the world (Ignatieff 
2002: 26).
Such interpellation of discourses, where military-led statebuilding comes to be 
portrayed as humanitarian, and humanitarianism as necessarily requiring military 
intervention, illustrates the intense inter-textuality o f peacebuilding. It also indicates 
the hegemonic position of the International Community as a legitimate agent of 
diverse acts of intervention. By early 2006, three years into the Iraq war and ‘nation- 
building’ venture, ‘peacebuilding’ lives on but its essential quality is as hard to 
distinguish as ever. It retains a trinitarian character, being at times one 
‘peacebuilding’ and at times three (see figure 4).
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Fig.4: Summary of discursive development of peacebuilding, 1992-2005
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1.3 Critical discourses: peacebuilding and the nature of hegemony
Peacebuilding is increasingly challenged by critical discourses emanating largely 
from the academy. While these discourses have grown in popularity among students 
and academics they have had limited or no effect on the character o f any of the three 
discourses outlined above. This final section of the chapter briefly outlines these 
critical discourses before going on to explore the hegemonic character of 
‘peacebuilding’, and the nature o f alternatives and resistance. It sets the stage for 
chapter three where the nature of ‘peacebuilding’ under hegemony is explored.
1.3.L Moderates and radicals
Critical discourses on peacebuilding have sought to highlight its liberal bias, but 
have been divided between moderates and radicals on how to respond.
The Moderate Critique: the liberal bias
It is readily apparent that peacebuilding as an analytical concept is ‘elastic’ (David 
1999: 25-41) or even amorphous. The application of liberalisation of both the 
economy and political system to post-conflict spaces takes place without substantive 
empirical evidence of success. In this vein, ten years after Boutros-Ghali’s seminal 
Agenda fo r  Peace, Lund argued for an evaluation and consolidation of existing 
approaches to peacebuilding.
A line needs to be drawn between peacebuilding and maximizing the various 
levels o f social, economic and political development possible in a given 
society. Otherwise, if the term peacebuilding becomes a synonym for all the 
positive things we would want to include in development in order to reduce 
any and all o f societies’ ills, it becomes useless for guiding knowledge 
gathering and practical purposes (2003: 28).
Paris, in a widely cited article, ‘Wilson’s Ghost’, argued that peacebuilding is guided 
by the doctrine o f liberal internationalism while ‘transplanting western models o f 
social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states’ (Paris 1997: 
56). In a later paper (2002) he portrayed peacebuilding actors as pursuing a ‘mission 
civilisatrice’, making an explicit parallel to colonial claims to legitimacy. A 
standard operating procedure for liberalisation -  involving competitive elections and
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a reduced role for the state in the economy -  was adopted, with very modest success 
and many setbacks, in all fourteen cases reviewed by Paris in his book, At War’s End 
(2004). His work contributes to a weight o f evidence suggesting that actual post- 
conflict cases can rarely be made to fit the criteria for successful peacebuilding (See 
Doyle and Sambani 2000). He found that interventions had generated ‘unforeseen 
instabilities’ and ‘destabilising side affects’, something that he argues results directly 
from the rapid liberalisation pursued under peacebuilding (Paris 1997: 73).
While Paris’s earlier work was critical o f peacebuilding, his actual challenges 
have been consistently moderate. He calls for an adjustment o f peacebuilding 
practice in terms o f ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ (IBL), thus ‘avoiding 
the pathologies of liberalisation, while placing war-shattered states on a long-term 
path to democracy and market-oriented economics’ (Paris 2004: 235). He 
characterises this as the thought of ‘classical liberal theorists’ rather than 
‘Wilsonianism’ (p. 235). This approach is remarkably similar to Huntington’s 
developmentalism of the 1960s (Dodson 2006: 246), particularly in its notion of 
waiting until conditions are ripe for elections, and in this sense it reflects and 
furthers an overall discursive trend towards statebuilding. At the same time it places 
the promotion o f ‘good civil society’, ‘control hate speech’ and ‘adopt conflict- 
reducing economic policies’ as priorities, much like humanitarian peacebuilding 
(2004: 179-211). IBL thus is an attempt at a new synthesis which, in terms o f both 
its content and synthesising function, is comparable to the pragmatic peacebuilding 
texts reviewed above. Whilst none o f these recommendations are new or untried, the 
overall product does represent a further qualification of neo-liberal temporal and 
spatial conceptions. This attempt to rescue and reform peacebuilding -  rather than 
dismiss it as irrelevant or thoroughly reconceptualise it -  characterises the moderate 
criticism of many pragmatists who are orientated towards policy prescription and 
work directly with the international community.
The Radical Critique: a hegemonic discourse, a ‘technology o f  governing ’
Moderates continue to argue that a reformed or refined peacebuilding is a legitimate 
endeavour -  that the model can be adjusted. Paris outlines and sensibly refutes a 
number o f objections to his IBL thesis including ‘endless-mission’, ‘culture-of- 
dependency’ and ‘excessive-costs’ (2004: 207-211). However, there is a bigger
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objection to his thesis: the manner in which Paris develops his argument serves to 
replicate the very hegemonic ideology he seeks to critique and replace. Radical 
critics argue implicitly or explicitly that even a reformed peacebuilding is a problem­
solving exercise which is, in various direct and indirect ways, re-productive of 
violence. International interventions largely reflect the donor priorities incorporated 
in the pragmatic peacebuilding meta-narrative outlined above. They advance both 
hegemonic interests and ideas. Radical analysis raises two fundamental points about 
peacebuilding: that as a liberal-rational model it has been superseded by ‘exceptions’ 
negotiated by power-political decisions; and that it is, thus, fundamentally 
ineffective at achieving its ostensible, progressive goals.
Radicals explore how power and politics linger behind knowledge and 
action. Claims to ‘universality’ mask a particular narrative of the powerful which 
serves to preclude or make implausible any challenge to their fundamental 
assumptions and positions of privilege. As a discourse of positivism, peacebuilding 
is based on assumptions of objectivity, instrumental rationality, and the need to find 
a parsimonious and ‘operationalisable’ core. It is an approach which assumes a 
‘natural’ and universal model of the liberal polity -  and ‘end o f history’ which is 
above or beyond ideology. However, Mouffe’s work (2000), embarking from 
Schmitt’s critique, has revealed the inherent paradox of such models. With the 
meeting o f the liberal and democratic traditions it requires that the liberty o f every 
individual is contained by the equality of all. Vice-versa, it implies that the equality 
of all is limited by the freedom of individuals. Accordingly, it necessarily entails an 
ongoing decision-making process to determine where restrictions on freedom and 
equality might lie -  Schmitt’s exception. ‘Human rights’, ‘equality o f opportunity’, 
the ‘constitution’ and other such givens of liberal democracy are constantly subject 
to negotiation and hence power relations (Mouffe 2000: 5). For Schmitt this tension 
is the seed of liberal democracy’s implosion. He argues in favour o f a stronger 
political executive not hamstrung by over-attentive application o f the rule o f law; 
politics is found where the exception forces and thus enables the sovereign to decide. 
For Mouffe, it means that working democracy must be based on a realisation o f its 
inherently political content; it must be more transparent about decisions which are 
continuously being made on behalf of the people (p. 5). In terms o f international 
intervention, it is argued, this problem of the exception is accentuated as those 
subject to intervention are especially lacking in the autonomous organisation that
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might allow them to consent to international decisions (See Doucet 2005). In 
particular, the capacity of global civil society to serve as a vehicle for such 
autonomy is deeply questionable (Amoore and Langley 2004).
This leads to the second issue. As is shown by Paris and others, in spite of 
the diverse locations in which they are enacted, international strategies are 
remarkably similar, and yet often extremely dysfunctional. By Ong’s account, 
neoliberalism produces ‘technologies of governing’. International peacebuilding 
practices are one example of this; they overlook particular and individual features 
through the imposition o f generalities and best practices (2006: 9). They do so 
because peace builders, in designing and reproducing ‘solutions’, must take for 
granted the global political context which constituted the given conflict in the first 
place. This inter alia leads to inefficacy. Anthropological studies of peaceful 
societies where there has been an absence of physical violence or limited structural 
violence find almost nothing in common between these ‘traditional’ societies other 
than their smallness (Fabbro 1978). Homogenising processes of modernity and 
globalisation have, to a certain extent, incorporated such communities into larger 
societies. However, universal politics and policies are, contends Dryzek, ‘ineffective 
when confronted with complex social problems’, imposing narrow forms of policy 
analysis and limiting the insights o f social science (1990: 5, 7). In their ‘objectivity’ 
and ‘rationality’, and their faith in universal applicability of programmes, 
peacebuilders fail in their ostensible aims o f making hegemony more stable 
(statebuilding), liberal-democratic (democratisation) and just (humanitarianism).
1.3AL Three critiques o f the common peace
Critical theorists o f various hues challenge the claim that peacebuilding is and 
should be an objective process, in the sense that it is something we do to them. In a 
discussion of critical approaches to conflict resolution, Fetherstone outlines three 
bases for critical alternatives: firstly, a Gramscian counter-hegemony, where 
alternative visions are articulated for mass opposition to hegemony; secondly, 
Habermas’s post-hegemony, an intersubjective dialogue between a community of 
actors; finally, a Foucauldian understanding o f anti-hegemony as a diversity of 
resistances to power, none of which can rule over others (Fetherstone 2000: 190- 
217). Each of these alternatives to peacebuilding posits different understandings of
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hegemony and resistance. However, much like in peacebuilding discourses, it is 
often difficult to locate texts exclusively in one o f these camps. The demarcations 
below are thus cautionary and for the purposes of clarity.
Counter-hegemony?
Counter-hegemonic theories of peacebuilding would argue that, as a representation 
o f existing power relations, peacebuilding is conservatism in the guise of 
transformative radicalism. Hegemony, according to Gramsci, is based on ‘the 
spontaneous consent given by the great majority of the population to the general 
direction imposed on social life by the predominant fundamental groups’ (Cited in 
Fetherstone 2000: 210). Counter-hegemonies or resistances are localised around 
particular agendas o f the poor which seek to challenge the status quo. As 
Fetherstone notes, ‘a counter-hegemonic project aims to build a consensus among 
non-dominant groups which articulates an alternative direction for social life’ (p. 
210).
Counter-hegemonic approaches are most popular among radical analyses of 
peacebuilding. Duffield has identified the functions of many political conflicts as 
arising from market incentives provided by globalisation, and the extra-legal 
economic activities they encourage (2002). Chandler’s work, from a more agent- 
focused perspective, has also shown how power-holders seek to prevent and repress 
counter-hegemonies via positive representations (2004:72). Discursive and practical 
constructions of counter-hegemony may emanate directly from communities o f the 
impoverished and can be promoted in radical discourse. For example, peacebuilding 
is, to Bendana, an instrument of repression adopted by multilateral organizations and 
governments which is challenged by the social movements of the ‘South’ (2003: 18). 
However, the extent and character of hegemony is paramount in Bendana’s key 
question: ‘how can multiple, differentiated local discourses across the globe 
approximate each other in order to achieve some degree o f collective counter- 
hegemonic power?’ Such power may be in the form of protest movements for fairer 
trade or minority rights. However, it is apparent that counter-hegemonies are not 
always ‘emancipatory’, and can take the form of, for example, nationalism or 
religious fundamentalism. If formed, a ‘collective counter-hegemonic power’ might 
be the basis for revolution, or a renewal of conflict -  a form of conflict
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transformation which is unlikely to build peace. Moreover, such approaches again 
risk replicating hegemony, not countering it.
Post-hegemony?
Post-hegemonic conceptions o f peacebuilding oppose the imposition o f new dogma. 
They argue that peacebuilding reasserts and reconstructs hegemonic understanding 
of identity and society, and in doing so fails to account for the pluralities o f political 
participation and identity. One school of critical thought on peacebuilding which 
might be characterised as post-hegemonic in orientation is radical feminism. Radical 
feminism argues that peacebuilding fails to account for built in gender assumptions 
which reify masculine and feminine roles. Identifying women in conflict, feminist 
theorists often find them in their given feminine role o f victim -  as refugees or 
sufferers o f physical and sexual abuse (See Brocke-Utne 1989). In peacebuilding, 
women, even more so than in broader political life, are officially absent from conflict 
resolution, while unofficially they are often local peacemakers and responsible 
community leaders. This serves to re-empower masculinity and resolves conflict 
with inbuilt gender-bias.
Thus, radical feminists provide a fundamental but in itself insufficient 
critique o f peacebuilding by opening up one dimension o f hegemony and contention 
-  gender. A more comprehensive critique is forwarded by constructivists and 
critical theorists. Dryzek (1990), from a Habermasian ‘communicative rationality’ 
perspective, explores the ‘authentic public sphere’ (p.21), something beyond the 
Popperian open society, where ‘the design of social and political practices can be 
itself a discursive process in which all relevant subjects can participate’ (p.41). Like 
many critical theorists he finds ‘real world approximations’ of his discursive designs 
in the new global social movements such as the environmentalist, feminist, and 
peace movements (p. 49).
However, others are sceptical about the relevance of groups making universal 
appeals to processes o f democratic institution-building in particular contexts 
(Pouligny 2000). Such analyses acknowledge that local ‘civil society’ -  its social 
space, rituals and institutions -  is created over a period o f time which may be 
significantly longer than that afforded by an international programme, for example. 
Moreover, civil society does not exist in a vacuum but is subject to politics and is
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itself political. The potential for new peace movements, grassroots and ‘civil 
society’ organisations to carve out for themselves autonomy in the public sphere is 
severely restricted under the drive for order domestically and internationally. Often 
‘critical’ insights and actors are incorporated by the broader peacebuilding 
framework under the guise o f ‘civil society building’, ‘peace education’, ‘gender 
workshops’, and other such notions currently popular with donors. Arguably, 
feminist alternatives were mainstreamed in such a way with the passing UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000, which has led to quotas for the 
proportion of female personnel in peace operations and other such ‘radical’ action. 
In such ways critical problems are ‘solved’.
Post-hegemonic conceptions o f peacebuilding seem to offer most hope for a 
critical alternative. However, we must ask to what extent egalitarian modes of 
relationship can be insulated from the political dynamics of hegemonic 
incorporation. Fetherstone acknowledges this problem of space -  o f the public 
sphere -  but holds out hope for the recovery of rationalism in peacebuilding:
It is clear that an ‘ideal’ space for communicative action cannot exist, but that does 
not lessen the validity of opening space for the necessarily incomplete and imperfect 
possibility of reconstructing the basis for meaningful and peaceful social existence 
(2000:213).
In this sense, we may need to look for challenges to hegemonic discourses at the 
margins.
Anti-Hegemony?
A Foucauldian anti-hegemonic understanding of peacebuilding takes a non- 
essentialist route out of this impasse. Foucault offers a critical conceptualisation 
rather than a theory and undertakes an historical analysis o f the process by which 
people are made subjects. As such, ‘while the human is placed in relations of 
production and signification, he is equally placed in power relations which are very 
complex’ (Foucault 2000: 9). A Foucauldian analysis involves the exposure of 
specific rationalities in order to uncover their origins and contingent nature. 
Foucault notes that the real challenge o f our days is, ‘to liberate us both from the 
state and from the type of individualisation which is linked to the state’ (p. 16). The 
implication o f this is to look at both symbolic and material dimensions when
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considering how conflict and peacebuilding are (re)produced by power relations in 
the Foucauldian sense o f ‘productive power’ (Emin Salla 1998).
While this kind of power is productive it is also limited and contingent. 
Outside of the field o f peace and conflict studies, Ong (2006) reflects on the 
mutations o f neoliberalism occurring under this simulcra o f universal performance. 
Her foci are neoliberalism as exception (i.e. the numerous, selective, often hidden 
adaptations made by the executors of interventions) and exceptions to neoliberalism 
(made by those who are made subject to interventions as they accommodate, adapt to 
and even resist). ‘Neoliberalism,’ she notes, ‘as an ethos of self-governing, 
encounters and articulates other ethical regimes in particular contexts’ (p. 9). This 
creates a certain inter-subjectivity in the constitution o f the political spaces of 
peacebuilding -  ‘a constellation of mutually constituting relationships that are not 
reducible to one or the other [particular modality]’ (p.9). In this sense, ‘the 
neoliberal exception in governing constructs political spaces that are differently 
regulated and linked to global circuits’ (ibid.). Similarly, despite the noble efforts of 
Paris and others to achieve a new model, peacebuilders necessarily make exceptions 
and meet exceptions to their designs as they encounter others.
To consider how, despite these inconsistencies, a veneer of universality is 
maintained we must look at discourse and other forms of representation. Francois 
Debrix’s Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping, has followed this Foucauldian tack to 
demonstrate how peacekeeping’s function of ‘riot control’ is re-presented the 
International Community. The UN he notes, ‘must represent world order in its 
absence’ (1999:16). Debrix thus regards UN peacekeeping practice as simulation 
where the world body presents a fa9ade, a form without substance, ‘that would have 
to be ideologically filled in order to obtain signification and a sense of purpose’ (p. 
6). Peacekeeping is not hegemonic in that it achieves or represents its ostensible 
goals -  rather, it is hegemonic because it is able to simulate them. In this sense 
Debrix argues,
Peacekeeping does not represent (disciplinary) liberal ideology. Once again, it 
simulates it. Peacekeeping depicts a fantasy space or dream land of international 
affairs (where peacekeeping operations are successful, governance is realised, etc.) 
inside which claims to neoliberalism on a global scale can be made (Debrix 1999: 
216).
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The work o f Debrix in particular illustrates that peace operations while failing in any 
given practical case can, via simulation, reproduce hegemonic ideas and identities of 
‘disciplinary liberalism’. In its performance it claims legitimate authority for the idea 
o f the International Community, as totemically represented by the UN. As such, 
despite the good intentions of many at the UN and the pragmatic compromises made 
by practitioners in the field, the function o f simulation is to preclude the practical 
attainment o f neoliberal goals.
Forms of discourse and representation serve to obscure this hegemonic role, 
portraying peacekeepers as neutral and impartial (Pugh 2004). Their power in 
achieving this indicates that discourse and representation are central not just in 
concealing reality but creating it. Pugh affirms Debrix’s focus on the discourse and 
‘the appropriation o f language’ as the means by which policy is shaped, outcomes 
simulated and interventions legitimised. He adds to this the importance o f 
‘televisual drama, a musical theatre o f poverty reduction played loudly in public 
spaces to mobilise mass support’ (Pugh 2006: 8) and visual stimuli which Tend 
depth, and thrill’ to the construction of neoliberal order (2003: 104-112). ‘Peace 
operations,’ he contends,
Contribute to an ideology of world order that reflects and legitimises neoliberal 
values, state-centrism and the economic structure of the international system. In 
sum, peace operations are part and parcel of the globalised “liberal peace” (p. 110- 
111).
Pugh (2006) highlights how different modes of intervention -  development, 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding -  are increasingly conflated in discourse. This is the 
most radical critique o f peacebuilding as it claims that peacebuilidng does not wish 
to provide the functions o f neoliberal world order but its ‘simulacra’. It is 
productive of objectives, policy, and expressive platitudes but not o f a functioning 
world order along the lines which it imagines and simulates. As such, notes Pugh, 
peace operations are practised in ‘chaos’, in the sense o f ‘a crisis managed context in 
which development is securitised to facilitate hierarchy and fortune’ (2003: 110- 
i n ) .
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1.3.UL Uncommon peace: the practical limits o f  hegemony
If  neoliberal practices merely serve to simulate peacebuilding, what can we say 
about how political power is being rearticulated locally and globally under such 
international interventions? The failure o f peacebuilding to achieve its ostensible 
aims raise serious questions not just about its purpose but about the nature of 
hegemonic ideology and thus hegemony itself. Moreover, ‘hegemony’ -  whether in 
its realist (Wohlforth 1999: 5-41), liberal (Ikenberry 2004), or various critical guises 
-  needs qualifying with a sense of the limits o f hegemonic structures, the 
constrictions on the power o f dominant actors, and finally the extreme objections to 
neoliberalism, particularly outside the West. To understand the limits o f hegemony, 
we must take an uncommon step beyond authors working on peace and conflict.
James C. Scott (1990) has developed an approach to discourse analysis which 
compares and contrasts ‘public’ and parallel ‘hidden’ transcripts in order to probe 
the extent of the hegemony and the character of resistance. He demonstrates that 
‘subordinates in such large-scale structures o f domination nevertheless have a fairly 
extensive social existence outside the immediate control o f the dominant’ (p. xi). 
Through the tactics o f ‘hidden transcripts’ inaccessible to the powerful, the 
subordinate disguise their forms of avoidance of domination. He finds in social and 
political relations not the sincere following of the ideology o f the powerful, but a 
performance o f the roles inscribed by public discourse, for example, that of 
peacebuilding. As Scott notes,
The dominant never control the stage absolutely but their wishes normally prevail. In 
the short run, it is in the interest of the subordinate to produce a more or less credible 
performance, speaking the lines and making the gestures he knows are expected of 
him (p. 4).
A hidden, alternative reality -  ‘an extensive offstage social existence’ -  is sustained 
by what Scott calls ‘the infrapolitics of subordinate groups’ (p. 21). His later work 
(1998) highlights how a large array o f attempts to impose ‘high-modemist’ 
ideologies -  from Soviet collectivism to Brazilian city-planning -  onto various 
societies which have been defeated by the metis (‘cunning’ and ‘practical 
knowledge’) of locals who are able to subvert their masters’ grand designs. This 
argument may be extended to peacebuilding which, while lacking the explicit 
authoritarianism of many of Scott’s examples, nevertheless exhibits many of the 
features o f high-modemism.
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To make this argument against prevailing understandings o f hegemony, Scott 
tackles directly the Gramscian or neo-Marxist argument that it is the ‘false 
consciousness’ of subordinates which produces hegemonic incorporation (1990: 73- 
74).23 By contrast, he argues, it is often when subordinates and/or elites sincerely 
believe the (disciplinary) ideology of the regime that they may begin to grasp its 
falseness, its distortions, deceptions and, in Debrix’s terms, simulations. Scott 
distinguishes between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ versions of false consciousness, the former 
of which portrays subordinates as enthused by hegemonic ideology.
The thin theory of false conscious, on the other hand, maintains only that the 
dominant ideology achieves compliance by convincing subordinate groups that the 
social order in which they live is natural and inevitable. The thick theory claims 
consent; the thin theory settles for resignation (Scott 1990: 72).
He argues that the thin theory is ‘eminently plausible’ but ‘fundamentally wrong’ (p. 
72). The falseness o f all false consciousness theory is shown, first and foremost, by 
the fact that it does not diminish social conflict as Gramsci claimed. Scott offers 
instead a ‘paper-thin theory o f hegemony’ which allows ‘limited and stringent 
conditions under which subordinate groups may come to accept, even to legitimate 
the arrangements that justify their subordination’ (p. 82).
Here Scott may be too dismissive o f the prospects for the legitimation of 
hegemony. According to Lukes’ reading o f Scott, a paper-thin theory o f hegemony 
requires that the subordinate have at least some opportunity for escape from their 
lowly position, and that coercion and oppression are ‘more covert and less severe.’ 
Yet the cases Scott considers, as he himself acknowledges, being situations of 
slavery, serfdom and other forms of bondage, do not have these characteristics 
(Lukes 2005: 129-130). Lukes convincingly argues that Scott provides one strong 
explanation for quiescence (in cases of illegitimate domination), but this does not 
mean that in cases where domination is less than total some kind o f legitimate 
consent can exist. ‘In short,’ he contends,
There is no reason to view Scott’s compelling account of the ingenious tactics and 
strategies of dissembling, ever-watchful slaves, peasants and untouchables and the 
like as refuting either the thick or the thin theory of hegemony. It does not show that
23 Lukes (2005), in a slightly different way, seeks to account conceptually in terms of a third 
dimension of power for this false consciousness. This third dimension, is ‘the power to prevent 
people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and 
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things’ (p.28).
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there is not also widespread consent and resignation, in both pre-modem and modem 
societies, that is best explained as viewing these as both expressing and resulting from 
relations of power. The response of the wise Ethiopian peasant, who bows deeply to 
the great lord and silently farts is, after all, only one of many (p. 131).
Therefore, thick (Gramscian), thin (Habermasian), and so-called paper-thin accounts 
of hegemony together offer a range of explanations for ‘peace’ which opens up the 
possibility that, through discourse analysis, we can assess the degree of hegemony 
and the nature of legitimacy which a given peace has accrued. These insights, 
together with the relational focus of Lederach’s work (1997; 2005), form the basis 
for a re-consideration o f ‘peace’ and ‘peacebuilding’ in chapter three. We must look 
not for one peace but many.
Conclusions
This chapter has set the stage for this investigation by probing the functions of 
peacebuilding as a basic discourse which is invoked in terms of the identity of the 
International Community. As such it represents universalist conceptions o f space, 
progressive notions of time, and individualist ethics. However, further study o f the 
discursive variations of peacebuilding revealed two somewhat contending variations 
on this theme: humanitarian and statebuilding discourses o f peacebuilding. The 
contrasts between these discourses indicate the essentially contested and shifting 
nature of the international approach, while their conciliation under grand narratives 
of pragmatic peacebuilding exhibits the homogenising functions o f neoliberal 
hegemony. However, critical discourses reveal the extent o f the ambiguities and 
uncertainties o f the grand narrative, in providing public counter-, post- or anti- 
hegemonic analyses o f peace. This raises the possibility that peacebuilding24 
actually entails the simulation of ‘peace’ and that hegemony is constantly being 
resisted as it is being resigned to.
Critical understandings may be most helpful in demarcating the hidden 
assumptions which limit thinking and action in terms of peacebuilding. Moreover, 
resurrecting a general model is a hopeless task which will only simulate another 
version o f a single common peace. Thus we must move beyond the idea o f a single 
peace and towards theoretical and methodological approaches that allow us to grasp
241 will use the shorthand ‘peacebuilding’ to refer to ‘pragmatic peacebuilding’ and international 
practice in general in subsequent chapters. This will allow some parsimony and analytical clarity as I 
seek to contrast international with local and elite discourses.
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the diversity of experiences of peace o f contesting individuals and groups in post­
conflict spaces. This insight paradoxically requires that we reconsider and, to a 
certain extent, reinscribe an ambiguously constituted ‘peacebuilding’, in order to 
improve our understanding of the power relations behind building peace. This kind 
of finely-drawn analysis can only meaningfully be pursued in context. It is to that 
task that this dissertation now turns.
66
CHAPTER TWO
War and Peace in Tajikistan
Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different
means) the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness.
-  Pierre Bourdieu (cited in Scott 1990:75)
From 1992, not long after the dissolution Soviet Union, the new Central Asian state 
o f Tajikistan was devastated by several years o f civil war. While the most intense 
fighting had ended by 1993, a peace agreement was not signed until 1997, and 
significant political violence continued sporadically until 2001. The war and its 
consequences have dominated Tajikistan's short history. The 'Kulobisation' of 
Tajikistan (Akiner 2001a), where cadres from the southern region o f Kulob came to 
hold most of the key positions in government, notwithstanding the power-sharing 
mechanism of the General Agreement, was confirmed by Emomali Rahmonov's 
victory in 1999's fraudulent presidential elections.
This chapter introduces the Tajik case in terms of its historical background 
and the key academic literature that has sought to explain it. Parts one and two 
provide an historical sketch with a narrative o f the war and peace process, from the 
Soviet period to today’s peacebuilding interventions and evolving peace. It is shown 
that while violence was not inevitable, these dramatic events evolved in such a way 
that war inherited ‘peace’, and vice-versa. Thus, Tajikistan has fundamentally 
digressed from the path set for it by peacebuilding interventions. Part three engages 
with literature from the dominant and marginal academic discourses of the social 
sciences. It argues that rather than viewing the conflict as a particular kind o f war 
and peace we must try to get inside the inter-subjective construction of post-conflict 
discourse and space, in terms o f its multiple dimensions and intrinsic ambiguities. 
Better analyses o f the war and peace process offers ways to understand hegemony, 
legitimacy and complexity in Tajikistan, and provide signposts on the road of 
research design.
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2.1. T he W a r
The citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan, a poverty-stricken state in Central Asia, 
have endured much violence and suffering since the state was created on 9 
September 1991. During the Soviet Union, as the poorest republic of the USSR, 
Tajikistan was structurally dependent on Moscow. In 1991, the republic received a 
higher proportion of its revenue from the Union budget (47%), and maintained a 
greater inter-republic trade deficit, than any of the other republics (World Bank 
1992). The demise of the Soviet Union rapidly and unexpectedly transformed the 
Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic into a sovereign state. The Soviet era had brought 
relative stability to a country with no history of nation-stateness. However, within 
months of independence the new state of Tajikistan entered a ‘swift and seemingly 
inexorable descent into a brutal civil war’ (Rubin 1994: 207) which led to over 
50,000 deaths and more than 250,000 refugees.
Fig.5: Basic Map of Tajikistan25
There is no definitive account of the conflict; many of the details are contested or 
obscured by the limited or partial records of the events of the time. As such it is 
particularly difficult to provide a single version of the conflict in its complex and
25 Available from: University o f Texas at Austin library 
(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/taiikistan.htmQ, accessed: 15/10/06
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varied social and political dimensions. Nevertheless a b rief sketch will be attempted 
here. I explore the links between violence and the political context which serve as 
background to the more detailed review of interpretations o f the conflict in the latter 
half of the chapter.
2. l.i. The Origins o f War
This sub-section constructs a narrative of events leading up to the war through the 
identification of three key antecedents to conflict. All o f these contributed to the 
nature of opposition to the government.
Antecedents to conflict
Regional cleavages were hugely important in shaping the republic’s politico- 
administrative development in the Soviet-era and its subsequent descent to violence. 
Usmon charts how resistance in the mountainous regions to the expansion o f Soviet 
rule in the 1920s and 1930s had led to ‘uneven development’ in favour of the north, 
and forced migrations o f those from the eastern mountainous regions of Gharm and 
the Pamirs to the south to provide agricultural labour (Usmon 2004). The map 
below (figure 6, p.71) hints at the complexity o f Tajikistan’s demographics at the 
end o f the Soviet Union. Indeed, the actual picture is more complicated than 
witnessed here with numerous minorities excluded and regional and ethnic diversity 
obscured. For example, the Tajik areas identified in the eastern part of the country 
are populated by Pamiri people professing Shi’a Ismaili Islam and speaking various 
dialects related to, but distinct from, Tajik.
However, it was the political-geographic dynamics o f the Republic which 
shaped the nature of the conflict. Traditional communities were recomposed during 
the Soviet Union into hybrid regional solidarity groups (Roy 2000). This created a 
political culture o f regionalism (mahalgaro’y  [Taj.]). Although Dushanbe had 
become the capital of the Tajik SSR, the northern province (Leninabad oblast, now 
Sugd), which had developed under Russian imperial power, provided the majority of 
the governing elite of the republic, including all the first secretaries o f the 
communist party between 1946 and 1992. Moreover, it was its economic and 
politico-administrative links with the southern cotton-producing region o f Kulob 
which allowed northern elites to maintain their domination o f the political life o f the
69
republic. This development was precipitated by a series o f population movements 
that had the effect o f crystallizing the regional identities which would be the vehicles 
for conflict during the civil war. Among the most important o f these forced 
migrations were the relocations of Tajiks from the central mountain ranges of 
Karategin (Gharm) and Darvaz to Khatlon’s cotton-producing valleys between 1925 
and 1940, and from the Pamiris between 1947 and 1960.
Along with creating animosity towards the authorities, the organization of 
these groups into their own kholkozes made integration o f migrants and indigenous 
peoples more difficult. Most o f these migrants, particularly so-called ‘Gharmis’, 
consequently avoided integration and held firm to regional identities; it was from 
these groups that the opposition drew much support during the conflict (Akiner
2002). Tajikistan went through numerous regional realignments reflecting the 
ascendancy of the Leninabad-Kulob alliance over politically weak regions such as 
Gharm and the Pamirs. However, Pamiris, Gharmis, and Russians continued to hold 
key posts and the idea of Leninabadi domination obscured a more complex set of 
power relations based on patronage networks both within and between regional 
elites, and with power-brokers in Moscow. In such an inconsistent form regional 
identity emerged during the Soviet period and remained the key vehicle for the 
mobilisation of armed groups during the conflict. The divisions o f the conflict 
between (to generalise) Uzbeks, Khujondi Tajiks, and Kulobi Tajiks on the one side 
and (to generalise again) Gharmi Tajiks and Pamiris on the other, can be 
comprehended not by reference to feudal, tribal or ancient antagonisms o f any kind, 
but rather through an analysis o f politico-administrative development during the 
Soviet period (Rubin 1998).
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Fig.6: Map of Tajikistan by ethnic groups, 199226
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A second way of viewing the conflict is as a battle of ideas. Many Tajiks 
consider the pluralism prompted by glasnost and perestroika as the primary cause of 
conflict. The reforms initiated by Gorbachev following his election as General 
Secretary on 11 March, 1985 provoked a variety of reactions within Tajikistan, 
ranging from hopes for greater autonomy to disappointment at the vagueness of early 
announcements (Hammer 1998). By the autumn of 1989 it was clear that
26 Available from: United Nations in Tajikistan:
(http://www.unti.org/files/maps/taiikistan ethnic 92.ipeg); accessed: 15/10/06
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substantive reform was in process with a new constitution on the cards that offered 
the possibility o f a greater decentralisation of power to the republics. Around this 
time reformist groups with wide-ranging aims began to be established by journalists 
and academics. However, as across the region, reformers faced a recalcitrant party 
elite, detached from both wider elite and popular concerns. Yavaron i Bozsozi 
(‘Friends of Reconstruction and Reconciliation’), the first significant group, was 
established in 1988 demanding the establishment of Tajik as a state language and 
making vague calls for economic and political liberalisation. It was soon banned by 
the authorities (Jawad & Tadjbaksh 1995: 11). Nevertheless other movements 
sprang up, some quickly quashed, others managed to attract reformist cadres from 
the party and bureaucracy. The media, particularly television, accelerated and 
intensified the clash between conservatives and reformers, providing a medium of 
popular dissemination of reformist discourses and other forms o f representations 
(Khodjibaeva 1999). Riots in February 1990, led by criminal gangs and ostensibly 
triggered by rumours that Armenian migrants were being given preferential access to 
state housing, led to 25 deaths and 800 injuries (Auten 1996: 199-212; Nourzhanov 
2005: 115) and sounded a warning bell that significant dissent could be mobilised 
against the regime.
A third way of interpreting the conflict is simply as an elite power-political 
struggle: a ruling faction confronted by an opportunistic opposition (Rubin 1998; 
Akhmeov 1998). Akiner, for example, comments that over-reliance on a regionalist 
explanation, ‘obscures the fluidity and ambiguities o f the situation’ and 
‘underestimates the power o f individuals to influence events’ (2001a: 21). The 
opposition eventually incorporated a wide range o f ideological positions, and a 
coalition of different regions, which was later divided between National-democratic 
and Islamist blocs. The former included the cultural-nationalist grouping Rastokhez 
(‘Renaissance’), formed in September 1989, and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan 
(DPT), founded in August 1990, both o f which were led by a nationalist 
intelligentsia and included elites representing a number o f local areas 
disenfranchised or marginalised in government. Added to these groups were the 
Pamiri organisations, foremost of which was L a ’li Badakhshon ( ‘Ruby of 
Badakshon’), also created in 1990, which gained support from their home region in
27 Rastokhez was founded by Tohir Abdujabbor from Asht in Northern Tajikistan and the DPT by 
Shodmon Yusuf from Darvaz.
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striving for greater Badakshoni autonomy and allied with other groups in March 
1992. Many o f these groups found considerable support from governmental figures, 
thus blurring the government/opposition dichotomy. For example, during the war 
the head of the Ministry o f the Interior (MVD), Navzhuvanov, a Pamiri and La ’li 
Badkhshon supporter, brought the main portion o f MVD troops to the ‘opposition’ 
camp to fight against the government.
Precursors to conflict
All three of these antecedents were constitutive of opposition and mobilisation 
against the government. Regionally- and ideologically-based movements, further 
complicated by family ties, inter-marriage and bitter personal rivalries, embodied a 
once legitimate power arrangement whose breakdown defies any monocausal 
explanation. This complexity is witnessed by the case of the most enduring 
opposition group. After its formation on 6 October 1990 by a number of young 
clerics, including Said Abdullo Nuri, the future leader o f the opposition, Hezb-e 
Nahzat-e Islami ( ‘Islamic Renaissance Party’, IRP) became the most significant 
opposition movement. The party declared itself part of the all-Union IRP which had 
been formed at a conference in Russia in the summer of that year. Nevertheless the 
party was rooted locally with its origins in both ‘parallel’/unofficial and 
‘official’/state-sanctioned Islam as they had evolved in Tajikistan through the 1970s 
and 1980s (Atkin 1995). While many younger members o f the official clergy joined 
the IRP, others -  often older -  opposed the politicisation o f Islam and supported the 
conservative hard-liners in government. The official Muslim Qazi, Akhbar 
Turajonzoda, at first straddled the two groups. He did not join the IRP, and 
sometimes publicly criticised its radicalism, but nevertheless stayed in regular 
communication with the organisation and moved closer towards it in the face of 
government intransigence (Gretsky 1994: 17, 19). The IRP aimed to gradually 
introduce Islamic law into Tajik society rather than pursue an immediate and 
fundamental overhaul o f the state. The Party drew widespread support from so- 
called ‘Garmi’ people from the Darvaz and Karategin (now Garm) areas o f the Rasht 
valley, and particularly Garmi migrants who were forcibly moved into the Vakhsh 
valley area in early Soviet-era migrations.
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While the Tajik republic declared its sovereignty (on 25 August 1990) an 
overwhelming majority of its citizens and leaders favoured the continuance o f the 
Soviet Union as demonstrated by the March 1991 Union-wide referendum. 
However, the political status of the republic was being dictated by events in the 
Slavic and Baltic republics o f the USSR. In the summer o f 1991, the coup against 
Gorbachev (20th August) took events out o f the Tajik leadership’s hands. Kakhar 
Makhamov, the First Party Secretary and President of the Republic and a hardliner, 
openly backed the coup and following mass demonstrations against him in Dushanbe 
was forced to step down. Amid continuing protests against the republican 
government, the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan reluctantly declared independence on 
9 September 1991 -  the twelfth of fourteen former Soviet republics to do so. 
Presidential elections were organised for 27 October 1991 and pitted a conservative 
former First Secretary, Rahmon Nabiev, from the Khujond region, against a joint 
candidate o f opposition parties, Davlat Khudonazarov, a well-known film director 
from the Pamirs. Nabiev won with 57% o f the vote, amid allegations o f vote-rigging 
and much rancour between regional elites, to become the first President of the 
independent Republic o f Tajikistan. The strength o f the opposition to Nabiev 
nevertheless indicated that the new state was divided along regional lines.
At this point, with conflict latent but as yet few deaths, devastating civil war 
was surely not inevitable. Chatteijee characterised this period as ‘the fight for 
legitimacy’ (1995:8), yet the role of key national elites and outside powers during 
this time served to escalate the situation rapidly towards widespread political 
violence. Conciliating agents were conspicuous by their absence. Here the role of 
individuals and contingencies, must be emphasised and serve as a reminder that no 
theory of war-starting or war-ending provides anything close to a complete account. 
Firstly, both Nabiev (who had an alcohol problem and is said to have ‘vacillated, 
making concessions to the opposition and then withdrawing them’ (Akiner 1998: 
36)) and Kenjayev (the speaker of Parliament, who used a televised address to attack 
Navjuvanov for exceeding his powers) played key roles in the descent to war. 
Secondly, the extreme turbulence of this period of history meant that many foreign 
policy miscalculations were made. In February 1992, for example, US Secretary of 
State, James Baker, visited Tajikistan seeking to assert American influence in the
28 A widely-quoted figure is that 97% across the Central Asian republics voted for the continuation of 
the USSR (Soucek 2000: 262).
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new region. He had a long private meeting with Nabiev where it is thought he 
offered US support if  Tajikistan resisted ‘fundamentalism* and Iranian influence. He 
refused to meet leaders of the opposition (p. 36). These understandable policy 
choices may have precipitated the descent to violence and represent a failure to grasp 
the increasing illegitimacy of the government.
2.1AL Civil War
The high-intensity period o f the conflict itself occurred over a year of tumult, 1992, 
and, I argue, can be divided into five phases; militarisation, ignition, governmental 
breakdown, battle for power, and government recapture. The first o f these, January- 
May 1992, the period of militarisation and even criminalisation, has inappropriately 
been called ‘the Tajik Spring* (Tadjbakhsh 1993). Nabiyev and Kenjayev, 
increasingly illegitimate, were recalcitrant against the opposition amid growing 
protests. Whilst a variety of issues o f political and economic reform provided an 
umbrella for national-democratic and Islamic wings to coalesce in opposition to the 
government, for many o f those attending the demonstrations the immediate 
motivations were bom in livelihoods and the search for sustenance (Whitlock 2003: 
156, 160). The demonstrations, taking place in Shahidon square in Dushanbe, 
continued consistently for 50 straight days and coincided with the rise o f the 
mujahedin and the fall o f the old Soviet-backed government of Najibullah in 
Afghanistan. Whitlock claims this parallel was emblematic in the eyes of many 
opposition demonstrators who saw Ahmad Shah M as’ud, an ethnic Tajik and the 
leader of the northern mujahedin, as a national hero (p. 158-9). Militant and 
criminal figures within and without the opposition movements, who were already 
forming militia, were becoming stronger within both sides. The IRP, for example, 
formed a militia, Najot-i Vatan (Salvation of the Motherland) in late-1991 (Olimova 
and Olimov 2001, no pagination). The increasingly anxious government made 
numerous pleas for calm whilst organising pro-govemment demonstrations at Ozodi 
square less than two kilometres from Shahidan.
The moment o f ignition occurred in early May 1992. The Ozodi 
demonstrators were largely Kulobi and led by Sangak Safarov, a convicted 
murderer, who would subsequently form the pro-govemment Popular Front o f 
Tajikistan (PFT) -  a coalition o f militias based on Kulobi and Uzbek Hissori factions
75
(Nourzhanov 2005: 116-117). With many thousands on both pro- and anti- 
government sides matters escalated quickly and dramatically. Thirteen criminal 
gangs connected with anti-govemment elites and operating under the collective 
name of Youth of Dushanbe City (YDC), who had been demonstrating on a third 
square, Aini, declared war on the government (Akiner 1998: 37). President Nabiev 
and his advisors consequently took the fatal decision on May 1 to escalate matters by 
distributing 1,700 Kalashnikovs in Azadi square to Safarov’s men; on the very same 
day, the 14th session of the Supreme Soviet began with a call for the establishment of 
a tripartite commission composed o f leaders from both sides and governmental 
representatives (Whitlock 2002: 162; Nazriev & Sattorov 2005: 143). In response, 
opposition leaders mobilised their ‘defence groups’, which were rapidly-forming in 
various regions, and secured the support o f MVD troops and presidential guards. On 
5 May, they launched attacks to take most o f the key government sights in Dushanbe 
and drive the pro-govemment supporters out of Ozodi square; on the same day the 
Supreme Soviet was forced to announce a break in its proceedings (Nazriev and 
Sattorov 2005: 144). With government in chaos, the seizure o f the television station 
may have been most significant as it allowed the opposition to disseminate 
alternative messages and images, so destroying the last vestiges o f state authority 
(Khodjibaeva 1999: 14). With widespread fighting in the streets, Russian troops, 
formerly part o f the Soviet armed forces, acted to protect Nabiev and mediate a 
compromise between the two sides. Finally, on May 11, a Government of National 
Reconciliation (GNR) was announced. Nabiev would remain as President and retain 
his key ministerial supporters, while a third of posts would go to the opposition.
The Dushanbe violence was the ignition for a period o f governmental
70  •breakdown between May and September 1992 as the regime rapidly lost its 
remaining authority. Very soon the GNR proved unworkable as the regions of 
Leninabad and Kulob declared they would not take orders from the new government. 
By July 1992, no security forces remained loyal to the coalition government 
(Nourzhanov 2005: 114) and fighting spread across the south of the country between
29 ‘Governmental’ rather than ‘state’ breakdown is used to capture the removal o f one regime without 
its replacement by another. ‘State breakdown’ is also a relevant description but this occurred over a 
much longer period beginning, at least, with independence from the USSR. In 1992 it is more 
accurate to say that parties were fighting to recapture government than the state as a whole. As part 2 
will show, even today the state remains a fractured and inconsistent institution. See also Markowitz 
(2005, ch.4).
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field commanders and their militias (p. 112). Such groups pledged their loyalty to a 
particular region, but ceasefires negotiated between regional leaders were often 
immediately broken by local commanders. Violence was most intense in and around 
the the town of Qurghanteppa where different regional groups lay side-by-side. By 
September, Nabiev had lost any remaining support that he had on either pro- or anti- 
government sides with both the Khujondi-Kulobi dominated parliament and the IRP 
calling for his resignation (Whitlock 2002: 168-9). On 7 September, while trying to 
flee from Dushanbe, Nabiev was cornered on his way to the airport by opposition 
fighters from the YDC and forced to sign his resignation at gunpoint (Nazriev & 
Sattorov 2005: 345-348).
As Tajikistan was left without a government between September and 
December 1992, this localised fighting turned into a fourth stage o f the war, a fierce 
battle fo r  power. Complete state breakdown was evident across all official fora 
including television where regional stations ignored Dushanbe and each broadcasted 
their own contrasting stories of unfolding events, each with their own regional 
heroes and villains (Khodjibaeva, 1999: 14). Akbarsho Iskandarov, a Pamiri and the 
Speaker o f parliament, formed a new government sympathetic to the opposition but 
equally unable to end the violence. However, Kulobi and Hissori forces fought back 
through the PFT and removed the ‘opposition’ from Qurghanteppa in late September 
(Akiner 1998: 38). Field commanders loyal to the PFT then began to challenge 
Pamiri control of Dushanbe, briefly taking the capital on the 24-25 October (Nazriev 
& Sattorov 2005: 431). While violence continued in the city, the PFT brought much 
of the south and west under their control. Against these complex developments a 
form of official politics continued. The 16th session of the Supreme Soviet of 
Tajikistan opened at the Arbob Kolkhoz near Khujond on 16 November 1992, but 
was boycotted by many ‘opposition’ delegates fearful of security (ibid.). Twenty- 
four o f the principal field commanders were present, as were representatives o f the 
governments of Russia and Uzbekistan (Nourzhanov 2005: 118; Whitlock 2002: 
177). At the meeting, the GNR was formally removed and Emomali Rahmonov, a 
Kulobi from the district of Danghara, and former head of a Sovkhoz collective farm, 
was elected Chairman o f the parliament and acting head of government. Rahmonov 
was the candidate o f Safarov and the PFT. This move reflected not just the
30 Evidence suggests that Rahmonov was initially placed in power to act as a stooge for Safarov’s 
PFT. Rahmonov is from the same mahalla as Safarov in Danghara. He rose from being director o f a
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political defeat of the ‘opposition’ but a shift in power within the pro-‘government’ 
coalition from Khujond to Kulob. It was, as Rubin describes, a shift from ‘those 
who held the factories and party personnel committees’ to ‘those who held the guns’ 
(Rubin 1998: 129). Despite this, Rahmonov soon received international recognition 
regionally and internationally, including from the United States, largely due to a fear 
o f Islamic government (Katzman 2002: 59).
The final period of sustained high-intensity conflict, from November- 
December 1992, was one of government recapture as the new faction, only formally 
led by Rahmonov, established a grip on power. A PFT force o f some 8,000 with 
Uzbek land and air support (Jawad and Tadjbaksh 1995: 16; Horsman 1999: 38-39) 
stormed Dushanbe driving opposition forces from the city and launching a brutal 
‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign against Pamiris and Gharmis (Akiner 1998: 39). The 
military campaign and its associated persecutions continued down the Vakhsh valley 
to the south and drove the bulk o f the opposition fighters and sympathisers across the 
border into Afghanistan or eastwards to Badakhshon. The humanitarian situation 
was exacerbated as over 55,000 houses were burned and tens of thousands o f non- 
combatants (mainly women and children) were forced to flee (Usmon 2004: 245). 
Chairman Rahmonov meanwhile focused on establishing his political authority in 
Dushanbe: appointing a cabinet composed of Kulobis, Hissoris and Khujandis; 
banning opposition parties and much of the media; invalidating laws made by the 
Government of National Reconciliation; and replacing the Muslim Qaziyat with a 
new national Muftiat (ibid.). Through its sponsorship by PFT warlords the 
Rahmonov government had achieved a ‘victory’ but was too weak to
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comprehensively defeat the opposition (Nourzhanov 2005: 119). Moreover, 
despite the deaths o f renegade warlords Safarov and Faizali Saidov (in March 1993), 
Rahmonov was not able to bring PFT warlords -  who had supported his candidature 
-  directly under his control (ibid: 118). Outside o f the capital intermittent violence 
continued.
During 1993, the opposition, having been driven out o f the country at the end 
of 1992, re-established itself and challenged the government’s claim to sovereignty.
Sovkhoz to Chairman of the Kulob Soviet in October 1992, after the previous incumbent in the post 
was killed by Safarov on 28th October. (Nourzhanov 2005: 117)
31 Nourzhanov (2005: 119) estimates that the PFT composed warlords and troops to the amount of 
20,000.
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In Afghanistan, the Islamic opposition regrouped and belatedly consolidated itself 
politically, forming the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) with Said Abdullo Nuri as 
Chair and Akbar Turajonzoda as First Deputy and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(Nourzhanov 2005: 118). It proceeded to function as a government in exile and by 
December 1993 had established an official alliance with the national-democratic 
opposition located in Moscow. For over a year before negotiations began the 
political conflict was frozen, with large parts o f the country outside of government 
control. From Spring 1993, the UTO launched attacks from Afghanistan, fighting 
battles with Uzbek-supported government troops in Gomo-Badakhshon (Jawad and 
Tadjbaksh 1995: 17), and taking significant parts o f the Gharm valley. In July 1993, 
UTO fighters attacked Russian troops guarding the Tajik border, killing twenty-five, 
and thus signalling that the war would continue (p. 16-17). In addition, ostensibly 
government-supporting warlords from the Uzbek-dominated region of Hissor and 
the northern province of Khujond both showed separatist tendencies as the future of 
not just the Rahmonov government but the Tajik state remained in doubt.
2.2 From  W ar to Peace
Drawing a line between war and peace in Tajikistan proves an impossible task, save 
for the legal definition that the war ended with the 27 June 1997 General Agreement. 
However, over twelve years, and three over-lapping periods between 1993 and 2005, 
one can see the gradual re-acquisition of legitimacy as the new regime was 
eventually accepted with varying degree of acquiescence at the local, regional and 
international levels.
2.2.L Intervention and the Peace Process, 1993-1997
International involvement in the conflict resolution process in Tajikistan involved 
two at times contending, but more often cooperating approaches: the regional 
mirotvorchestvo (‘peacekeeping’ or ‘peacemaking’) approach o f regional actors, 
primarily the Russian Federation, often acting through the Commonwealth o f 
Independent States (CIS); and, the ‘third party’ peace-making and post-conflict 
peacebuilding of the Western-dominated International Community including, among 
others, the UN and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
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This thesis affords little space to discuss the pre-agreement period save for the key 
moments of its beginnings and final success.
Russian support was crucial in maintaining Rahmonov in power as Tajikistan 
fell under Moscow’s hegemony. Russia, in some turmoil itself, declared ‘neutrality’ in 
the early stages o f the conflict. However, its forces provided support for the victories 
of ‘government’ forces in November and December 1992, and soon moved into a 
position of support for the status quo. In addition to the border guards of the Federal 
Border Service o f the Russian Federation (RBF), which were until 2004 maintained 
along Tajikistan's southern border with Afghanistan, Russia led the way in establishing 
a small CIS peacekeeping force in 1993. The total CIS/Russian presence at one stage 
numbered 20,000 troops.33 Lynch describes how Russian involvement moved from 
‘unconditional commitment’ to ‘differentiated peacekeeping’ involving, to a limited 
extent, Central Asian states in a CIS force.34 Both Russia and Uzbekistan also assisted 
the government in establishing new security forces based largely on PFT remnants 
(Jawad and Tadjbaksh 1995: 17). The great fear for these governments was that 
Afghanistan's instability and Islamic militancy could spill over into the CIS region. 
President Yeltsin declared in 1993 that Tajikistan's southern border was, ‘in effect, 
Russia's,’ as he began a policy o f consistent support for the Rahmonov government 
both politically and financially (Cited in Rubin 1998). At this time analysts and some 
members of the Russian government characterised Tajikistan as a ‘protectorate’ 
(Whitlock 2002: 191) or ‘Garrison state’ (Rubin 1994). But while the colonial 
analogy became popular, out o f the stalemate a conflict resolution process began to 
develop.
In early 1993 the International Community had become involved on the 
ground in Tajikistan through the presence of the UN Secretary General’s special 
envoy to Tajikistan. Shortly after, in June 1993, an OSCE centre was set up (See 
Gorayev 2001). At this time there may have been greater unity between the Moscow 
and Afghanistan wings of the opposition, who were in regular communication and, 
argue Jawad and Tadjbaksh, ‘worked in uniformity’ (1995: 18), than there was
32 For a comprehensive review see the edited volume of Barnes & Abdullaev (2001).
33 The agreement to create a CIS peacekeeping force was made on 24 September 1993 between the 
governments of Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. See Orr (1996).
34 The Russian government made several unsuccessful attempts to have that force recognised by the 
UN. Lynch argues that, having become an active party to the conflict, their involvement had ‘nothing 
in common with traditional or contemporary international practice’ (Lynch 1999: 171).
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within Rahmonov’s government which was divided between Khujandi and Kulobi 
factions. UN-sponsored negotiations in Tajikistan thus began precariously. In the 
first round of March 1994, a junior minister in the Tajik government met the 
National-Democratic opposition in Moscow. Both the senior echelons of the Tajik 
government and the Afghanistan wing of the UTO chose not to take part. Despite a 
lack of progress in negotiations, Rahmonov -  emboldened by the support he 
received from Russia -  chose to push on with elections. On 6 November 1994, in a 
simulation of democratic consent, the Kulobi Rahmonov defeated the Khujandi 
Abdullojonov, receiving 60% of the vote in an election which Helsinki Watch 
(1994) described as ‘marred by a climate of fear and flagrant fraud’.
Despite governmental intransigence, crucial signs o f movement towards an 
accord were visible in the background. The beginning of negotiations and the 
signing of a notional ceasefire had allowed the UN to introduce official observers in 
December 1994 with a view to ‘free and fair elections’.35 Before this, in Moscow, 
from March 1993, a second-track process o f facilitated negotiation, the Inter-Tajik 
Dialogue, began between junior figures and associates o f both sides, and 
independent representatives of the intelligentsia under the auspices of the non­
governmental Dartmouth Conference (Saunders 1999: 9). The dialogue was 
instrumental in creating some kind of organisational coherence among the opposition 
and providing the beginnings o f consensus across elites (Matveeva 2006; Saunders 
1999). However, official negotiations made little progress until developments in 
Afghanistan provided a sense of urgency for both sides. As the Taliban took Kabul 
in 1996 both Russia and Iran, who had become significant in the negotiations as a 
consequence o f sponsoring and supporting the IRP, pushed for resolution of the 
conflict. Breakthrough talks o f December 1996 were held in Afghanistan, under 
Mas’ud’s auspices; a ceasefire was agreed and a draft power-sharing arrangement 
discussed. In addition, by the winter of 1996/97 there was considerable ‘war 
weariness’ among Tajiks and the agreement made in Afghanistan had been 
foreshadowed by the ‘Gharm Protocol’, a ceasefire between local commanders on 19 
September 1996 (See Abdullo 2001; Whitlock 2002: 230-231). The effects of 
massive unemployment and hyper-inflation (over 2,000% in 1993) meant that
35 The UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was established on 16 December 1994 on 
renewable 6-month tours of duty as specified by a cease fire signed in Iran on 17 September 1994 and 
authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 968 (UNSC 1994). UNMOT’s mandate was renewed 
successively until the winding up of the mission in April 2000 and replacement by UNTOP.
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underdevelopment and the challenge o f ‘making ends meet’, rather than physical 
violence, had become the primary threat to survival by this time (Harris 1998: 660- 
661). While incidents of fighting continued over the winter there was widespread 
support for the peace agreement among soldiers and civilians.
2.2AL Agreement and Implementation, 1997-2000
The package of agreements and protocols constituting the General Agreement on the 
Establishment o f Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed on 27 June 
1997 in Moscow. A protocol on refugees was to facilitate the return o f refugees 
after 5 years exile in Afghanistan. The military protocol o f the agreement provided 
for a process o f Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) o f ex-UTO 
fighters into the armed forces. The political protocol established a basis for power- 
sharing in national and local government on a 70:30 split between the government 
and UTO, created a joint Central Election Commission (CEC), and agreed to the 
lifting of all restrictions on opposition parties following the completion of DDR. 
The implementation process was to be coordinated by a Commission on National 
Reconcilliation (CNR), composed equally o f government and UTO members and 
chaired by a UTO representative. The CNR would disband after the new parliament 
was reconvened.
At this stage it is important to assess the impact o f the accords on ending 
violence in Tajikistan. Iji contends that, while the peace agreement was not 
comprehensive, it did ‘put an end to the major armed conflict’ (Iji 2005: 189). 
However, four qualifications need to be made here. Firstly, major military activities 
continued after the accords, as further significant battles and systematic political 
violence took place at least until 2001. Secondly, the accords were limited 
agreements and reached only after heavy international pressure. Hay (2001) notes 
that the UN mediating team always drafted the initial texts of a protocol, 95% of 
which was accepted by the parties. According to Abdullaev and Barnes, ‘the 
agreements represented the minimum point o f consensus between the negotiators at 
the time they were drafted and did not attempt to provide a normative blueprint for 
the future’ (2001: no pagination). Thirdly, their content represented an inter-elite 
‘compromise’ which mirrored the dominance of the civil war’s victors, the Kulobi 
factions around Rahmonov. In other words, the winners further institutionalised
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their victory by severely restricting the political position of UTO groups, and 
succeeding in excluding the Khujondi faction. Finally, the peace agreement 
contained an informal political and economic subtext which divided the (legal and 
illegal) resources of the country in favour of the Kulobi factions. ‘Divvying up the 
drug smuggling market,’ Matveeva remarks, ‘was perhaps an unwritten part o f the 
peace agreement, in which both sides had a share’ (2006: 20). Nevertheless, while 
the 1997 General Agreement did not itself resolve the conflict, it became an 
important symbol of compromise between elites and a crucial foundation for 
legitimate government. It continues to be affirmed by elites on all sides as the basis 
for the peace which must continue to be preserved (See Seifert & Kraikemayer
2003).
Implementation of the accords was inconsistent. In keeping with the general 
agreement, UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri took charge o f the CNR. Strong progress 
was made on the repatriation of refugees from Afghanistan with the deteriorating 
condition there and the new optimism in Tajikistan producing both ‘carrot and stick’ 
incentives to return. Tens of thousands were repatriated with the assistance of the 
United Nations (UN Mission of Observers to Tajikistan [UNMOT] and UNHCR) 
and Russian forces (both border guards and CIS peacekeepers). However, progress 
was much slower and weaker with respect to the protocol on military issues. The 
disarmament stage of this process was due to take just two months, with ex-opposition 
fighters assembling at specified points to deliver their arms to be held in secure depots. 
In actuality this proved unrealistic. From the early stages o f the process the UNMOT 
officers noticed a ‘discrepancy between registered fighters and the weapons 
returned’ (Cited in Conrad 1999: 3). By the end of 1998 the CNR announced the 
registration of 6,238 opposition fighters and 2,119 weapons handed in; approximately a 
ratio of 3 fighters for every weapon. In August 1999 the official disarmament process 
was declared complete, thus allowing for the legalisation of opposition parties, 
although only a minority of the weapons thought to be held by opposition forces had 
been handed in. President Rakhmonov stated that, ‘no one knows the number of 
weapons. You [unspecified, probably referring to the Opposition] have hidden them’ 
(Cited in ibid: 3). With security limited, pro-governmental commanders remained 
armed and organised, with areas o f Dushanbe divided between them (Chatteijee 2002: 
74). Nevertheless the process continued and by March 2000, 4,498 UTO fighters had
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been integrated into the armed forces, largely within their own separable units (Abdullo 
2001).
Implementing the Political Protocol was an equally troubled process. At a 
national level the 70:30 split was broadly achieved with inter alia Turajonzoda taking 
the position of first vice-premier and the UTO military commander, Mirzo Ziyoev, 
appointed to head the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MCHS), a ‘power’ ministry 
with its own troops. At the local level, the redistribution of posts was less extensive, 
heavily complicated by localised loyalties and intra-regional rivalries. Writing in 1999, 
former US Ambassador to Tajikistan R. Grant Smith noted that,
The government and its strongmen feel they won the civil war and see little need to 
make more than cosmetic concessions on the power-sharing issue. The UTO field 
commanders for their part, want to firmly establish their power based in UTO- 
controlled territory (Smith, RG. 1999: 247).
The process was further complicated by periodic localised outbreaks o f violence 
between warlords and by the re-emergence of a ‘third force’ which had been explicitly 
excluded from the official negotiations. Former Prime Minister Abdullojonov, 
operating from outside the country, established the National Reconciliation Movement 
with allies from the northern area of Khujond, and predicted the failure of the peace 
accords due to their lack of support from Khujondis. When the commander o f the 
government’s First Rapid Reaction Brigade, Mahmud Khudojberdiev, rebelled against 
the government and then made an incursion into the north of the country in November 
1998, with an attack on Khujond, the country’s second city, collusion with 
Abdullojonov was alleged by the government. Over 1,000 troops briefly occupied the 
centre of Khujond, the country’s second city, before being driven out by a major 
government offensive involving the troops of Suhrob Qosimov (MVD) and Mirzo 
Ziyoev (MCHS) who had been on opposing sides before the peace agreement.
Despite numerous crises, momentum in the implementation process was 
maintained towards presidential and parliamentary elections in November 1999 and 
February 2000 respectively. Rahmonov’s re-election as president with 97% of the vote 
on a 99% turnout was implausible but was not popularly challenged. Although the IRP 
had great difficulty in registering its candidate, Davlat Usmon, it was clear that 
Rahmonov would probably have won anyway by a comfortable margin (Akiner 2001: 
59). In parliamentary elections, the President’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won
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a clear majority of 36 out of 51 seats, with the IRP -  the only opposition party to gain 
seats -  gaining just two (ibid). The elections signified the end of the implementation 
phase, underscored the dominance of the governing elite, and exhibited a factionalised 
opposition which was simultaneously ‘included’ within the political system and yet 
marginalised from real power. A new hegemony was gradually being established 
under Rahmonov, yet ‘national unity’ remained contingent. As Khodjibaeva noted at 
the time with respect to national televison, ‘the smallest mistake in editorial policy 
could cause a new explosion’ (1999: 15). This was the situation at the beginning of our 
period of analysis.
2.2JiL Emerging Peace: 2000-2005
While the 1993-1997 peace process provided a juridical ‘peace’ with the UTO, and the 
1997-2000 period extended the empirical ‘peace’ across elite factions (who were now 
largely either co-opted or controlled by the regime), it was the period 2000-2005 where 
a greater ‘peace’ was achieved. The year 2000 brought the creation of the UN 
Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) by Security Council mandate, to replace 
UNMOT, in order ‘to consolidate peace and promote democracy’ (UN Security 
Council 2000). The OSCE also shifted its focus towards peacebuilding issues such as 
security sector reform and support for political parties. However, the way that peace 
has been consolidated is often diametrically opposed to international norms. This brief 
sketch provides an introduction to the period 2000-2005 which occupies this study.
The period has seen the increasing political dominance of Rahmonov’s 
Danghara clique, as the 70:30 split of posts between government and opposition was no 
longer maintained with few former-opposition figures still in position. A June 2003 
referendum served to change the constitution in fifty areas including most crucially 
allowing 2 seven-year presidential terms, raising the possibility o f Rahmonov staying in 
office until 2020. However, this shrinking of the circle o f power has primarily involved 
much work behind the scenes, including the use o f kompromat (‘compromising 
materials’, for political pressure) to force out dissenters. Targets included both 
opposition figures from the war, most prominently Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, the leader 
of the DP and ex-commander from the Tajikobad district of Rasht valley, and some of 
President Rahmonov’s closest allies, including Ghaffor Mirzoyev, the commander of
36 By 2005, the only prominent oppositionist still in position was Mirzo Ziyoev, Minister of 
Emergency Situations. A few others held junior posts at central or provincial levels.
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the presidential guard. Quantitative data provide further evidence of this trend to 
increasing authoritarianism. Freedom House’s index reports that Tajikistan remained 
firmly within its ‘not free’ category for both civil liberties and political rights across the 
period, 2001-2006 (7 = most unfree; 1 = most free). As shown in fig. 7 below, despite 
marginal improvements as the peace treaty was implemented after 1997, since 2001 
there has been a gradual yet consistent increase in authoritarianism.
Fig. 7: Nations in Transit Democracy Score, Freedom House, 1997- 2006
1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Democracy score 
[7 = least free;
1 = most free]
6.20 5.95 5.75 5.58 5.63 5.63 5.71 5.71 5.93
The nature of this form of domination by an increasingly exclusive section of elites will 
be examined in chapter five.
The 2000-2005 period has also seen a notable decline in political violence. In 
1999 and 2000, fighters of the Islamic Movement o f Uzbekistan (IMU) made 
substantial incursions from temporary bases in Tajikistan into neighbouring Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan. At least two districts of the country -  Darband and Tavildera -  were 
dominated by warlords, and are thought to have provided support for IMU activities. 
Violence, largely around criminal activities, was frequent in the Rasht valley as a whole 
including the kidnapping of foreigners, violence around the trafficking o f drugs and 
rivalries between groups. Across the country during the 2000 elections violence killed 
a total o f 19, including 2 candidates (OSCE/ODIHR 2000). However, these groups 
cannot be said to have been acting ‘independent of the authorities’ but rather 
overlapped with the state as their members often held positions within state structures. 
Gradually, the Rahmonov regime has further co-opted these groups or has suppressed 
renegade elements that have become an embarrassment or impediment to their 
hegemony, for example in the final battles of the conflict against Rakhmon Sanginov 
and Mullo Abdullo in 2001. The annihalation of these two warlords and their groups 
represents the re-centralisation of military forces to Dushanbe that has characterised the 
period. This correlates with far less political or open violence in the Rasht valley which 
is now firmly under government control. However, as will be discussed in chapter six, 
this is more a process of the changing dynamics of securitisation than it is one of DDR.
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Moreover, despite this reduction in political violence across the country, violence 
continues in the family and home.37 This is emblematic o f Tajikistan’s ‘peace’.
Tajik society is highly stratified with extreme, apparently increasing, inequality. 
Over this period the Tajik economy achieved impressive formal rates of economic 
development and rises in GDP per capita (see fig. 8). However, these figures are hardly 
representative of the real economy of the country. They do not capture the cotton 
business and narcotics trafficking through which elites can make huge profits while the 
poor and children are forced into unpaid labour, nor the combination of subsistence 
agriculture, labour migration and shuttle-trading through which the poor seek to earn a 
living. Outward seasonal migration by males, largely to Russia, is highly significant 
in Tajikistan. Figures gathered by the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) estimate that anywhere between 0.6 and 1.2 million left the country for work 
between 2001 and 2002 (Olimova and Bose 2003). Significantly, these numbers 
suggest that perhaps around a half o f men of fighting age may be abroad for a 
significant period over the course of a year. Whitlock notes, ‘in the new century far 
more Tajiks went to Russia than had ever done so during the days of the Soviet 
Union’ (2002: 266). Aid is a huge part of gross national income (GNI) and remains a 
staple for those Tajiks who remain in the country (see fig. 8). According to Harris, 
large aid flows into an impoverished and resource-poor economy has meant that by 
the late-1990s, ‘dependence on Moscow has largely been replaced by reliance on the 
International Community’ (1998: 668-669). Despite substantial international 
assistance, peaking in the period 2000-2002, the evidence o f socio-economic 
progress is equivocal. Figures from the UNDP’s human development index after 2000 
indicate a decline in Tajikistan’s human development in 200338 which compares with 
the drop in life expectancy indicated in the table below, and household surveys which 
indicate a rise in poverty in recent years (Olimova and Bose 2003; Babajanian 2004). 
As explored in chapter seven, a reliance on international aid remains a feature but 
one which can be manipulated locally by those in positions o f power.
37 Domestic violence is extremely high in Tajikistan. Empirical studies support these observations, 
suggesting that around 50% of women in Tajikistan may suffer from domestic violence of some kind. 
See Haarr (2005).
38 From 2001 to 2003 (the latest available data), Tajikistan’s human development index fell from 
0.677 to 0.652 (where 1 is highest, 0 is lowest). This equated to a slip in the rankings from 112 to 122 
in the world. However, this data should be taken with caution as much of the raw data comes from 
the state statistical committee (UNDP 2003,2005).
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Fig.8: Basic social and economic data, Tajikistan, 1997-2003 (Source: U N D P 2005)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Life expectancy at 
birth, total (years)
67.2 67.5 67.4 67.6 68.3 68.6 63.6
Population, total 
(millions)
5.9 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.4
GDP growth (annual 
%)
1.7 5.3 3.7 8.3 10.2 9.1 10.2
GDP per capita, PPP 
(current international 
US$)
630 660 690 760 850 930 1,040
Aid (% of GNI) 9.77 12.71 11.88 13.35 16.79 14.31 9.85
2.3. Reviewing w ar and peace: academic analyses
Analyses of war and peace often seek to reduce the building of peace to 
‘peacebuilding’. Some of this work, which constitutes the primary lens through 
which Tajikistan is seen by international actors, nevertheless provides useful insights 
and empirical data. It will be considered in chapter four as part of a constitutive 
framework for understanding the country’s peace. This final section o f this chapter 
discusses an academic literature on Tajikistan which, in Chatteijee’s 
characterisation, ‘is no longer scanty but scattered’ (Chatteijee 2002b: 11). Away 
from the centres of the International Community we find analyses which question 
these assumptions via alternative problem-solving and critical academic discourses. 
They offer dissenting opinions on the beginning and ending o f the Tajik conflict in 
terms of hegemony, legitimacy and complexity. Moreover, this literature provides 
insights regarding how a broader understanding of the Tajik peace can be 
reconstructed.
2.3.L Hegemony: political-realist and institutionalist explanations
The importance o f hegemony in making war and building peace is evinced by 
accounts o f war-starting which emphasise the breakdown o f central government, and 
those o f war ending that emphasise its restitution. Rubin argues it is the combination 
of weak centralising institutions with weak national identity that lies behind the 
failure to prevent conflict. It was these factors that forced Tajiks to fall back on their 
local, often kolkhoz-based, solidarity groups. ‘Civil peace is not the direct result o f 
social peace,’ he argues, ‘it results from a state apparatus and economy capable of
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supplying sufficient incentives and sanctions to manage social tensions’ (Rubin 
1998: 139). Under the Soviet system, civil peace ‘depended on the stable functioning 
o f the administrative-command economy, the monopoly o f power by the party, and 
the latter’s ability to coordinate the apparatuses of production, surveillance, and 
repression’ (p. 140). To resolve conflict, Tajikistan requires a ‘strong state’, which 
‘can promote civic nationalism by integrating citizens into its institutions and 
protecting their autonomous activity in civil society’ (p. 139). By the late 1990s, 
according to Rubin, Tajikistan had become a Russian ‘garrison state’, where stability 
was a product of an imposed Leviathan. He contends that ‘only intervention by the 
International Community, in this case a far from disinterested action by Russia and 
Uzbekistan,’ he contends, ‘enabled one faction to consolidate power, which it shows 
every sign o f monopolising’ (Rubin 1998: 71).
Institutionalist analyses complement Rubin’s account. Jones-Luong’s 
influential analysis of transition in Central Asian states provides a neo-institutionalist 
explanation for the continuance of regionalism based around Soviet administrative 
boundaries. Thus, intra- and inter-regional patronage networks are not evidence of 
post-Soviet regression but the legacy of a system in which, ‘the boundary between 
state and society was purposefully blurred in accordance with the vision o f creating a 
heroic-Leninist state’ (2004: 24).39 Her model o f the transitional bargaining game 
outlines a pact-making process where perceptions of power determine the extent of 
the challenge that regional factions may pose to the regime. In Tajikistan, the 
opposition saw ‘an opportunity to challenge the regional power-sharing system 
instituted under Soviet rule’ (Jones-Luong 2002: 274). She notes, ‘the continuation 
of regionalism, therefore, was crucial to maintaining the power base, and hence, 
political and economic status’ (p. 101). The importance o f competition among 
regional patronage networks in Tajikistan’s civil has been confirmed by other 
accounts, including that of Markowitz, also from a neo-institutionalist perspective, 
which illustrates the importance o f economic rivalries between ‘strongmen’ in the 
region o f Kurghon Teppa (Markowitz 2005).
Collins provides an institutionalist account o f inter-clan warfare which at first 
sight takes culture seriously but ultimately falls back on a rational actor model. She 
suggests that regionalism in Tajikistan is actually an expression of the informal
39 The reference to ‘heroic’ state is interesting here as it suggest a role for representation which is de­
emphasised elsewhere in Jones-Luong’s (2002,2004) work.
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institutions o f the clan. Clans, she argues, are institutionally constituted based on 
the practices of kinship relations and networked ties. Thus, rather than attributing to 
‘clan’ either a primordial or imagined quality, Collins sees the clan as a rational and 
functional social institution: the clan network. This leads to a regime type which she 
defines as ‘clan hegemony, or government by clan hegemonial regime’ (2001: 5, 7). 
The strength o f Collins approach is that by considering the political functions of 
social and cultural practices and images she is able to look at the positive 
dimensions, even ‘rationality’, o f politics under the so-called weak state. However, 
she finds agency resting solely with clan elites who use their manipulation o f official 
resources in the space of the state in order to build legitimacy within clans and make 
deals with other, well-disposed clan elites. The state, civil society organisations, 
political parties and other formal structures become facades: ‘clan hegemony is 
concerned less with state as state, than with a governing process in which competing 
clan networks are kept together, within the state, through a process of division and 
distribution o f resources amongst dominant clans’ (p. 141). Academic writing from 
a ‘state failure’ perspective here dovetails with policy-prescriptive texts on 
‘statebuilding’ to produce a powerful discourse which comprises the dominant 
international perspective on post-Soviet conflict and political change at the time of 
writing (Hughes and Sasse 2001; Beissinger and Crawford 2002; Jones-Luong 
2004).
Despite her emphasis on the triumph of informal structures, Collins is 
ultimately excessively phenomenological herself, failing to acknowledge the 
expressive or imagined value o f the tropes o f ‘state’, ‘nation’ and even ‘civil society’ 
under clan regimes. In her reading, clans remain juxtaposed as traditional 
alternatives to democratisation, and symptomatic of democracy’s absence in Central 
Asia. This leads to a very bleak reading of Tajik stability. In 2003 she argued that 
‘a new but related cycle o f violence has begun’ due largely to the failure o f the peace 
process to integrate clans (Collins 2003: 268). Thus, she contends, the 1997 peace 
agreement or ‘clan pact’ is even more contested than the failed pre-conflict 
arrangements of 1991, and, as a clan hegemony, acts to exclude other clans from a 
share of the spoils. Having diverged at independence, the dominance o f clans in 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will lead them to converge ‘towards 
unconsolidated and unstable hegemonial regimes’ -  the least stable o f which, she 
argues, is Tajikistan (2001:.16, 382-383). Here, Collins rather over-reaches in her
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analysis and obscures key differences between these contexts which may be 
expressed in the character of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ that she implies are marginal or 
irrelevant. Moreover, Tajikistan has stabilised and remains distinct from both 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, both of which have suffered from significant instability 
and political violence since 2002/2003. Her analysis leaves unanswered the central 
question o f how stable governance may be established in the medium- to long-term 
under a clan hegemonial regime in context of a weak Tajik state.
These problems reflect assumptions common across neo-institutionalism 
where meaningful political trends are rational, observable and quantifiable. 
Thinking more deeply about why a rational actor account provides an inadequate 
explanation of political power is instructive to a better reading o f the Tajik conflict. 
Both Collins and Jones-Luong disappoint in their instrumentalist narrative of identity 
formation (Collins: 20003: 48). Here, the clan vs. country dilemma is resolved in 
the argument that ‘clan’ or ‘region’ is the provider o f livelihoods, social position and 
protection. It becomes the basis for identity and the functional unit for political life. 
Meanwhile, ‘state’ and ‘nation’ are irrational or artificial edifices that conceal the 
real vehicle for furthering political and economic interests: the network, which for 
Collins is expressed as the ‘clan’. However, such neat rationalisations can be 
problematic. Their relegation of the formal to a facade, and the state to merely an 
arena for the struggle of networks/clans, seems to neglect the importance o f modem, 
Soviet-era images and identities to the practice of hegemonic formations (Naumkin 
2005: 234-235). As Surucu notes, in a review of Jones-Luong’s influential work, 
‘identities are not such neatly demarcated and exclusionary categories in the minds 
of those who hold them. Our subjects are not trained comparativists and have every 
right to be non-conformist’ (2004: 28-29). Hegemony is not just a material- 
institutional phenomenon, but one which is reproduced in the way it is imagined, 
enacted and discursively performed.
2.3AL Legitimacy, Culture and the State
Forms of representation in particular are fundamental to the continued existence of 
any state, and hence an important dynamic in its institutional decay and 
transformation. Collins’ ‘clans’ and Jones-Luong’s ‘regions’ are not simply 
institutions but are maintained by shared ideas and ideals among group members.
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However, this raises a wider question of how the regime has gained legitimacy both 
locally and globally.
Lynch uses Holsti’s two levels of legitimacy to introduce this concept to 
Tajikistan (Lynch 2001: 51; Holsti 1996: 84). He argues that the Tajik state in 2001 
enjoyed significant legitimacy domestically and internationally. ‘The absence of 
conflict over the fundamental idea of Tajikistan, its territory, Tajik boundaries and 
citizens,’ he argues, ‘had created enough common ground between the parties for 
progress in the peace process’ (2001: 51). This crucially brings the state back in as a 
factor in the making o f peace, and, to go further, helps explain how regional 
rivalries, which so occupy Jones-Luong and Collins, might be contingent upon forms 
o f representation and practices o f network formation within the state. While Lynch 
does not take Tajikistan’s weak legitimacy to be an enduring basis for peace -  
writing in 2001, he feared, curiously, that violent conflict may return at any time 
(p.51, 69) -  his analysis indicates both the constitutive role o f legitimation in 
building peace, and also the different spaces or dimensions of that process. The 
norms through which the Tajik state is being legitimated among elites and citizens, 
are quite different to those upon which it is being legitimated internationally. To 
fully understand the character o f these processes o f legitimation one must bring 
culture to the centre o f analysis.
Few interpreters o f the Tajik peace take culture seriously in their analysis. 
Nourzhanov’s work is an exception. He provides a detailed account o f the role of 
warlords in the weak Tajik state in the course and aftermath of the war. Power, 
wealth and honour interconnect in the noticeably modem discourses o f warlords. 
Yakubjohn Salimov, a warlord who served as Minister of Interior, from 1993 to 
1995, claimed that ‘the goal o f our enemies was not simply to destroy the statehood 
of our people, but its honour as well’ (cited in Nourzhanov 2005:114). This 
represents, Nourzhanov notes, ‘the transposition of family-related concepts and 
values on the general body politic’ (p. 114). Thus, post-war Tajik politics, he argues, 
function much the same as during the war, where ‘commanders continue to be 
warlords first and foremost, and loyal cogs of the national executive machine a 
distant second (p. 124). It may be wrong to assume that warlordism is declining, he 
argues, when ‘it remains an important mechanism of regime survival on the one 
hand and an instmment o f mass mobilisation by opposition forces on the other hand’
(p. 126).
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However, Nourzhanov points out a peculiar feature among Tajik warlords: 
their statism -  their propensity to be co-opted and controlled by the growing and 
strengthening Tajik state. He claims that they thus represent, ‘a different category o f 
warlords who do not so much confront or tolerate the state, but work in partnership 
with it’ (p.111). Moreover, they ‘have been instrumental in restoring the collapsed 
state in Tajikistan; on many occasions they worked on its behalf propping up 
centralised government at the national level’ (ibid.). What explains Tajikistan’s 
statist warlords? According to Nourzhanov, they remain ‘autonomous agents’ 
whose legitimacy often coincides with national elites who represent the same sub­
national community (ibid.). This echoes Collins’ assumption that Tajiks are clan 
members first and citizens of the state second. However, given the course of Tajik 
political development this argument is problematic. While a small circle has come 
to control the key power positions and access to resources at the expense of ex-PFT 
and ex-UTO warlords, this has not led to popular resentment or mass mobilisation of 
those from other regions behind ‘their’ warlords. It remains unclear why this is the 
case; perhaps the relationship between state and clan is more ambiguous than 
Nourzhanov suggests.
2.3.UL Complexity: the differentiation of space
An explanation for this may begin in the fact that discursive and practical 
legitimation is necessarily complex, containing multiple discourses at multiple 
levels.
Three ‘Levels local, elite and international
Roy offers a subtle reading of the informal structures o f Tajikistan’s local spaces, 
arguing that the Tajik conflict must be seen as a distinctly post-Soviet conflict 
reflecting a re-constitution of Soviet-era regionalism.40 He points out that Gharmi 
and Kulobi factions fought together in the Basmachi Islamist revolts o f the 1920s, 
and that Mullahs were allied with Soviet-era administrators on both sides of the 
conflict (Roy 2000: 46-49, 95; Roy 1998: 134-135). Rather collective farm units 
(kolkhoz and sovkhoz) were ‘tribalised’ as ‘new recompositions of solidarity groups
40 That he was the head of the OSCE in Tajikistan between 1995 and 1997 illustrates something of the 
limits of peacebuidling discourse in the International Community (Roy 2000).
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resulting from sedentarism or population transfers’ (Roy 2000: 88). Thus tribal 
identity did not have a primordial value but was given social and political meaning 
by the migrations. Under the Soviet system, administrative structure provided the 
vehicles for political advancement and, to some extent, enrichment. Within and 
between politico-administrative regions, these recomposed tribal groupings fought 
for power -  a process known locally as ‘regionalism’ (mestnichestvo [ru]; 
mahalgera’y  [tj]). It is in this sense that Roy labelled Tajikistan, ‘the war of the 
kolkhoz’ (p. 94-96). For example, during the 1992 battle in the Vakhsh valley 
between the Gharmi-dominated Turkmenistan kolkhoz and Kulobi-dominated 
Moskwa kolkhoz, the border between the collective farms was the frontline in the 
fighting. When the Gharmis were defeated in November 1992 it was minority 
Kulobis from Turkmenistan kolkhoz, that had fled to ally with Moskva, who then 
returned with a number o f Kulobi allies to lead the kolkhoz, with the Gharmis who 
remained as their labourers. When Gharmi refugees returned, aided by UNHCR, 
they similarly took up lowly positions under their new Kulobi masters. ‘Thus what 
one had here,’ he notes, ‘was the reconstitution of a social differentiation arising out 
o f the combined effects o f war, predation and neo-tribalism’ (p. 95). This kind o f re­
continuity raises important questions about the terms under which the defeated came 
to accept their subordination.
The beginnings o f an answer might be found in how the micro-level is linked 
to a meso-level o f hegemony. Roy highlights state-national elite spaces as a crucial 
dimension, through which localism’s dynamics become explicable (p. 98). Long­
term political success is only possible through a solidarity group at the national level 
of the interpersonal network, which extends across tribal and regional divisions. 
Political status and economic interests were maintained and enhanced by networks 
‘created around leading public figures or important families’, often sealed with 
intermarriage (p. 99). ‘At this level’, Roy argues, rather than being seen as an 
economic grouping, ‘the much decried mafia can be seen as another solidarity group 
orientated towards “business’” (p. 99). Such elite networks can equally be orientated 
towards politico-administrative control or military action, as was the case during the 
civil war. As in other Central Asian republics, Roy observes that ‘the state 
machinery manages localism by sharing out important posts or by according a 
degree of autonomy to the local level’ (p. 143). Post-conflict institution-building has 
been pursued in this fashion according to the emergence of reconstituted post-Soviet
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identities. However, it is not just elite cooperation over material resources that 
constitutes the Tajik peace but also public adherence to a set of common 
representations. As Khodjibaeva notes, ‘a “television reconciliation” between the 
two sides is more important than anything else’ (1999: 15).
However, there is a further, international dimension to this process. The 
region of Central Asia, including the dominant role o f Russia, is primary here and 
can be considered a separable sub-system or imagined regional community (see 
Chapter 4.3.iii). The actors of the global International Community conduct a very 
different form o f international engagement. Given the vagaries of the Tajik state, 
Weigman notes, the post-conflict process in Tajikistan has produced ‘hybrid 
institutional arrangements consisting o f formal and informal sets o f rules’ (Weigman 
2004: 2). This ‘statehood-building’ process takes many different forms with local 
and international actors helping produce the output of state (p. 2). This implies that 
many o f the resources required to render patronage are provided by ‘external’ actors 
which may play a greater ‘internal’ role than the state itself. By working within this 
process of the re-institutionalisation o f statehood, Western donors, UN agencies and 
the OSCE also contribute to ‘peacebuilding’ -  the restoration of hegemonic politics 
and statehood. They are producing new rules of the game, new modes of consent, 
and new spaces for politics. To understand the Tajik ‘peace’ better we must 
understand how it is differentially legitimated in its local, state-national and 
international dimensions.
From ambivalence to ambiguity?
Such a complex picture belies any attempt to derive a uni-drectional set of factors 
driving conflict transformation. Dudoignan, more promisingly, considers how 
political culture has been ambivalently reconstituted via countervailing local and 
international factors (Dudoignan 1998: 58, 52). This brings us back to question the 
strict separation of different ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ legitimacies. As 
international actors became increasingly involved in Tajikistan during the conflict 
this provided a further set of tropes to practice. The domination and subjection of 
the Tajik political elite to foreign powers -  be they neo-Soviet or neoliberal -  has 
arguably institutionalised contemporary contradictions. In the medium term then it 
might be that the key characteristic of ‘peacebuilding’ is the journey o f Tajikistan’s
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political system ‘from current ambivalence to future ambiguity’ (p. 58, 52). 
Dudoignan defines ambivalence here as ‘an attitude characterised by a special ability 
to integrate alien ideological mottos, and to play simultaneously different, sometimes 
openly contradictory registers of discourse if  not of thought’ (2004: 122). It is this 
ambivalence which allows the Tajik political elite to simultaneously participate in 
international peacebuilding and elite mahalgera’y, and may account for ‘the capacity 
o f the regime bom from the Soviet period and the civil war to integrate those alien 
elements which are estimated [to be] too dynamic to be let out o f state structures’ 
(p. 134). It is the relationships built where multiple ‘levels’ o f governance meet, we 
might infer, which reproduces the ‘peace’.
This analysis has radical repercussions for our understanding of Tajikistan’s 
‘peace’. Such ambivalence allows for different ‘clan’ or ‘regional’ groups to find 
their own ‘niche inside the state apparatus and state-owned economic system’ 
(p. 135). I f  the International Community were to attempt to force through neoliberal 
reforms -  to make the state technically and rationally more effective -  such as the 
reduction o f the bloated public sector, it might jeopardise the peace. Dudoignan 
notes that ‘these purely accounting concerns of international organisations rarely 
take into account the decisive functions of the abundant administrative body: it has 
permitted the Tajik state to integrate at very low cost, large segments o f the society 
into the overall system of social networking’ (p. 146). In particular the ‘non­
coordinated and often redundant’ role o f overseas aid ‘has accentuated the attitude of 
ambivalence of the Tajik authorities, which had a long habit of dealing with 
contradictory and unconsequent [sic.] demands from Moscow during the late Soviet 
period’ (p. 137). This leads to perestroika-style ‘reforms’, involving ‘a cosmetic 
commitment to norms enunciated by the international agencies coupled with a total 
lack of political will for change’ (ibid). More fundamental changes are required to 
achieve reforms but, intimates Dudoignan, it is cosmetic changes that satisfy 
international actors (p.139-140). His analysis raises the prospect o f a ‘peace’ where 
reform is simulated internationally whilst corruption is practised among local actors.
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Conclusions
If  the events o f the Tajik conflict themselves are contingent and complex, the writing 
o f them is barely a simpler endeavour. Taken together, the writing of Tajikistan’s 
peace presents a very complicated discursive picture, with dominant peacebuilding 
discourses (discussed in chapter 4) and disciplinary academic ones building on and 
reacting to one another. These discourses are inter-textually linked. Moreover, 
whilst this chapter, for heuristic purposes, has separated the practising o f history 
from its writing, I would argue that they are inherently linked. Influential English- 
language reports and journalistic accounts, undoubtedly feed back into the practices 
o f international actors, donor priorities and foreign policies decisions -  as will be 
shown in chapters four to seven. The academic analyses discussed above provide a 
window on political development yet, in themselves, remain only marginal as a 
constitutive agent o f change. Therefore, the focus of chapters three and four will be 
the identification and location o f hegemonic discourses that actually constitute 
political action among internationals, elites and their subordinates.
The history o f the Tajik war and peace process is a highly contingent and 
complex affair which has been reduced here to a processional narrative. This review 
o f the writing and practising of history has provided insight into the differences and 
similarities between war and ‘peace’ in Tajikistan and thus the character of 
‘peacebuilding’. Regionalism is the most significant feature of this process. It was 
groups divided on a regional basis that confronted one another during the fall o f the 
Soviet Union and took up arms against one another during the war (section 2.1). It 
was regionalism that provided the basis for a new hierarchy with cadres from Kulob, 
particularly Danghara, in the ascendancy during the transition from war to ‘peace’ 
(section 2.2). International academic discourse shows that regionalism still provides 
the primary cleavages in Tajik politics yet it is somehow held in check by an 
increasingly legitimate state in a complex, multi-level environment (sections 2.3). 
So a key question becomes: how has the character of regionalism changed from war 
to ‘peace’? Moreover, how has a destructive competitive regionalism transformed to 
a cooperative one despite the hegemony of a particular regional clique? In 
beginning to answer these questions we must depart from the assumption of a single, 
correct mode o f peacebuilding and a shift to a consideration o f how legitimacy is 
inter-subjectively composed.
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CHAPTER THREE
Complex Legitimacy: dimensions of analysis and evaluation
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only 
weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces 
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive 
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance 
whose function is repression.
-Michel Foucault (1980:122)
This thesis addresses both peace and power. Like peace, power is frequently used 
metaphorically to provide ‘a misleadingly narrow approach to understanding modem 
methods o f domination’ (Mitchell 1990: 545). Chapters one and two sought to 
deconstruct international peacebuilding by revealing its discursive dimensions and 
contrasting it with the actual case o f building peace in Tajikistan. Reconsidering 
peace, as both a concept and a form of praxis in Tajikistan, requires us to go beyond 
peacebuilding’s neoliberal frame of reference and investigate the multiple 
dimensions o f power (Lukes 2005) which this frame obscures.
This chapter builds upon the discussion of discourse and hegemony in 
chapters one and two to develop a new approach to thinking about peacebuilding as 
a process of legitimation, which must be understood inter-subjectively in terms of 
discourse, politics and space. In a case involving international intervention, 
legitimacy is not simply based on a social contract between the government and the 
governed, but is constituted alongside international actors, regionally and 
internationally. These interventions not only disburse material resources but throw 
into the fray new political ideas and symbols. They have direct and indirect 
consequences for political dynamics.
I develop peace as complex legitimacy in three stages. Section one explains 
how discourse analysis can provides a new basis for understanding war-to-peace 
transitions. Section two insists on political analysis and introduces and qualifies 
David Beetham’s work as a conceptual basis for thinking o f peacebuilding as the 
discursive, inter-textual legitimation of power. The third section develops this 
further by elaborating three spatial dimensions of legitimacy and consequently 
reworking Beetham’s account of legitimacy and its referent object, the state. It
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further develops three ‘levels’ to understand the building o f peace -  local 
(subordinate), elite and global -  that were raised at the end o f chapter two. Finally, 
section four reflects on where these three stages leave us in thinking about the state 
in the building o f peace.
3.1. Discourse: peacebuilding as practice
We have established that discourse analysis is a critical tool in deconstructing 
dominant readings of peace, and exploring the nature of hegemony. This first section 
extends this line o f argument to establish forms of representation, primarily 
discourse, as constitutive o f peace.
3.1.L The false dichotomy: beyond greed versus grievance
To embark on this process we must begin from the most basic dichotomy of social 
science: between epistemologies which give primacy to material things and those 
which privilege the power of ideals. In the case o f the former, the theorist can 
disregard the cultural context in favour o f a ‘materialist’ and ‘rationalist’ account o f 
what actors ‘actually do’. In the study of conflict it is best represented by literature 
on warlords, known as the greed approach. Secondly, and more commonly within 
the field of peace studies, is the track of identifying a single normative model fo r  
peace, and lately known as the grievance school. This section briefly illustrates the 
falseness of this dichotomy.
All about greed?
So-called materialist accounts of war and peace constitute a political economy or 
‘greed’ approach to conflict and have been heavily influenced by the neo­
institutionalism referred to in chapter two. Reno defines warlordism as existing in 
societies, under ‘shadow states’, where, ‘political authority and command over 
resources comes mainly through the decisions of specific individuals who act to 
serve the private interests, largely without regard for formal government institutions, 
rules and processes’ (Reno 1998: ix). Political economy analyses thus emphasise the 
market incentives and private interests of actors, focusing on how they use the cover 
of the state, and often international restructuring programmes, to rape the country’s 
natural resource base for personal profit. The ‘economic functions of violence’, as
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detailed by Keen, include ‘bottom-up’ economic violence such as pillage and the 
stealing of aid, and ‘top-down’ economic violence such as illicit trade and the 
redirection of state finances for personal accumulation or sectarian gain (Keen 
1998). Some analysts, most notably Collier (2000), have adopted a rational 
economic actor approach to conflict where entrepreneurs who do well out o f war are 
expected to seek its continuation. Others (Rich 1999; Reno 1998) have taken this 
further to argue that the public/political sphere is a mere shell for private economic 
interests. War here is, to innovate on Clausewitz, the continuation o f economics by 
other means (Keen 1998). Chabol and Daloz argue that this makes ideas the 
servants o f interests: ‘Beyond the many changes in ideology exhibited by political 
leaders o f which democratisation is perhaps the latest -  what is most noticeable is 
the unchanging nature o f their ties with society’ (Chabol and Daloz 1999: 2). Thus, 
the Tillyian maxim that states make war and war makes states does not work in the 
third world (Sorensen 2001).
Greed analyses, particularly the work o f Collier, have been increasingly 
popular in the International Community and have informed recent developments in 
peacebuilding, particularly statebuilding (Berdal 2005). This at first seems strange 
as international discourses are highly normative and value-laden, and thus not 
predisposed to economic analysis. However, their attraction can be explained by at 
least three factors. Firstly, ‘greed’ has utility: the act of reducing the complex to the 
simple -  in the form of graphs and charts -  provided policy-makers and social 
scientists with a means of prescribing and measuring solutions (Ballentine and 
Sherman 2003). Secondly, ‘greed’ corresponds with peacebuilding’s universal 
ethics as it portrays the contestation o f war as economic predation and deemphasises 
particular grievances which may convey alternative ethical positions against 
neoliberalism, be they religious or secular. Finally, ‘greed’ affirms peacebuilding’s 
tension with regard to the ideal-/enemy-other -  a valueless yet rational figure who 
may switch from predator to prospector under conditions o f democratisation or be 
declared a self-serving ‘spoiler’ who can justly be destroyed. Greed analysts thus 
offer a series o f recommendations for market regulation to break the predatory 
networks o f warlord groups. The International Community has taken on some of 
these recommendations in initiatives such as the Kimberly Process to curtail trade in 
conflict diamonds begun in 2003. While it is still too early to assess the strength of 
Kimberly it is clear that such approaches are subject to evasion and circumvention
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by local operators who resist legalisation and retain their power locally in ways more 
varied than can be accounted for in international regulations (Pugh and Cooper 2004: 
208-210).
All about grievance?
It is readily apparent that market regulation is in itself insufficient both as an 
explanation and as a prescription for the path from war to peace (Berdal 2005: 689). 
The work of David Keen has evolved from the political economy school, via 
Foucauldian insights, to understand conflict’s functionality more broadly. His later 
work on Sierra Leone (2001, 2002) has placed economic functions alongside 
political, security and, with Richards (1996), culturally-imbued psycho-social 
functions of conflict. These insights allude to Foucault’s ‘functions o f violence’ 
elaborated in his study of the Soviet gulag (Foucault 1988). What might be 
‘rational’ for economic purposes may be irrational for narrow political purposes; 
what might be ‘rational’ for psycho-social imperatives, within a certain cultural 
context, may be irrational in terms of economic gain or physical security. 
Accordingly, war becomes a system o f collusion in which power relations may play 
out differently in different aspects o f conflict (Keen 2000a: 2). While warring 
parties may be economic competitors, they may remain political allies, family or 
friends.
Such work highlights the multiple processes of subjectification inherent in 
war, particularly ethnic conflict. Materialist approaches o f economists and realists, 
in contrast, rather overlook the fact that in order to end violent conflict over the long 
term, control and cooption are not enough -  power must be legitimated. Beetham 
argues:
The effectiveness of the powerful, in other words, is not just a matter of resources 
and organisation, as the ‘realists’ would contend, but also of their legitimacy. The 
realists are at this point simply not realistic enough; they do not take people 
seriously as moral agents, or recognise that what the powerful can get others to do 
depends upon normative considerations as well as upon the resources and 
organisational capacities at their command (Beetham 1991: 20).
Human relationships, including those constituted within and between states, are 
conducted via texts and images as well as material exchange. Material power 
distribution can promote choices which conciliate as much as confront (which make
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states or break them) depending on the ideas, identities and relationships that 
interpret and give meaning to things.
However, there is a danger of swinging too far in the other direction and 
over-emphasising the role o f ‘values’ and ‘ideas’ as something which exist apart 
from their material significance. Any approach which discounts one in favour of the 
other, whether it be the materialism of ‘greed’ or the idealism of ‘peacebuilding’, 
distorts the picture of peace. One recent study (Ballentine 2003) examining the 
greed vs. grievance debate argued that theoretical frameworks must go beyond uni- 
causal or single paradigm approaches to conflict resolution. The editor concluded 
that ‘to view attempts at state capture simply as an economic agenda would deprive 
the concept of much of its explanatory utility, while also ignoring the degree to 
which political and economic agendas may in reality be mutually reinforcing’ 
(Ballentine 2003: 272). Alternatively, I would add, they may contradict and run in 
parallel. The greed literature at this point hits a dead-end, unable to explain the 
complexities of political violence. It offers compelling yet reductive descriptions of 
the context o f conflict via a merger of the realist notion o f the security dilemma with 
the economists’ idea o f market forces (Snyder and Robert 1999). It thus describes 
and prescribes certain actions within the rules of a wartime environment, but it is 
much less convincing when faced with the task of theorising the process o f moving 
from war to peace. Thus, we must go beyond greed and grievance. But, to where?
3. l.ii Discourse Analysis and the Study of Peace
Greed/grievance and material/ideal dichotomies are misleading. Moreover, the very 
dichotomy is ‘the very effect o f strategies of power’ (Mitchell 1990: 546). 
Discourse analysis denies these dichotomies. It provides not only critical insights 
but also underscores the way that ideas give meaning to, and are themselves given 
meaning by, events and their material consequences (Zehfuss 2001: 73). Since early 
overtures in the 1980s, discourse analysis has expanded as a meaningful approach to 
the study o f international relations, producing a wide variety o f accounts particularly 
in the studies o f foreign policy and security.41 It is a body of work which seeks to 
expose forms of signification, issues o f productivity (including the construction of
41 See Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), Campbell (1991), Checkel (1998) Der Derian and 
Shapiro (1989), George (1994), and Shapiro, Bonham and Heradstveit (1988).
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‘common sense’), and the complexity of practice in the domain o f hegemony and 
resistance (Milliken 1999). This has an under-explored relevance for the study of 
war and peace. Over recent years academics have begun to use discourse analysis as 
a means to better understand peace and the related concept o f security, following in 
the footsteps o f the empirical studies of David Campbell (1993; 1998a; 1998b) inter 
alia. Foremost amongst this emerging scholarship is the work o f Viviene Jabri and 
Lene Hansen.
Discourses o f Violence: the work o f Vivienne Jabri
To prioritise discourse is not to exclude the material dimension but to take a certain 
approach which interprets structures o f justification. One attempt to do this, via 
Giddens’ theory o f structuration, is Vivienne Jabri’s (1996), Discourses o f  Violence. 
To Jabri, violent conflict can be deconstructed as ‘a deeply embedded continuity 
reinforced through dominant discursive and institutional frameworks’ (p. 75) -  a 
constructed social reality. Discourses o f violence, she argues, assert hegemonic 
understanding o f mutually-exclusive and conflicting identities. Jabri thus links 
discourse to space.
Public space, it could be argued, is a realm of contestation for the production of 
dominant discourses. Such contestation draws upon the structural continuities of 
social systems in the reproduction or transformation of such systems. Power and 
domination cannot therefore be reduced to decisions taken in relation to specified 
targets. Such overt forms of power must also be seen in relation to more ‘hidden’ 
forms which, for example, allow certain discourses and self-definitions while 
rendering others irreversible and therefore beyond contestation. Such power runs 
silently through discursive and institutional practices and severely limits the 
transformative capacity of individuals and collectivities (p.83).
According to Jabri, the ‘discourse o f war’ is situated in relation to ‘structures o f 
domination and specifically the state as a social formation centrally implicated in the 
reproduction of violent political conflict’ (p.90). So discourses o f violence must be 
confronted at their root by discourses of peace. Such discourses o f peace would 
foster substantive dialogue and engender relational empathy between groups.
But there is a problem here. War, she argues, is a ‘social continuity’ which 
occurs ‘within discursive and institutional continuities which are drawn upon by 
actors in the reproduction o f social systems’ (p.90). This leads one to wonder 
whether the differences between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ are as marked as many argue.
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Exploring the transition from war to peace, Keen has asked with regard to the 
transition from war to peace, ‘how can one thing change into another... unless it has 
already begun to resemble it?’ (2000a: 1) In terms of discourse analysis this can be 
put another way: how do discourses of war become discourses o f peace? In other 
words, how do discursive complexes in support of ‘peace’ emerge out o f conflict? 
(Jabri 1996: 95)
Discourses o f Security: the work ofLene Hansen
Lene Hansen’s recently published Security as Practice, explores the relational 
character o f identities and how they produce, and are reproduced by, foreign policies 
via a study o f Western intervention and non-intervention in Bosnia (2006: 21). 
Hansen, from a post-structuralist perspective, argues that there is ‘no extra- or non- 
discursive realm of explanations from which one might construct competing 
explanations’ (p. 25). Thus representations, in discourse, move to the centre of our 
analysis and serve to distinguish ‘war’ from ‘peace’. However, while hegemonic 
discourses through their inter-textual linkages and ideological quality can develop 
considerable internal stability and resilience to shocks and failure, they are 
nevertheless related to policies in complex ways. They rarely lead directly to 
particular policies. Hansen’s argument is that policies with respect to security [or 
peace] are interdependent with widely shared beliefs about who ‘w e’ and ‘they’ are. 
Moreover, they ‘construct authority and employ forms of knowledge’ which 
maintain certain identities and ideas over others. As such political discourses have 
ethical, spatial and temporal dimensions -  as discussed in the case of peacebuilding 
in chapter one. Hansen, accordingly brings the discursive production and 
reproduction of ‘se lf to the centre o f foreign policy analysis. She distinguishes 
between studies of single and multiple ‘selves’, where a ‘se lf  is a spatially identified 
group with a common sense of identity (p.73). While a study of foreign policy (like 
Hansen’s own work) can be a single ‘se lf study, a study o f a peacebuilding process 
under international intervention (such as this dissertation) must explore relations 
between multiple ‘selves’.
One o f the strengths of Hansen’s work is its ability to expose the continuities 
and stabilities of discursive representation not as the result o f ‘ancient’ identities but 
via the process o f political and discursive reproduction. Novels and travel writing
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for example with romanticist portrayals of the region are, for example, cited in 
policy texts on the Balkans in the 1990s (pp. 148-178). In such a way the 
differences between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ are constantly being re-constituted. Moreover, 
any individual ‘se lf is necessarily an aggregation or reduction of a number of over­
lapping and inter-related identities. The single self which is the subject of Hansen’s 
study, ‘the W est’, is something of a meta-self. While all ‘selves’ are constructed 
amid a variety of competing social identities, it seems there is something more 
complex about a self which is itself composed across multiple political authorities. 
In Hansen’s work, much of the fluidity between Balkan (romanticist), humanitarian 
and genocide discourses and their positions on intervention to Bosnia derived from 
US/European divisions (pp. 115-147), to say nothing o f the differences between elite 
and popular perspectives within these two sub-selves. In a study o f a peacebuilding 
process it is particularly urgent to break down a single self and show the numerous 
‘selves’ across which conflict lines are drawn and peace is produced. What is 
required is an analytical framework to understand the discursive relationships 
between multiple ‘selves’, and thus discern shifts towards peace in post-conflict 
space.
3.1 Jii. Scott’s hidden transcripts: how many discourses?
The works o f Jabri and Hansen illustrate significant steps forward in the use of 
discourse to understand peace, security and foreign policy-making. However, as 
works of International Relations, they remain focused on elite discourse. In 
particular, they find it difficult to account for the micro-level of space and discourse; 
in other words they lack an anthropological perspective on world politics.
As discussed in chapter one, Scott introduces ‘subordinates’ as a meaningful 
category o f actor as they have ‘a fairly extensive social existence outside the 
immediate control of the dominant’ (1990: xi). Reading Scott alongside Lukes 
allowed us to consider the different forms and degrees hegemony might take. Here I 
elaborate on those insights to consider how we might interpret forms o f hegemony 
via discourse analysis. In order to do this we must differentiate in two ways: 
between subordinates and elites, and between public and hidden transcripts. The 
subordinate groups that Scott studies offer clear cases o f the repressed in situations 
o f ‘peace’ or stability: peasants, slaves, serfs, ‘untouchables’. However, despite such
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structural violence, Scott readily agrees that observable public conduct can often 
seem to affirm conformity and unity. Yet, for Scott, these ‘public transcripts’ offer 
‘an indifferent guide to the opinion of subordinates’ (p. 3). Thus he widens the 
scope of discourse analysis, making it more ethnographic and introducing the idea of 
the ‘hidden transcript’ which is ‘beyond direct observation by powerholders’ (p. 4). 
In such a way he uncovers ‘patterns of disguising ideological insubordination’ in the 
‘rumours, gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, jokes and theatre of the powerless’ (p. 
xiii). He thus creates four transcripts for analysis. In figure 9 below I distinguish 
them in terms of two ‘selves’ (1, a dominant group; and, 2, a subordinate group) and 
two spaces (A, public; and, B, hidden).
Fig. 9: Scott’s  differentiation of discourses
Dominant Subordinate
Public Transcript 1A Transcript 2A
Hidden Transcript 1B Transcript 2B
This has three important ramifications for the study of peace as complex 
legitimacy. Firstly, it allows us to reveal the multiplicities o f  peace. As Scott makes 
clear, public and hidden transcripts are dialectically related: ‘the practice of 
domination, then, creates the hidden transcript’ (p. 27).
Power relations are not, alas, so straightforward that we can call what is said in power­
laden contexts false and what is said offstage true. Nor can we simplistically describe 
the former as a realm of necessity and the latter as a realm of freedom. What is 
certainly the case, however, is that the hidden transcript is produced for a different 
audience and under different constraints of power than the public transcript. By 
assessing the discrepancy between the hidden transcript and the public transcript we 
may begin to judge the impact of domination on public discourse (p. 5).
This formulation is controversial in sociological literature. Tilly has noted that 
Scott’s work takes the hermeneutic tack in insisting on four transcripts, rather than 
the three supposed in the formulations of Gramsci and Foucault -  where a single 
public transcript is dominant -  while in practice seeming to replicate the three 
transcript model (1991: 593-602). This tension arises from the nature of Scott’s 
model where both the elite/subordinate and public/hidden divisions are dialectical 
under conditions of hegemony. In theory then they could be collapsed to a single 
transcript study (surely an unhelpful route), or equally expanded to include a
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proliferation of transcripts. As Tilly asks, who is to say how many there should be. 
‘Why not,’ he asks, ‘as many discourses as subordinates?’ (p.598) Later in this 
chapter I argue for a starting point of a minimum of six transcripts in the study of 
peacebuilding, although ultimately the answer here can only be justified in context. 
Assessing ambivalence among the elite, both national and international, and 
resignation among the subordinate, is vital for a fuller interpretation of cases of 
peacebuilding.
Secondly, Scott’s approach allows us to assess the role o f representation in 
building peace, and thus fundamentally reassess the dimensions o f  peace in terms of 
the affective and representational. He acknowledges that public transcripts are not 
simply incitements to dissonance but can limit that dissonance to the private, and 
exclude it from the public. They are themselves productive o f order, ‘peace’, and in 
certain circumstances legitimacy. Thus practices o f ‘symbolic display’ which extend 
beyond what Scott calls the ‘command performance of consent’ (1990: 17, 20) 
become central to constructing ‘a show o f discursive affirmation from below ' (p. 58). 
The dominant can, ‘accommodate a reasonably high level o f practical resistance so 
long as that resistance is not publicly and unambiguously acknowledged. Once it is, 
however, it requires a public reply if the symbolic status quo is to be restored’ (p. 
57). An unanswered or unambiguous act of resistance gives confidence to others to 
be insubordinate and before long authority breaks down. When sincere consent is 
absent, the dominant demand ‘at least the simulacrum of sincere obedience’ (p. 58). 
Such public acts from elites are also functional in the reproduction of their ‘we’ 
group. They must act towards subordinates according to a public transcript of 
(racial, physical, moral, and/or intellectual) superiority and via practices of mutual 
affirmation, concealment of incompetence, the euphemistic representation o f forms 
of violence, the stigmatisation of subordinates, and public shows of unanimity and 
togetherness. ‘At every occasion,’ Scott notes, ‘on which the official euphemism is 
allowed to prevail over other, dissonant versions, the dominant monopoly over 
public knowledge is publicly conceded by subordinates’ (pp. 45-53).
Third, we are able to interpret the degree o f peace. In comparing the various 
transcripts o f a given context we can assess the ‘thickness’, durability and 
productivity o f hegemony, and, to go further, the degree of legitimacy. Systems o f 
power and authority which have accrued the least legitimacy, Scott ventures, are 
those where the differences between private and public discourses are greater, the
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latter having ‘a stereotyped, ritualistic cast’ (p. 3). Yet such a society may still be 
significantly short o f conflict formation. Scott distinguishes four varieties of 
political discourse among subordinate groups: (i), conformism to ‘the flattering self- 
image o f elites’ in the public transcript', (ii), the dissonance o f the hidden transcript', 
(iii), the ‘politics of disguise and anonymity’ at times of clandestine political 
mobilisation; and, (iv), ‘the rupture o f the cordon sanitaire between the hidden and 
public transcript’ at moments of political breakthrough (pp. 18-19). These four 
varieties should not be seen as representing cumulative stages towards war, or 
reverse steps back to peace. All four can exist at times of either widespread 
insurgency or increasingly illegitimate authoritarian ‘peace’. However, it is 
undoubtedly true that if  the third variety is widespread, and moments o f the fourth 
more and more frequent, then conflict is forming and peace breaking down.
A final lesson from Scott and the wider sociological-anthropological 
literature is methodological. It shows that ethnographic participant-observation can 
enhance discourse analysis as it affords opportunity to interpret how discourse 
creates reality informally and orally in the ‘hidden’ spaces o f international 
intervention. What I have outlined here is the beginnings o f a method, based in a 
post-positivist epistemology, to assess the shift from tentative ceasefire (Scott’s 
‘quiescence’) to a more durable peace -  a state of resignation (either paper-thin or 
thin hegemony) to a degree of consensus (thick hegemony). But by what over­
arching concept are we to evaluate this degree of hegemony, the extent of 
peacebuilding? In order to advance this method further we must consider the 
governing concept o f this reconsideration of peace, that of political legitimacy.
3.2. Politics: power and its need for legitimacy
Legitimacy is, in general, a forgotten concept in the study of international relations, 
and a derivative concept in the study of peace. In IR, few studies have adopted 
legitimacy, particularly in its recent theoretical innovations in political science, as a 
means o f understanding the constitution of order.42 In peace studies it is often 
adopted in tautological terms to pronounce success or failure for international
42 One exception, using Beetham’s approach to legitimacy to understand the rise and fall of 
Yugoslavia, is Williams, J. 1998. Recently the use of the concept has expanded in debates on global 
governance, and the legitimacy of EU authority. Steffek 2003 provides a good overview of this 
literature.
108
intervention. Peacebuilding’s normative orientation leads it towards objective 
accounts o f legitimacy as derived from structures o f justice or democracy. A wide 
range o f policy analyses implicitly retain a crude, objective notion of legitimacy in 
their advocacy for peace (Chanaa 2002: 34; Fukuyama 2004: 99). Sisk, for example, 
argues that there’s no other show in town:
In sum, there is simply no more just or legitimate way to peacefully manage
differences among contending groups than democracy, however difficult it may
seem to move from violent to electoral competition (2001: 785).
This illustrates the ideological power of neoliberalism within the International 
Community. It also leaves peacebuilding at a conceptual dead-end, unable to 
explain the messy alternatives to ‘democracy’ which actually constitute a ‘peace’ in 
some post-conflict settings.
A more prominent approach in social science literature is largely derived 
from the Weberian account of a subjective condition (See Connolly 1984). In 
‘Politics as a Vocation’, Weber describes his three grounds for legitimacy as the 
authority o f (i) ‘custom’ (traditional legitimacy), (ii) the ‘gift o f grace’ (charismatic), 
(iii) ‘legal statue’ (legal). He notes that actual cases exhibit ‘highly complex 
variations, transitional forms and combinations of these pure types’ (2004: 34). 
David Beetham, however, argues that Weber’s reading equates legitimacy to belief, 
which he argues is an ‘almost an unqualified disaster’ (1985: 8).43 Beetham notes, 
‘most social scientists in the twentieth century have followed Max Weber in defining 
legitimacy as the belief in legitimacy on the part o f the relevant social agents; and 
power relations as legitimate where those involved in them, subordinate as well as 
dominant believe them to be so’ (1991: 6). From Weber, other political scientists 
have reduced the concept to the top-down attempts by governments to convince their 
populations that their domination is justified -  a campaign o f legitimation (Beetham 
1985: 10), or what might today be considered part of a campaign of statebuilding. 
Either way, legitimacy then was present to the extent to which subordinates believed 
the power o f the dominant to be legitimate. Thus, legitimacy remained a descriptive 
category which one can distinguish more or less of, simply in terms o f the
43 Barker argues that this failure is Weberian (made by his intellectual followers) rather than Weber’s. 
(Barker 2001: 17-19)
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prevalence o f beliefs. Similar tendencies are prevalent in analyses o f legitimacy 
among states in international relations (Steffek 2003, 2004: 485-490).
3.2.i Beetham*s concept of legitimacy
However, legitimacy is better understood as constitutive o f political dynamics. 
‘Legitimacy,’ Beetham remarks, ‘is not the icing on the cake o f power, which is 
applied after baking is complete, and leaves the cake itself essentially unchanged. It 
is more like the yeast that permeates the dough, and makes the bread what it is.’ It is 
thus ‘not merely an important topic but the central issue in social and political 
theory’ (1985: 39, 41). He offers an alternative definition o f legitimacy which 
considers it to be the intersubjective constitution of political power. This approach 
provides, according to Barker, ‘a bridge or an alliance between is and ought’ (2001: 
8). It thus becomes the necessary partner to power.
Power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that:
i. it conforms to established rules',
ii. the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant 
and subordinate;
iii. there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power 
relation. (Beetham 1985: 15-16 Emphasis added)
This definition is conducive to discourse analysis, but, in practice, demands an 
element o f ethnographic study. His three components of legitimacy are 
interdependent, and he does not argue that one, in general, is primary. ‘Obedience,’ 
Beetham notes, ‘is therefore to be explained by a complex o f reasons, moral as well 
as prudential, normative as well as self-interested, that legitimate power provides for 
those who are subject to it’ (p.27).
This process o f accruing legitimacy, legitimation, is particularly relevant to 
peacebuilding. Beetham’s approach has been challenged by Weberians for offering 
a new tautology. ‘Since the claim to legitimacy is one o f the characteristics o f 
government,’ Barker notes, ‘to ask is the government legitimate can be tautologous’ 
(2001: 21). However, legitimacy is not an attribute of a government embroiled in 
war -  or o f a state that is contested. Processes of legitimation and delegitimation are 
crucial here. Legitimacy potentially provides a richer, ‘positive’ description o f a 
‘peace’ such as Tajikistan’s than that provided by ‘negative peace’ or ‘war 
weariness’. ‘Enhanced order, stability, effectiveness’ -  notes Beetham -  ‘these are
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the typical advantages that accrue to a legitimate system of power as a result o f the 
obligations upon the subordinate that derive from its legitimacy’ (1985: 33). Unlike 
the idea o f ‘negative peace’, legitimacy sets limits on power which extend beyond 
the simple absence o f widespread political violence. The concept of legitimacy is 
not just o f descriptive utility to a post-war condition, nor is it merely a claim made 
by rulers -  a process of self-legitimation (Barker 2001). On the other hand, 
legitimacy does not cause peace or order. Rather, it constitutes the degree and form 
of peace in a given context. This is how peace holds in a given context.
The Three Components
Beetham’s first component of legitimacy comprises the rules o f power. He observes 
that, ‘power relations are almost always constituted by a framework of incentives 
and sanctions, implicit if  not always explicit, which align the behaviour of the 
subordinate with the wishes of the powerful’ (p.27). They do not have to be o f a 
specific type -  protecting the individual, guaranteeing social protection, and so forth 
-  but they must be widely known and consistently adhered to. They serve as ‘rules 
of exclusion and access’ which regulate who may access resources and under what 
conditions (p.57). ‘Where the rules of power are continually broken,’ he notes, ‘we 
could speak of a condition o f chronic illegitimacy’ (p. 16). On the other hand, 
consistently practised rules serve to legitimate authority. The establishment and 
affirmation of such rules might be one sign o f peacebuilding.
Secondly, Beetham’s emphasis on the importance o f beliefs is quite different 
from the Weberian subjective concept of legitimacy. ‘A given power relationship is 
not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy,’ he notes, ‘but because it can 
be justified in terms o f their beliefs’ (1991: 11). Thus, beliefs are produced 
intersubjectively among the rulers and the ruled. While the content o f these beliefs 
is not circumscribed, they must nevertheless deal with certain key themes, 
particularly related to authority. Beetham contends:
To be justified, power has to be derived from a valid source of authority (this is 
particularly true of political power); the rules must provide that those who come to 
hold power have the qualities appropriate to its exercise; and the structure of power 
must be seen to serve a recognisable general interest, rather than simply the interests 
of the powerful (p. 17).
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This requires not ‘complete uniformity’, but ‘a minimum o f the appropriate beliefs 
[...] being shared between the dominant and the subordinate and indeed among the 
subordinate themselves’ (p. 17). A comparative analysis o f public and hidden 
transcripts might reveal such a minimum consensus, which is vital to why peace 
holds.
Thirdly, performances o f consent are not merely an illustration o f people’s 
belief that something is legitimate but ‘they confer legitimacy; they contribute to 
making power legitimate’ (p. 12). Forms of consent, be they ceremonial events, 
voting in an election, swearing allegiance, are ‘a culturally specific matter, 
determined by the conventions o f a given society, rather than definable absolutely’ 
(p. 19). Such consent has both normative and symbolic power. ‘Actions expressive 
of consent,’ Beetham notes, ‘even if  undertaken purely out o f self-interest, will 
introduce a moral component into a relationship, and create a normative commitment 
on the part o f those engaging in them’ (p. 18). In addition, performances o f consent, 
‘have a publicly symbolic or declaratory force, in that they constitute an express 
acknowledgement on the part o f the subordinate of the position of the powerful’ 
(p. 18). However, as discussed above, such emphasis on consent must not overlook 
the role o f hidden transcripts (Scott 1990) in subverting public discourse, in 
sustaining the appearance of ‘happy slaves’ (Herzog 1989) while challenging a given 
political order. In a situation o f peacebuilding, the dissonant role o f ‘hidden 
transcripts’ in withdrawing public consent would be limited or at least declining in 
both their frequency and militancy.
In order to investigate peace as legitimacy the remainder of this chapter will 
consider how the concepts o f discourse and space can be combined with the concept 
of legitimacy to provide an overall research design. While this will involve taking a 
post-positivist turn, and thus some departure from the idea of a consistent set of 
rules, beliefs and forms of consent, I will stay close to these terms o f analysis 
established by Beetham.
3.2.H. Peacebuilding as legitimation
This brings us to the process where a given political order becomes more or less 
legitimate; the means by which power is legitimated, or delegitimated. ‘It is in the 
sense o f the public actions o f the subordinate,’ Beetham remarks, ‘expressive of
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consent, that we can properly talk about the “legitimation” o f power, not the 
propaganda or public relations campaigns, the “legitimations” generated by the 
powerful themselves’ (p. 19). Thus, while the performance of ‘expressed consent’ 
constitutes legitimation, the withdrawal o f consent and offering o f resistance, 
constitutes delegitimation (pp. 19-20). Such consent does not merely involve 
adherence to a static discourse o f power; Scott shows how processes o f both 
legitimation and delegitimation might exist side-by-side. Yet Herzog is surely right 
to note that ‘any plausible account of legitimacy and obligation must center on 
whether the state is for the most part responsive to the people’ (1989: 205). 
‘Responsiveness’ (p.207) here is used in its most generic sense, derived from 
relationality. It demands that a state, to be legitimate, must be responsive to ‘what 
people do want, not what they should’ (p.205). Yet these ‘choices’ take place within 
power relations.
Beliefs o f legitimacy: public and hidden
Such an approach replaces a single belief in (the common) peace, with multiple and 
contrasting beliefs o f  (complex) legitimacy. It insists that there is more than one 
conception o f peace which correlates with any given context of ‘peace’. In periods 
where legitimacy/peace are in formation, a minimum of shared beliefs and values 
transmitted in public discourse is of particular importance. These may, however, 
continue to be disbelieved in hidden transcripts. Beetham himself notes that, to 
assess the degree o f legitimacy in a given political order one must evaluate, ‘the 
features internal to a system of power that, on the one hand, sustain and reproduce its 
legitimating beliefs, or, on the other, systematically undermine them over time’ 
(p.23). Berger and Luckmann (1967) explicated this further in their work on the 
social production o f knowledge. They argue for four levels o f legitimation, 
beginning with an ‘incipient’ stage where a language o f authority is inter- 
subjectively agreed, to the final realisation of a ‘symbolic universe’ which acts to 
homogenise disparate views (p. 96).
The study o f both public and hidden transcripts becomes vital to discover the 
degree o f consent, resignation or rebellion. The making o f new, conciliatory hidden 
transcripts may occur partially and locally whilst rules and performances o f consent 
congruent with an economy and culture of war continue to dominate the observable
113
practices o f politics. Eventually, for these conciliatory beliefs to spread they must 
produce rules and forms of consent, discursively represented, and enacted in 
practice. Local and international actors may then attain a bare minimum of 
‘consensus’ and mutual tolerance, where these discourses and practices become 
accepted as the most plausible or credible arrangement.
Degrees o f  legitimacy, degrees o f peacebuilding
Being something you can have more or less of, legitimacy has ‘developmental stages 
within each [of the three] components]’ (Beetham 1991: 98). Weak legitimacy 
might exist in post-conflict contexts and exhibits certain forms o f beliefs, rules and 
consent to power, as well as certain means by which common interests and 
differences are determined. Specifically, according to Beetham, it is likely to 
involve a paternalist rather than consultative determination o f common interests, an 
ascriptive rather than meritocratic principle of differentiation o f access to power, a 
traditional instead o f popular source of authority, conventional rather than legal 
regulation, and an expressive rather than contractual mode o f consent (ibid.). It is 
such weak legitimacy that one expects to evolve in the emergence o f ‘peace (see 
fig.10)’.
Fig.10: Beetham’s  Weak vs. Strong Legitimacy
Weak Legitimacy Strong Legitimacy
Common Interest Paternalist Consultative
Differentiation Ascriptive Meritocratic
Beliefs Traditional Popular
Rules Conventional Legal
Consent Expressive Contractual
This classification is a helpful starting point for studying the degree of legitimacy in 
general, but inevitably some clarification will need to be made of these categories in 
context. This process will take place over subsequent chapters and be summarised in 
the conclusion. Before empirical investigation can begin in chapter four, I must 
clarify my broader theoretical positions regarding the object and subjects of 
legitimacy. Legitimacy, Beetham notes, has two governing principles: o f the
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differentiation of elites from subordinates, and o f the common interest. These will 
be explored in an analysis which leads us to reconsider the nature o f the state as the 
essential container of power and legitimacy. I will first consider this differentiation 
in spatial terms (section 3.3) before dwelling on the nature o f the ‘common interest’ 
in the form of the post-conflict state (3.4).
3.3. Space: differentiating and contesting legitimacy
Legitimacy is formed and differentiated by space and identity. Beetham’s first 
governing dynamic captures this in terms of a principle o f  differentiation which 
‘reveals the dominant as specially qualified, suited or deserving’ (1991: 59). The 
problem o f space/identity must be addressed in order to better understand both the 
centrality and contrariety of the state.
3.3.L Unbinding the principle of differentiation
Space and identity are both under-explored in Beetham’s approach. His concern is 
with a ‘principle o f differentiation or separation which distinguishes the dominant 
from the subordinate’ (p.76). It is assumed here that the dominant and subordinate 
exist within the territory of the largely unquestioned state. This state-centrism is 
problematic in that it fails to contend with how authority often exists at multiple 
levels beyond and across the bounds of the state, denying a single dominant or single 
subordinate group. In post-conflict spaces localising and globalising tendencies are 
both prevalent, as the boundaries of the state may be called into question by 
irredentist claims. Both elite and subordinate discourses may posit other objects of 
legitimacy, such as ethnic group or confessional order, alongside ‘the state’.
Faced with such evidence, others argue normatively that the hegemonic state 
must be transcended in order to achieve peace (Jabri 1996: 120). Jabri thus argues 
for a counter-discourse which replaces the discourse o f the single and homogenous 
state with a globalist discourse of difference.
The symbolic orders and interpretative schemes upon which identity is based 
constitute “public” or political space. The transformative capacity of counter­
discourses must also be located in the public space. It is the domination of this 
space which generates hegemonic discourses based on exclusionist ideologies which 
are used to legitimate the onset of war and the manipulation of information in time 
of war. (my emphasis p. 158)
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Jabri implies that this space is potentially global, and hence conflict resolution 
requires the reimagining of global space in terms o f inclusive relationships via 
‘unhindered communicative action which involves participation and difference ’ (pp. 
163, 161). It is thus ‘a zone of peace based on dialogical principles,’ not just mere 
‘intersubjective consent’ (pp. 166-7). In such a way Jabri inscribes content into 
‘peace’ beyond that provided in legitimacy.
However, Jabri’s analysis obscures the powerful differences between 
communities o f space and identity which tend to persist in post-conflict settings. 
Thinking in terms o f multiple communities, differentiated by space, brings us to the 
idea of ‘levels’. However, it is difficult to theorise ‘levels’ without reifying them. 
Classical models o f levels o f analysis in International Relations, such as those of 
Singer and Waltz, reiterate the state-centrism of Beetham. They demarcate 
territorially defined levels and fail to grasp how states and systems can inter- 
subjectively constitute one another (Singer 1961; Waltz 1959). Thus, rather than 
adopting a traditional levels of analysis approach, common in IR, ‘levels’, to be of 
any use, must be understood in their inter-subjectivity and power relations (Buzan 
1995); specifically this requires a study of inter-spatial relations.
Therefore, to understand space we must think less in terms o f geopolitical, 
territorially defined entities than in terms of critical geopolitics or Derrida’s 
ontopolitics. We must study the discourses which reproduce or challenge identities 
which themselves lie at the base of a legitimate claim to occupy or administer 
political space (Derrida 1994: 82). O Tuathail, for example, charts the ‘ambitious 
redrafting o f space around the principles o f empire and state sovereignty’, producing 
‘the territorialisation o f space.’ The state has become over time the key container of 
geo-power in a ‘power struggle between different societies over the right to speak
r
sovereignly about geography, space and territory’ (O Tuathail 1996: 6, 11).’ This 
battle over space is inherently linked to the production of identities. It is identity
r
which enables space, and space which enables identity (Shapiro 1997). As O 
Tuathail argues:
The struggle over geography is also a conflict over competing images and 
imaginings, a contest of power and resistance that involves not only struggles to 
represent the materiality of physical geographic objects and boundaries but also the 
equally powerful and, in a different manner, the equally material force of discursive
116
borders between an idealised self and a demonised Other, between “us” and “them” 
(O Tuathail 1996: 15).
The quantity and quality of such discursively-produced spaces which are identified 
might change depending on the question of analysis. Moreover, what I call in- 
between spaces can be found at the margins of ‘selves’ as will be discussed in part 
two. Going beyond this is difficult short o f context-specific analysis. Nevertheless 
some theorising is possible at this stage.
Complex legitimacy insists that we consider the relationships between 
multiple political communities or ‘selves’. Such a study requires an analysis which 
is sensitive to ‘the power to organise, occupy and administer space’ (O Tuathail 
1996: 1). Space here is made and remade primarily through discursive relations. 
Multiple ‘selves’ constitute Tajikistan’s ‘peace’ through three inter-dependent, inter- 
subjective ‘levels’. But if  they are inter-subjective how are they separable? Due to 
the complexities o f spatial differentiation, Beetham’s notion that differentiation is 
based on either ‘ascription’ or ‘merit’ does not capture the nature of differentiation 
in settings o f post-conflict intervention. Rather than being ascribed or merit-based, 
differences are inscribed in discourse which provides for the ascendancy o f an elite 
within that given space, whether that be religious, traditional or modem. Thus, as an 
authoritative leader of a local ‘clan’, a given leader may represent a largely 
traditional source o f power, whereas as a representative o f the state he may derive 
his authority from discourses of nationalism or socialism.
3.3.0. Three *levels*
O f course, any ontological or onto-political framing necessitates a degree of 
essentialism which imposes a degree of artificial order to inconsistent and contingent 
processes. Identifying ‘selves’ is no easy task. Both the ‘elite’ and ‘subordinate’ 
may exist beyond the bounds of the state; moreover, such short-hand categories can 
conceal more complicated arrangements where authority is differentiated. For elites, 
there may be several layers of political authority from internationally-instituted 
power such as those o f the Bretton Woods institutions or specific transitional 
administrations in a given territory, to regional peacekeeping forces, to national 
government, to sub-national de facto political authorities based around region, 
ethnicity or religion. For subordinates, resistance, quiescence, resignation or consent
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may take place transnationally in non- or anti-state political movements in diaspora 
communities.
The framework offered here is inspired by, but a significant adaptation of, 
Joel M igdal’s state in society approach. It is based on three ‘levels’ (categories of 
spaces/‘selves’): local (subordinates existing ‘under’ various authorities, local, 
national and translocal); elite (including local, national and regional elites in 
authority over popular social spaces); and global (including ‘the International 
Community’, but also radical and moderate transnational movements). It is assumed 
here that each relational ‘level’ is produced in the context o f multiple spaces, and yet 
under conditions of hegemony44. In the following paragraphs I will briefly introduce 
these ‘levels’ and their intra- and inter-relationships. The inter-weaving of ‘levels’, 
spaces and discourses allows us to analyse how over-lapping identities (e.g ‘Islam’ 
or ‘Central Asia’) might be contested and reproduced in different spaces and 
discourses.
Local-subordinate spaces: subnational, national and transnational
For the majority, various local-subordinate spaces provide the basis for social or 
societal life. The way in which groups and individuals resist the state, and the way 
social forces are co-opted by the state, can ‘change [the state’s] social and 
ideological underpinnings’ (Migdal 1994: 12). How might we characterise this kind 
of ‘societal’ interaction with the state? In order to conceptualise state-society 
relations, Migdal shuns categories such as class or ethnic identity which can 
obfuscate as much as they explain. Rather he uses Greenfield and Martin’s 
minimalist definition that society’s ‘only definitive characteristic is that it is the 
outermost social structure for a certain group of individuals who, whatever might be 
their attitude toward it, view themselves as members and experience their identity as 
being determined by it’ (1998: viii). However, ‘society’, understood as existing 
under a given state, is not the only expression of local or subordinate space; local 
spaces can take subnational or transnational forms. Considerable homogeneity in 
public transcripts can be produced despite this heterogenous environment, to the
44 From his theoretical perspective Migdal (1994,2001) speaks of domination, which can be 
integrated or dispersed, rather than hegemony which can be thick or thin. Against Migdal, and to 
avoid obfuscation, I will continue to use the notion of hegemony to understand relationships of 
domination.
118
extent that we can meaningfully speak of a single set o f homologous local or 
subordinate spaces during periods o f building peace (producing two transcripts). 
Alternatively, one or more of these cleavages can provide the vehicles for conflict, 
mutual stigmatisation and inter-spatial violence -  thus pitting ‘selves’ against one 
another.
Subordinate spaces and discourses have a great deal o f autonomy from elite 
and global actors due to two special features: the particularity o f community or ‘se lf  
and the locality of practice. Particularities o f community can serve to bind local 
actors against elite and global forces, perhaps in terms o f class or some other form of 
identity, or they can form the basis for cleavages in identity. The study o f local 
spaces and discourse can illustrate to what extent contention or cooperation occurs 
between societal and/or (sub/trans)-national spaces. At times o f civil war or political 
violence we can expect that local-subordinate discourse will be contested between 
fighting groups. Minor differences would be stigmatised, and popular transcripts 
would be produced in part in a response to contrasting elite discourses of local 
ethnic, religious or regional ‘selves’. On the other hand, in cases of peace building, 
where the nation-state or some other wider-political community remains 
symbolically and normatively powerful, subordinate transcripts may inscribe both a 
common interest with, as well as differentiated positions from, elite and global 
actors.
The second feature for the autonomy of local-subordinate spaces are their 
specific localities. Scott characterises the special genius o f the local as ‘practical 
knowledge’ or metis (cunning intelligence, the know-how or knack). In his later 
work, he has illuminated how ‘high modernist ideologies’ of the state, and with them 
‘various schemes to improve the human condition’, often fail when they confront 
metis. Its power, once again, is derived from its space -  its ‘localness’ or ‘practical 
knowledge’ which differentiates it from the state, the region and the world. ‘Any 
formula,’ Scott notes, ‘that excludes or suppresses the experience, knowledge, and 
adaptability o f metis risks incoherence and failure’. Like language it is best learned 
by daily practice and experience in context (Scott 1998: 319). ‘An institution, social 
form or enterprise that takes much of its shape from the evolving metis o f the people 
engaged in it will thereby enhance their range o f experience and skills’ (p. 359). The 
degree to which elite or international interventions become transformed in context 
constitutes the nature of the subordination of locals in the order o f things.
119
Elite spaces: sub-national, national, regional
A second set of spaces in the greater context o f peace are those of the elite: the 
spaces of the sub-national, national and regional political leaderships which can 
make some claim to sovereignty over localities. These are elites who are not seen as 
outside ‘interveners’ but leaders accepted as ‘internal’ or ‘ours’ (those at or near the 
top o f a larger ‘w e’ group). At times of war, as discussed above, one can expect 
elite discourse to be fractured by the violent articulation o f difference, and the 
contestation of ‘inside’/ ’outside’ and ‘us’/ ’them’. For example during the conflict in 
Tajikistan, the elite (as well as the citizenry) of the new state was partitioned by the 
stigmatisation of ‘Islamic’ and ‘Gharmi’ as forms o f identity. Violence, Jabri 
remarks, is based on a ‘discourse o f exclusion’ between groups with ‘exclusionist 
identities’ along the boundaries o f highly demarcated spaces. Thus, it invokes 
‘articulations o f separateness, of limitations to access, of strict boundedness’ (1996: 
130-131). However, a form of discursive boundedness is essential to the 
functioning o f hegemony. Under conditions of building peace we would expect to 
see a gradual convergence or emerging complementarity between various elite 
discourses.
The degree o f discursive consensus among a state or national elite may remain 
limited. Dominant groups too can have multiple identities and spatial homes -  both 
‘below’ and ‘above’ the state. Whilst sub-national and nationalist discourses have 
been investigated in studies of ethnicity and nationalism, inter- or trans-national 
regional identities are remarkably under explored. The idea o f a regional space 
raises difficult questions of how and where a particular region can be located. Buzan, 
Jones, & Little (1993) argue that a regional level o f analysis is justified, based on the 
degree o f interaction, by which international anarchy can be overcome. This 
justification for the regional level is imbedded within structural interpretations of 
international relations but there are grounds to suggest that not only political- 
diplomatic but ‘economic’ and ‘cultural/symbolic’ relationships can create regional 
communities in world politics. Adler has argued that ‘Imagined (Security) 
Community’ are formed as ‘cognitive regions’ o f international relations where elites 
and even citizens o f states, ‘imagine sharing a common destiny and identity’ (1997: 
253). Regional space raises the question of how domination becomes enhanced 
(integrated) or dispersed through international ties. Regional communities may
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provide elites with a solidarity group to resist the International Community (as in 
Central Asia perhaps), or alternatively better facilitate the forces o f globalisation (as 
in Europe perhaps). In the case of ‘peace’, regionalised understandings can provide 
the basis to oppose liberal peacebuilding in favour of peace operations deemed more 
‘traditional’ or ‘culturally appropriate’. Here, the representation o f territorial 
concerns such as state borders in terms of ‘Us’/ ’Them’ becomes an important part of 
the practice of sovereignty in situations of peacebuilding -  they can inscribe national 
and/or regional elite understandings o f community.
Global spaces: inter-state and transnational
The significant weakness of Migdal’s analysis o f ‘state in society’ (2001) is the lack 
of an elaborated international dimension.45 The post-conflict state is particularly 
vulnerable to interventions by international and transnational actors which might 
affect the kinds o f domination and resistance taking place. The extent to which 
international actors are able to alter elite-subordinate relations is the key question for 
a study o f peacebuilding. It is also possible that elites and subordinates may adapt or 
re-appropriate international interventions. In this respect it is necessary to 
investigate the effect o f global political spaces and actors on the elites and 
subordinates of a given local context, and vice-versa.
When the inside/outside or domestic/international dichotomy is 
demythologised, contemporary processes and transformations can be understood as 
contestations of claims by state actors that politics must exist either within or 
between states (Walker 1993: 13). These processes can challenge who ‘w e’ are and 
begin to alter or transform ‘Us’/ ’Them’ images (1990: 23). While denying absolute 
cosmopolitanism it is important to recognise that spaces and an identity o f the 
International Community is emerging in contemporary world politics, alongside 
transnational corporations and pressure groups in the world economy (Ong 2006). 
Here, where the dominant role is played by ‘the West’, the symbolism of certain 
defining images and discourses has an ideological quality, as explored in chapter 
one. While, in the manner o f Scott, one can doubt the direct impact o f such 
discourse in terms o f ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’, the global space-making implications
45 Migdal has (2001: 135-142), however, suggested that constructivist international relations theory is 
a ‘state in society’ approach writ large into global politics.
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of the ‘International Community’ are profound, opening up new territories for 
international intervention and the creation of autonomous spaces of the International 
Community in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and others. We must look 
at how the increasing involvement of international organisations and transnational 
companies in post-conflict spaces may help produce new forms o f power and 
legitimacy, both locally and globally.
In such a way the spaces of the International Community are increasingly 
dispersed transnationally. In the hot-spots of the global economy it may be cities or 
special economic zones that gain a certain sovereignty; in the realm of peacebuilding 
it can include the transnational inter- and non-govemmental organisations o f donors 
and their implementing partners. ‘The oscillation between neoliberalism as 
exception and exception to neoliberalism, ’ Ong notes, ‘has also engendered ethical 
geographies, emergent spaces o f would-be NGO administration’ (2006: 21). In 
some post-conflict spaces it is the International Community that, however 
ineffective, is often the first port o f call in the protection o f rights or provision of 
services; this in turn challenges traditional, state-based patterns of citizenship.
Space -  local (subordinate), elite, and global -  may or may not be territorialised. 
Moreover, the same elites and subordinates may find themselves meeting in various 
territories where state practices are negotiated, where the inscription of that space 
and their ascendant or lowly position in it may shift accordingly. A given physical 
territory, such as that of the teahouse (choihona) in Tajikistan, may at one time 
represent local space (for daily tea sessions o f patriarchs), at another time an elite 
space (for occasional meetings between officials), and still another an international 
space (a temporary office for representatives o f the International Community). In 
this way territories can be the meeting points of multiple spaces in a similar way that 
a person can have a multi-layered identity. Territory -  the physical boundaries o f a 
state or community is thus negotiated inter-spatially and inter-textually.
3.4. The Post-Conflict State: against itself?
Beetham’s second governing dynamic is that legitimacy contains a minimum of 
consensus. This is important as it is the means by which legitimacy’s subjects 
relationally imagine its object to be somehow representative o f themselves as a
122
collective. Beetham conveys this in terms of legitimacy’s principle o f  common 
interest, which is ‘shown to serve not merely the interests o f the powerful, but those 
o f the subordinate also, or else to make possible the realisation of larger social 
purposes o f which they have concern’ (Beetham, 1991: 59). This clearly raises the 
question o f the state. The state is empirically unavoidable in contemporary forms of 
legitimacy, but it is not essentially given as such. How should we understand the 
legitimate, post-conflict state?
3.4.i Deconstructing the common interest
First we must question the ‘common interest’. Beetham notes that, ‘a recurrent 
feature of the social organisation of power is that general interests can only be met in 
ways that serve the particular interests of the powerful, since the means o f realising 
them are under their control’ (emphasis added, 1991: 46-47). In post-conflict 
settings the potential for contention between the particular and ‘the general interest’ 
is especially large. However, Beetham charts how paternalism may arise as the basis 
for uniting the elite and the subordinate under the common interest. ‘A paternalist 
form o f power,’ he notes, ‘involves a relationship in which the subordinate are 
defended wholly or partially, temporarily or permanently, incapable o f recognising 
and defending their own interests, and these therefore have to be defined or 
advanced by the powerful on their behalf (p.89). Barker goes further in noting that 
legitimation should be understood in terms of identification; he argues that ‘people, 
not laws and commands’ are legitimated (Barker 2001: 31-36). Therefore, 
endogenous legitimation, among elites, can be as important as the exogenous process 
of legitimating the regime in the eyes of subordinates. Moreover, we must ask if  the 
authority o f the ‘common interest’ is located with individuals, a regime or the state.
This inevitably raises fundamental questions of the political and the state 
which cannot be fully considered here. To what extent should we consider the locus 
of authority to be with the state or the ruling regime acting on behalf o f ‘the state’? 
Schmitt and Foucault, in different yet commensurable ways, are deeply concerned 
with these issues. Schmitt’s concept of the political goes beyond the Weberian logic 
to give the political an overarching potential. Social relations become political when 
they are represented in terms o f the Friend/Enemy dichotomy (Schmitt 1996: 38). 
Foucault, similarly, charts how hegemonic rationalities are projected onto our lives
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through various cultural, social and economic media. The presence o f ‘economic’ 
and ‘cultural/symbolic’ hegemonies may indicate ‘govemmentality’, where we are 
made subjects under ‘political’ power (Foucault 1991, 2000). Whereas the state 
remains central for Schmittian analysis in political science, Foucauldians prefer to 
look at networks o f power under the state. As will be shown across chapter five and 
six, authority can ambiguously be located both with individuals and groups and with 
the state.
These broad insights demand a reconsideration o f the common interest in 
peacebuilding/legitimation, and the essential role o f discourse and ideology in its 
construction. Beetham argues that ‘the political sphere is especially bound up with 
the ultimate source o f normative validity that is acknowledged within the society’ 
(1991: 70). This ultimate source is the basic belief system within a given political 
space, ‘whether it be tradition, divine command, scientific doctrine, popular will, or 
whatever’ (p. 70). This is not to equate discourse with ideology but to insist that 
discourses correlate with an ‘ideological construction’ (Jabri 1996: 96) which serves 
to explain structures of domination or exclusion. Similarly ‘common interest’ is the 
product o f inter-textual relations which are ideologically informed. However, this 
inter-textual construction of authority allows for multiple representations thereof. 
What constitutes authority in post-conflict spaces, and who is able to act on behalf of 
it, is highly contingent upon discourses of peace. Thus, it is how ‘the state’ is 
represented among subordinates, elites and internationals that may determine the 
nature of authority, what constitutes the ‘common interest’, and the extent to which 
the practices of state actors reinforce or attenuate these representations.
‘The state’ invariably provides the object or focus in contemporary 
discourses of peace, yet this does not necessitate the state as an exclusive locus of 
authority. Neither Schmitt’s concept o f ‘the political’ nor Beetham’s ‘common 
interest’ is derived directly from ‘the state.’ However, Schmitt’s understanding of 
the political seems to limit political activity to that which is actively adversarial and 
potentially military, whilst Beetham’s object o f legitimacy is unquestioningly the 
state. One can see the apparent empirical justification for this yet it is a theoretical 
misstep if it leads to the reification of the state as a given, rather than the state itself 
being constituted via a symbolic order (Zizek 1999). Avoiding this misstep, we can 
explore how contrasting representations o f the state compose a multi-layered 
complex o f the political where one ‘common interest’ remains elusive. Such
124
political spaces resist any simple application o f the friend/enemy dichotomy. This 
brings us to distinguish between the idea of ‘the state’ as the object o f legitimacy (as 
it often is) and the state as a coherent institutional location o f legitimacy (as it rarely 
is). As Bartelson has noted, this demands ‘an analysis o f the contradictory meanings 
o f the state concept, and above all an analysis o f its remarkable staying power within 
political discourse, despite its contradictory nature and recurrent celebrations o f its 
demise’ (2001: 2).
3.4AL Representation versus practice
So the state remains something of an enigma in the post-conflict context -  at once 
ever-present and elusive -  where practices in the name o f ‘the state’, particularly the 
post-colonial and post-conflict state (Chabl and Daloz 1999), consistently challenge 
the ideal-type image. However, rumours o f the death o f the state are greatly 
exaggerated. The state remains the paramount political idea o f our age and it 
continues to be invoked in law, public performance and informal behaviour (Migdal 
2001: 135-172).
The state thus remains the focal point o f politics and political violence, and 
hence the inter-spatial framework outlined above seeks to understand how it is 
reproduced as such an object. It can act ‘against itse lf (Migdal 2001: 22) in the 
sense that it provides a place of contest for various, contending actors claiming to 
represent the state. Nevertheless it is important to recognise that even weak states 
have a certain autonomy based on the very idea. Thus, in order to escape from 
reification, we need to de-link, in Abrams’ terms, ‘state-idea’ from ‘state-system’ 
(1998: 58-89). The salience o f the idea o f the state allows us to comprehend cases 
where, ‘the state’ sets the parameters of political life -  symbolically and normatively 
-  despite its self-evident distortions. Discourses and other forms o f representation of 
the state act to reproduce ‘the state’ when in economic and military terms it pales 
into insignificance compared to other loci of elite authority and discourse.
The representation of ‘the state’ is especially important when both the control 
and character o f the state are contentious. Foucault argues that since the sixteenth 
century the state had developed a kind o f ‘pastoral power’ much like the church. 
This power was bom out of its ability to justify and institutionalise subordination, 
firstly ( ‘horizontally’) among elites incorporated within an expanding state 
bureaucracy, and secondly (‘vertically’) over ‘society’ and its variety o f local spaces
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and subordinate actors. However, any notion o f absolute hegemony or domination is 
a myth.
But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not 
have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor to speak frankly, 
this importance; maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a 
mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than any of us 
think... It is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition 
and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the 
public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can only be understood in its 
survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of govemmentality 
(Foucault 1991: 103).
Thus one important space is the ‘composite reality’ o f the state defined by its tactics 
of ‘govemmentality’. While states may rarely exercise empirical sovereignty across 
their juridical territory, ‘the state’, made legitimate via ‘tactics o f govemmentality’, 
becomes the central object o f ‘peace’. State elites use symbols and images and 
cultivate discourses in order to create an ‘aura of invincibility’ around the state that 
belies its actual dysfunctions and inconsistencies.
However, the study of representation is insufficient to grasp how 
subordinates, elites and internationals experience the state as an institution. Migdal 
redefines the state, to take account of these conditions o f reflexivity and 
inconsistency of experiences.
The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by 
(1) the image o f  a coherent, controlling organisation in a territory, which is a 
representation o f  the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices 
o f  its multiple parts. (2001: 17-18).
This tension is crucial to understanding the evolution o f the state, particularly in its 
post-conflict form where (2) can seem particularly far from (1). ‘While the image of 
the state implies a singular morality, one standard way, indeed right way, of doing 
things,’ Migdal notes, ‘practices denote multiple types o f performance and, possibly, 
some contention over what is the right way to act’ (p. 19). However, subversive 
practices are often interpreted problematically in terms which affirm state 
sovereignty rather than challenge it. If  it is widely believed in a given context that 
elites are necessarily corrupt, and that elites dominate the state, then evidence of 
corruption is unlikely to provoke resistance. This is particularly salient in the post- 
Soviet context where state practices reproduce ambivalence towards ‘the state’. This
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dissertation broadly adheres to Migdal’s definition, while it will qualify the degree to 
which instrumental manipulation (implied in 2) and various performances, 
simulations and reproductions of the image (described in 1 and implied as a single 
image of single elite) are actually contradictory.
Conclusion
The figure below outlines the conceptual framework developed here and in chapter 
one for the study of peace as complex legitimacy based on politics (hegemony and 
legitimacy), discourse and space. There is a certain amount of congruence between 
the two evaluative dimensions. In cases of thick hegemony it is likely that 
legitimacy is strong; in cases of thin (or paper-thin) hegemony it is likely that 
legitimacy is weak. In both cases it is necessary to analyse the public and hidden 
transcripts of actors in local, elite and global spaces. Thus, we move from Scott’s 
four transcripts to six.
Fig. 11. Evaluative and analytical features of peace as complex legitimacy
DIMENSION EVALUATIVE CATEGORIES KEY SOURCES
Legitimacy Strong Weak Beetham
Hegemony Thick Thin (or Paper-Thin) Various
ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES
Discourse Public Hidden Scott
Spaces (Level) Local-
Subordinate
Elite International Various
State Image Practices Migdal
The approach o f complex legitimacy that I have outlined above, seeks ambitiously to 
meet that challenge of theorising the consolidation o f peace and re-establishment of 
legitimate government in the post-conflict context. Here power is both hegemonic 
and, to the extent that it is more than mere coercion, legitimate. It is discursive and 
complex (that is spatially differentiated). This ‘temporal and spatial partitioning of 
the individual’ (Jabri 1996: 132), is a necessary part o f institutionalisation and 
functional to forms of peace -  as well as war. In complex legitimacy the state is the 
primary locus but its authority remains inherently ambiguous; contingent on the 
practices of its representatives. Building peace, by this definition, is the process o f
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the re-establishment o f hegemony and legitimation o f power. It takes place among 
actors and between local-subordinate, elite and global spaces and discourses.
Out of context this definition means little; to be meaningful it must be 
explored empirically. In any given case, complex legitimacy can entail the 
continuation o f limited political violence, the establishment o f imperial, 
authoritarian, and/or patrimonial governance, ongoing (even worsening) poverty and 
inequality, and the continuance o f a heavily-criminalised war economy which 
facilitates corruption and the systematic abuse of human rights. On the other hand, it 
can provide closure to a period o f widespread physical violence, establish the basis 
for physical security and order, provide for the expansion o f patron-client networks 
that provide a minimum of social welfare, and thus provide the basis for 
‘normalised’ politics and social life. It consists of both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ 
attributes. This provides problems for those engaged in peacebuilding as, ‘at best,’ 
Pugh and Cooper note, ‘an inability to transform war economies, perpetuates 
corruption, flawed governance, and tensions generated by competing patrimonies or 
ethnic groups’ (Pugh and Cooper 2004: 3-4). At worst it leads to a return to 
widespread violence. The concept o f legitimacy provides a means to understand 
why such a ‘negative’ peace does or does not hold.
This chapter thus constitutes a critical conceptual journey from the idea of 
common peace to the approach of complex legitimacy. It is not good enough to 
dismiss such an approach as apologetics for negative peace and structural violence. 
Herzog provides an excellent justification for maintaining a concept o f legitimacy 
which would allow us to study the building of peace in a world which consistently 
fails to produce any actual cases of the idealised accounts o f peace that exist in the 
peace studies literature. I have annotated his quote -  with some reference back to 
my reading o f Scott on the complexities and forms o f peacebuilding -  to explicate 
the nature o f legitimacy as the intersubjective construction of political life.
One can call a state legitimate without thinking it perfect or even inspiring. It’s 
legitimate if it’s good enough [for those subject to it], if it passes a threshold [for each 
of them]. Ascriptions of legitimacy are then compatible with spirited opposition 
[expressed in public or, more likely, hidden transcripts]. A theory of legitimacy could 
depart from these strands of our intuitions: they’re not sacrosanct. In a world blessed 
with much better states than ours is, we’d have a good case for tightening up our 
standards, for diagnosing them as historical artefacts that had lagged past the context 
that made them sensible. But we have good reason to go on drawing a line that will 
differentiate among states instead of lumping them all together. In this sense, a theory 
of legitimacy is rightly contingent on facts (Herzog 1989: 205-206).
128
Complex legitimacy, I argue, provides an analytical lens through which to 
understand this peace of our time.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Constituting Legitimacy: three ‘levels’ of the Tajik peace
Studies of identity formation and inter-ethnic conflict in Central Eurasia must pay serious 
attention to the moral convictions that motivate individuals and groups to speak as they do. 
However, it would be a reductionist error of the first order to collapse ethics into politics or 
economics on the one hand, or, on the other hand, to treat it as a cultural “residue”, 
representing “traditional mentality”. The subjects we study are sentient beings as complex 
and fully human as ourselves, and whose moral sensibilities implicate political logics and 
economic rationalities in multi-layered and complex ways.
-  Morgan Liu (2003:7)
Chapter three argued for the importance o f the discursively and spatially 
differentiated analysis of building peace as a process of constituting complex 
legitimacy. It identified three spatially defined ‘levels’ o f discourse, which are 
integral to the analysis o f complex legitimation within a given context. I expounded 
on the global-international discourses and spaces o f peacebuilding in chapter one. 
Here I explore the specific practising of these basic discourses o f international 
peacebuilding in Tajikistan in the public pronouncements, acts of programme 
implementation and diplomatic endeavours of the International Community. 
However, ‘peacebuilding’ is understood differently in popular and elite spaces in 
Tajikistan. These perspectives on peace cannot simply be dismissed as mere excuses 
or diversions from the survival or enrichment strategies of local actors, but must be 
understood as constitutive of practices. This is reflected in Beetham’s exhortation 
that a social scientist, in investigating legitimacy, ‘is not imposing extraneous or 
ahistorical criteria, but employing those internal to the society or system of power 
itself, against which it requires to be judged; he or she is, as it were, reproducing the 
reasoning o f people within that society, and reconstructing the logic o f their own 
judgements’ (1991: 100). Yet, with Scott, we see how such spaces also produce 
their own hidden transcripts which disrupt the power to represent reality o f the 
public transcripts.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first takes a discourse 
analysis and ethnographic approach to the International Community in Tajikistan. 
The second considers the spaces, ethics and temporal perspectives o f tinji 
(‘peacefulness’/ ’wellness’ [Taj.]), a local (subordinate) discourse o f conflict 
avoidance and accommodation. It situates tinji as an ethos which reflects
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subordinate public and ‘hidden’ accounts of peace. Section three considers the 
spaces, ethics and temporal perspectives of mirostroitelstvo (‘peacebuilding’)46, an 
elite discourse o f peace enforcement. Such discourse has, as its basis, a post-Soviet 
political imaginary that emphasises ‘stability’ and ‘authority’. Moreover, section 
three concludes by raising issues o f the discursive reconstitution of the Tajik state, 
which will be explored more fully in part two of this thesis.
4.1 The Global: peacebuilding and its discontents
This section introduces the particular features o f peacebuilding practice with respect 
to Tajikistan which provides a qualitatively different subject of discourse compared 
to paradigmatic cases such as Rwanda or Bosnia. There simply isn’t the level of 
interest in the country in either the English- or even Russian-speaking world to 
generate a huge body of literature with extensive inter-textual linkages. The points of 
contention between democratisation, humanitarianism and statebuilding are less 
well-rehearsed in the relatively small International Community in Tajikistan. Whilst 
international discourses function in Tajikistan much like they do in other settings, 
their production is less politicised and more dispersed than in paradigmatic cases 
such as Bosnia. The policy-prescriptive accounts o f peacebuilding (often 
commissioned by the International Community) often blur into academic discourses. 
Moreover, the terms ‘conflict prevention’, ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘conflict 
transformation’ are often used interchangeably, and merged with goals for the 
economic development, health and education, and ‘civil society’. Despite this 
multitude o f tasks, international actors deploy ethical, spatial and temporal 
conceptions o f the ‘other’ which are congruent with the three international 
discourses identified in chapter one. In revealing the particular representations of 
peacebuilding texts, this section will begin an investigation of the extent to which 
global political space, identity and ideology extends into Tajik territory. Where, it 
asks, is the world in Tajikistan?
4.1.L The International Community and the Tajik Other
The character o f the subject -  the ‘other’ -  in peacebuilding discourse, as argued in 
chapter one, is determined in comparison with the International Community -  the
46 ‘Peacebuilding’ can also be translated as mirostroyennie.
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‘se lf . Lying on the margins of this space, Tajikistan is subject to certain general 
readings, intrusions and expectations. In such a way the global boundary line 
between civilised and uncivilised is drawn. However, regions and localities also 
acquire their own particular meanings in international discourse as Campbell (1998a; 
1998b) and Hansen (2006) have both shown with respect to Bosnia. Peacebuilding 
perspectives o f the Central Asian(s) subject have been shaped through the 
‘them’/ ’us’ and Peril/Promise dichotomies, where the peril that they may regress to 
traditional solidarities and conflicts can be offset by the promise that they might 
become more democratic, like us.
Who they are: the peril in Tajikistan
In international discourse the Central Asian space has often been presented in terms 
of danger: the perils o f re-traditionlisation. Myers (2003) has shown how it has been 
seen through Sovietological and Post-Soviet discourses and has increased in its 
exotic otherness since the fall o f the USSR. Elsewhere, we have identified three 
‘threats’ identified by this ‘discourse of danger’ in Central Asia (Thompson and 
Heathershaw 2005): Islamic fundamentalism, resurgent nationalism, or reawakened 
tribalism (Heathershaw 2005a: 23-25). Often these perils are combined as in one 
pseudo-historical popular account comparing Tajikistan’s ‘valley-based clans headed 
by petty warlords’ with those of Afghanistan, whose own war was, ‘a protracted 
civil conflict that radicalised young Tajiks and promoted Islamic fundamentalism’ 
(Meyer 2003: 183-184). Foremost among these threats, to Western eyes, is that of 
Islam - a perception which has been exacerbated with increased interest in the 
region from ‘outside’ after September 11. This had special implications for 
Tajikistan whose conflict was represented more in Islam versus Secularism terms, as 
a religiously motivated civil war (Rashid 1994: 159-186). Thus, preventing the peril 
of radical Islam becomes a key task of international intervention (FS. Hansen 2005: 
45-54; Seifert and Kraikemayer 2003). Such analyses serve to downplay 
international factors such as the role of the US, Russia and Uzbekistan in 
exacerbating or failing to dissuade the conflict. As such, the UN Secretary-General's 
representative in Tajikistan, Vladimir Sotirov, argues that the reasons for the war and 
any future conflict are not about external factors, as often claimed by Tajik political 
leaders, but by Tajik society’s own ‘deep problems’ (UNTOP/NAPST 2003: 64).
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As ‘They’ are dangerous in these deep-rooted ways, it follows that many 
policy-based assessments are very sceptical about Tajikistan’s ‘peace’. For some, 
this reflects regression across the region (Schoberlein 2002; Olcott 2005). This is 
reflected in the study o f Central Asia in general, a region about which there is very 
little knowledge in the West; sweeping statements are thus commonplace in 
international discourses. For others, Tajikistan represents a particular problem. The 
Open Society Institute (OSI) reported that despite the peace agreement, Tajikistan 
was ripe to ‘erupt into armed conflict’ (1999, no pagination); a judgement that was 
echoed by Lynch (2001: 69) and Collins (2003: 268-269). This continued 
perception of peril in Tajikistan expresses a widely-held belief that peace will remain 
elusive while the country remains unreformed (ICG 2001a: ii). For example, 
Schoberlein, in a guidebook to conflict prevention work in the region, judged that 
‘current tensions in Tajikistan are far greater than before the war,’ and only the ‘war­
weariness of the population may provide some insurance against any widespread 
outbreak o f violence’ (2002: 476-477). Thus, Tajikistan stood as ‘the most 
vulnerable of Central Asian nations’ (ICG 2001a: i). From a peacebuilding 
perspective it is axiomatic that the authoritarian policies o f Central Asian states will 
precipitate future conflict -  this is often implied in official discourse and widely 
accepted privately.
Who we are: the promise in Tajikistan
For peacebuilders, war is bom out of a failure o f democratic institutions. This 
reflects a second prism through which Central Asia has been seen in the era of 
independence, that of nascent, transitional democracy. Democratisation was the 
principle paradigm through which Central Asia was viewed by international actors in 
the immediate post-Soviet period. This reflects a sense o f ‘U s’, how we have been 
able to keep peace in our societies, and thus how ‘They’ must look a little more like 
‘Us’. In the Us/Them and peril/promise dichotomies of peacebuilding, the absence 
of violence and instability does imply that progress is being made.
Public international discourse with respect to Tajikistan consciously reflects 
this democratisation thinking as well as peacebuilding’s positive dimension. This 
fusing of peace and democracy is indeed institutionalised in the role o f the UN in 
Tajikistan. The UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP) was established,
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according to the Security Council, ‘in order to consolidate peace and promote 
democracy’ (2004). Sotirov, who heads UNTOP, remarked in 2002 that, ‘there is a 
wish and will in the leadership o f the country to introduce democratic principles of 
governance and development in the society, in an effort to create a vibrant civil 
society.’ Furthermore he noted,
I am encouraged by the democratic developments so far in this country. I believe if 
it continues to move in the same direction in the future, it will quickly develop into a 
pluralistic democracy. However, a lot of difficulties have to be overcome, especially 
in the field of further separation of powers, mass media, promotion and the 
protection of human rights, thereby encouraging civil society, reforming power 
structures, and continuing with a spirit of tolerance and dialogue in the society.47
Diplomatic representatives of Western governments -  primarily the US, UK, 
Germany and France -  also hold out this promise, bringing up democratic deficits 
which threaten the peace, whilst being broadly supportive o f the government. For 
example, the US Ambassador to Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, in March 2004, he 
remarked that he was ‘optimistic about democracy in Tajikistan’ and that ‘in the first 
instance, this is because the government has chosen a democratic path’.48
The public transcripts o f international actors in Tajikistan consistently 
reproduce the ethical, temporal and spatial ideal-other o f the neo-liberal 
peacebuilding described in chapter one. Abdullaev and Friezer’s 2003 study, for the 
UK Government’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, follows a similar line of 
argument. Success is attributed to international intervention, ‘as the peace building 
process resolved many of the power sharing tensions between the former warring 
parties’ (p. 7). The ‘state-building process, where the central government has 
struggled to assert control over the entire country,’ is also seen as a significant but 
more precarious process given the centralisation o f power and resources this has 
involved, and the ‘network o f patron-client relations’ which it is based on (p. 7). 
Moreover, they argue:
47 Integrated Regional Information Network [IRIN]. TAJIKISTAN: Interview with UN Secretary- 
GeneraVs representative, 27 Nov 2002, available at www.irinnews.org. accessed: 22 May 2004, no 
pagination.
48 Eurasianet Insight, ‘US envoy calls for changes to Tajik laws on election, media’, Dushanbe, in 
Russian 0830 gmt, 03/03/04.
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While the country has effectively overcome many challenges, it continues to grapple 
with securing cooperative arrangements with its neighbours, establishing a democratic 
and decentralised system of governance, and promoting economic development and 
investment (p. 5).
Such discourses inscribe on the person the desire for ‘rights’ and the responsibility 
o f citizenship, while inscribing the state with the right o f sovereignty and 
responsibilities for reform. Similarly, an ICG report which warned o f the potential 
for Tajikistan to slip back into conflict made eight recommendations to the Tajik 
government to further democratisation and power-sharing, none o f which have 
subsequently been fulfilled (2001a: ii).
The resilience of international peacebuilding discourse in Tajikistan raises 
questions about how its ideal or ‘promise’ for the country interprets events and local 
and elite practices which fall far short of this ideal. This jarring contrast reveals the 
tremendous power of dichotomous discourse to interpret and re-interpret reality. In 
international accounts, Tajikistan seems to oscillate between the peril o f being like 
‘Them’ and the promise of following ‘Us’ in the discourses of international actors. 
Such peril/promise characterisations of the Tajik subject may be dismissed by some 
as rhetorical carrots and sticks, yet underlying such statements are peacebuilding’s 
axioms regarding the sustainable post-conflict state. This basic discourse provides 
the very foundation of international action, space and identity in Tajikistan. Thus, it 
implied and at times makes explicit that the current ‘peace’ in Tajikistan is 
insufficient and it requires reform and intervention (Sotirov 2004: 63). This 
intervention must come from ‘Us’, the International Community. Such discourses 
may be most significant in terms of how they serve to reproduce the identity o f the 
International Community. While by 2005, few international observers were claiming 
that outside initiatives could do much to challenge the retrenchment of 
authoritarianism, this regression had occurred, it was argued, not because o f the 
involvement o f the International Community but because o f insufficient involvement 
(M alekzade[Tll]: 2).
4.1.ii. From humanitarianism to statebuilding
This is not to say that peacebuilding discourse remained entirely consistent over the 
2000-2005 period. Rather, shifts in international discourse may have been produced 
both by global trends towards statebuilding and experiences working in the Tajik
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context. This began to affect the advice being offered to international actors. For 
example, Abdullaev and Freizer’s distinction between ‘peacebuilding’ and 
‘statebuilding’ (2003: 5, see above) advocates the latter as the new challenge for 
Tajikistan. The following section explores the interpretations and interventions o f 
international humanitarian discourses, and the impact o f the ‘war on terror’ and the 
rise o f statebuilding discourses.
The 1990s and early 21st century saw a surge o f humanitarian interest in 
Tajikistan. In the case of Tajikistan there has certainly been a huge quantitative 
growth in such organisations. Between 1994 and 2001, approximately four hundred 
NGOs were registered with the Tajik government (Akiner 2001: 58). To 
humanitarians the conflict can be seen as a desperate fight for resources, bom out of 
poverty and the dysfunctional post-Soviet economy. Whitlock (2002) has produced 
perhaps the most widely read English-language account of the conflict, which 
provides numerous stories o f its humanitarian aspects. However, humanitarian 
discourse has largely been developed in the analytical and monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) reports of international organisations and NGOs in the region. The 
humanitarian ethics o f peacebuilding dovetailed with the norms o f the wider 
development community particularly with the twinning o f macro-economic reform 
to community development and poverty reduction under the strategy to achieve the 
UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for the country (ICG 2003; 
Babajanian 2004). Both MDG and peacebuilding maxims informed an emphasis on 
community-based organisations (CBOs) as agents o f change (Tabyshalieva 2002: 
482). Indeed, around 2000, CBOs as part of ‘civil society’ were frequently 
presented as an antidote to an excessive focus on the state. Saunders argues that 
under the concept o f the multilevel peace process such organisations have facilitated, 
‘crucial processes o f post-conflict peacebuilding by citizens in civil society’ (1998: 
4). Mullojonov suggests that while civil society was ‘weakened and fragmented’ 
from the war, in the aftermath of the peace accords the influence o f grassroots 
organisations on local government has ‘increased considerably’ (2001, no 
pagination).
The changed international context following 9/11 encouraged a discursive 
backlash against humanitarianism and re-focusing back towards the state. Ztircher’s 
recent report, commissioned by GTZ, can perhaps be read partly in this light. His 
work is also inspired by neo-institutionalist analyses o f patronage and networks.
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While the risk of violent conflict is ‘decreasing’, he argues that ‘poverty, rising 
inequality, and high dependence on labour migration and donor money,’ combined 
with ‘uneven access to land’ is exacerbating the dominance of an elite which has 
seized control o f the state (2004). Therefore, he argues, hybrid forms of local 
governance are emerging which reflect the power of vertical patronage networks but 
vary greatly from community to community (p. iv). By reasserting the elite as the 
key providers of order, and exponents of exploitation, Ztircher effectively bridges 
humanitarian and statebuilding wings o f peacebuilding.
Matveeva’s work reflects a further shift in that direction. Her recent, Central 
Asia: A Strategic Framework fo r Peacebuilding, written after spending a period working 
for the UN in Tajikistan, reflects and supports the post-9/11 shift towards 
statebuilding. Peacebuilding she argues, needs to be revised.
There is no reason to hide a preference for programmes that ensure full 
accountability, good governance at every level and democratic participation by all. 
But it is not the most effective approach to insist at all times on that full agenda, 
especially when some parties with which donor governments want to work, 
including governments in Central Asia, find profound cause for concern in the 
democratisation agenda. The suggestion here is to focus on local-level 
transparency, some long-term aspects of statebuilding and the development of 
national discussions about the future (2006: 12-13).
Moreover, the report notes that Tajikistan has achieved a ‘degree of stability’ 
primarily through ‘enhanced security -  the main plank of the government’s 
legitimacy’ (p. 19). It is in the security dimension that common ground between 
international actors, and the basis for ‘engaging with Russia’, can be found (p. 10, 
12). Such work suggests that it is both global discourses and inter-textual relations 
with elite and local actors which determine shifts in policy advice and analysis.
Nevertheless a debate remains between proponents o f order and advocates for 
liberal democracy. Some statebuilding accounts start from an assumption that 
Tajikistan is a ‘failed’ or ‘semi-anarchical state’ dominated by warlords, where 
further war can only be precariously avoided through the presence o f foreign troops 
(Dadmeher 2003: 257). Such analyses o f the ‘failed state’ make plausible, indeed 
necessary, the application of statebuilding programmes to Tajikistan. Since the 
declaration o f the ‘war on terror’, such programmes and platforms have been 
explored and advocated in the work of contending Washington-based analysts (See 
Blank 2005; Giragosian 2006, Hill 2002, Mihalka 2006). On the other hand, in the
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inter-textually constructed world of peacebuilding, proponents of liberal reform 
continue to stubbornly affirm the value of democratisation in statebuilding. Hill, for 
example, writes of statebuilding in these terms:
The primary goal for U.S. policy must also be to enhance Central Asia’s development 
not just its military role. Like Afghanistan, if they are to transform themselves from 
potential breeding grounds for transnational terrorists into viable, stable states, the 
Central Asian countries must liberalise economically and democratise politically 
(2002: 18).
Similarly, ICG noted that Tajikistan’s peace depended to a great extent on its 
progress in democratic reform and that a conservative or gradualist ‘peacebuilding’ 
had allowed a legitimate settlement to regress into an increasingly illegitimate and 
resolutely anti-democratic institution-building process (2004: 19). International 
public transcripts o f the Tajik peace were never homogenous between 2000 and 
2005 yet their ‘pragmatic’ prescriptions stayed within the bounds o f the neo-liberal 
political imaginary of the International Community with its peril/promise and 
Them/Us dichotomies.
4.1 ML Peacebuilding’s discontents: skepticism, pessimism and consternation
Peacebuilding discourse reflects an irresolvable and unavoidable tension in the 
International Community about which ‘level’ should be most emphasised in the 
work o f international organisations. However, as all these texts are drawn from 
explicitly public fora they reveal just part of the story, a sanitised and rationalised 
version o f events. In countless personal interviews taken between 2003 and 2005 I 
found many disillusioned and dispassionate members o f the International 
Community. Usually this was expressed off the record. I concluded the regularity 
o f such dissent was more than a representation o f the stresses and strains of 
implementing challenging programmes in a difficult environment. Rather these 
‘hidden’ or private accounts express doubt about the ethical, spatial and temporal 
parameters o f the public transcript. They suggest that particularity and context is 
considerably more important than the very idea o f the International Community 
supposes. Here, I will introduce three key dimension o f these accounts: scepticism 
about the stated success o f programmes (including that represented in ‘independent’ 
evaluations), pessimism regarding the state of the country (as opposed to the
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optimism of public transcripts), and consternation with one another (as opposed to 
an outward image of ‘the International Community’).
Representatives often profess scepticism, even cynicism, regarding the 
impact o f the programmes they were themselves conducting to further that peace. 
One NGO officer, for example, conceded that political development in Tajikistan 
was dominated by the state and there was ‘no role for civil society’ in 
democratisation. Furthermore he remarked that the role o f the International 
Community in Tajik politics would ‘always’ be very limited.49 Another programme 
manager noted that their work had limited impact in terms o f both physical and 
social infrastructure. He noted that NGOs in his region o f Tajikistan had built ‘a 
million fucked-up water systems.’ Moreover, in terms o f his project ot build civil 
society and ‘peaceful communities’ he noted:
My best case analysis is one step at a time. On my worst day I would say: how can 
we even talk about building civil society in a country which is a million miles away 
from such a thing as bringing women into everyday processes? How can we do 
anything in terms of civil society when we are dealing with people who think women 
are dogs and rats? Can you define civil society with 50% of the population?50
Such ‘hidden’ scepticism was common particularly among officials who spoke some 
local language and/or had been in the country for some time. While negative about 
the progress of democratisation, they nevertheless were confident that the country 
would not return to widespread violence.
By contrast, pessimism is a second variant in the ‘hidden transcripts’ o f the 
International Community; it abandons all hope of the promise o f democracy, in 
resignation to the peril o f authoritarianism. ‘The next revolution will start from this 
region,’ one international official noted. ‘When people can’t access political life 
they look for something different, and this something is Hizb-ut Tahrir\S] This view 
was echoed by an ex-diplomat in Dushanbe.
What do you do as a young Tajik? There’s labour migration. Then some get jobs in 
local administration which are paid low and they have some kind of values and don’t 
pay bribes. [ ...]  The more clever guys, they could probably end up as an office
49 Interview, international programme coordinator A, Khujond, July 2004
50 Interview, international programme coordinator B, Khujond, July 2004.
51 Interview, international official, Kulob, June 2005.
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manager, programme manager [for an international organization], but this is the very, 
very top. The problem is the bottom. The bottom is enormous. (Epkenhans [T5]: 2)
In such representations it is assumed that Tajiks might react to the strains o f extreme 
poverty in their country in ultimately the same way as ‘w e’ might, and that their 
ways out are through ‘us’, however limited those opportunities might be. This 
illustrates that many hidden transcripts do not directly contradict their public 
testimonies but simply express more plainly and acutely some of the trends in public 
discourse.
Indeed, clashes between true believers (who largely adhere to a public 
transcript o f peacebuilding), sceptics (who question it), and pessimists (who 
emphasise peril over promise), lead to consternation within the ‘International 
Community.’ One recent example can be found in an email exchange between an 
editor of the open-source intelligence agency Oxford Analytica (OA) and the current 
US Ambassador to Tajikistan, Hoagland. OA pronounced peacebuilding as a failure 
and portrayed local and international actors as irresponsive to the problems of 
authoritarianism. President Rahmonov is picked out for particular criticism as his 
regime is ‘too weak and corrupt to cope’, while he personally is, ‘reported to be 
unperturbed by the scale and immediacy o f the problem’ (OA 2006, no pagination). 
In response to these assertions, Hoagland wrote to OA that,
Frankly, the ’’State Weakness’’ analysis was without doubt the worst I have seen in my 
nearly three years here at the US Embassy in Dushanbe and for the two years previous 
when I was Director for Caucasus and Central Asia in the State Department. The 
conclusion, ’’...the country is set to remain a failed state on the brink of civil war" is so 
far from reality that if one of my staff had turned this in, I would have responded, 
"What the hell have you been smoking?" (Johnson’s Russia List. 2006, no pagination).
Perhaps, the most revealing aspect of this discussion is the disagreement over basic 
facts between two expert institutions, OA and the US Embassy. Hoagland rightly
c 'y
questions the OA claim that the UTO still exists as a meaningful alliance as well as 
their citation of the Islamic Movement o f Tajikistan (IMT), which they describe as, 
‘the local wing of Hizb ut-Tahrir,’ which has incorporated Taleban and members of
52 The UTO served as an umbrella group to unite opposition factions during the negotiations and 
peace implementation period, roughly between 1993 and 2000. It was only a temporary alliance and 
subsequently has ceased to function in any meaningful sense. That OA continue to use ‘UTO’ as a 
marker, indicates the need of analysts to reduce complexities to easily understandable categories, and 
describe loose networks of individuals as formal institutions.
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the IMU (OA 2006). Regarding the IMT, he comments that, ‘my folks [at the 
embassy] who follow such things have only two very sketchy recent reports of 
something called the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan’ (Johnson’s Russia List. 2006).
To characterise such exchanges as ‘debate’ would miss the revealing 
absurdities here; that two of the most highly-regarded agents o f knowledge about 
Tajikistan in the International Community -  Oxford Analytica and the US State 
Department -  can’t agree on the basic facts. The OA author and editor, whose reply 
to Hoagland strongly defended the piece (ibid), follow the trends of peacebuilding 
discourse in portraying Tajikistan as a site o f peril which can only be overcome by 
the promise of democratisation. He/she is not objectively reading facts but 
interpreting them in light of a deeply embedded and ideologically-imbued discourse 
of peace. Hoagland, on the other hand, departs from the peace-/state-building 
mainstream, in questioning this peril and promise as well as the construction of 
terrorist threat. This is not to say that he himself -  like all o f us -  isn’t influenced by 
discursive trends and ideologies. Indeed, Hoagland, perceptively makes a point 
about how discourses are built inter-textually when commenting in his response that, 
‘the problem with a truly flawed analytical report like this one is that it gets into the 
mix of other sources and can influence other analyses’ (ibid). ‘Reality’, he implies, 
may be influenced by such ‘truly flawed’ analysis. Furthermore, this example shows 
that hidden transcripts can both affirm and deny public representations. These 
aspects o f ‘inter-textuality’ will be returned to frequently in subsequent chapters.
4.2. The Local-Subordinate: the ethos of Tinji
These days the people in power are former communists. The only difference is that now they
are members of the President's party, but their ideology has hardly changed at all
Isroil Ismoilov, pensioner and former university lecturer, February 200553
Don’t hidden transcripts themselves constrain underdogs' definitions and awareness of
overdogs’ vulnerability?
(Tilly 1991:599)
When we think in terms of different discourses o f ‘peace’ in terms of their space- 
makign qualities, we must chart the points of intersection between these spaces. The 
practices of peacebuilding have diverged from the ostensible practices of
53Cited in IWPR, RCA, No. 347,08/02/05
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peacebuilding not just because of a lack of resources, political will or consensus 
within the International Community, but because o f its practical engagement with 
local spaces. Scott’s (1998) characterisation o f when ‘high-modemism’ meets 
‘practical knowledge’ or metis nicely characterises why various schemes to build 
peace have failed or turned out quite differently from the intended. This section 
explores the ethos o f tinji, and the metis o f Tajik localities -  the representational 
resources of local actors to avoid, accommodate and defy the interventions of 
peacebuilding. While popular discourses are no less subject to ideology than elite or 
international narratives, they entail much more practical intensity and thus take the 
forms of ways of life. However, I shall not make a ‘culturalist’ argument for either 
the absolute relativism of competing discourses, or the immutability o f traditions, 
cultures and mentalities. Rather, I will show how, despite the differences of 
religious persuasion, ‘clan’ or region, a subordinate discourse of inter-regional peace 
has emerged publicly, alongside evidence of the existence o f hidden transcripts of 
dissent against the new elite.
We must explore the discourse of tinji with reference to the ethical, spatial, 
and temporal dimensions of its public transcript:
■ Ethics: the idealising of ‘unity’ and ‘patriarchy’ where social ‘cohesion’ 
ought to be retained
■ Space: the preservation o f the local ‘community’ (mahalla) as a social, 
apolitical site
■ Time: the search for post-conflict ‘modernisation’
Before embarking on this discussion of contemporary tinji, I will provide some 
historical context to local Tajik spaces. While my analysis characterises elite spaces 
and discourses as ideologically neo-Soviet, Kandiyoti points out that it is ‘at the 
level o f the quotidian that one finds the clearest expression o f habits and 
expectations acquired during the Soviet period, as well as important generational 
differences in their expression’ (2002: 253). After outlining the main tenets o f the 
discourse I will then go on to challenge the public account with the dissent and 
resignation found in ‘hidden transcripts’.
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4.2.L ‘Society’: the evolution of local spaces
Mann (1998) has noted that to speak of the society, just as to speak of the state, is to 
cheat. Tajik ‘society’ can be broken down into regions, sub-regions and various 
identity groups based on gender, ethnicity, confession, education, professional or 
social status. Moreover during the civil war these sub-national cleavages 
predominated. ‘The Tajik civil war, ‘ Geiss comments, ‘has already indicated how 
opposed forms o f communal commitment and competing interpretations o f 
collective identity might render it difficult to find a common ground for politics’ 
(2003: 246). This is reinforced by the arguments of Roy (discussed in chapter two) 
that the civil war took the form of ‘the war o f the kolkhoz.’ However, in the post­
conflict period, and perhaps starting before the peace settlement, tinji has had a 
pacifying function in producing a common public transcripts across communities 
and between communities and the state, and thus forms the basis for a renewed 
common ground. This common ground, paradoxically, seems to entail the apartness 
o f communities from one another and elites via a parochial and patriarchal vision of 
the village. Thus, the very emergence o f tinji is in itself a major indicator o f peace. 
This conciliating trend did not emerge from nowhere: it had its roots in historical 
processes that have created bases for cooperation as they have simultaneously 
spawned forms o f contestation.
Conjoining spaces: the attempted integration o f  avlod, mahalla and kishlak
Under various empires, power in what is today Tajikistan was always effectively 
decentralised as ‘local rulers established themselves in strategic positions, carving 
out small, independent principalities’ (Akiner 2002b: 10). Despite this, an 
inconsistent process of the integration o f local spaces was taking place before and 
during the Soviet period. Tajiks do not speak directly about ‘clans’ or ‘tribes’ but 
use alternative terms to express local and familial ties. The avlod (extended family 
group [Taj.]) was the fundamental social unit o f pre-Soviet Tajik society but it did 
not take the dominant position in public or political space at that time. Rather it was 
the mahalla (community [Taj.]), often including numerous avlods, which provided a 
public space for festivities and the resolution of questions of local governance. 
Geiss comments,
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Although kinship relations played a role within the mahalla, membership of it did 
not depend on kinship, but on residency. The importance of this principle was most 
visible in the fact that family feasts did not involve relatives but all residents of the 
mahalla (2003: 9).
In this respect, pre-Soviet Tajik society differed from the tribal societies of Central 
Asia (Kyrgyz [Kara Kyrgyz], Kazakh [Kyrgyz], Turkmen) where kinship was more 
important and perhaps remains more important today. Both Uzbeks and Tajiks of 
present-day western Tajikistan -  whose ethnic distinctions are not very clear now 
and were even less so in pre-Soviet times -  often resided in larger kishlak 
(agricultural settlements [Taj.]) made up of several mahallas.
In practice, to the extent that integration occurred, it was stratified. So-called 
‘detribalisation’ here took place under the influence of the khan who 
administratively divided subjects on the basis o f kishlak or mahalla, and took over 
the traditionally tribal duties o f conflict regulation, to erode the political power o f the 
avlod or larger clan (p. 92). This residential or spatial unit was the basis for their 
further political integration into the ‘state’ structures o f consecutively the Khanate of 
Kokand (for northern Tajiks) or Emirate o f Bukhara (for southern and eastern 
Tajiks), the Russian Tsarist empire, and the Soviet Union. However, avlod remained 
the base social unit as the larger units of mahalla and kishlak became absorbed into 
imperial power structures. According to Geiss, this process, where the Khans 
successively ceded more ground to Russian Tsars, undermined the bases of 
legitimacy in nineteenth century Central Asia. ‘Thus,’ he remarks, ‘patrimonial state 
structures in tsarist Central Asia were based on domination rather than authority, due 
to the lack o f shared legal and political community structures’ (p. 239). Multiple, 
over-lapping claims to political authority continued to exist at this time. ‘Tajik’ 
politics had a complexity which evolved through the Soviet period as familial 
cleavages combined with administrative-provincial ones (as discussed in chapter 
2.1.i). Thus to speak of a local level of subordinate spaces -  under which different 
sub-groups interact -  we must empirically justify this judgement in terms o f the 
discourses of peace emanating from mahallas across Tajik society. The uniting force 
for Tajik society, which both reflects and produces this ‘unity’, is the discourse of 
tinji.
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4.2Ji. Ethics and spaces: harmony and hierarchy
In Tajiki there are numerous words for peace. However, the commonly-used notion 
of tinji (wellness/peacefulness) perhaps best conveys the feelings o f many who avoid 
conflict socially and especially politically. As tinji is communicated orally, inter- 
textual relations are less formalised and more difficult to follow. Here discourse 
analysis requires an ethnographic approach which reveals not just forms of 
representations but wider practices which sustain or challenge them. The following 
analysis of the discourse of tinji is based on research conducted in five communities 
across two sub-regions (Asht and Panjakent raiyons) in Sughd oblast where 
international organisations had just begun to work in 2005 (Heathershaw 2005c).54 
These results were also consistent with my experiences and findings from the other 
three regions o f the country.
Peace as harmony: the ethics o f  conflict denial
The first element o f the discourse of tinji is the denial or downplaying o f conflict in 
the community. Conflict, ‘tension’ (naprazheniye) or disquiet (bezspokoystvo, 
raznoglasiye) when it is acknowledged is attributed to brief arguments caused by the 
lack of resources. Less common is the acknowledgement of tension with the 
khukumat (local government [Taj.]) or with other villages (where the dispute is again 
over resources). When asked to identify threats again there was significant 
agreement between community leaders and members -  with both identifying the lack 
of work opportunities and the consequent effects o f unemployment and labour 
migration as the most significant threat to ‘peace’ (tinji [Taj.]; spokoystvo).55 Figure 
12 below presents a categorisation o f the answers o f all sixty respondents in five 
villages to the open question: ‘What is the greatest threat to peace in the village’. 
Economic (lack o f resources) and social deficits (illiteracy, addictions) were cited as 
potential threats. Strictly political or military threats to security were not cited at all.
54 The communities selected were Navbuned and Tojikokjar (in Asht raiyon) with Koshonar, 
Margedar and Novabad (all in Panjakent). Responses were in Tajik, Uzbek and Russian. Russian 
was usually the lingua franca between Mercy Corps staff, local leaders and myself. However 
conversation often switched between the vernacular and Russian.
55 ‘Spokoystvo’ (peace/calmness) was used more than the formal and far-reaching ‘mir’ (peace); 
equally ‘raznogalsiye’ (discord) was more publicly accepted than the neologism ‘konflikt’ (conflict) 
which was frequently used by internationals when they spoke Russian to locals.
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To probe this perception further it is interesting to look at public testimonies 
with regard to communal and personal livelihoods. Local elites give the impression 
that while the situation is still difficult, the material conditions o f the community 
have improved over recent years. Testimonies from villagers (their subordinates) 
were somewhat more mixed. Attempts to measure personal views o f conflict and 
livelihood were often thwarted by an interpretation o f ‘you’ as necessarily meaning 
‘the community’ -  part of a broader public transcript o f community togetherness. 
Such representations constitute a Tajik ‘harmony ideology’ (Bichsel 2005). Under a 
harmony ideology, community members refuse to acknowledge any disagreements 
or even any personal opinions for fear o f breaking from the group. The harmony 
ideology of these communities -  in strong contrast to peacebuilding discourses -  
was, ironically, particularly strongly represented by the nascent Community 
Initiative Groups (CIG) and Community Action Groups (CAG) which had recently 
been established by the international organisation Mercy Corps in each community.
Figure 12: Perceived Threats to Mahalla
What is the greatest threat to peace in the village?
Community
Unemployment 
& Labour 
Migration
Lack of Water 
and other 
resources
Illiteracy/ 
Alchoholism/ 
Drug Addiction
There 
are no 
threats Grand Total
Koshonar 7 2 3 12
Marqedar 11 1 12
Novabad 6 6 12
Navbuned 2 6 4 12
Toiikokiar 1 1 10 12
Grand Total 27 9 7 17 60
Unity and Patriarchy: gender, age and societal space
While a harmony ideology indicates a denial o f conflict, in Tajikistan it is 
accompanied by affirmations of community unity. Perhaps, the most revealing 
demonstration o f this worldview in my research was provided during the bilingual 
Russian/Tajik SWOT analysis conducted with the CIG in Novabad. When asked to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the village, and the opportunities and 
threats that they face, the CIG identified the aspects detailed in figure 13. Their 
responses inscribed ‘unity’ (edinstvo) and ‘cohesion’ (splochonnost) onto the village. 
Strengths and opportunities relate to the achievement o f unity, weaknesses and
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threats relate to insufficient unity. Whilst a harmony ideology might only represent 
public avoidance or even denial of the actual existence of conflict, it is important to 
recognise that such ideologies can be, to a certain extent, productive. They do not 
end perceptions o f inequality, or stifle all tensions and arguments, but they can to 
some extent reproduce self-censorship and hence become self-fulfilling prophecies.
The overall theme of unity carries over into patriarchal understandings of 
community management and leadership. The gendered and ageist preconceptions of 
this discourse are immediately reflected in the public silence o f women and the 
young when around an older, male elite. This reflects a local self where female roles 
are subordinated below those of men. The two most common words attributed to 
community problem-solving are ‘cohesion’ and ‘activeness’ (aktivnost). Often they 
are used together to imply that an active community is one that coheres, and a 
coherent community is one that is active. When asked, ‘do people listen to your 
voice?’ the head of Koshenar community committee (raisi mahalla [Taj.]) noted, 
‘Yes, of course. The village represents one family, from one root [koren].’56 The 
community leader in Margedar, who served forty-five years as a brigadir from the 
first day the community was opened until 1997, described his leadership role: 
‘because I worked with them from the first day. All men and women grew up under 
my eyes. The people trust me and would not be able to deceive me.’ Community 
leaders in all five villages cited numerous examples o f the mobilisation o f people for 
collective voluntary labour (khashar [Taj.]) prior to the involvement of Mercy 
Corps. ‘Mobilisation’ here is understood as calling on people to provide free labour 
for a community goal which has been decided by the rais and other ‘respected’ 
(uvazhaemye) community members or even local government. However, while 
decision-making may not be exclusively top-down, it is clear that certain sections of 
the community may be listened to more than others. A majority o f men, particularly 
older men, cite that they feel listened to, while just two out o f fifteen younger 
women felt that their voice was heard in the community. However, for many people 
there is little sense that this is a problem. The Koshenar CIG leader was quite open
56 Interview, mahalla head, Koshenar, 26/06/05
57 Interview, aksakal, Margedar, 27/06/05
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that ‘the voice of women has no kind of meaning’. The women in his group
f O
vociferously agreed.
Figure 13: SWOT Analysis, Novabad, Panjikent district
STRENGTHS
Respectful culture (Izati Ehtirom. [Taj.]/ 
Uvazhaemaya kultura)
Unity (Yagonay. [Taj.]/ Edinstvo)
Mutual Understanding (Yakdigarfahmi[ Taj.]/ 
Vzaimoponimaniye)
Friendship (Dusti \Ja].]l.Druzhba)
WEAKNESSES
Provocative or insubordinate beahviour (Ighvo 
[Taj.]/ Provokatsiya) -  incl. People who do not 
follow the leadership. ‘People who know head of 
the police and report lies to them about our 
community, because they are jealous of projects’. 
‘People who dig up our pipes before’.
OPPORTUNITIES
To teach the youth and direct them on the right 
path
Solving problems with mutual understanding and 
without quarrels
THREATS
Not being able to agree
Belittling one another
Some people don’t obey the head of the
community
In these villages mahalla was often used interchangeably to denote both the 
community as a whole and its leadership.59 Often the title aksakal (literally ‘white 
beard’ [Taj.]) was used for older men in the community who have special status as 
decision-makers and conflict-enders. In any of these variants a group of, usually, 
older men meet daily in the ‘teahouse’ (choihona) and discuss the life of the village. 
The young and, especially, women are rarely present at these times. While in other 
parts o f Central Asia attempts have been made to formalise the mahalla committee 
or equivalent body by making it an organ of local government (Uzbekistan) or 
advisory council (Kyrgyzstan), in Tajikistan the mahalla has remained entirely 
informal notwithstanding the attempts o f international organisations to formalise it 
through the establishment of community-based organisations.
4.2.UL Time: Islam, the post-conflict and modernisation
This study has, thus far, conspicuously omitted direct discussion o f Islam as a social 
or political force. This small sub-section will look at Islam particularly in terms of
58 Interview, CIG, Koshenar, 26/06/05.
59 Sometimes the term mahallinski komitet (community committee) is used to denote the leadership of 
the community, at other times simply raisi mahalla or raisi kishlok (head of the community or head of 
the village).
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the temporal dimension o f tinji, a post-conflict anti-politics, considering the extent to 
which Islamic symbols and norms might reflect the temporal ideal-other o f tinji. In 
this sense, my findings indicate that in Tajikistan’s subordinate spaces Islam is not a 
primary political force, and coheres with those accounts which show the limits of 
political Islam in Tajikistan (Hiro 1994: 203, 217; Atkin 1995: 254).
Post-conflict anti-politics
Unified and patriarchal local spaces, despite evidence of inequality, are buttressed by 
a further aspect of Tajiki tinji: a strong aversion to the political sphere, an anti­
political outlook. This is temporally juxtaposed to memories of the divisive pre-war 
election, particuallry the 1991 presidential elections. Community leaders in
Margedar provided a particularly strong example o f this. ‘In our village’, one man 
noted, ‘peace (spokoystvo) is one o f our strengths’. Another man added, ‘there are 
no tensions, no kind o f political parties.’60 At this point he was quietly chided by 
fellow group members for mentioning politics. Another leader (the raisi mahalla) in 
a later interview agreed that there was no political tension. However, he 
acknowledged that ‘there are political parties’61 but contended that ‘there are no 
contentious (sporni) questions between them.’ More generally, citizens strongly 
express deference to and respect for the state -  both the idea o f it and its 
representatives. But, this deference seems to be rooted in a rendering o f time as 
post-conflict where conflict is a period of the past associated with political activity. 
The remembering of the past produces parameters for contemporary social and 
political behaviour. The above example offers a glimpse of the retreat from active 
political participation which has taken place in Tajik society since the numerous 
popular political movements o f perestroika, prior to the civil war. The association 
o f plural and competitive politics with war is extremely strong. Accordingly, the 
political becomes a place for elites, represented by the state. This anti-political 
discourse envisages the political as an attribute o f an ‘other’ and thus tames the 
political as something which can be avoided or forgotten. Ironically, this gives the
60 Interview, CIG, Margedar, 27/06/05
61 We later discovered that the three political parties represented in the village are the President’s own 
National Democratic Party of Tajikistan, as well as the Communist Party of Tajikistan and the 
Socialist Party of Tajikistan -  neither of which are effectively oppositional.
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discourse o f tinji enormous political impact as an essential element in the 
maintenance of Tajikistan’s peace.
Modernising Islam
Given this context, it is hardly surprising that ‘Islam’ is frequently read in terms of 
tinji in the public pronouncements o f both worshippers and religious leaders 
{mullos). Indeed, Islam is often woven in with discourse of modernisation and a 
position on women which reflects the patriarchy outlined above rather than the 
norms o f shari ’a. This serves as an acceptance of the inequities o f development in 
the public space but also some enthusiasm for the smaller, but not insignificant, 
piece o f the cake which can be gained through participation in international 
programmes. CAG members in Komsomol were particularly enthused by the 
prospect for modernisation through Mercy Corps’ Community Action Investment 
Programme (CAIP) as answers to the following question show:
JH 62: In what ways has the community changed because of CAIP?
‘We want to organise an NGO.’
‘We want to be developed. To turn into a “little New York”.’
‘Have leamt how to do projects.’
‘We don’t want anymore war. We want a modem country.’63
The group’s plans for their activities in the coming years amounted to a programme 
of cottage industrialisation including ‘a sewing factory [for 25 girls]’, a ‘mini-factory 
[for processing fruit and vegetables]’ and a ‘workshop’ to bring employment, as well 
as a ‘pumping station’ to deal with water shortages.64 Other CAGs similarly 
associated conflict resolution with the development o f core economic and social 
infrastructure including bridges, electrical transformers, school improvements, and 
health clinics.
Interestingly there is a certain amount o f ambivalence with respect to this 
process o f post-conflict, post-Soviet change: both hope and fear. On the one hand,
621 indicate myself in this way as interviewer and interlocutor.
63 Interview, CAG, Komsomol, 15/04/05
64 Ibid.
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infrastructural improvement is not merely seen as a palliative but as part of a process 
o f modernisation which cures societal ills. On the other hand, many community 
leaders emphasise continuity in lifestyles and values under modernisation. A mullo 
who was a CAG member in Shule cited as an example o f improved outlook, that 
‘women became more skillful after a sewing competition.’65 ‘Modernisation’ is 
reconciled with ‘Islam’ in this transcript. Modernity is associated with peace and 
stability conveying a sense o f temporal progress from ‘backwardness’ to 
‘modernity’. In such a way, Islam has a modernising force and is itself modernised 
by the lives and practices o f Tajik believers.
4.2.iv. Dissent and disharmony: resistance or avoidance?
Such ethical, temporal and spatial understandings of ‘se lf  and locality are clearly 
indebted to experiences o f the Soviet Union. In Humphrey’s terms, they constitute, 
‘some combination o f previous ways, beliefs, and habits o f mind, many of which 
could be characterised as Soviet or Post-Soviet forms repertoires by means o f which 
people can make sense o f their activities’ (2002: xxi). Moreover, in a no less post- 
Soviet fashion, the public ideals they profess provoke substantial ‘hidden’ disquiet 
especially from women and the young.
Avoidance: focus on livelihoods and employment
In many o f the communities I visited in 2004 and 2005, those who were not involved 
in village leadership were particularly preoccupied with the difficult process of 
scratching out a living and coping with poverty. The young -  both male and female 
-  testified that they increasingly feel the burden o f making a living locally, going on 
labour migration to Russia (for men), and coping as head o f the household without 
their husbands (for women). During street interviews, I asked the question: ‘What 
changes would make your life easier?’ Fifty-three out o f sixty interviewees named 
‘work places’ as one of, or the only, change that would make a difference. A 
selection o f answers is below:
65 Interview, Mullo, Shule, 27/04/05
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JH : What changes would make your life easier?
24-year-old, female, housewife: ‘First, there's no work places. Second, there's no 
libraries for us to be able to study. I can read but there's no books. I want to study but 
there's no possibilities. We need to raise the level of education.’
18-year-old, female, housewife: 'There's no work places for us, for women. If they 
opened a sewing shop for us, we'd be able to make our lives easier.'
28-year-old, male, unemployed: ‘Work places. I want to work.’66
Such testimonies, which are extremely common across Tajikistan, do not represent 
hidden transcripts o f dissent or disquiet. They do, however, depart from the 
harmony ideology of the developing community that is typically portrayed to 
internationals and outsiders.
Dissent yet resignation: anger and hopelessness among women and the young
In line with the above, dissenting voices are more likely to occur among the young 
and the women of the village, two groups which are particularly excluded in a 
patriarchal system. When asked to assess whether the livelihood o f the village has 
improved over the last year, an overall majority felt it had, reflecting a public 
transcript o f harmony promoted by village leaders. However, the minority who 
answered ‘no’ (16 out o f 60) were composed of just one man but half o f all women 
(15 out o f 30). While publicly women claim that they accept their lot as second- 
class citizens, a small minority are ready to speak out. As a male researcher, I found 
enough cynicism behind closed doors, towards the regime in particular and men in 
general, to believe that ‘hidden transcripts’ o f dissent exist to a greater or lesser 
degree across the country. They may exist among groups of female cotton-workers, 
peasant farmers, male labour migrants, or within the extended family, mahalla or ex­
kolkhoz. However, as will be explored throughout this thesis, such dissent largely 
remains hidden and limited.
There seem to be two directions o f hidden transcripts or ‘resistances’: anger 
over poverty; and hopelessness with the local community. For example, female 
cotton workers in the village o f Kizil Ketmen, near Sharituz, in the south reported to 
my wife that they hadn’t been paid in 6 months and that the community priority was
66 Street interviews, Panjakent and Asht raiyons, June 2005
67 Ibid.
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not that officially decreed by the community leadership during Mercy Corps 
planning workshops but, simply, to ‘get paid’. ‘The head [of the village, a member 
o f the MC group] promised,’ one claimed, ‘but it hasn’t yet come.’ The women 
noted bitterly that they had simply received left-over cotton stalks to sell in the 
bazaar. In Shahrinav, the Rasht valley, some young male peasant farmers noted 
how the actual arrangements for ‘water management’ were less equitable and 
harmonious than the village leadership claimed. One noted that the member of the 
dekon farm which was attached to the Sovkhoz got priority access to water and when 
they used it there were shortages for poorer members o f the community who had 
their own plots. Moreover, one remarked, ‘if  you want to irrigate your land you 
have to monitor it’, in order to stop others redirecting the water.69 A lack o f trust in 
the local elite contrasts strongly with the ‘unity’ and ‘harmony’ maxims o f tinji. In a 
very few cases it is also contributing to increased support for radical Islamic 
movements, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir in both the South and North.
4.3. The Elite: mirostroitelstvo and neo-Sovietism
The Tajik people have entered the new millennium firmly convinced that peace, unity and 
creative work, a formula for advancement -  which was instigated by President Rahmonov 
and which became the quintessence of the previous ten years of independence -  will give a 
powerful impetus to our further movement towards democratic, secular and legitimate 
statehood and towards integration into the world community
-  Fatoev, Tajikistan: Ten Years of Independence (2001:104)
Elite discourse and practices o f mirostroitelstvo (‘peacebuilding’) in Tajikistan are 
indebted to the ideologically-saturated post-Soviet space. The translation o f UN 
Security Council decisions and international doctrines o f peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping means that more than the original English is lost in translation. While 
Russian-language doctrine borrows much from UN language, its practical 
interpretation both in Moscow and on the ground bears little resemblance to liberal 
ideals o f the ‘International Community’. This is less a technical matter o f translation 
than an issue o f a ‘travelling concept’ which takes on a new meaning in a different 
political context. Thus, unlike liberal notions of peacekeeping as humanitarian 
intervention, it has come to represent a distinctly authoritarian approach to conflict
68 Street interviews, Sharituz, June 2005
69 Interview with villager, Sharinav, 11/08/05
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resolution (MacKinlay and Cross 2003; Heathershaw 2004). We must explore 
mirostroitelstvo, based in what I label ‘an ideology o f neo-Sovietism’ (Heathershaw 
2006) with reference to the temporal, ethical and spatial dimensions of discourse:
■ Time: the remembering o f perestroika as the cause of war, and a 
discourse o f national progress or ‘democratisation’
■ Ethics: the idealising o f a common interest in ‘stability’ and political 
‘authority’
■ Space: the locating of elite networks around the basic idea o f ‘the state’, 
locally, nationally, and regionally (and across ‘Central Asia’)
In this sense, neo-Sovietism is much like Liu’s conception o f a postsocialist political 
imagination, that ‘envisioned eventual economic and political liberalisation within 
solidly Soviet assumptions about the role of the state’ (2002: 192). Thus, I read 
mirostroitelstvo in terms of its neo-Soviet spatial, temporal and ethical ideals.
4.3.L Times: from Soviet to neo-Soviet
The notion o f progress is clearly important to neo-Soviet elites. However, their 
sense of time is imbued with a different set of meanings and signifiers than one 
might find in neo-liberal peacebuilding. This sub-section looks at how neo- 
Sovietism may derive its ‘newness’ and its ‘sovietism’ from the evolutionary 
hollowing-out of Soviet ideas, before looking particularly at the temporal 
dimensions o f mirostroitelstvo’s peace.
From sovietism to post-/neo-Sovietism
‘In the Soviet system,’ Sakwa notes, ‘power and ideology were explicitly linked.’ 
The doctrine o f Sovietism began as an archetypal form of what Scott calls 
authoritarian high modernism that lay behind the collectivisation o f the early-Soviet 
period. Scott observes,
At its centre was a supreme self-confidence about continued linear progress, the 
development of scientific and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, the 
rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not 
least, an increasing control over nature (including human nature) commensurate with 
a scientific understanding of natural laws (1998: p.89).
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The disillusionment with such grand narratives was apparent well before the 
traumatic fall o f the Soviet Union. During Stalin’s reign Sovietism was ‘gutted of 
living content and reduced to mere instruments of power’ (Sakwa 1998: 170). ‘Over 
the years,’ Sakwa remarks, ‘Soviet ideology became transformed into the ethos of 
the system, and by the same token lost some of the characteristics o f philosophy’ 
(p. 174). Ideology continued to be at the centre of the Soviet Union but was never 
properly remade -  and the final attempt to do so played a large part in the system’s 
collapse (Sakwa 1998). Late-Sovietism retained, however, the elitism and the 
dependency o f the political on the economic of Lenin’s adaptation of Marx without 
its theory o f progress. It is apparent that the even thinner ideology -  such that it is -  
sketched below bares an impoverished resemblance to its parent, its representatives 
being much less involved with the accumulation of knowledge, scientific and human 
progress.
Today’s neo-Sovietism takes the form of an ideologically indebted form of 
praxis. Sakwa draws similar conclusions regarding the political make-up of Putin 
whose politics are ‘imbued with a post-Soviet face whilst often taking on a neo- 
Soviet aspect’ (2004: 47). Putin’s ‘success’ in stabilising Russia is admired by many 
leaders across the region, particularly those holding positions within the place o f the 
state (gosstruktura), including both so-called reformers and hardliner members of 
the nomenklatura. Moreover, like ‘peacebuilding’, the neo-Soviet discourse of 
mirostroitelstvo is not simply analytic but also expressive and performative. As 
such, it can both shape the assessments o f ‘interest’ by decision-makers and it 
endows hard-line actions with legitimacy both for an inner circle o f decision-makers 
and a wider public.
Neo-Soviet memories: from  perestroika to war, with the President to peace
President Rahmonov’s public testimonies, rarely mention the war. However, in his 
few pronouncements on the topic, he has associated the war with perestroika, which 
created ‘a vacuum, which was formed as a result o f the break-up (raspad) o f the old 
state [the Soviet Union]’. This breakdown of power was followed by ‘attempts to 
fill in [the old state] with all possible kinds of extremism at the beginning o f the 
1990s’ (Rahmonov 1999). Tajik elites allude to particularly negative memories of 
the formal end of the USSR and the ‘anarchy’ it is thought to have brought about.
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Such readings serve powerful political functions as they inscribe war as an exception 
to authoritarian rule, rather than a product o f it. Similarly, this allows Rahmonov to 
portray himself as a saviour rather than a placeman for the country’s powerful and 
brutal warlords. Elite accounts of the war, to the extent that they detail political 
violence, do not link this violence to the process by which the current elite became 
ascendant, but rather associate it with non-state factions.
In public life, elites talk about war to the extent that they talk about ‘peace’ -  
specifically the ‘progress’ being achieved under the present government. This kind 
o f narrative is even found in texts whose publication is funded and supported by the 
International Community. For example, the second volume of The Republic o f  
Tajikistan: History o f  Independence, which covers 1992 when tens of thousands of 
Tajiks died due to the conflict, portrays the collection as a contribution to the study 
of peace (Nazriev and Sattorov 2005). It is,
an attempt to reconstruct the history of the making of Tajikistan as an independent 
sovereign state, to analyse and generalise the unique experience of peacekeeping work 
[mirostvorcheskoi deyatelnosti] of the leadership and all fruitful [zdorovykh] forces of 
the country in the search for a way out of the political crisis, upon the resolution of 
which the existence of the Tajik state itself depended (p. 3).
In other transcripts the narrative is inscribed with a stronger ‘positive’ dimension, 
emphasising ‘democratisation’. Lavrakas, for example, contends that the war, 
‘revealed the core strength that has allowed Tajikistan’s people to survive for so 
long.’ Moreover, the people understand that ‘national priorities can only be achieved 
by reference to values such as democracy and political, cultural, spiritual and 
economic revival’ (Lavrakas 2004: 6).
This positing o f a managed ‘democracy’ as an accepted goal and war as 
overcome situates the Tajik people under the leadership of an elite guiding it on the 
track to prosperity. Readings of the civil war are regularly accompanied by accounts 
o f recovery and progress under the person o f the president. The official book, 
Tajikistan: Ten Years o f Independence, remarks:
These years which saw civil war followed by long-awaited peace, the implementation 
of economical and social reforms unprecedented for such a complicated period, these 
years which symbolised the tragedy and triumph of our Tajik people will be forever 
linked with the thoughts, hopes and work of one man whose name has become widely 
known all over the world -  Emomali Rahmonov (Fatoev 2001: 95).
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It is noted that ‘the government [at the start of the war] could not prevent the 
bloodshed and maintain proper state order’ (p. 96). It is widely accepted that 
Rahmonov was able to harmonise national interest by stepping in as an arbiter and 
overcoming the disorderly struggle among the parties (Olimov 2003: 120-121). 
Thus, elite accounts differ from international portrayals by remembering government 
as above the conflict rather than as an active player in the civil war. Such accounts 
reflect not only the temporal dimension o f elite discourse but ethical and spatial 
dimensions o f the Tajik elite ‘se lf.
4.3JL Ethics: ‘stability’ and ‘authority’
The concepts o f ‘stability’ and ‘authority’ found in official discourse o f regional 
elites are central to the ideology of Neo-Sovietism. They are inherently linked. This 
is an authoritarian state-as-guardian view where the elite are not only responsible for 
political stability and economic growth but quiescence in social relations and the 
maintenance of a moral society.
Firstly the notion o f ‘stability’ (stabilnost) is typically used to explain the 
priority o f economic development over democratisation. It denotes a state which is 
achieved via prosperity and where regime change is considered necessarily 
‘destabilising’, and liberalising reform is considered a secondary or subsequent 
concern.70 Here ‘democratisation’ becomes a gradual process which can only 
happen after significant economic development has been achieved (Usmonov 2003). 
According to Ubaidulloyev, the ex-commander, mayor o f Dushanbe and Chairman 
of the upper house of parliament, this is reflected in ‘the important fact, that the 
basic aim o f every citizen of our country and society as a whole consists o f the 
acquisition o f the fruits of a peaceful life, the strengthening of activities in the 
economic sphere’ (2003: 66). Moreover, ‘the perfecting o f a political system for 
society, in our view, must be planned [...] and must not bear spasmodic character, 
but be smooth, consistent {posledovateVnym) and expedient’ (p.63).
Secondly, the term ‘authority’ (avtoritet) is often used to signify a person 
who has power and influence over his peers.71 In political discourse, it is inscribed 
as primarily residing with official elites, firstly the President, and those appointed or
70 Interview, Abduhalim Gaffurov, Chairman, official Socialist Party of Tajikistan, Dushanbe,
5/08/05.
71 Also to indicate the girth of a man o f some rotundity.
157
supported by the President, to the exclusion of non-governmental actors (Fatoev 
2001: 95). Within his own party, Rahmonov’s personal ‘authority’ is explicitly 
homologous with the authority of the party. In answer to the question why does the 
PDP have such a strong position in the politics of Tajikistan, Asozoda proclaimed 
that this was a question of ‘authority’.
Firstly, this is something that everyone accepts. The position of the party became so 
strong when [President] Emomali Sharipovich Rahmonov -  a person who has colossal 
avtoritet -  became our Chairman. Why? First, he promised the Nation that he would 
end the war. Second, he at once said that all political migrants and forced evacuees 
should return to the homeland. Third, he said, that he’d resolve the problem of 
hunger. That’s how the avtoritet of this person came about! Our party did not 
increase his avtoritet. He gave this avtoritet to the party (Asozoda [Tl]: 3).
Faced with such public deference, Rahmonov has at times had to step in himself to 
deny a cult o f personality which he may have found embarrassing.72 Ironically, of 
course, only he is able to place limits on the veneration of his authority; for others to 
publicly challenge him would be (career) suicide.
The concepts o f ‘stability’ and ‘authority’ are also twinned to provide an 
account of the Tajik subject -  at once savage and submissive -  where the strength o f 
the state is required to control the public sphere and to gain prosperity and stability. 
Civil society organisations emphasise their non-political nature even when they are 
being funded by international organisations to support programmes which are 
apparently political such as voter education, gender issues or conflict resolution. 
This elite model o f control assumes individuals are legible; that they can be counted, 
measured and thus controlled. The state, furthermore, is portrayed as possessing a 
common, even unitary, interest with the people (Fatoev 2001: 96). However, roles 
are differentially inscribed where ‘W e’ are invoked with the qualities to lead ‘Them’, 
who lack the said qualities. The invocation o f the noun for ‘government’ (vlast) or 
‘authority’ carries a notion of ‘se lf  as an elite and head (rais) o f the people. The 
head of the raiyon o f Vose, for example, explained the character o f the cadres who 
are needed.
A great deal depends on the heads of districts and Jamoats themselves, and on how 
they work. They are all state servants (gosudarstvennye sluzhashchie). They must 
know their powers (polnomochiya) and know how to call on them. Heads of raiyons
72 Asia-Plus Blitz, #158 (1067), 20/08/02, and #311 (903) 20/12/01.
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don’t have the right to take for themselves all power. Only those [political] parties 
must exist which are committed to the country (predan stranye) and work from their 
heart (UNTOP/NAPST 2002b: 32).
Such ethics inscribe a subject people in need of being controlled and limited by an 
authoritative elite. The Soviet-era idea of a people o f ‘low self-consciousness and 
high respect’73 is widely held among elites and, in a modified sense, among ordinary 
people. These testimonies o f an ideal o f ‘authority’ correlate significantly with Liu’s 
findings regarding ‘good authority’ among ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan. 
Such a person was ‘a strong and ruthless but benevolent and wise paternal figure 
whose influence would hold sway over neighbourhood, city, and state’ (Liu 2002: 
1).
43ML Spaces in ‘the state*
In mirostroitelstvo, political spaces are also inscribed in neo-Soviet terms. The state, 
ethically and temporally conceived, is considered the spatial locus o f the elite. 
Moreover, as it is embodied by its representatives, it becomes a social and personal 
actor (Liu 2002). In the case of Tajikistan, the person of authority is habitually 
referred to as the Rais (head), and exists at all levels o f government from the 
unofficial authority of the mahalla to the presidency. However, while ‘the state’ 
provides a degree of identity for a collection of Rais who constitute the regime or 
political elite, ‘nation’ is a peculiarly ambiguous trope in elite discourse. It remains 
so because o f the multiple layers of identity, and political community in the Tajik 
context, not least regional formations which served as vehicles for the war. Here, I 
look at statist conceptions o f community, before looking at how regionalism is 
barely concealed in hidden transcripts.
The state-nation
Nationality (nationalnost) has remained an, at best, secondary signifier throughout 
Tajik history. In accordance with Stalin’s nationalities policy the Soviet government 
o f the Tajik SSR undertook a grand project to create the historical legitimacy for the 
Republic’s borders. Scholars Sadriddin Aini and Bobojon Gafurov (re)discovered a
73 (Tajik: ‘hudshinosipastu, ehtirom b a la n d Russian: 'nizkoye samosoznaniye, visokoye 
uvazheniye 3This phrase is often seen as a stereotype and determined by the people themselves rather 
than practised in governance. See UNTOP/NAPST (2002a: 26).
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Tajik literature and cultural history which from the 1930s were incorporated into 
educational and political discourse (Akiner 2002b: 15). However, this grand project 
was limited in scope. ‘Collective identity linked to nationality did not matter,’ Geiss 
remarks, ‘as Soviet power obviated its politicisation and limited the range of 
possible public representations and interpretations of this identity’ (Geiss 2003: 
246). Thus, at the time o f the war, the Tajik state had acquired a territorial basis 
within the Soviet borders but was spatially fractured by regional identities recreated 
under the Soviet system.
Since the war, the ruling elite has sought to gamer legitimacy and remake 
formal ideology through reference to the ‘national idea’. Following the 1997 peace 
agreement it renewed and furthered the Soviet-era campaign, representing the 
Samanid dynasty of the eight and ninth centuries as the historical basis for the 
modern-day nation-state.74 Monuments to national icons such as Ismoil Somoni 
were constructed, including a very large arch and memorial complex in the centre of 
Dushanbe to mark the supposed 1100th anniversary o f the Samanid state in 1999. In 
such symbols and discourse it is the benevolence and authority o f the state which is 
celebrated (Chatteijeee 2002: 21-25). To this extent, the Tajik elite compose a 
‘nationalising regime’ (Smith et al. 1998: 139-164). However, ethno-nationalism 
remains problematic given the large number of ethnic minority groups (see figure 
6).75 Consequently, nationalist discourse has taken two contrasting directions. The 
first o f these consists o f catering to ethno-nationalist histories of Tajik intellectuals. 
These narratives are most common among intellectuals from the south -  particularly 
the Vaksh and Kulob regions, from where Rahmonov hails. Some scholars argue 
that such discourse was politically powerful in the 1990s for a government that in 
denigrating the domestic and foreign ‘other’ appealed first to natives in its regional 
homeland (Chatteijee 2002; Nourzhanov 2001). Despite the limited inter-textual 
reach o f such ethnic nationalism, it continues to be represented in rituals and rhetoric 
such as 2006’s ‘Year of Aryan Civilisation’ (Shozimov 2005; also Nourzhanov 
2001).
74 Samanid power existed under the Sunni Islamic empire and the suzerainty of Arab Baghdad while 
Islamic civilisation established itself in Central Asia under local governorship. The Samanid- 
controlled region centred on Bukhara and included much of current Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. It 
peaked in size in the ninth century. See Soucek (2000: 73-76).
75 According to the 2000 census 15.3% of the population is Uzbek of a total 20.1% which is non- 
Tajik. See, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ti.html; 
accessed: 04/12/06
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Secondly, and more importantly, elites practise statism or nation-statism -  a 
political project to identify a national community under the state. In this sense, 
nation-building across Central Asia, Smith contends, is based ‘on the notion that 
only through strong political leadership that both material prosperity and geopolitical 
stability will be secured’ (Nourzhanov 2001). The 1994 constitution, written whilst 
the government was at war with the opposition, alongside the laws of the state, is 
frequently referred to as the key text o f the country and the basis for peace 
(Ubaidulloyev 2003: 63). Following 2000, Rahmonov has often referred to a ‘new 
stage of statehood’. For example, in his 2000 address to parliament, he noted:
Tajikistan is at a new stage of statehood. The irreversible process of peace and 
national accord has reached its final stage. Measures for the democratisation of the 
country’s political life are continuing.76
Such discourse, with its rediscovery o f the Samanids, Nourzhanov (2001) notes, has 
formed the foundation o f the new official history o f Tajikistan. He picks out six 
axioms in Rahmonov’s account found in the President’s 1996 article, ‘The Tajiks in 
the Mirror o f History’. To paraphrase, these include: the Tajiks have a civilising 
mission to Central Asia; ‘Tajik’ and ‘Aryan’ are synonymous; Tajik wars were 
defensive against outside invaders; Tajiks acquired sovereign statehood before the 
Mongol invasion; Soviet rule reawakened Tajik statehood, despite the injustice of 
border delimitation; independence in 1991 was a good which was attacked by 
enemies o f the state (ibid, no pagination).
Such spatial imaginaries serve specific political ends. An independent 
Tajikistan was hijacked, in Rahmonov’s words, by ‘power hungry political 
adventurers, demagogues and careerists supported by external forces that detested 
the existence o f an independent and sovereign Tajikistan’ (emphasis added, cited in 
Nourzhanov 2001, no pagination). Such texts represent ‘Tajikistan’ as a modem 
state-nation rather than a primordial ethno-nation, yet they clearly allude to 
oppositionists from other regions o f the country, and at the same time overlook the 
fact that the most significant external intervention came from Russia and Uzbekistan 
in support o f the Rahmonov regime. This trend has continued in elite discourse. A 
recent work by Deputy Minister of Culture, Ibrohim Usmonov (2005), Treatise on
76 ‘Tajik president addresses joint parliament session: full version,’ Source: Tajik Radio first 
programme, Dushanbe, in Tajik, 0525 gmt, 27/04/00
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the State, is a prescription for a strong state based on the personage of a ‘just ruler’. 
It is through such discourse that elite actors make sovereign space.
Central Asia: a regional community o f  states and statesmen
Tajikistan’s elite networks today are primarily ‘domestic’ regional and state-based 
formations. However, their ties also extend beyond national boundaries. Such 
networks during the Soviet Union crossed republican boundaries and provide a 
unique historical basis for Central Asia’s new regionalism -  networked elites across 
the region who share similar experiences, spaces and discourse. Adler’s analysis of 
‘imagined (security) communities’ (1997) is primarily relevant to processes of 
integration between liberal-democratic states -  with the obvious inspiration being the 
European Union -  rather than regions of authoritarian states which have recently 
been through disintegration. However, as an imagined rather than a territorially- 
based community, it can be argued that regional-international discourses and spaces, 
in places such as Central Asia, can be created around illiberal norms of ‘authority’ 
and ‘stability’ (Heathershaw 2006). The continuance of a cadre o f Soviet-era elites 
and bureaucrats in the region, and the almost complete marginalisation o f liberal 
reformers in all o f the five new states except for Kyrgyzstan, provided the human 
foundation for this. Indeed the announcements o f the dissolution o f the Soviet 
Union were not readily believed in Central Asia (Brill-Olcott 1996: 39). Elite 
discourses reflect this post-Soviet predicament. Indeed, Central Asia as a sub-region 
of the former Soviet Union cannot be fully comprehended without regard to both 
domestic regional divisions and the emergence o f an international, regional political 
identity o f ‘Central Asia’.
As space, the boundaries o f the region are fluid not fixed. Adler and Barnett 
remark that ‘regions themselves are socially constructed and susceptible to 
redefinition’ (1996: 77). Locating ‘Central Asia’ provides a particular challenge. 
Regional leaders have often been ambivalent about Russia’s role in the region, at 
times calling on the Kremlin for leadership, at other times resisting arrangements 
which create an exclusive relationship with Moscow (Allison 2004). Furthermore, 
Central Asia’s imagined community is accompanied by apparently contradictory 
national independence discourses in the new republics (Prazaukas 1997; Rumer 
2002; Vasiliev 2001). However, one must ask whether this necessarily represents a
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contradiction to regionalism. The existence o f multiple and contending identities 
should not be a surprise in a region where political elites were practised at playing 
both national and regional cards (Brill-Olcott 1996: 40-41). Such ambivalences are 
very much a part o f neo-Soviet ideology and post-Soviet politics. Elsewhere, I have 
argued that the prevalence of multiple signifiers of regional space -  from ‘Middle 
Asia and Kazakhstan’ (Srednaya A ziya  i Kazakhstan , the term commonly used 
during the Soviet Union) to ‘Eurasia’ (Evroaziya, which has a particularly complex 
geneaology [Smith 1999b]), from ‘the New Great Game’ to ‘the Heartland’ -  
indicates a space-making as well as space-contesting function for ‘Central Asia’ 
(Heathershaw 2006). Whilst territory may provide a bone o f contention between 
elites, and border clashes remain frequent, in their similar spatial, ethical and 
temporal imaginaries they often find common ground.
These imaginaries are reproduced discursively, and in the formal institutions 
of regional international relations. Discernible post-Soviet discourses of 
m irostroitelstvo, m irotvorchestvo  (Lynch 1999; Smith-Serrano 2003), and 
konfliktologiya  (Reeves 2005), communicated primarily in Russian and under an 
ideology o f neo-Sovietism, establish the norms and beliefs which divide ‘Us’ from 
‘Them’ regionally as well as nationally. Regional governments seek to de-legitimate 
terrorists by portraying them as an external and nihilistic challenge to the legitimate 
authority o f the state, and a threat to the prospects for economic development and 
social stability (Horsman 2005; Liu 2006). In this sense it is common thinking on 
the importance o f state territorial independence that paradoxically constitutes 
common regional space. Numerous CIS, SCO, Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO), and Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) summit 
meetings often do little more than express one another’s membership and the ethics 
of ‘Central Asia’. Joint military exercises and military cooperation agreements 
frequently performed between Central Asian states and Russia are usually conducted 
under the auspices o f the CIS or CSTO. They perform a continuing sense o f ‘Us’ 
and a degree o f cooperation against domestic opposition and transnational foes, and
77 Initially CIS cooperation was based on the collective security treaty and later, after it was set up in 
2002, independently under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). For example, the 
2000 operation ‘Southern Shield of the Commonwealth’ was an important act o f regional theatre. See, 
Asia-Plus Blitz # 58, 29/03/00; The most recent military exercise among CSTO members was 
‘Border-2005’ held in Tajikistan in 2005.
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facilitate substantial economic investment by Russia and China into the region. 
The USSR’s disintegration served to de-territorialise and de-spatialise one regional 
identity but ro-spatialise imagined communities o f ‘Tajikistan’ and ‘Central Asia’, at 
the heart of both o f which is the strong state.
4.3.iv. Cracks in the marble: statesmen versus ‘the state9
Heads of state and other leading figures {drugie glavnye litsa)... want to show that they want 
[democracy]... They never announce that “I come in order to rob from my people. I came in 
order to wage war. I came in order to bring hunger." No one ever made such an 
announcement. The worst tsar, the worst king, never announced that, and neither do they 
now. In actual fact it is their actions which should show what they want. What they say is not 
what they do.
-  Ibrohim Usmonov, Deputy Minister of Culture ( [T20]: 11, emphasis added)
In Tajikistan, nationalism is diluted by representations and practices at sub- and 
supra-national identities across ‘Central Asia’. This quote from Ibrohim Usmonov, a 
member o f the Tajik government himself, illustrates a number of challenges to the 
idea o f elite discourse. Firstly, and most fundamentally, this is a challenge to the 
idea o f objective legitimacy and norm transfer from international organisations to 
elites through processes of ‘democratisation’ or ‘statebuilding’. Secondly, it is a 
challenge to discourse analysts who see nothing beyond text: words -  even when 
both public and hidden transcripts are taken into account -  are not the totality of 
action. Representations can be undermined by unspoken or unwritten acts of 
political manipulation and personal enrichment. While they are profoundly 
important conveyers of meaning and shapers of expectation, public discourses are 
inconsistently powerful as reproducers of actions and thus, in and o f themselves, 
‘thin simplifications’ of (the totality of) reality. However, in some contrast to 
Usmonov, I would argue that politically what they say is a very large part o f what 
they do; textual representation -  while not the totality -  is the primary means by 
which actors make sense of their positions, possessions and relationships. A study 
of public transcripts must be complemented with an ethnographic account o f hidden 
transcripts.
78 During the Batken incursions in 2000 there were attempts at military cooperation between 
Kyrgyzstan, Ubekistan and Tajikistan. See, Asia-Plus Blitz # 154, 15/08/00.
164
Corruption and the state
The state is not just an ideal but provides cover (krisha) for networks o f corruption; 
these networks constitute ‘the state’ itself. Their practices exist in ‘hidden’ spaces 
and are represented in ‘hidden’ transcripts. Here, in advance of the main body of 
empirical work in chapters 5 to 7 which explores in detail such practices and 
testimonies, the general effect on the state of this post-Soviet, post-conflict 
corruption will be introduced.
Corruption makes state actions highly contingent on regional alliances and 
personal networks; this effects the degree o f control which elites expect. Moreover, 
this loss of functional consistency coincides with the institutional changes and 
material losses that have taken place since independence. Elites have lost their 
formal home -  the communist party -  that they inhabited during the Soviet Union. 
Local government heads are not necessarily required to be members of the dominant 
party. Even where parties are ostensibly significant and dominant -  such as 
President Rahmonov’s Peoples’ Democratic Party of Tajikistan -  the real basis of 
power is networks based around individuals and families. However, the extent of 
this shift from the party to individuals is not as great as often implied. As indicated 
above, both the ideology of the Soviet Union and the cadres o f the party have proved 
remarkably resilient. Even during the Soviet Union informal networks within and 
between ‘clan’-based solidarity groups formed the basis for party nomenklatura (Roy 
2000). Thus, while there are genuine believers in Neo-Sovietism within post-Soviet 
power structures, among others the ideology is often quite ambivalently practised 
(Dudoignan 2004). ‘Stability’ and ‘authority’ may remain ideals embodied in the 
past (during the Soviet Union) or in other spaces (e.g., Russia under Putin), their 
elusiveness in practice serves to continually undermine the productive power o f the 
mirostroitelstvo public transcript.
Numerous examples of how corruption constitutes the state and deconstitutes 
the ideal o f ‘the state’ are found in post-Soviet privatisations. Such processes take 
place as an indirect consequence of international interventions. In the later stages o f 
the war significant macro-economic assistance, including IMF credits and a World 
Bank-assisted privatisation programme had begun to stabilise the economy (Akiner 
2001: 60). However, it was state elites that benefited from a process o f privatisation 
where state industries were transferred from the public hands of the ministry to the
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‘private’ hands of the minister, his family and supporters. For example, the Tajik 
Khizmat company, run by ex-minister Sayfuddin Turayev, came into existence 
simply by the privatisation of the ministry ‘with the profits being pocketed by the 
minister in question’ (Roy 2000: 184). In other cases, Roy describes, an industry is 
kept in ‘public’ hands but the income goes to a particularly elite grouping that runs 
the particular state body. He notes:
The state is thus effectively leased to networks o f power. In Tajikistan, a 
deputy-minister is in a position to resell for convertible currency cotton that 
he has bought from the kolkhoz in roubles, and banks his profits in a foreign 
account. As in the case o f privatisation, state control can be equally illusory. 
Here the maintenance o f the statist structure does not necessarily mean 
control by the state, but the use of that structure in order to better satisfy 
private interests (p. 184).
Here despite the tenets of the discourse of mirostroitlestvo, the public transcript is 
denied in hidden spaces and discourses. However, these practices, which challenge 
the very idea of ‘the state’, depend on the maintenance o f the idea o f the state as the 
essential container o f political power. It is the paradox o f the strong/weak state 
(McMann 2004), at once omnipotent and impotent, that will be returned to in 
subsequent chapters.
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Figure 14: Summary table of discourses of ‘peacebuilding’ in Tajikistan
Level PUBLIC
TRANSCRIPT
Typical actors, 
spaces
Spatial self Ethics Temporal self HIDDEN 
TRANSCRIPTS 
& PRACTICES
Typical actors, 
spaces
Overall
Approach
(Political
imaginary)
GLOBAL 
(See also 
fig. 4)
Peacebuilding Senior
representatives 
of international 
governmental 
and non­
governmental 
organisations; 
diplomatic and 
donor community
International 
Community 
(with reference 
to states and 
global civil 
society)
- Neoliberal
- Technical- 
rational
(with reference 
to justice, liberal- 
democracy & 
order)
Modern and 
future-orientated 
(with reference 
to idea of post­
conflict progress)
- Scepticism
- Pessimism
- Consternation
Junior
representatives 
of international 
governmental 
and non­
governmental 
organisations; 
diplomatic and 
donor community
Combinations of 
democratisation, 
humanitarianism 
and statebuilding 
(Neo-Liberal)
ELITE Mirostroitelstvo
(Russian:
peacebuilding)
Senior officials, 
of provincial and 
national
administrations; 
representatives 
of local NGOs 
and political 
parties
The State - ‘authority’
- ‘stability’
Modern and 
future-orientated; 
national progress 
and
‘democratisation’
- Familial 
loyalties; 
corruption
Officials, of 
provincial and 
national
administrations; 
representatives 
of local NGOs 
and political 
parties
Peace
Enforcement
(Neo-Soviet)
LOCAL Tinji
(Tajik:
peacefulness/
wellness)
Subordinates — 
primarily male 
and older-in 
public meetings 
and ceremonies
Mahalla
(neighbourhood,
community)
- Conflict denial 
and anti-politics
- ‘unity’
- ‘patriarchy’
- ‘cohesion’
Traditional and 
Modern; for 
‘modernisation’
- Resignation 
(seeking 
livelihoods & 
employment)
- Resistance (via 
radical
organisations)
- Corruption
Subordinates -  
often female and 
younger -  in 
‘hidden’ spaces 
(family homes, 
private
conversations)
Conflict
Avoidance and
Accommodation
(Local
knowledge,
ethos)
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Conclusions: the discursive politics of in-between spaces
This chapter has illustrated the complex discursive constitution o f the process of 
peacebuilding, 2000-2005 (as summarised in figure 14). Mirostroitelstvo and tinji 
cannot simply be dismissed as superficial or illegitimate as they are productive of 
ideologies, identities and spaces which have had a far longer tenure in Central Asian 
societies than have those of peacebuilding. Indeed, their coexistence with one another 
is based on inter-textual relations which have been practised and have evolved over a 
considerable period o f time not withstanding ruptures such as that of the Tajik civil 
war. The discourse o f peacebuilding as a global or ‘external’ phenomenon contrasts 
sharply with the two ‘internal’ discourses in the in-between spaces o f intervention 
where all three types of actors relate to one another politically. On the other hand, as 
inter-textual productions, peacebuilding shares with them a very minimum of 
consensus in the public transcript which sustain interactions among internationals, 
elites and subordinates: ideal temporal-others couched in terms of ‘progress’ or ‘- 
isation’; ideal-spatial others which retains, to some extent, a respect for ‘state 
sovereignty’; ideal ethical-others which avoid overt ethnic discrimination. Thus, we 
can chart the reproductions and adaptations in representations across three discourses 
during post-conflict international intervention. Such an approach avoids the absolute 
relativism and inflexibility o f simply contrasting discourses, but insists that any 
international intervention can only contribute to the intersubjective constitution o f 
reality.
This intersubjectivity creates an ever-shifting and ambiguous complex 
legitimacy. Occasionally true believers bring the distinction between peacebuilding 
and mirostroitelstvo, for example, into sharp focus. However, actors at each level are 
also subject to the discourses of the other levels and find their ideas and identities a 
product o f the fluid interaction of these discourses. Very often this produces 
ambivalence and self-seeking opportunism by well-positioned individuals, across all 
three ‘levels’ delineated above. This is perhaps best conveyed in Zizek’s rendering of 
Sloterdijk’s ‘cynical subjects’ who ‘know that, in their activity, they are following an 
illusion, but still, they are doing it.’79 In the following thematic chapters the points of 
intersection o f contending discourses and spaces will be the focal point o f my analysis 
as I seek to chart how discourses have accommodated each others’ contrasting
79 For a discussion of Zizek and Sloterdijk’s reworking of Marx’s formula for ideology, see Myers 
(2003: 63-77)
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representations. For example, an expatriate working for an international NGO on a 
community self-governance project may find his ostensible role as a peacebuilder 
compromised by the mirostroitelstvo o f local government leaders, and the 
disengagement from public life of community members operating in terms o f tinji. 
Similarly, a local government leader wishing to conduct an ‘election’ which affirms 
the ruling elite may find he has to adjust his behaviour at times to satisfy the OSCE 
observers, and simultaneously mobilise a disengaged population to do their ‘duty’. A 
member o f an internationally-organised CBO might testify to ‘progress’ and even 
‘change’ in their mahalla to represent the contrasting ideals o f ‘democratisation’ of 
elite and international actors. In such a way inter-textual political practice is spatially 
differentiated and politically contingent.
Larger stories of the state of Tajikistan will be revealed in coming chapters. 
The particular challenge will be to show how the public and hidden transcripts o f the 
three basic discourses interact to legitimate ‘peace’ and ‘the state’ in ambiguous ways. 
They thus bring about complex forms of authority, livelihoods and sovereignty. It is 
to a thorough analysis o f these ambiguities of peacebuilding -  in the areas of 
decentralisation, security sector reform, and political parties and elections that this 
dissertation now turns.
169
PART TWO
International Intervention and the Making of Peace in Tajikistan,
2000-2005
Introduction
The re-conceptualisation of peace as complex legitimacy and the development o f a 
methodological framework to study its working out in Tajikistan that I pursued in part 
one represents a contribution to a growing body of literature which is reconsidering 
peace and peacebuilding (Richmond 2005). Another promising effort is found in a 
recent special issue of Security Dialogue, where contributors developed a three 
dimensional understanding composing representation, welfare and security. 
Reflecting discursive trends, Schwarz invokes ‘state-building’ but notes the 
limitations of analyses which measure the distance between a ‘failed state’ and an 
‘ideal-type’. What is needed, he argues, is a ‘functional understanding of the state’ 
(2005: 433). However, despite these nods to the contextual nature o f peace, ‘post- 
conflict peacebuilding’ remains something that we directly do to them: ‘the creation of 
a post-conflict order that aims at all three elements: security, welfare and 
representation’ (Ibid: 444). The focus remains on public goods which can be provided 
to, or facilitated for, the people, by local political authorities or international 
organisations. Such an approach inscribes to the participants in this process of ‘post­
conflict peacebuilding’ many of the desires, rights and responsibilities o f a 
functioning liberal- or social-democratic state. However, as Rubenstein notes in the 
same volume ‘intervention involves claims about legitimacy, standing and authority 
that are socially constructed and culturally constituted’ (2005: 528). Thus, peace is 
inter-subjectively produced. Any new approach which attempts to objectify the a 
priori nature of peace has misunderstood the relational character o f politics, space and 
discourse.
This thesis has pursued a more critical approach by bringing in post-positivist 
ontologies and methodologies to the study o f peacebuilding. As such, parts one and 
two are separated not by a theoretical/empirical dichotomy, but by a change of focus 
from the de-/re-construction o f a concept to the (re-)interpretation o f a case. The 
latter contributed to the former, and the former directly informs the latter. Thus, part 
two adopts the radical take on peacebuilding developed in part one to show how
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power in context lies with the legitimating functions of inter-textual and broader inter- 
subjective relations. It does not seek to look either at international ‘peacebuilding’ 
initiatives or at the practices o f local politics, but the relationship between the two. 
Chapters five to seven will emphasise the consequences of international interventions 
in terms o f how normative stances and material allocations are reinterpreted and 
reappropriated in context. Similar to Schwarz and his fellow contributors (2005), I 
consider the building o f peace in terms of three attributes: authority, livelihoods and 
sovereignty. Unlike such scholars, I do not consider these three attributes as having 
fixed ethical, temporal and spatial parameters but look at how their very essence is 
ontologically or ontopolitically constituted in context. In considering a particular 
case, I develop our understanding of how such ‘general’ attributes are contextually 
generated. Moreover, I implicate international assistance in the ‘negative’ as well as 
‘positive’ consequences o f this process, including state violence and corruption.
The three attributes are identified through the study o f a number of practical 
areas of peacebuilding whose selection was determined by the foci of the international 
community peacebuilding in Tajikistan. Chapter five  looks at support to political 
parties and democratic elections and considers how this has indirectly reproduced 
increasingly narrow space for political authority. In chapter six, explores how 
support to the security sector has contributed to the simulation and concomitant 
dissimulation of Tajik sovereignty. Chapter seven we see how interventions for 
community development in fact serve the re-territorialisation o f livelihoods (under the 
state) and, in turn, encourage their de-territorialisation through labour migration. In 
each case, the accumulation o f greater legitimacy to the elite under ‘the state’ (in 
terms of recentralisation, reterritorialisation and simulation) dialectically produces 
‘hidden’ practices of popular avoidance and elite corruption (in ‘decentralisation’, 
deterritorialisation and dissimulation). Translocal or transnational space supplants 
local or national territory. Finally, in chapter eight I draw some conclusions and 
implications of my analysis for our understanding o f contemporary Tajikistan, for the 
study of peace, and for actors who want to build peace.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Political Parties and Elections: Performance, Authority, and 
‘Opposition’
I’m not sure a bad election is good for peacebuilding
-  Peter Eicher, Head of OSCE Election Observation Mission80
Chapter four laid out a multi-level complex of three discourses that constitutes a 
process o f legitimating power and building peace in Tajikistan. I now consider the 
specific case of international intervention in support o f multiparty politics. Free and 
fair elections conducted under a multi-party system are seen as the essential symbol of 
peacebuilding’s success. ‘Indeed,’ Jeong notes, ‘conducting elections n eeded  to 
establish a  legitim ate governm ent has been the overriding objective under which all 
other international activities are generally subsumed’ (2003: 103, emphasis added). 
This goal reflects deeply-held ideas about the objective character of legitimacy as a 
product o f a pluralist political system. Moreover, the goal derives from two 
assumptions about the structure and susceptibility to intervention of the ideal-other: 
that governmental legitimacy is an objective condition derived from popular 
representation and participation, and that it can be increased in partnership with the 
International Community. These ideals lie at the heart o f peacebuilding.
In Tajikistan, between 2000 and 2005, the International Community invested 
considerable time and resources to improving electoral law, increasing civic 
engagement and the monitoring of national elections. Such investments reflect policy 
priorities set by donor-funded research that in turn adopts the generic priorities of 
peacebuilding discourse. For example, the 2003 ‘peacebuilding framework’ for 
Tajikistan identified people’s opportunities to ‘non-violently express their 
dissatisfaction  with government, ruling elite policies and programmes through the 
dem ocratic p rocess ’ as one o f five priorities. Its recommendations included support 
for opposition parties and ‘a democratic multiparty system’, the ‘creation o f open 
spaces for dialogue’, assistance for ‘holding free and fair elections’ and, in particular, 
‘technical assistance and training to improve election procedures’ (Abdullaev &
80 Personal communication, Dushanbe, 03/03/05.
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Freizer, 2003: 54-55). However, while the ideal o f electoral multi-partyism stands 
almost without dissent in the International Community, it works out quite differently 
in context. Indeed, the Tajik government has consciously incorporated the language 
of democracy into its legal framework and public pronouncements, yet is largely 
unconstrained by democratic institutions or norms.
This chapter seeks to explain how and why the actual practices of political 
parties and elections diverge from the normative framework o f peacebuilding. It 
reveals the role o f international assistance in the performance o f authority. The idea 
of the performative act (Austin 1962; 1970) links discourse to wider experience, 
enactment and embodiment. I argue that these performances constitute the very 
nature o f ‘political parties’ and ‘elections’ in a way which produces a peculiarly 
inconsistent form o f authority.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one introduces the role o f the 
International Community and the parties themselves through a consideration o f the 
2000 elections and the subsequent attempts to reform the law on parliamentary 
elections. Section two considers the function o f the 2005 parliamentary elections in 
this hybrid system; how, as a ‘spectacle of consent’, they perform the authorising of 
elections and the electing of authority. Section three looks at the attempts to generate 
multipartyism and provide an outlet for opposition via dialogue between the state, 
political parties and civil society. It shows how ‘opposition’ exists in in-between 
spaces, which concomitantly re-inscribe the state as a preserve o f a publicly unified 
and dominant elite. Finally, section four outlines ongoing post-conflict processes of 
the re-centralisation and ‘de-centralisation’ o f authority, and raises the question of 
what role international assistance plays in generating these processes.
5.1 Political Transition: from single-party rule to multi-party rules?
International intervention to support and develop political parties and elections in 
Tajikistan takes place in a political context o f party structures that barely conceal 
significant elite networks. This section briefly introduces these parties and networks 
in their fluidity and complexity, and highlights the limits of both institutional analyses 
of these dynamics, and institution-building interventions by the International 
Community.
173
5.1.1. The 2000 Parliamentary Elections
Post-conflict multi-party politics faced difficulties from the beginning. In August 
1999, following the UTO’s declaration that its armed units had disbanded, the ban on 
political parties was lifted. However, pressure increased on political parties with six 
o f the eleven parties registered since 1998 being suspended, banned or deregistered 
(OSCE 2000: 3-4).81 It was not until 26 September 1999, that an amendment was 
passed to the constitution which extended the presidential term to seven years and 
created a two-chamber parliament (Majlisi Oli). A last minute deal between 
President Rahmonov and UTO leader Nuri introduced the parliamentary election law 
on the eve of the presidential elections less than three months before Tajikistan’s first
O'!
democratic parliamentary elections. Rahmonov was duly re-elected with 97% o f the 
vote in fraudulent presidential elections where he was effectively the only candidate
OA
standing. Subsequent to his victory the election law was adjusted to give opposition 
parties a more reasonable chance o f entering parliament and legally guarantee them 
20% representation on district election committees (DEC) and polling station 
committees (PSC). Despite some significant violence, the 2000 elections passed off 
without serious political conflict and with the overwhelming number of seats going to 
the President’s party. The new parliament included the presidential People’s 
Democratic Party (36 deputies), the pro-governmental Communist Party (13 
deputies), and non-affiliated ‘independent’ candidates who were largely staunch allies
81 This group included most parties who were not formally part of the UTO nor strongly linked to the 
government. The outlawed parties were: Party of Political and Economic Revival (suspended in April 
1999), Jumbish -  National Movement of Tajikstan (denied registration, April 1999), Ittikhod - Civil 
Patriotic Party of Tajikistan Unity (banned, April 1999), Agrarian Party (suspended in April 1999, 
banned in September 1999), Party of Justice and Progress (registration cancelled, September 1999), 
Democratic Party/ Tehran Platform (deregistered, November 1999, due to having a name similar to 
another party).
82 Parliament consists of an upper house, the National Assembly (Majlisi Milli), and a lower house, the 
Assembly o f Representatives (Majlisi Namoyandagon). The upper house is composed o f eight 
presidential appointees and twenty-five elected by secret voting in each of the four oblast assemblies 
and the Dushanbe city assembly. The lower house is elected on a mixed system with 41 single­
mandate seats where one candidate is elected on a simple majority system and 22 proportionally- 
elected party seats with a 5% threshold.
83 It is widely assumed in Tajikistan that the deal further guaranteed some representation in parliament 
for the IRPT in return for acquiescence to the results of the presidential elections.
84 For most o f the campaign there was only one candidate and much political uncertainty. Two of the 
three opposition party candidates -  Saifiddin Turaev from the Party of Justice and Sulton Quvvatov 
from the Democratic Party (Tehran platform) -  were denied registration by the supreme court. Davlat 
Usmon from the Islamic Renaissance Party was granted last minute registration, allowing him very 
little time to launch a campaign.
174
of the government (10 deputies). The IRPT won two seats, both via the party list 
(OSCE 2000: 24).
The mere fact o f the presence of ‘multi-party politics’ led most outside 
observers to praise the elections as a great advance in pluralism. ‘It is absolutely 
certain,’ Lavrakas, for the OSCE, notes, ‘that the possibility o f electing deputies by 
party lists played an important role in the development o f pluralism in Tajikistan and 
meant an increase in the role o f the multi-party system in society’ (OSCE 2004: 20). 
For the International Community, the headline conclusion related to the explicit goals 
o f peacebuilding. ‘The most significant accomplishment in this peacebuilding 
process,’ the official OSCE report noted, ‘was the inclusion o f the former warring 
parties and others in the electoral process’ (2000: 1). Although international 
observers also noted deficiencies in terms of both the legislative framework, 
campaign, and election-day irregularities (pp. 1-2), it is understandable that the 
international community would emphasise positives over negatives in Tajikistan’s 
first post-conflict parliamentary elections.
However, the inclusion o f opposition elites within a ‘multi-party system’ does 
not necessarily constitute democratisation. Elections can be a symbol o f unity and 
homogeneity through cooperation and subordination and thus produce the reverse of 
pluralism. They can also allow for the inclusion o f new elites, the rotation of old 
ones, and provide for the exclusion of parties deemed to be a threat. These alternative 
representations and practices can serve to exclude popular participation and inhibit 
diversity, yet this does not necessarily mean they are illegitimate. This raises the 
question o f the extent of the differences between a single party system and one which 
is formally multi-party.
5.7.//. The Parties in 2000
To reduce Tajikistan’s politics to its formally existing parties and elections does not 
begin to capture underlying political dynamics, of which parties are merely a 
superficial representation. Such parties are formed from elite networks which deploy 
‘authority’ and ‘stability’ in public testimonies and practices. Thus any exploration of 
political parties needs to consider the constitutive role of mirostroitelstvo's  precepts in 
their origins, the regional basis of their members, and their public pronouncements 
and practices.
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The Winners
The Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDPT) is the youngest o f Tajikistan’s parties which 
gained seats in 2000. The history of its development is one of the formation of a 
regional elite centred around victorious Kulobi warlords and apparatchiks. Formed in 
1993 as the People’s Party of Tajikistan, and registered in 1994, it was initially a party 
o f the Kurghon Teppa regional elite and headed by Abdumadzid Dostiev. As 
Rahmonov worked to consolidate his power, Kurghon Teppa elites found their power 
diminishing and Rahmonov’s network moved to use the party as a vehicle for their 
power. After President Rahmonov became a member in March 1998, he was elected 
party leader with Dostiev his deputy at the 4th Party Congress of 18 April, 1998 
(Olimova and Bowyer 2002: 16). The party was renamed the PDPT and political 
elites at all bureaucratic levels (province, district and local) were instructed to join it. 
This process, shadowing the growth in Rahmonov’s personal power, constituted the 
widening of his patronage network to include new and old allies which were placed in 
governmental positions across the country. The testimony of one party leader in 
Garm district illustrates how this process worked with respect to formerly opposition- 
held areas.
K adirah Juryaev: I became a member after I was given the position of chief o f the 
Dekon farm. That is I became a member in 2000.
JH: How did you find out about the party?
K J: In meetings of the district Khukumat we were often told about the party. The head 
of the Hukuamt explained that this is the party in power now and only this party can 
change things.85
However, as the PDPT functions as merely the formal face of the ruling elite, as an 
institution it suffers from many of the weaknesses of other political parties in terms of 
organisational limitations and financial shortages.
If the PDPT came to be the new representative of the party-state, the 
Communist Party (CPT) was the previous version in decline. The party still 
intertwines strongly with government providing a number o f the present regime’s 
leading figures including Prime Minister Akil Akilov. In parliament, the thirteen- 
strong communist faction, sitting between 2000 and 2005, was openly pro- 
governmental. Some CPT officials themselves present this as a constructive
85 Interview, Kadirah Jurayev, Deputy Head, PDPT, Garm, 11/08/05.
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relationship where they are in support o f the government on most issues but can 
quietly dissent on others (CPT [T3]: 3). However, this role within the government has 
taken place alongside a haemorrhaging o f party membership to the PDPT. In Kulob, 
for example, cadres had retained their membership o f the CPT whilst joining the 
PDPT to gain favour with local authorities and maintain their positions in the local 
administration.86 The CPT officially supported the local PDPT candidate in 2005 in 
return for places in the local assembly (Dinkayev [T4]: 3). Such close relations 
between the PDPT and CPT are part o f normal multi-party politics in Tajikistan.
The Losers
As discussed in chapter two, the Islamic Renaissance Party o f  Tajikistan (IRPT) grew 
out of the revival o f political Islam across the Muslim world in the late-twentieth 
century. The party maintained a moderate public platform and describes its members 
as ‘Muslim-citizens’ of Tajikistan (Himmatzoda 2003a). Although the IRPT won two 
seats in the 2000 elections, this was significantly below what it had hoped for. It is 
traditionally strongest in rural areas particularly in the Rasht valley (esp. Tavildara 
raiyon), as well as in various pockets of Khatlon (eg. Vakhsh) and Soghd (e.g. Isfara) 
oblasts. However, it has lost support in both directions from those who have been co­
opted by government and from those who are turning their back on the party in favour 
o f more radical Islamic groups.
The Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) was also founded during 
perestroika. It has since undergone a gradual decline, being riddled by internal splits 
and tensions. It lost its ethnic Russian faction (from the city of Chkalovsk) and the 
conservative group o f Akil Akilov (Olimova and Bowyer 2002: 20-21) to become an 
ethno-regional party o f elites o f the Rasht valley, united with the IRPT. In 1995, 
after overtures from the government to return to Tajikistan and isolate the IRPT, it 
split once again between Almaty and Tehran platforms. The Almaty platform, with 
the election of Makhmadruzi Iskandarov, reconciled with Rahmonov and continued to 
fill a number of state positions under the terms of the peace agreement. Despite this 
relationship with the government, they failed to gain any seats in the 2000 elections 
(receiving only 3.5% of the votes). As a consequence of these splits, the DPT has 
now lost the regional power bases it once had. It has subsequently, in 2004, lost its
86 Asia-Plus Blitz #059 (1218), 31/03/03.
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leader, Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, who was arrested, tried and convicted on terrorist 
charges.
The Socialist Party (SPT) was founded towards the end o f the peace 
negotiations. It served as a vehicle for Safarali Kenjayev, a leading figure of the 
nomenklatura, between its genesis in 1996 and his assassination in 1999. The party 
grew in popularity in Kenjayev’s home region of the Zerafshon valley and influenced 
other areas of Soghd oblast and Dushanbe. However, following Kenjayev’s death, 
and his son Sherali Kenjayev’s ascent to the leadership, the party descended into what 
one prominent leader labeled as ‘some kind of crisis’ (Horisova [T8]: 2) and began to 
suffer from what Asadulaev calls ‘a lack of prominent people’ (p. 21). While the new 
leadership supported Rahmonov in the presidential elections of 1999, the membership 
preferred to support the candidate of Adolatkoh (Party of Justice), Saiffidin Turaev. 
The party split again in 2004 as Mirhussein Narziev was removed from the leadership 
by party members ostensibly unhappy about the party’s entering into coalition with 
other parties for the 2005 elections.88
Underlying these shifts in power networks are informal processes o f 
cooptation (into the ruling elite and its systems o f patronage) and control (the 
repression o f those who attempt to develop an independent political force). However, 
the extreme fluidity of political formations in Tajikistan challenges the idea that either 
parties or the informal networks which underlie them are the exclusive mediums 
through which to view the constitution of a new ruling elite. In reality both ruling and 
‘opposition’ networks are constantly in flux with the cooptation o f ‘opposition’ 
figures and expulsion of ‘governmental’ representatives. For example, Akil Akilov, 
the current Prime Minister and senior member of the CPT, was once a leader o f the 
DPT, while similarly, Qadi Turajonzoda sided with the IRPT during perestroika
OQ
before returning to the ruling elite as Deputy Prime Minister. Elites on both sides 
shift between parties and factions. While this chapter will investigate cases o f 
personnel and institutional change, its focus will be on the beliefs, norms and forms of 
consent which determine insider representations and practices and outsider
87 Adolatkoh emanated from the Northern district of Konibodom in 1995. After its unsuccessful 
moving of Turaev’s candidature against Rahmonov, its registration was suspended in February 2001 
and banned in August 2001, ostensibly due to ‘administrative violations.’ Asia-Plus Blitz #125 (787) 
04/07/01; #149 (811), 07/08/01.
88 Jumhuriyat. August 20, 2004. No. 93 20/08/59.
89 Turajonzoda was given the position as an opposition figure as part of the 1997 peace accords, yet 
quickly allied himself closely with the Rahmonov and the regime.
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representations and practices. It is these dimensions o f legitimacy which demarcate 
authority, ‘opposition’ and resistance.
5.1.UL Reforming elections, 2002-2005
Tajikistan’s elections were considered by the International Community to be a ‘first 
step’ on the road to multi-party democracy. Therefore, certain democratic deficits 
were identified which might be addressed before the next elections in 2005. Human 
Rights Watch, for example, noted:
People have not seen candidates express diverging views [...]. I mean, I speak to people 
every day in the streets, in the stores, and I ask them: 'Who will you vote for?' 'What 
party will you vote for?' And they say: 'We don't really understand the difference 
between the parties...and we don't know many of the people presenting themselves 
because they haven't been exposed to us.’ [...] They should be able to say, 'I vote for 
this person' in an unrestricted manner—without intimidation, without pressure and 
without reprisal (cited in Martin 2000, no pagination).
This analysis not only presupposes that Tajiks desire a more plural political 
environment, it also implies that this is a reasonable goal o f international intervention. 
Motivated by similar interpretations, from 2002 to 2005 the International Community 
worked with state and societal groups to improve the country’s electoral laws, the 
training of officials and the awareness and engagement o f voters.
International initiatives fo r  electoral law reform
The OSCE led attempts to reform the electoral law following the deficiencies 
identified by their Office for Democratic Institutions and Human rights’ (ODIHR) 
report on the 2000 elections.90 In late 2002, it began a process o f informal 
consultation and in April 2003 convened a formal conference for opposition parties 
and the government under the project, ‘In preparation for the 2005 elections’.91 The 
OSCE Centre in Dushanbe created a working group to consider such amendments 
which was formed of a deputy and a vice-chairman from three parties (CPT, IRPT 
and DPT). The more marginal opposition parties -  the SPT and a new party, the 
Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT) -  were excluded from this group and
90 The following material is based on a narrative of the progress of this attempt told to me by a senior 
OSCE official in Dushanbe.
91 Asia-Plus Blitz #063 (1222) 04/04/03.
179
confined to formulating amendments, involvement in relevant seminars organised by 
OSCE, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) (Lavrakas 2004: 35). ODIHR reviewed the draft and 
advised the group to strengthen it to address issues such as the increase o f the number 
o f seats in the lower house, independence of the electoral commissions, financing of 
campaigns, and the inclusion of non-partisan domestic observers.
At this point, as the draft was to be discussed formally by parliament, the 
initiative began to hit difficulties. Fearful, the working group refused to sign the 
draft. Moreover, as the group worked outside of parliament, it was ridiculed as 
illegitimate by some deputies and PDPT representatives were instructed to oppose it. 
As the OSCE official described, ‘well, you know, there was a lot o f trouble. They 
said “how can you challenge the authority of parliament?”, “this is a matter of 
national sovereignty”.’ By late-February 2004 two drafts appeared in parliament: a 
CPT/IRPT draft with some similarities to the OSCE-supported text and a PDPT draft 
which appeared 10 days later. ODIHR analysed the drafts and found them both to be 
deficient. Marti Ahtisaari, personal envoy to Central Asia o f the OSCE president-in- 
office, passed the comments directly/officially to Speaker o f the lower house. Both 
Ahtisaari and then Bulgarian president-in-office, ‘pressed the government and 
conveyed the message of importance.’ Following these interventions President 
Rahmonov stepped into the breach in the manner of an arbiter and announced that 
parliament should invite opposition parties to discuss the ammendments. On 10-12 
June 2004 they held public consultations for three days which were attended by 
OSCE, UNTOP, a number of NGOs and representatives of the Presidential 
Administration. However, the protocol drafted by parliament largely reflected the 
PDPT draft. The law was passed by the lower (16 June 2004) and upper (8 July 2004) 
chambers of parliament. While opposition parties appealed to the President to veto 
the law in two letters signed by five parties (all except PDPT)), Rahmonov labeled it a
Q'y
‘compromise solution’ and he subsequently signed it into law.
For the International Community this law contained some small improvements 
and some significant new problems (OSCE 2005g: 4). Prohibiting governmental 
interference, for example, was meaningless as so many government officials ‘double­
hatted’ as election officials (p. 4). Asadullaev in a CIMERA-edited elections guide
92 Interview, Terry McGinty, NDI, Dushanbe, 13/07/04.
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noted that Article 32 of the new law had ‘the most anti-democratic character’ in that it 
required a pledge or deposit per candidate of the equivalent o f 200 minimum monthly 
wages (equivalent to 1,400 USD in 2005), which made it difficult for anyone outside 
the most wealthy to stand for parliament (Asadullaev 2004: 36). One government 
official privately noted that this change made the law less democratic than its 
predecessor (Usmonov [T20]: 5-6).
The limits o f  international intervention: the importance o f  space
This outcome raises two major themes which will structure the rest o f this chapter: the 
simulation o f ‘democratisation’, ‘opposition’ and ‘multi-party politics’; and the 
performance o f authority. Democratisation is simulated in the public transcripts of 
the International Community. Despite some limited public and more extensive 
private criticism of the new law (see also ICG 2004), senior international officials 
often caveated their criticism with the promise of peacebuilding. Hoagland, the US 
Ambassador, in a 3 March 2004 speech remarked:
Although not all political parties have been registered, there is a multiparty system, 
including the only legal Islamic party in the whole Central Asia. What is more inspiring 
is that the government is adhering to the democratic practice of decreasing the central 
government control over local affairs. I am confident that democracy will prosper in 
Tajikistan.93
These kinds o f divisions in the International Community reflect somewhat the 
statebuilding versus humanitarian differences in the democratisation-plus approach to 
peacebuilding, as well as the differences between public testimonies and less-public 
or ‘hidden’ transcripts. W hat’s important here is how the ideal-other o f peacebuilding 
survives in the public transcripts of elites despite negative feedback from the local 
context.
Secondly, the performance of authority is witnessed by the regime’s occlusion 
of international criticism. The right of the state to consent to elections, formally and 
informally, and interpret laws consistent with the interest of ruling authorities is 
intrinsic to the ‘stable’ and ‘authoritative’ politics imagined in elite discourses. This 
state-as-guardian approach does not only provide the right of state intervention but the
93 Euraisianet Insight, ‘US envoy calls for changes to Tajik laws on election, media’, Dushanbe, in 
Russian 0830 gmt, 03/03/04.
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state responsibility of ensuring safe elections occurring without incident.94 The idea 
of NGOs providing independent advice or monitoring is unacceptable to the regime. 
The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), IFES and NDI have all had 
experiences with this elite discourse. One IFES seminar on election law reform in 
spring 2004, including representatives from the Presidential Administration (PA) as 
well as the Central Committee on Elections and Referenda (CCER), discussed the 
question o f non-partisan observers. One PA representative questioned, ‘even if  we 
passed a law for this what kind o f people will you put on there? What do they 
know?’95
Such conversations illustrate the very nature o f the dialectical relationship 
between performed authority and simulated democracy. The hostility o f government 
towards ‘political’ actions by NGOs, according to one programme coordinator, can be 
reduced to the maxim: ‘get government permission in advance, always invite the 
Khukumat [local administration]’.96 When the local administration is unwilling to 
give permission, even for very small events, it is often necessary to involve the PA. 
In one meeting regarding an IFES publication, ‘The Journal o f Democracy’, a PA 
official gave a forty-minute lecture: ‘Tajikistan is not America’, ‘we’re not ready for 
this’, ‘demonstrations in the street are not appropriate for Tajikistan’.97 Working in 
such an environment, the goals of international organisations can become much more 
modest. One example from the testimony o f the same programme officer noted:
We organised a workshop with 70 participants and asked the local government to 
participate in order to work with them -  you know the idea was to increase the role of 
citizens in taking about issues in their area, to have roundtables on priority issues to 
feed into local government who normally don’t listen at all. In actuality the Khukumat 
had the say in who is invited and who speaks, but I think you can say that it was a step 
in the right direction -  to get anyone to participate is a positive thing.98
A ‘step in the right direction’ is all that remains of peacebuilding in this case. 
However, it is an important remainder; it simulates a process o f peacebuilding.
94 Asia-Plus Blitz #035 (944), 19/02/02.
95 Interview, Stephanie Wheeler, IREX, Dushanbe, 23/02/05.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
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5.2 The 2005 Parliamentary Elections: the spectacle of consent
[The elections] were a show (spektakl) where our government and the poor played the leading 
roles
-  Dilbar Samadova, representative of the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan [T18]: 5)
On 27 February 2005, Tajikistan held its second post-war parliamentary elections. 
Unlike the 2000 elections, where eleven people -  including one prominent candidate 
-  were killed in pre-election violence, both the campaign and election-day itself 
passed off peacefully. International Community representatives saw the elections as a 
crucial stage of peacebuilding. A UN Needs Assessment Mission in April 2004 thus 
recommended ‘the provision of electoral assistance within the peace-building strategy 
o f UNTOP’ (UNDPA 2004: 2). The hope was to keep state manipulation o f the 
elections to a minimum, to increase the role of opposition parties, the media and the 
general public, and to see the beginnings o f a strong opposition bloc emerging in 
parliam ent." However, similar to 2000, the PDPT won an overwhelming victory, 
actually increasing its share of the vote from 64.9% to 74.9%.100 There was a great 
deal o f continuity between 2000 and 2005, reflecting two general trends in Tajik 
politics: a decrease in violence and instability, and a further consolidation of 
presidential power. This section o f the chapter considers the role o f elections in the 
Tajik ‘peace’ as a non-democratic spectacle of consent.
5.2.L Authorising Elections
This sub-section investigates two areas in which the structure of elections was 
authorised by elites: inclusion on the ballot and the nature o f media coverage.
99 The international community provided over 1.9 million US dollars in assistance prior to the 
elections. These funds were distributed to the CCER to train officials ($0,125 mil.), to political parties 
to train and facilitate polling observation ($0.88 mil.), to NGOs for civic and voter education ($0.61 
mil.), and for media training ($0.31 mil.). The major donor was the US government with the State 
Department providing 1.1 million directly and another 0.5 million fimneled through USAID- 
contracting NGOs: IFES, IREX and NDI. A further 900,000 US dollars was provided by the OSCE and 
its member states in in-kind assistance for the monitoring of elections. See UNTOP (2004).
100 Power was further consolidated with the PDPT of President Rahmonov (who won 52 seats 
compared to 36 in 2000) with a decline in the number of ‘independent’ (from 10 to 5) and CPT 
deputies (from 13 to 4). The IRPT again achieved two seats on the party list with a slightly increased 
proportion of the vote (8.9% compared to 7.3% in 2000). See OSCE (2005g)
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Getting on the ballot: authorising candidates
Candidature for the elections was authorised by reference to two broad techniques, 
familiar to Tajik politics: control and cooptation. Control can include the barring of 
candidates as well as direct pressure on candidates to withdraw.101 More pervasive 
was the deterrent provided by the expensive electoral deposit which could be returned 
if the candidate withdrew before the election. All three self-nominated candidates in 
one constituency where I observed with the OSCE, Vakhdat (DEC 10), withdrew on 
17 February, just 10 days before the election (2005f: 1). These practices suggest that 
such candidatures may not be bona fide  but are submitted in order to give the 
impression o f competitive elections (2005g: 10).
The role o f ‘authority’ is clearly apparent in these practices of cooptation; its 
performance is more important than party membership as a marker of inclusion in the 
elite. While most opposition party candidates were directly excluded, many self­
nominated, CPT and SPT candidates were co-opted by the ruling elite (2005b: 2-3). 
Self-nominated candidate Dustov in Faizabad (DEC 11) was de-registered by the 
CCER on the 19 February and put his support behind the official PDPT candidate. He 
had previously stated on 5 February that he was ‘affiliated’ to the PDPT. During the 
campaign he regularly appeared together with the official PDPT candidate, and his 
posters were prominently displayed alongside those of the PDPT (2005d: 3). In Rasht 
(DEC 12), the candidate for the PDPT, Saidullo Khairulloyev, was not a member of 
the party, but his nomination was supported by them. As Chair o f the lower chamber 
of parliament, he, like many senior elites, played the role of a leader whose authority 
exceeds that o f the party. Together these intra-elite, anti-democratic practices exhibit 
a variety of different forms o f cooptation; this constitutes a form of consent to 
authority within the elite. Performing loyalty to the party in an ultimately unfulfilled 
candidacy asserts membership of the ‘authoritative’ elite, and offers the prospect of 
position or privilege in the future. It would be misleading to dismiss these as purely 
economic relationships of patronage as they exhibit elite norms and affirm the 
privileged space o f ‘the state’.
101 Interview, Hurriniso Gaffurzoda, Regional Head, SDPT, Garm, 11/08/05; OSCE 2005g: 22.
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Public information: authorising news and precluding debate
State control of information was a pronounced feature o f the election, and became a 
challenge for numerous international projects. Over half a million dollars was 
tunneled through the American NGOs IFES, NDI and IREX, in an election-related 
grants program particularly targeted at women and first-time voters. One such IREX- 
supported NGO was Elim in the Kulob region which administered a small grant to 
educate women voters through project entitled ‘Vote and W in!’ (Rahmonova [T15]: 
5). It is revealing to hear the testimony of the head o f Elim, Latifahon Rahmonova.
The events that we organised were political events. Moreover, our organisation was 
non-governmental. That’s why we faced many problems. In the first instance this 
seems to be a very simple thing, but as one gets involved many difficulties come along. 
For this reason during these four months that I was occupied in this field -  firstly 
because it was my field and secondly because it was a political field -  it was a little 
hard to work with the Jamoats [local administration]. The residents of Shahrvand 
village know that while we were waiting to receive letters from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and IREX, this created opposition between us and the Khukumat [local 
government]. However, after receiving the letter we came to a consensus and together 
with the Khukumat and the chair of the [governmental] women’s committee of this 
community could gather all the women and explain to them their voting rights. Until 
this moment not only the housewives but also women with qualifications did not know 
the essence of elections. [...] I am glad that I came across lots of literature that was 
made available for us from the American organisations, that we are living in a 
democratic society, that our community is following this path, and we have to support it 
(Ibid: 5).
What’s interesting here is how tension between local government and an NGO 
working on ‘political events’ in a small number o f rural villages were overcome by a 
letter o f permission from central government and a subsequent ‘consensus’ where the 
Hukumat (local administration) acquires a leading role in implementing this 
ostensibly non-governmental project. There is a clear acceptance of patriarchy here: 
that women need to be taught to participate (p. 6). Thus, the voter education material 
of IREX is presented in essentially conservative and disempowering terms -  ‘that our 
community is following this path, and we have to support it’ -  rather than as 
empowering personal choice and highlighting democratic deficits o f Tajikistan.
This affirmation o f elite authority was also apparent in media coverage o f the 
elections. In many rural areas, such as Rasht, there are no newspapers and (if the 
power is on) only a few Russian TV channels and state-owned Televizioni Tojikiston 
(the only nationwide TV station). Significantly, there was a complete lack of debate 
or critical programmes in the media and many reports of ‘self-censorship’ across the
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country. In the month before the elections Televizioni Tojikiston devoted just 25 
minutes in total to the elections.102 The coverage that was provided was either 
technical, with significant time given to the CCER to explain the election process, or 
focused on senior governmental elites. For example, a documentary crew followed 
the candidate for Rasht and Chair of the lower chamber o f parliament, Saidullo 
Khairulloyev, during his campaign (OSCE 2005d: 4). OSCE monitoring found that 
63% of total state TV news coverage before the election was devoted to the President 
while only 6% covered the elections and candidates (2005e: 10).
5.2.ii. Electing Authority
The elections themselves were extremely subdued. This performance indicated 
subordinate resignation and elite consent to the ruling order.
The Campaign: authorising political space
The campaign (agitatsiya) involved the public performance o f quiescence. Control 
and cooptation practices marshaled the line between the politically included and 
excluded. At times this bordered on the absurd. For example, fellow OSCE 
observers in the Rasht Valley documented the ‘cow case’ which involved one IRPT 
candidate who was questioned three times by the head of Faisobod district 
(Kkhukumati rais) over 19 and 20 February 2005 concerning a cow he was alleged to 
have stolen in 1994 during the civil war. The rais noted that new evidence had been 
found and the case re-opened. The candidate was threatened with being beaten and an 
attempt was made to force him to sign a confession. Intimidation tactis also included
I  A -J
the removal o f campaign leaflets and posters , the withholding of permission for 
meetings (OSCE 2005d: 2-3), and direct threats to candidates and parties. In such 
cases local political rivalries often drive clashes between ‘the state’ and ‘the 
opposition’ which originate from the time o f the civil war. However, to reduce these 
actions purely to the pursuit o f interests may be misleading. They also construct party 
politics as a ‘threat’
102 Whilst each opposition party was allowed 30 minutes free TV airtime under the 2004 amendments 
to the election law, state TV refused to air a number of paid advertisements by opposition parties and 
censored or altered some opposition party broadcasts (OSCE 2005g: 13-14).
103 Reported directly to author by DPT in Dushanbe and CPT in Garm.
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The public performances o f elites also performed the opposite o f threat: 
‘authority’. The use o f ‘administrative resources’, government vehicles and official 
spaces by the PDPT and some favoured self-nominated candidates was a dominant 
feature o f the campaign104. For example, a meeting on 10 February in the cultural 
centre o f Garm was organised jointly by the DEC and the Khukumat. It was packed 
with 750 people who had been told to attend by their bosses or the local authorities. 
After a short speech by the IRPT candidate, the PDPT candidate, Khairuloyev, gave a 
speech of 75 minutes with reference to Tajik history and literature and the importance 
of patriotism. After this speech, five members o f the audience ‘spontaneously’ 
entered the stage to praise the work o f the PDPT and encouraged people to vote for 
the ruling party. After a speech o f about 15 minutes by the CPT candidate (cut short 
by Khairuloyev), the head of the Khukumat entered the stage to praise the PDPT and 
once again urged people to vote for them (OSCE 2005b: 2-3). The meeting contained 
no debate or questioning of candidates. Similar events were common across the 
country (OSCE 2005d).
As a consequence of this performance of unity, consensus and legitimate rule, 
opposition candidates abandoned the more public and prominent spaces o f towns and 
cities to authorised ‘governmental’ candidates and retreated into their ‘hidden’ spaces. 
They held meetings in people’s homes, choihonas and mahalla premises. ‘Some 
candidates expressed a preference for this kind of low-key activity,’ the OSCE report 
notes, ‘which they believe guaranteed them a greater level o f security and freedom of 
speech than official meetings’ (2005g: 11). Whilst democratic elections require that 
state actors stay neutral during an election campaign, this axiom is not accepted by 
political elites in Tajikistan. In an environment where all public space is political, a 
different and more long-standing dichotomy is more salient: that between the 
public/official and the private/unofficial. The latter is the acceptable space of 
‘opposition’: a space which extends to the private homes of sympathisers and a few 
local choihonas and mahalla premises out of the eyes o f the governing elite.
Election Day: authorising voting
In an environment where a single political space is subsumed under ‘the state’ -  
where the ruling elite authorises candidates, information and campaigning -  the day
104 RFE/RL CAR, Vol. 5, No. 6, 16/02/05.
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o f polling itself is reduced to the mere simulation of popular decision. However, this 
simulation remains an important part o f elite legitimacy, in performing consent among 
the ruling elite and the resignation o f subordinates. As an OSCE short-term observer 
(STO), I witnessed elections where elites from the President down to the members o f 
Polling Station Committees (PSC) enacted a normative preference for the status quo: 
an election seemingly scripted as a spectacle o f  consent, yet constituted by thousands 
o f autonomous acts by elites, voters and international observers.
Figure 15: The physical challenges to election observation, Rasht valley -  our STO team digging 
out the vehicle on polling day, 27/02/05
In a TV broadcast before polling day, the President remarked that he had given 
‘appropriate instructions’ to the electoral commissioners who must now ‘set an 
excellent example o f patriotism.’105 There were many huge hurdles to overcome in 
conducting an election in a high-mountainous country in the middle o f winter. I put 
this to the head of DEC in Rasht who nevertheless assured me there would be 
absolutely no problems with the elections despite the extreme weather conditions (see
105 Personal observation 20/02/05.
188
Figure 15) and the fact that many PSCs were cut off from the main road.106 Sure 
enough on the morning of 28 February -  twelve hours after polling stations were due 
to close -  almost all results were in. However, as the DEC had closed down by this 
time, we visited the Khukumat where the deputy head (who should not legally have 
been involved in the elections) gave us a district turnout figure of 92%. In this act, as 
on election day itself, ‘authority’ trumped legality.
The performances themselves contained many elements which were familiar 
from the 2000 elections. In terms of the voting itself these included:
■ Orchestrated voting, where voters had been instructed to turn up early to do their 
duty;
■ Group voting, where groups -  often women -  enter the ballot box together and 
make a collective decision;
■ Proxy voting, where one person votes for others;
■ Family voting, a specific form of proxy voting where the patriarch votes for the 
whole family.
I observed all o f the above directly in the Rasht valley area and all were recorded by 
the OSCE across the country (2005g). The practice of group voting, in particular, 
indicates the fine line between resignation and consent. It had a strong gender 
dimension. Men would often tell women that they should chose this man or that man 
because he is from the Khukumat. Such practices gave a ‘communal’ feel to the 
polling station which reproduced tinji principles o f unity and patriarchy. In figure 16 
below we see a number o f features of this with a man in the foreground distributing 
ballots to the female members o f his family and a large number o f people to the rear 
identifying together who they should vote for before entering the booth in groups. 
We frequently heard certain male voices naming the candidate o f the PDPT as the 
correct choice. While power and influence are at work here it would be an over­
simplification to attribute such practice solely to elite manipulation. Resignation was 
an active process. It was constituted via tinji public transcripts and practiced on 
entering the elite/official spaces of the polling station.
106 The electoral district was one of the largest. In winter it is almost impossible to travel on side roads. 
We met groups who had taken twenty-four hours to travel from Jirgatal to Rasht, about half the length 
of the constituency.
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Election D ay: authorising counting
However, active elite manipulation did play an important role. In terms o f the 
administration o f polling the major trends were:
■ Direct participation by local authorities in polling station commissions
■ Exclusion of opposition observers from the counting and tabulation process
■ Simulated counts where the concern is for making the paperwork look correct rather 
than actually counting the votes. Here overall figures are made equivalent to the 
number of signatures -  this often led to the direct manipulation of results
■ Polling stations closing early, completing the count and then bringing the result to 
the DEC ahead of schedule
Figure 16: Group voting, Rasht valley, 27/02/05
One example o f early closing which we witnessed in polling station number 
75 in the Faizabad constituency is particularly illustrative. When we arrived at 
2.45pm, the polling station had already closed (at 2pm, six hours before the scheduled 
closure o f 8pm). Counting was ongoing with the PDPT ‘observer’ directing the PSC 
members who were separating the votes into piles (see figure 17). At this point the 
number o f people on the voting list, the ballots received, ballots used, valid ballots 
and ballots spoiled had been entered into the protocol. Astonishingly, the numbers of
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voters, received ballots, used ballots and valid ballots were exactly the same: 276. 
This supposed that there were no excess, unused or spoiled ballots on a 100% turnout. 
In our presence, the PSC then began counting the ballots for each party and candidate 
and found it impossible to make the votes add up to the number o f 276. The PDPT 
observer who was still orchestrating the process jovially blamed this on the ‘Chinese 
calculator’ he was using. After several recounts (requested by my partner on our STO 
team) the figures were adjusted to reflect the actual number o f votes the candidates 
had received which had the effect o f reducing the number of votes for the PDPT 
candidate, increasing slightly the number o f votes for the IRPT, and reducing the 
100% turnout. However, a ‘fair’ calculation o f the vote still meant that over 80% of 
the votes were for the PDPT. After the count had finished, the IRPT observer stood 
up and, without a trace o f irony, thanked the PSC for doing a professional job.
Figure 17: The count at Polling Station 75, Rasht valley -  the search for the magic 276
This may or may not be an extreme case of a simulated count; according to the 
OSCE, ‘ballots were not properly controlled or accounted for’ (2005e: 2) in most 
polling stations. However, it illustrates a variety o f ways in which ‘authority’ and 
subordination were performed. Many local PSCs simulated counts to show their
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adherence to the discourse o f the ruling local and national elites for a well-organised 
election which supported the status quo. A prime example was the prevalence of 
closed polling stations in the afternoon of election day; their inactivity symbolised the 
deafening silence o f continuity which the elections performed (see figure 18). Such 
violations did not determine overall results in themselves. They were affective rather 
than effective. The PDPT was genuinely popular in the sense that local people had 
resigned to ‘authority’ and cast their votes accordingly. Moreover, given the 
temporally idealised ‘anti-politics’ o f tinji, there was perceived to be no credible 
alternative. In such a way, authority was performed and produced in the 2005 
elections.
Figure 18: Closed polling station, Rasht valley, 6.04pm, 27/02/05. (Due to close at 8pm but 
closed since 2pm)
5.2.UL Contrasting international and subordinate representations
The argument I have made in this section is that authorised non-democratic elections 
have a ‘positive’ as well as negative function in that they allow intra-elite personnel 
changes and, more importantly, allow that elite to accrue a degree of legitimacy
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among subordinates, among itself and even in the International Community. Local 
and global testimonies about the elections indicate these functions.
International discourses: finding a measure o f  pluralism
Privately, international observers were disdainful o f the Tajik elections of 2005, 
expressing a widespread view that they were a product o f elite manipulation. For one 
OSCE observer in Garm, it was a ‘Brezhnev election’, whereas for another it was ‘just 
how things work here.’107 A senior member o f the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, commented, 
shortly after having had his requests to publish the EOM ’s preliminary findings in a 
paid-for advertisement in a Dushanbe newspaper declined, ‘I ’ve never seen an 
election which was to such an extent managed by elites.’108
By contrast, in public transcripts international discourses represented an 
attempt to rescue a ‘promise’ o f democracy from this morass. The final report o f the 
organisation was somewhat less critical than these private discourses, using routine 
language to state that the elections ‘failed to meet many OSCE commitments and 
other international standards on democratic elections,’ and listing a number o f ‘large- 
scale irregularities’ and ‘serious shortcomings’ (OSCE 2005a: 1). The elections were 
qualified as, ‘the first major test of Tajikistan’s progress in consolidating democratic 
processes in the post-war years’ (2005c: 3). Via the deployment o f this temporal 
ideal-other, the promise o f democracy was rescued from the peril o f authoritarianism 
in the ‘measure o f pluralism’ (p. 1) provided by six registered political parties (2005a: 
1-2). In such texts, international discourse serves to reduce the political context to the 
technical, legislative and physical environment. It was a ‘lack of implementation’ of 
electoral law which was the problem (2005c: 1). As a consequence, any criticism 
remained constrained by peacebuilding’s hope o f long-term progress towards a 
reformed state.
Subordinate discourses: resigning to authority
The requirement of participation in parliamentary elections would at first sight seem 
to provide something of a challenge to tinji discourse. However, the extraordinary 
predictability of results reaffirmed its anti-politics and conflict avoidance ethics. This
107 Personal communications, 27/02/05.
108 Personal communication, 03/03/05.
193
predictability has been a constant feature of Tajik elections in the country’s short 
history (Ghani 2001) but the widespread acceptance o f these (predictable) results is a 
much more recent phenomenon that perhaps began with the December 1999 
presidential elections. Subordinate testimonies reflected widespread apathy and 
dismissal o f the process as something which had little bearing on their lives. They 
departed substantially from the OSCE’s peril/promise dichotomy, its ethical and 
ontological individualism, and its optimism in the universal validity and linear 
progress o f democracy. Indeed, ‘democracy’ becomes something quite different in 
the Tajik context. Unlike in the neighbouring country o f Kyrgyzstan where 
fraudulent elections prompted a popular coup or ‘revolution’, elite manipulation of 
elections was almost universally accepted in tinji public transcripts.
Practices and representations o f communal voting were marked by collectivist 
notions o f duty and obligation. Rahmonova, for example, who administered the ‘Vote 
and Win!’ project, considers the goal o f the project to be the ‘participation’ o f women, 
i.e. simply being present and going through the process, often for the first time, and 
thus reducing the amount of family voting. ‘Groups o f girls and women came to vote 
themselves,’ she remarked, ‘which was one of our goals. They participated directly, in 
person. This was exactly our purpose’ ([T15], 6). But both men and women were 
seemingly voting for the status quo. One Taxi driver noted to me why and how he 
was voting.
JH : Will you vote?
Taxi driver: Yes, of course, it’s the duty of the citizen. I ’ll tell you: I’ll vote for
democracy, for the democratic party.
JH: For the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT)?
TD: Yes, for the President, the head of democracy (glava demokratii).
[NB. The president is the Chair o f the NDPT while the DPT is an opposition party that
was part o f the UTO during the war.]
This conversation is not necessarily typical but the lack o f knowledge and interest 
which it reveals was widespread. In other cases, a preference for political continuity 
was presented in terms o f disdain for the President, more often total disinterest in 
‘democracy’. I was told in several conversations that those in power are better 
candidates because they have good connections and thus are more likely to be able to
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do things for people.109 For some, family or group connections offer the hope that a 
local elite can provide some assistance to ease their difficulties. For others, having 
experienced a relatively effective single party during the Soviet Union, there is simply 
a preference for such a unified system (Olimova and Bowyer 2002: 10).
These subordinate representations of process and uniformity -  a performance 
of powerlessness -  differ somewhat from the public transcript o f elites, yet they resign 
to mirostroitelstvo in that they affirm, in terms o f tinji, that peace requires ‘unity’. 
One explanation for this resignation is that Tajiks are ‘happy slaves’ who are resigned 
to structures of domination because they offer no meaningful alternative. Opposition 
elites present such people in terms o f an ‘uneducated’ population which is ‘easy to 
manipulate’ who are thus open to ‘threats’ and ‘false information’ about 
candidates.110 From this perspective, there is a complete lack o f consent or even 
resignation in the Tajik polity as citizens are totally disempowered and have their 
choices made for them. However, this does not seem to be a fair description o f either 
the enactment o f the elections or the range o f public attitudes in post-Soviet 
Tajikistan. For the majority, there is an observable ambivalence where it becomes 
normal, justifiable and even a moral requirement not to know or care about politics. 
One young woman in Kulob remarked,
I don't know anything about the elections [...]. There is no gas, no television and no 
radio. In circumstances like these, how are you supposed to know what the election is 
about and who the candidates are?111
Indeed, disinterest and disdain for politics all become more understandable when one 
grasps that most Tajiks have little frame o f reference for ‘democracy’ outside o f their 
experiences since the fall o f the Soviet Union. In particular, the country’s rancorous 
first presidential elections in 1991 are remembered in such a way as to associate 
‘elections’ with ‘civil war’.112
Via analysis o f international and local discourses and practices we can see 
how the elections simultaneously constitute a ‘spectacle of consent’ and a non-event. 
This was acutely illustrated in an election fair organised by IFES in Dushanbe (see
109 See also RFE/RL CAR, Vol. 5, No. 7, 23/02/05.
110 Personal communication, OSCE LTO, 3/03/05.
1,1 RFE/RL, CAR, Vol. 5, No. 7, 23/02/05
112 See chapter 2.1 .i, chapter 4.2.ii and chapter 7.1 .iii.
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figure 19). The event took place in a fanfare o f traditional Tajik trumpets, following 
welcome speeches by senior representatives from CCER and IFES. Inside, 
representatives o f international organisations mulled around while young locals took 
bundles o f flyers and information leaflets from the various party desks. Surprised by 
this enthusiasm, I asked a group o f young people outside why they had taken so many 
leaflets. They reported that the leaflets could be used to make stakanchiki -  paper 
cones used to sell popcorn. The story echoes the findings here that elections were 
functional for elites in the inclusion and exclusion from power o f certain individuals, 
and in maintaining a relationship with international donors and allies, but they had 
little discernible effect on the lives o f the vast majority.
Figure 19: Fanfare at the IFES election fair, Dushanbe, 25/02/05
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5.3. Dialogue with the ‘Opposition’: discourse in an in-between space
We knew that the PDPT would win [the 2005 parliamentary elections.] They would’ve won 
even if they hadn’t so impudently utilised ‘administrative resources’. Because the situation 
today is such that our only trump card is that we, practically of all secular states, are the only 
one who has an Islamic Revival Party. With this we are playing our trump card. In other 
words, when they say that we don’t have democracy, we say emphatically that we have the 
IRPT.
Turko Dinkayev, journalist, Kulob ([T4]: 4)
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The previous section illustrated the limits of international interventions to address the 
issue of consent -  the relationship between elite and popular spaces -  in the 2005 
parliamentary elections. This section looks at international attempts to create new 
rules and beliefs between government and opposition through various dialogue 
projects. It will be argued that in Tajikistan, this ‘opposition’ constitutes an 
evanescent in-between space found between international intervention and the 
amorphous political space of the official elite.
In peacebuilding terms dialogue is a fundamental element of peace and a 
necessary dimension of any peace process from the start. The Dartmouth Conference 
project under Hal Saunders introduced the idea of the ‘multi-level peace process’ to 
Tajikistan in 1993, initially meeting in Moscow for a track two mediation process and 
eventually trying to link civil society to intra-elite dialogue (Matveeva 2006). In 2000 
and 2001, inspired by the Dartmouth process, UNTOP and the OSCE began dialogue 
projects. UNTOP’s Political Discussion Club (PDC), in partnership with the National 
Association o f Tajik Political Scientists, held around ten roundtable meetings each 
year in towns and cities across the country involving heads o f local government, 
political party representatives, civil society and the media. Each year had a theme 
which was cognate to UNTOP’s peacebuilding aims.113 The OSCE meanwhile began 
a high-level dialogue supported by the German and Swiss governments and the Centre 
for OSCE Research (CORE) in Hamburg discussing the role o f Islam in Tajik politics 
leading to a document of confidence-building measures and two publications.114 In 
addition to this major project, regional OSCE centres conducted occasional dialogue 
forums between political parties, known as ‘Political Plov’.115 Such projects have 
been lauded by one practitioner as ‘substitutes [for] the lack of open political 
discussion in the parliament’, whilst simultaneously relying ‘on the good will o f the
1,3 Themes included: ‘The peace-building process in Tajikistan: problems and ways to resolve them’
(2001); ‘The cooperation of local self government, local authorities, NGOs, the mass media, political 
parties and private businesses in the development o f democracy and the free market in Tajikistan’
(2002); ‘The broadening of pluralism in Tajikistan: political parties, elections and the national 
parliament’ (2003), See UNTOP/NAPST 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, and 2003. In 
2003 there were 11 meetings and 1,350 participants (UNTOP 2003: 58)
114 The project was entitled, ‘The creation of confidence-building dialogue on the existence and 
cooperation of cultures and civilizations in the OSCE region’. In October 2002 the Swiss Department 
of Foreign Affairs and the Programme for the Study of International Organisations of the Graduate 
Institute for International Studies (HEI) in Geneva joined the project. (Kraikemaijer and Zeifert 2003; 
Bitter et al 2004)
1,5 The meetings involved a local dish of plov alongside the discussions.
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government to continue the dialogue that they started through the peace process’ 
(Malekzade [T il]: 1). This tension raises questions about the limits of international 
intervention when faced with local discourses and spaces. I f  they truly allow ‘open 
discussion’ surely we should see some of the testimonies o f hidden transcripts begin 
to penetrate the public spaces o f dialogue.
5.3.L Opposition Discourses
At first sight Taiikistan’s opposition discourses can appear to be a critique o f the 
ruling elite. However, a closer look at the publications produced by internationally- 
supported dialogue projects illustrates the points of inter-textuality between them, as 
well as the points of contrast. Opposition discourses oscillate between radical yet 
‘hidden’ dissent from mirostroitelstvo and conformity with the statements o f the 
ruling elite.
From ‘hidden ’ radicalism to public conformism
The ‘hidden transcripts’ o f opposition figures often provide stronger criticism and, in 
some cases, appear to reflect sincerely held commitments to pluralism (Narziev 
[T12]: 8). Political party leaders will openly criticise the statements and policies of 
the government but only outside of public spaces. Fior example, one noted
Now there’s no stability (stabilnost). It’s just that people are afraid of the ruling regime 
— and indeed they stop at nothing! On television they constantly repeat the recordings 
of the events o f 1992, and through the mass media they give the appearance that the 
opposition is about war and instability (nistabilnost).u6
Such accounts explicitly respond to both ruling elite and international accounts. In 
another example, opposition activist Mohinisso Horisova noted how the dependency 
of the Tajik press on the government made the idea o f independent election 
broadcasts -  which, she noted, were praised by the OSCE in their report -  a myth 
(Horisova [T8]: 8). While such views may be common in private, public statements 
against exploitation and domination are few and far between. These transcripts 
remain hidden due to the hegemonic role o f neo-soviet mirostroitelstvo, as the 
legitimating tool o f the official elite, within public space.
116 Interview, political party leader, Dushanbe, August 2005
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In consequence, opposition figures, including some of those who might 
otherwise hold ‘radical’ views, take on more conformist elite perspectives. This is 
reflected in the conclusions o f dialogue exercises, which represent a ‘compromise’ 
between ruling and opposition elites, and can be so bland as to be almost absent of 
meaning. For example, the headline conclusion of the German-Swiss dialogue 
exercise between 2001 and 2004, involving some very senior elites from government 
and opposition, noted:
The harmonisation of the correlation of state and religion is the important prerequisite 
for the protection of national consolidation, of the political and moral wholeness of the 
young Tajik state, and also of the stability of the process of its further formation (Bitter 
et al. 2004: 41).
It went on to emphasise the separation o f religious organisations from the state (as 
guaranteed by article 8 of Tajikistan’s constitution) and opaquely describes Islam as 
‘the organic ingredient o f Tajik society and national culture and has a real influence 
on social-political processes’ (p. 42). It highlighted the importance of overcoming 
‘disunity between Islam and secularism’ through ‘unifying factors’ (p. 42). This, it 
argues, involves taking a common front against external threats principally emanating 
from Afghanistan (pp. 42-3). It is extraordinary how closely these findings echo 
official pronouncements.
Exponents o f dialogue exercises argue that it is the process rather than the 
results which are important here (Saunders 1999). However, this process occurs in a 
highly politicised environment which does not allow challenges to ‘authority’. The 
conclusions o f dialogues function as shifting signifiers that can be accorded different 
meanings in different spaces. To international officials, this might require 
fundamental political as well as economic reform. To elites, an evolutionary process 
o f elite-led economic development in an ordered society can overcome poverty and 
the conditions for radicalisation (See also Olimova 2003 and Usmonov 2003a). Many 
in the ostensible opposition as well as civil society representatives express similar 
viewpoints (Himmatzoda 2003b; Gafforov [T6]: 4; Kamullodinov [T10]: 4; Zoirov 
2003: 224-5). Rahmatullo Valiev, the deputy chair o f the DPT, for example, argues 
that ‘there should be rotation in government (rotatsiya vo vlastif for the elections to 
count as ‘free’ and ‘democratic’ [T21]. By such an account it is the failure o f the state 
to provide places in government for the opposition which is the weakness of 
democracy. The paucity o f alternative viewpoints to the public transcript of
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mirostroitelstvo indicates the homogenous nature of Tajikistan’s elite public 
transcripts.
IRPT discourses o f  peace
IRPT testimonies mirror this oscillation between public conformism and a degree of 
hidden dissent. While many party members have become disenchanted with the 
peace process, the leadership, many of whom have gained financially from the peace 
agreement and their relationships with international donors, has stayed committed to 
the ‘peace’. IRPT leaders’ accounts seek to overcome elite representations o f political 
parties and political Islam with the war and justify their own profits from the peace.
117The leader o f the party until 2006, Nuri , emphasised the compromises that were 
made for ‘people's general interests’ and ‘unity and mutual understanding’.118 
Underpinning this perspective were elite beliefs of the Tajik subject as backward and 
politically unaware (‘they used to live like slaves in Soviet times and, in fact, did not 
have any political views’) 119, and that Tajik space has its own political conditions
170(‘Tajikistan is not Europe and does not yet have developed democratic traditions’). 
Nuri was frequently complimentary about President Rahmonov, never entered into 
harsh criticism of governmental elites, and had even suggested that an IRPT-PDPT
171coalition would be possible.
Given such public conformism, the IRPT has lost members to radical groups 
(Olimova and Bowyer 2002: 29). Moreover, in an authoritarian environment, its 
ability to represent political Islam to a wider audience is extremely limited. However, 
with both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ orientations in the party, IRPT discourses 
should not be characterised monolithically. These wings are to some extent 
represented by the vice-chairs of the party, Muhammadsharif Himatzoda and 
Muhiddin Kabiri. Himmatzoda presses for an increased role o f Islam in politics, 
questions the separation of church and state as a Western idea inappropriate for 
Islamic societies, and objects to the interpretation of article 8 (on the secular state) o f
!I7 Nuri died in August 2006 and was replaced by Kabiri.
118 Interview with Said Abdullo Nuri, Voice of the Islamic Republic o f Iran, Mashhad, in Persian 0100 
gmt 07 Apr 00, available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/taiikistan/hvpermail/200004/001Q.html 
, accessed: 10/02/05.
1,9 Ibid.
120IWPR, RCA, No. 437,24/02/06.
121 Ibid.
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the constitution in these terms (2003a). Kabiri, however, tends towards a more liberal 
Islam which is popular with the International Community. His writings and public 
comments have particularly accentuated the differences between the IRPT and radical 
groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (Kabiri 2003a), and emphasised cooperation with 
international organisations (2003b). Indeed, as an English speaker who often travels 
to Europe, Kabiri has been involved in many international programmes and is a 
frequent interviewee o f visiting international journalists.
Despite these differences, both ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ wings of the IRPT 
have remained moderate in the face of increased pressure by the government and 
shrinking space for political action. The party has largely kept the rules o f ‘authority’ 
and consequently has weakened vis-a-vis the regime. Some have argued that this 
constitutes a ‘de-Islamicisation’ of the IRPT which has created increased support for 
radical organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir (Karagiannis 2006). In this sense the possibility 
for new conflict may be produced by Tajikistan’s process of peacebuildng. However, 
investigationg these nascent hidden spaces of radicalism would require substantial 
ethnographic research beyond the scope o f this inquiry.
5.3AL In-between spaces and the International Community
Both the opposition in general and the IRPT in particular gravitate between a ‘hidden’ 
critique o f Tajikistan’s post-war authoritarianism and public conformity with the 
state. That the radical discourses, often deployed by the same individuals, found in an 
internationalised ‘opposition’ space are silenced in public spaces by discourses of 
conformity indicates the importance of space for discourse. Thus the function o f elite 
space is such that ‘opposition’ parties exist outside political space. Where then do 
they exist?
‘Opposition ’ space: between UNTOP and a hard place
The programmes of the International Community are predicated under the assumption 
of a public sphere that somehow exists a priori to government restrictions; if  only this 
space can be opened up then democratic politics can emerge. The OSCE reported, for 
example, a political party environment which is ‘to some extent restricted’ (2005g: 
10-11). In such a way, it is assumed that if  specific institutional and observable 
impediments are removed, a pluralistic political culture can take root. The
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International Community seeks to support this process through dialogue programmes 
and events where ‘political parties sit round one table and listen to one another and 
more or less tolerate the opinions o f each other’ (Shoev [T19]: 5-6). Many political 
party representatives praise the space they are given to speak out in such low profile 
events out of the public eye and the opportunities and insights afforded by overseas 
visits and seminars. ‘You know,’ Horisova remarked regarding an NDI-organised trip 
to observe elections in Poland, ‘for a Tajik, when traveling overseas the most 
important and best thing is the freedom. For me it was very interesting to see how 
people vote. No one forces them, they simply go and vote for the party that they 
want’ ([T8]: 7).
Such international events, whether those o f the Polish elections or seminars in 
OSCE or UNTOP buildings, represent an in-between space where a debate can take 
place. They exist tenuously, in contrast to the official elite space o f government, 
rather than representing the opening up of government to other voices. In Tajikistan, 
they create ‘opposition’ (a simulated alternative to opposition) rather than opposition 
as it is understood in peacebuilding discourse (a real alternative to government). This 
affirms Liu’s argument that ‘space is complicit with exercises of authority’ (2002: 8). 
These in-between spaces produce their own institutions and practices that exist apart 
from government and leave its authority unchallenged. They thus simulate democracy 
among Tajiks rather than actually democratising elite and popular spaces of 
Tajikistan. This apartness of the ‘opposition’ is maintained through their role as 
recipients o f international aid and as functionaries o f international programmes. 
Many of the senior representatives o f political parties which I interviewed also ran 
their own NGOs to provide a sideline income. In addition, before the elections they 
received grants to support their activities around the elections and provide personal 
incomes for party representatives -  almost $1 million was dispersed in total in 2004- 
2005 (UNTOP 2004). Supported by international programmes, political parties can 
seem even more detached from local realities; their raison d ’etre becomes the 
simulation o f practices predicated on international discourses, rather than attending to 
local concerns. As a consequence of such simulation they are able to continue to 
exist.
This simulated, evanescent context of the internationalised ‘opposition’ is 
most apparent where international spaces touch elite spaces. I received numerous 
complaints over 2004 and 2005 from opposition figures about the OSCE and UN’s
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failure to speak out regarding, among other things, the spurious constitutional 
referendum of 2003, and the violations in the 2005 elections. Ishonov, the CPT Head
for Garm district, for example, noted that international training seminars produced
100‘general comments’ (obshchie frazi) but ‘very little o f substance’. When such 
internationally-supported events gain any kind of profile they become politicised and 
are controlled by the regime. For example, in Khujond in 2004 the PDC was 
dominated by governmental elites who used it as an opportunity to perform their 
loyalty to the state. The meeting was held in government buildings while initially 
opposition representatives were shut outside as the head o f UNTOP and senior 
members o f the OSCE sat inside. A series of governmental speakers praised the 
regime in front o f an audience of hundreds o f state servants (goschinnovniki) who 
applauded every speech. When the opposition parties were allowed in they had to 
stand at the sides. After they were eventually given a few minutes to speak they were
123met with silence.
The SDPT as internationalised political party
The SDPT, as the youngest opposition party and a party o f the intelligentsia, rather 
than a regionally-based party, is a particularly strong example of a party which exists 
in an in-between space. It oscillates between internationalised ‘opposition’ and the 
control and cooptation strategies o f the regime. The SDPT began after a meeting 
between various opposition party representatives who were excluded from the 2000 
elections including Ramatillo Zoirov, leader of Adolat va Taraqqiyot ( ‘Justice and 
Progress’) and Shokiijon Hakimov, a member o f the Congress o f Popular Unity of 
Tajikistan.124 By this time Zoirov had also become a senior advisor to the President 
and this facilitated the eventual registration o f the party in 2002.125 However, he was 
quick to assert his independence from Rahmonov. He resigned from his position in 
response to the 2003 referendum which allowed the President to be elected for two
122 Interview, Dilovar Ishonov, CPT, Garm raiyon, 09/08/05
123 Accounts o f OSCE, UNTOP and party representatives, June 2005.
124 RFE/RL, CAR, 09/06/00; Asia-Plus Blitz #021 (930) 30/01/02, #022 (931) 31/01/02, #051 (960) 
15/03/0.
125 Asia-Plus Blitz #220 (1131), 20/11/02.
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further terms in office and publicly argued that, as the referendum was illegal,
|  'y/r
Rahmonov’s term in office ended in late-2004.
After this falling out with Rahmonov, the SDPT found itself in the in-between 
space o f the internationalised ‘opposition’. Deputy chair Hakimov characterises the 
party as ‘intelligent, secular, democratic opposition’ (Hakimov [T7]: 2). It has 
gained supporters in this mold, having a few thousand registered members, 
professionals and NGO administrators, from Dushanbe, Sugd and Badakhshon. 
Hakimov notes that because when people become members they face ‘pressure’ from 
the authorities and may lose their job, the party tries to recruit those who ‘in economic 
terms are relatively independent’ (p. 4). Its membership has stayed relatively small 
and it stays afloat partly because many of its’ leaders run NGOs which subcontract for 
international organisations. Zoirov, for example, has often worked as a consultant for 
the International Community including for the PDC (UNTOP 2001: 16). Hakimov 
observes, ‘as for us all avenues [to government] are closed, we are able to participate 
in the projects of international community’ (p. 6). Here, international programmes 
serve as an alternative to, not a conduit for, real politics.
On the other hand, this involvement with international actors has entailed the 
further exclusion of the SDPT from the corridors o f power. Dilbar Samadova who 
joined the party following a personal meeting with Zoirov cited how the party in 
Khujond has been increasingly marginalised:
When we talk and criticise this doesn’t mean that we hate our homeland and we wish 
for something [bad] to happen to the state. But nevertheless [the government] doesn’t 
want to understand this and doesn’t want to cooperate, I think then we need to work 
more with international organisations to find some kind of way. For example, you 
know the Political [Discussion] Club, the first time I participated I was glad and was 
thinking that this was of use (v polzu). But after I participated, you know, that 
everything stayed the same. There was no response on the part of the Khukumat. It’s 
as if ‘the dog barks but the caravan goes on’ (kak budto sobaka layet, a karavart 
idiot)127. Our opinions don’t interest them. They don’t consider us. For example, they 
never invite our party anywhere. (Samdova [T18]: 6)
Such testimonies affirm the importance of the performance of state/elite authority. 
Those who do not perform according to ‘authority’ and ‘stability’ face sanction. 
SDPT members have been pressured to resign from the parties by their bosses (being
126 Asia-Plus Blitz #048 (1207) 12/03/03.
127 Literal translation. Figurative sense: ‘it’s as if everyone carries on regardless.’
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asked ‘Why do we need more than one party?’), and two candidates in the 2005 
elections for the Jabor Rasulov district were jailed after insulting a judge who turned 
down their candidacy (Ibid.: 13).
The SDPT is one case among many which illustrate how discourse functions 
to create political space, and vice-versa. Zubaidulloev, a Tajik political analyst, 
interprets SDPT’s difficulties in terms of ‘the crossing of a line’ set by the authorities. 
‘People know that the judge was not correct [in the Jabor rasulov case],’ he noted, 
‘but you do not challenge the judge -  he’s a state servant (goschinovnik).’ 
Furthermore, the SDPT ‘may have been able to win one or two seats’ had they not 
made a couple o f errors: entering a coalition with other political parties and offering 
places on their party list to the Tarraqiyot party o f Sulton Quvatov who had ‘fallen out
1 0Oof favour’ with Rahmonov. We might characterise such ‘crossing a line’ as the 
spatially enacted and discursively practised boundary between simulated ‘opposition’ 
o f the in-between space of the international community and the public spaces of 
contemporary Tajik politics.
5.4 Legitimacy and Authority: Re-/de-centralisation under international 
intervention
The trials o f the SDPT illustrate that in Tajikistan political authority is inscribed 
exclusively to the spaces of the ruling elite. It is primarily according to 
mirostroitelstvo with its ethics of ‘stability’ and ‘authority’ that ‘lines’ or rules are 
accommodated and ritualised consent to authority performed. However, as discussed 
in chapter four, the location o f this authority with ‘the state’ obscures a process o f the 
‘state against itse lf where under the cover of ‘the state,’ statesmen are able to steal 
state resources (Solnick 1998). The experience of Tajikistan’s ‘multi-party politics’ 
shows that rather than precipitating an inevitable collapse o f the system, personalised 
patronage politics becomes a part of normalised post-conflict politics and correlates 
with the inter-subjective, inter-textual legitimation of power at the centre.
128 Nasimjon Shukurov (candidate to local assembly) and Nizomiddin Begmatov (candidate to the 
national parliament) were jailed for terms of 18 and 12 months by a court in Sugd 22/06/05.
129 Interview, Mukhibullo Zubaidulloev, UK Embassy, Dushanbe,06/08/05. The Coalition for Free and 
Fair Elections included the SDPT, DPT and IRTT. It was set up in May 2004 as a tactical alliance.
The SDPT initially included Sulton Quvvatov and five other Tarraqiyot members on their list of 
candidates in December 2004 before they were forced to withdraw his name by the security ministry 
because he was suspected of committing the crime of ‘insulting the honour and dignity of the 
President’, see IWPR, RCA, No. 342,21/02/05
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International and local actors accept and adapt to it. This sub-section considers how, 
in the midst of international intervention, authority is simultaneously and dialectically 
re-centralised (under ‘the state’) and de-centralised (by statesmen and their associates 
for personal gain).
5.4A. Re-centralisation under *the state9: inter-textual relations
Elite discourse has proven resilient, ambiguously incorporating the vocabulary of 
‘peacebuilding’ and that of tinji within its public transcripts. ‘Pluralism’ (pluralizm) 
and ‘democracy’ (<demokratsiya) have become frequently cited norms in Tajikistan. 
In his speech before the PDC, for example, Ubaidulloyev emphasised ‘the political 
pluralism of political parties enabling the formation and expression of the will o f the 
people’ with the existence of six parties which ‘are not “departments” o f the state, nor 
its “branches” of government, but independent links of the political system’ (2003: 
63, 65). However, there are qualifications to this reflection o f peacebuilding ethics. 
Even within the public fora of dialogue projects, we can look a little deeper and 
acquire a ‘thicker’ sense o f the variety of meanings o f ‘pluralism’ in context. 
Ubaidulloev, accepts the need for ‘criticism’ (kritika) but this must be ‘based on 
facts’. ‘However,’ he goes on, ‘criticism for the sake o f criticism, criticism from an 
irrecoverable, dated point of view, criticism in order to wound people, is not fruitful 
since it leads [...] not to the resolution of problems, but to a mirage or to the idea “to 
grab and to divide” which is not acceptable’ (p. 64-5). These caveats are not merely 
cynical ploys but are made sense o f in wider elite public transcripts.
Elites also reflect subordinate discourses of ‘anti-politics’ and reproduce the 
‘threat’ o f the political. For governmental elites, the 2005 parliamentary elections and 
the 2006 presidential elections raised the fear that foreign governments may back 
opposition movements and led to further restrictions being placed on the work of 
international organisations. This fear, accentuated by memories of the civil war, 
makes the threat o f ‘democratic revolution’ a powerful limit to the meaning of 
‘pluralism’ in Tajikistan (Lavrakas 2004: 25). This conveys a temporal self which 
invalidates political parties and encourages the continued discursive linking of 
‘democracy’ with ‘stability’ and ‘authority’. Ubaidulloev, for example, remarks:
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I at once want to note that it must not weaken the ability of all branches of government 
(vlast) to command and regulate the situation as it takes shape, and it must not set one 
group or party against another, and in such a way as to divert it from the fundamental 
work of supplying rapid economic growth and the reduction of poverty. (2003: 62)
Such ‘fundamental work’ reduces ‘democracy’ to the provision of basic physical 
wellbeing, and prioritises ‘stability’ over openness. Such viewpoints lead PDPT 
leaders to idealise their party as the exceptional party which is ‘post-conflict’, ‘non- 
ideological’ and beyond ‘political struggle’ (Safarov 2003: 129-130). They represent 
both the values and interests of the consolidated political elite, and reflect subordinate 
concerns.
This inter-textual constitution of threat is evidenced in discourses and practical 
responses to the phenomenon of ‘coloured revolution’. Following successful 
uprisings in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively, elites feared that the 
2005 elections could provide a kickstart for popular rebellion against the government. 
The discourse of ‘coloured revolution’ gained momentum among authoritarian elites 
across Central Asia in 2004 and 2005, and was given a further boost after the ousting 
of President Akayev in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the Andijon uprising in May 
2005 (Heathershaw 2006). Tajik elite responses reflected neo-Soviet political 
thinking that sees public protest as necessarily violent and disorderly and justifies 
rules against even peaceful expressions of public dissent. These rules were deployed 
widely in Tajikistan during the 2005 elections and immediate aftermath, with elites 
forbidding even minor demonstrations (Hakimov [T7]: 5), and placing restrictions the 
work o f international organisations with civil society. ‘Everything that’s happening 
with them,’ Asozoda comments, raising the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, ‘we 
have seen with our own eyes.’
God forbid that they have what we had [referring to the civil war]. We’re watching 
everything very carefully. Indeed we’ve already seen. But they -  Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan -  they haven’t seen all this. The first democratic 
transformations in the USSR began in Tajikistan, already in 1989. But when we 
announced independence, the USSR was still strong. We now watch all these events 
carefully, not interfering. And we give our opinion: no problems can be resolved with 
violence (putyami krovi). ([T2]: 9)130
130 Events in Ukraine, November-December 2004, may be reasonably characterised as ‘popular’ and 
Western-supported, however, in Kyrgyzstan, March 2005, mobilisation was based on clientelism, in 
support of regional patrons. No broad-based opposition movement emerged and Western support for 
‘opposition’ groups was insignificant. In Andijon, Uzbekistan, May 2005, unlike in the other cases, 
there was significant violence (between the government and militants) -  although the exact events are 
extremely unclear. In Azerbaijan there was no significant opposition movement, but there was an elite
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Elites found an audience among both themselves and subordinates for these 
hyperbolic visions of instability. Even opposition and civil society representations 
implicitly and at times explicitly adopted these assumptions of the dangers propagated 
by political competition (Pochoyev 2005[T]: 4). Such inter-textual relations re­
inscribe the ‘threat’ of pluralism.
Figure 20: Billboard of President Rahmonov, Khujond. It reads ‘The health of the nation is a 
priceless wealth’; the structure blocks the light to numerous occupied residential apartments.
This example reveals a final and important locus o f the inter-textual relations 
of the re-centralisation of authority: the elite itself. Whilst elites are able to interpret 
popular resignation to such ‘authority’ as an acceptable level of consent (Asozoda 
[T2]: 6), performed occasionally at elections and ceremonies, they demand more from 
within their own circles. Explicit action of recognition and acceptance is required as 
elites are expected to reaffirm the untouchable position of the President. Thus, the
fear o f ‘democratic revolution’ occurring there around the elections in 2004. This linking o f  
profoundly dissimilar events is a particular example o f  the importance o f  discursive practice in 
remembering history and imagining political reality. See Heathershaw (2006).
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2005 parliamentary elections were perhaps more important for the consent performed 
by local elites who managed the elections, returned the re-continuity of ‘stability’ and 
‘authority’, and thus renewed their places in the positions o f power. Moreover, from 
day to day, iconography put in place by officials reconfirms their acceptance o f 
presidential power. The huge increase in the number o f portraits and sayings of 
Rahmonov hanging from public and non-public buildings often alongside other Tajik 
‘national heroes’ is a feature o f the period since 2000.131. For example, the hanging of 
the three-storey high portrait shown hanging on an apartment bloc in Khujond (figure 
20) represents consent by regional elites to the ‘colossal authority’ of the President. 
Similarly, invitations to public ceremonies and the celebration of national holidays, 
and the acceptance of these invitations, are day-to-day spectacles o f consent which 
perform and reproduce authority.
5.4AL ‘De-centralisation * to statesmen: making sense of the state-against-itself
Under the cover of this reformation of authority, dissenting practices continue as state 
actors re-appropriate official resources to local networks. Yet the state loses authority 
as these practices are made sense o f in hidden transcripts. This process can be 
considered a form of ‘de-centralisation’ where the authority of the state is made 
highly contingent on the practices o f regional factions and individuals. This raises the 
question of who is being legitimated: the regime or the state?
Power-holders in Tajikistan are increasingly representative of a regime based 
around President Rahmonov, where both former civil war allies and opponents are 
gradually being excluded. Thus, we see the strengthening o f the regime but not the 
strengthening of the state. The litmus test offered as proof for this assertion is the 
transfer of power from Rahmonov to another President. How, it is asked, could such 
a transition take place? If  the President fell ill or was killed by an assassin’s bullet 
what mechanism exists to bring a new government to power short of descending into 
another civil war? Such questions invite speculation but, like all counterfactuals, 
offer little prospect of resolution. The problem here is demarcating the state from the 
regime. In elite public transcripts ‘the state’ and ‘state officials’ are inscribed as
131 However, it has at times reached an extreme where the President on several occasions has publicly 
called on state bodies not to engage in a ‘cult of personality’ or the ‘eulogisation’ of his personality, 
particularly around his fiftieth birthday in 2002. The truism about ‘authority’ here of course is 
contained in the reality that only the President could call for such portraits to be taken down. See: 
Asia-Plus Blitz, #311 (903), 20/12/01; #158 (1067), 20/08/02.
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being synonymous. State ‘authority’ and ‘stability’ constitute the powerful ethics 
which legitimate the rise of the PDPT (in this chapter), the subordination of 
‘communities’ (in chapter 7) and the re-integration of warlords (in chapter 6). As a 
consequence, institutionalist analysis may be of limited utility in terms of 
differentiating regime from state. The de-centralisation o f state roles to networks and 
individuals continues alongside re-centralisation of authority and the idea of ‘the 
state’.
Moreover, and crucially, de-centralisation may be dialectically produced by 
re-centralisation, and vice-versa. As Scott notes (1990), the public transcripts o f the 
dominant demand that the elite perform the particular role that has been inscribed for 
them. Thus, as possessors o f authority, statesmen can act above the law and break 
their own laws. An emphasis on personal ‘authority’ necessitates that practices that 
are de jure  codified are de facto dependent on the elite who implement it. In such a 
situation, the observation of the law consistently and universally, would be deeply 
delegitimating for the ruling elite. The ‘authority’ of ‘the state’ rests on the elite’s 
ability to monopolise official spaces not make them work effectively for the general 
good. Indeed, such monopoly would unavoidably be weakened if  statesmen stopped 
being corrupt and functioned according to the democratic ideals o f peacebuilding or 
even the more technocratic goals of statebuilding. The ethic of ‘authority’ demands 
that information and law are used and abused to maintain control, rather than are in 
themselves regulative o f social control. Senior officials are said to hold ‘black files’ 
containing such o f evidence o f formal rule violation (which isn’t in itself a problem) 
but can be used on those below them if they violate the informal rules and modes of
1 “17 • * •consent of ‘authority’ . Where information becomes a weapon of ‘authority’ it is 
unsurprising that it is reduced to the provision of bland statistics, or is completely 
withheld. One journalist in Kulob notes that officials, ‘are afraid o f information. 
Not simply negatively but positively afraid. That’s why access is shut everywhere. I 
work, as a spy, in order to find some kind o f information’ (Dinkayev [T4]: 7). Such 
inconsistent observation of law and absence of public information paralyses the 
general functioning of the state. Thus, the very nature o f such a system means that the 
President is unable to get things done without his personal networks o f power. It is
132 Unnamed senior government official quoted in, IWPR, RCA, No. 333, 10/12/04.
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this built-in tension which explains the particular way in which the state fails to live 
up to its image.
Thus, although there are genuine believers in mirostroitelstvo within post- 
Soviet power structures, as noted in the previous chapter, the ideology is often 
practised by ‘cynical subjects’ aware o f the tension between representations and 
actual practices. However, such ‘cynicism’ is often justified as elites negotiate their 
re-centralising and de-centralising practices, and refer to public performances in their 
hidden transcripts. Shoyev, a political analyst, notes that the expansion of the PDPT 
mirrors the communist party in this way:
That’s why it’s very similar to the communist system, which was also like that. The 
communist party led but its members were largely people which themselves didn’t 
believe in communist ideals. They were members of this party so that they could 
occupy certain posts and to move on in their work (prodvigalis po sluzhbe), but in their 
hearts they know that its not correct, that the policy of the party is probably not correct. 
That’s why I even know such people who, although members of the PDPT voted for 
other parties at the elections. I asked them why they did that and they answered, that of 
course the idea of their party isn’t correct. Simply they are members for the sake of 
employment (dlya sluzhbe), in order to occupy a good post, but in the election, they 
say, “I will be voting honestly and with my heart.” ([T19]: 3-4)
The public/private dichotomy here represents the kind of elite ambivalence analysed 
by Scott (1990) where the dishonesty of the public discourse produces a desire for 
honesty, a need to negate the lie, as well as a functional adherence to public 
‘authority’ and the private stealing of state resources.
This picture of ambivalent elites as ‘cynical subjects’ calls to question whether 
even a regime is being ‘built’ in Tajikistan, never mind a state. However, therein may 
be the rub. As Foucault has noted, the state may be ‘no more than a composite reality 
and a mythicised abstraction’ (1991: 103). This is the character o f the weak state o f 
Tajikistan, where the idea of ‘the state’ has been mobilised concomitantly in popular, 
elite and international discourses as the means by which war can end and order be re­
established. It is this idea, this myth, which is vital. It is thus a strangely ambivalent 
form of authority that has been legitimated in post-conflict, postsocialist Tajikistan. 
Authority is (re)produced in similar ways across the region. As I have argued 
elsewhere (2006), political practices in Central Asia, ‘may be better understood as 
what anthropologists call “myths” -  stories which are told to reproduce the identity, 
boundaries and values of a (political) community’. My findings are analogous with 
March’s contentions with respect to Uzbekistan. ‘Authoritarian legitimation must not
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be seen,’ he notes, ‘as primarily a set of explicit arguments against democracy, but 
rather a consistent rejection o f the existence of conceivable ideological alternatives to 
the substantive orientation o f the regime’ (2003: 210). Authority in such settings 
remains based on what Alexander calls ‘formless political culture’ (2000: 40-41). 
The myth o f the Tajik state continues to be told and simultaneously continues to be 
betrayed. The consequence o f this is a ‘state’ which, despite being emboldened by the 
re-centralisation o f authority, is corrupted systematically by statesmen, avoided where 
possible by citizens, and resigned to by both. How people go about carving out 
livelihoods and scratching out a living both with and despite the state will be 
addressed in the chapter seven.
5.4.UL What difference has ‘peacebuilding* made?
A final question remains: how do international interventions perform the ‘authority’ 
of the regime and thus legitimate it? Based on the findings above, I would argue that 
such assistance have had three over-riding functions.
Firstly, these programmes performed the authority o f  the dominant regime 
(and its representation o f  ‘the sta tej among the wider elite. The decision to monitor 
the 2005 elections illustrates how international actors adapt their discourse in context, 
and how this then serves to perform governmental authority. For example, before the 
2005 elections, the OSCE Needs Assessment Mission noted that ‘some independent 
journalists advised [the Mission] not to send election observers as the OSCE/ODIHR 
observation efforts may increase the perception of integrity to a potentially flawed 
process,’ while political parties noted ‘that staying away might send a negative signal 
regarding the political process in Tajikistan’ (OSCE 2004: 6). The OSCE ultimately 
concurred with the parties rather than the more radical journalists. By working with 
local authorities and limiting its criticism o f them it performed their authority and 
enhanced their legitimacy.
Secondly, ‘peacebuilding’ discourse performed Tajikistan’s existence in the 
‘international community \  The continued existence of the IRPT in particular, as 
noted by Dinkayev (this chapter, p. 196), allows Tajikistan to credibly defend itself as 
a ‘democracy’ or at least maintain the appearance o f being ‘on the road to 
democracy.’ This representation is vital to continued donor support for Tajikistan 
across a variety o f areas which helps legitimise the government in the eyes o f both the
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wider international community and the Tajik people. The International Community 
and even many ‘opposition’ parties are sensitive and adaptive to this, but it is the 
government itself which is perhaps most aware of the danger of appearing too 
authoritarian. ‘It is in our interests,’ Rahmonov announced on TV a week before the 
2005 elections, ‘to ensure that elections are free and transparent, and that they 
conform to international standards... so that this important political event promotes 
Tajikistan’s image in the international arena.’ However, against Schatz (2006a: 
263-284), I argue that the Tajik government’s occasional and cosmetic concessions to 
the international actors have not led it to substantially emulate the role, inscribed for it 
by the International Community, o f an agent o f democratisation. Rather, the 
emulation has primarily occurred on the part o f subcontracting partners and the 
International Community itself who must always ‘invite the Hukumat’.
Finally, following from the above arid most importantly o f all, these 
international interventions performed the increasing dominance o f the authoritarian 
Tajik regime to its people. Internationally-supported ‘elections’ and ‘opposition’ in 
Tajikistan are habitually greeted with disdain or apathy by subordinates who see them 
as irrelevant to their daily lives. International interventions embolden the authority of 
the ruling elite in providing a forum for their own expressions of ‘authority’ over the 
people and ‘opposition’. The degree o f domination by the elite, and consolidation of 
that elite into government, differs region by region. However, as acknowledged by 
Malekzade ([Tl 1]: 7), wherever it went the PDC reproduced these power dynamics 
rather than challenged them. To this extent this analysis accords with Matveeva’s 
conclusion that dialogue programmes in Tajikistan lost whatever agency they had 
after 2000 and served to ‘reflect’ the political process (2007, forthcoming: 29-30). 
Moreover, the ‘consensus’ they did achieve prior to 2000 may also have been a 
product o f the broader, evolving political context o f the reconstitution of hegemony. 
The realities o f discourse and space dictate that the International Community acts 
through the regime. While in none o f the cases o f intervention cited above does the 
regime have a direct material interest in international assistance, such interventions 
accrue greater legitimacy for ‘the state’, which constitutes the regime’s benign 
representation of itself. Thus, democratisation through Huntington’s processes of 
‘replacement’ or ‘transplacement’ (Schatz 2006a: 279) cannot be said to be either at a
133 Personal observation 20/02/05.
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first step or near completion in post-conflict Tajikistan. The government’s ‘soft’ 
authoritarianism (p. 279) is increasingly hardening.
Conclusions
While peacebuilding purports to support elections and facilitate dialogue as the first 
steps towards pluralism and democracy, representatives o f the International 
Community are divided about how effective such interventions are. One international 
officer privately noted that the projects themselves were ‘crap,’ noting that Islamic- 
secular struggle ‘was never the essence of the conflict.’ Moreover, he argued,
Dialogue is cheap. You can send some persons to Germany, show them around. The 
Tajik mafia guys can do some shopping. Everybody’s happy. The government’s not 
too heavily involved. It’s not too expensive (Epkenhans [T5]: 4).
On the other hand, an UNTOP official contends that there is ‘a need to maintain a 
political dialogue and not to give away the achievements o f the peace process’ 
(Malekzade [T il]: 3). Assistance to political parties and elections, particularly 
through dialogue projects, continues to be popular. This simulation of ‘opposition’ is 
not without its own functions for the marginalised groups involved.134 Moreover, it is 
doubtful whether without international support, opposition parties such as the DPT 
and SDPT could continue to exist. Similarly, without these ‘partners’ it is 
questionable whether organisations such as NDI could justify much o f their work in 
Tajikistan. In this sense the International Community and its sub-contractors develop 
interdependent interests which give them a vested interest in maintaining the myth of 
democratisation despite evidence to the contrary. In such a way the ideas of ‘free and 
fair elections’ and ‘inter-Tajik dialogue’ live on; they are rescued in peacebuilding 
discourse through the temporal ideal-other of post-conflict Tajikistan which serves to 
justify the disbursement of substantial international assistance and employment of
1 3^international programme staff and consultants. The reasons why the discourse of 
peacebuilding adapts and survives in international practice will be explored further in 
subsequent chapters.
134 Some of these are direct. For example, the NDI trip to Poland, according to ex-head of the SPT 
Mirhusseino Narziev, served as the catalyst for the formation with other parties of the Coalition for 
Free and Fair Elections to fight the 2005 parliamentary ballot. (Narziev [T12]: 7)
135 For example, after much hesitation, and despite the fact that the elections were clearly going to be 
non-competitive, the OSCE decided to monitor the Tajik presidential elections of November 2006.
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This chapter has argued that the process that such interventions facilitate is not 
that o f democratisation but o f the legitimation of authoritarianism -  those o f the re- 
/de-centralisation o f authority. Peacebuilding discourse facilitates an alternative to 
real political contention, and international assistance to the ‘opposition’ continues its 
marginalisation outside the spaces o f power. To reflect on the Head o f the OSCE 
EOM’s comments headlined at the outset o f this chapter, it is evident that whilst a 
‘bad election’ may not be good for ‘peacebuilding’, it was functional in the kind of 
peace building taking place in Tajikistan -  the reconstitution o f authority and 
legitimacy to an authoritarian regime.
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CHAPTER SIX
Security: Simulation, Sovereignty and ‘Border Management’
The subject of security is the subject of security’
-R.B.J. Walker (1997:78)
Security constitutes the second category of interventions under the name of 
peacebuilding considered in this dissertation. In previous chapters, I have explored 
the discursive invocation of security alongside international peacebuilding in general 
(chapter 1) and specifically in Tajikistan (chapter 4). Security practices in the post­
implementation period most often involve leftover tasks under the rubric of 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as well as a new agenda of 
tasks under the title of Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Chanaa 2002). Before 
beginning the empirical work of this chapter, I would like to explore what it is about 
the nature o f security that makes its subject, the sovereign state, not an a priori given 
but a work forever in progress and thus the subject of our anlysis.
In studying security we must address questions o f political community and 
identity. Barker reminds us that legitimacy is ‘sustained to a greater or lesser degree 
by the depiction of enemies’ (Barker 2001: 138). The Copenhagen School o f security 
studies (Buzan et al. 1998) and more radical critical security studies (Lipschultz 1995; 
Krause & Williams 1997; Walker 1997; Der Derian 1995) literature both see the 
presence or absence of security as a product of discursive practice. Rather security is 
discursively practiced as a ‘speech act’ (Waever 1995: 50) or ‘a performative 
discourse constitutive of political order’ (Der Derian 1995: 78). Thus, ‘security’ is 
generated through ‘processes of securitisation and desecuritisation’(Waever 1995: 57) 
as ‘extreme form[s] o f politicisation’ where ‘the state’ demands the right to take 
extreme measures, ostensibly in the name o f protecting its citizens (Buzan et al. 1998: 
241). The invocation of ‘national security’ and the specifications o f ‘threat’ and 
‘enemy’ serve a political purpose for the accumulation o f authority locally or 
‘internally’ to the state. For political elites this makes the construction o f enemies a 
process vital to one’s own identity and existence as a political entity (Lipschultz 1995: 
217).
The centrality placed on the subjects o f security by securitisation theory brings 
state sovereignty to the foreground. If  security discourses lose all plausibility among
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elites, subordinates or internationals this can delegitmate the subject itself; similarly, 
it is via these discourses that sovereignty and authority can be reconstructed -  as with 
Tajikistan’s peacebuilding. For many established or ‘strong’ states these discourses 
can become ‘sedimented’ or relatively static so that largely material considerations of 
the balance o f power seem to predominate (Buzan 1991; Waever 1995). Walker 
comments that, ‘to speak of security is to engage in a discourse of repetitions, to 
affirm over and over again the dangers that legitimate sovereign authority that is 
constituted precisely as a solution to dangers’ (Walker 1997: 73). Thus the 
(re)construction o f sovereignty in ‘strong’ states is often ignored. However, in the 
case o f a ‘weak’ state such as Tajikistan, which is only now undergoing a period of 
independence, of state- and nation-building, free from political crisis, the repetitive 
invocation of ‘security’ is vital to the constitution o f sovereignty via performance or 
simulation. Like security, sovereignty is, ‘a practice of legitimation that serves to 
render other ways of being human, other ways of being both one and many, of 
relating self to other, of articulating space/time -  almost unimaginable’ (Walker 1997: 
321-322). However, whilst in chapter five such performances were seen to be highly 
successful at determining the spatial boundaries (of state authority) ‘inside’ 
Tajikistan, this chapter shows how they face contrasting representations (of state 
sovereignty) ‘outside’ of Tajik space. Authority is performed; sovereignty is 
simulated.
This chapter explores two areas of security that have been of considerable 
interest to elite and international actors: the reintegration o f warlords, and the reform 
of border management. Section one, looks at the reintegration o f ‘commanders’ as 
co-constituted with processes o f securitisation in the country. Section two, turns our 
attention to an increasingly securitised aspect of the security sector in Tajikistan: the 
state border. It dwells on the contrasting nature of three performances 
(resecuritisations) of sovereignty -  national, regional and international -  during the 
handover of the Tajik-Afghan border from regional to national responsibility from 
2004-2005. Section three extends this argument to consider attempts to reform 
border management. It show how the state border, and by extension sovereignty, as 
an attribute o f post-conflict peace, seems at once both ever-present (in ideal-type form 
in contending discourse and representations) and strangely absent (in the rent-seeking 
actions o f ‘state’ actors and the struggles o f daily life). This paradox can only be 
resolved analytically through the acceptance of contrariety. Ontologically,
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sovereignty is neither present nor absent, but in a constant process o f construction and 
de-construction. In other words, it is concomitantly simulated and dissimulated.
6.1 DDR and Securitisation: from ‘w arlords’ to ‘statesm en’
In an earlier study of international interventions to tackle small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) in Tajikistan I explored a ‘paradox of peacebuilding’, broadened in 
the introduction here, where an absence o f substantive disarmament has been 
accompanied by a puzzling lack of proliferation (2005a). While in other conflict 
zones across the world small arms proliferation is a major post-conflict problem, 
Tajikistan has been able to bring SALW under the control o f the state relatively 
quickly and coercively (ibid.). This comprises a challenge to the precepts o f 
peacebuilding and suggests we must rethink the assumptions o f SSR and the nature of 
security in ‘peacebuilding’. The practices of the security sector depart considerably 
from international and elite representations. In Tajikistan ‘disarmament’ has been 
usurped by the recycling of small arms by the regime under the authority o f ‘the 
state’, and ‘demobilisation’ has been precluded by a process where commanders who 
seek to retain their independence as political actors are destroyed. What has been 
paramount is a process of ‘reintegration’ where those who are prepared to sacrifice 
their political and military independence are incorporated into the elite networks 
existing under the name of the state (see also, Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007).
6.1.L Forced demobilisation, 2000-2002: the legitimation o f violence
The implementation of the peace agreement between 1997 and 2000 began a process of 
integrating or excluding commanders from political authority through the distribution of 
positions in the state. However, this form of consolidation must be seen as a qualitative 
as well as quantitative change: warlords continue to exercise influence to the extent that 
they are ‘statesmanlike’. Most studies of Tajik warlords draw a unambiguous distinction 
between warlords and the state, and have thus failed to grasp the nature o f this change 
(Lezhnev 2005). Evidence indicates that after expanding networks of patronage to 
accommodate the opposition from 1997-2000, since 2000 Rahmonov has increasingly 
consolidated economic power around his Danghari sub-regional ‘clan’ to the exclusion 
of other Kulobis as well as ex-opposition commanders. Yet this contraction o f patronage 
networks has not been accompanied by substantive ‘spoiler’ activity. The means by
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which independent military commanders (komandiri) have lost popularity and power
in the period from 2000 to 2005 warrants particular attention in this study. While
many o f these have been killed, jailed or fled overseas, others have been incorporated
within the burgeoning ‘state’ either formally as state officials or informally and more
commonly as ‘businessmen’ (biznezmeni). These people could easily have been
powerful ‘spoilers’ (Stedman 1997; Toijesen and MacFarlane 2007) but in fact are
part o f the consolidation o f an authoritarian peace.
As the proliferation of SALW required extraordinary measures by the state (in
the form of presidential decrees) to achieve ‘disarmament’ (Heathershaw 2005a: 28-29;
Heathershaw et al 2004: 15-16), so too did the continuing presence of independent
military commanders (primarily around Dushanbe and in parts of the Rasht valley).
Over the period o f2000 and 2001 they were securitised as a ‘threat’ which required their 
1‘neutralisation.’ By this time any local support commanders had for operating
independently was waning as their ability to command powers of patronage and
protection declined. A number of high-profile assassinations and hostage-takings in
2000 and 2001 were represented as nihilistic ‘terrorist acts.’137 However, it seems likely
that these acts had significant economic dimensions and governmental representatives
118continued to negotiations with the groups over their economic and political aims. 
Such commanders were forced to bring their violence within ‘the state’ or face 
elimination.
Mirzo Ziyoev, the MCHS and the commanders
It is difficult to categorise these remaining independent commanders as either 
criminal leaders or Islamic militants -  by their very nature they were all implicated in 
criminal networks and some were heavily involved in the drugs trade, but not all 
expressed a radical Islamic agenda and many were ardently secular. What is more 
important is what they did not represent: ‘the state’. In 2000 and 2001, officials 
targeted primarily those connected with the UTO, in particular those who were 
associates o f the powerful Minister of Emergency Situations (Ministerstvo 
Cherezvichaynikh Del [MCHS]), Mirzo Ziyoev. Ziyoev’s involvement in these
136 Asia-Plus Blitz #212 (625), 07/11/00.
137 Asia-Plus Blitz # 171 (833), 10/09/01
138 Ibid.
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operations, as a senior representative of the state and at the request of Rahmonov, 
highlights the growing credibility o f ‘the state’ as a uniting force for commanders 
who were previously in conflict.139 At a representational level, ‘the state’ thus 
constitutes much more than the elite networks centred around Rahmonov and his 
Danghari allies.
Mullo Abdullo was one prominent commander, based in Darband, who had 
rejected offers of formal reintegration in 1997. It was, however, not until 2000 that 
the government felt able to take action against Abdullo; a move prompted by his 
killing of the head of Garm regional administration (raiyon) in June 2000.140 
Following the assassination, Ziyoev was called on to negotiate and in July an MCHS 
official announced a successful conclusion to the negotiations with seventy of 
Abdullo’s followers being incorporated within MCHS structures. Abdullo himself 
had two options which the official outlined as: ‘1) the former UTO commander may 
be appointed chairman of one of the dehkon farms o f the Darband district or 2) he will 
return to his permanent place of residence in the Kofamihon district.’141 However, 
other representatives o f the state portrayed Abdullo as refusing reintegration as he 
wanted to continue dugs trafficking and was said to ‘share the same religious 
convictions as the Taliban.’142 The ‘truth’ about the interests and ideas o f Abdullo 
may never be known. However, the representation o f Abdullo as a terrorist opposed 
to the right authority o f the state was a fa it accompli after the group itself was 
destroyed by government forces. In September 2000, in an attack on his militia, 
twenty-eight fighters were killed and a further forty apprehended (ICG 2001: 17). 
Abdullo fled to Afghanistan and was reportedly killed in fighting in February 2002 
(Torjesen et al 2005: 111). The destruction of Abdullo’s group was important as it 
weakened the position o f independent commanders further vis-a-vis those in 
government. One apparent consequence was that the government was able to force 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), numbering about 250 fighters, out o f the 
country and into Afghanistan.
139 The first powerful sign of the binding performance of the state was in the joint action against 
Mahmud Khudoberdiev taken by Suhrob Qosimov (MVD) and Mirzo Ziyoev (MCHS) who had been 
on opposing sides before the peace agreement. See, section 2.2.ii
140 Asia-Plus Blitz # 132 (545), 14/07/00.
141 Ibid.
142 Cited in Torjesen and MacFarlane (2007, no pagination).
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Rahmon Sanginov (known as ‘Hitler’) was another commander in whose clash 
with the government Ziyoev became the key negotiator. While Sanginov had been 
portrayed as a criminal, he clearly had some religious convictions and political 
interests (Nourzhanov 2005: 127). He had been briefly reintegrated into the Ministry 
o f Defence after the war but was later dismissed for refusing to implement orders 
(Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007). He subsequently formed a militant group with 
Mansur Muaqqalov, another ex-UTO commander, and relocated to the village of 
Rohaty outside of Dushanbe.143 In April 2001, a number o f their men who were 
already integrated into the state -  as part o f the MCHS in Tavildara -  were arrested 
for the assassination o f the Deputy Minister of the Interior. Sanginov and Muaqqalov 
responded with two apparently coordinated hostage-takings, one in Teppai 
Samarkandi village near Dushanbe on June 11 in which several MVD officers were 
apprehended, and a second shortly after where fifteen workers from the INGO German 
Agro-Action were taken captive in the village of Sabzikharv, near Tavildara.144 The 
Tavildara incident had been led by the Head of the District MCHS for Tavildara, Hasan 
Saidmahmadov, a former UTO combatant who had been reintegrated into state 
structures. The personal intervention of Ziyoev was required to secure their release on 
June 18.145 Following this embarrassing incident, forces o f the MVD under ex-warlord 
Suhrob Kosimov, launched an assault against Sanginov’s group on June 22. Over the 
coming days and weeks he and many of his supporters were killed or captured, and a 
number o f Kosimov’s troops and civilians lost their lives.146
Fixing the shifting boundaries o f ‘terrorist ’ and ‘state ’
The cases o f Abullo and Sanginov are indicative of a broader process of securitising 
and ‘neutralising’ commanders to fix ‘the state’ as the unchallengeable basis o f 
political power in the country. They illustrate the fine line between ‘state’ and 
‘terrorist’/ ‘warlord’ -  where representatives of the former can be portrayed as the 
latter if  they step out from under the authority of the senior representatives o f the 
state. Moreover, these cases show the particular dynamics o f state consolidation
143 Asia-Plus Blitz # 118 (780) 22/06/01.
144 Asia-Plus Blitz, # 114 (776), 18/06/01.
145 Personal communication, former hostage, Khujond, July 2004.
146 Asia-Plus Blitz # 118 (780) 22/06/01, # 126 (788), 06/07/01, # 128 (790) 09/07/01, # 145 (807) 
01/08/05, # 159 (821) 21/08/01.
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where, as Torjesen and MacFarlane (2007) point out, ‘reintegration’ precedes 
‘demobilisation’ -  where armed bands are formally integrated into the state without 
submitting fully to its authority. Thus, the elimination o f these commanders served 
broader political functions beyond the elimination of forces hostile to the regime. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of the state increased. Political elites represented these 
crackdowns not in terms of turf wars between trafficking groups, or even a campaign 
against radical Islam. Rather Abdullo and Sanginov were portrayed as a monolithic, 
illegitimate threat to ‘peace’ in the sense that they refuse to commit to the authority of 
the state.147
These representations were largely well-received among elite and subordinate 
audiences o f post-conflict Tajikistan. They constitute specific and successful 
securitisations o f ‘the state’ against non-state groups. Sanginov’s group for example 
was portrayed by Isamova, for the national Asia-Plus news outlet, as an 
‘uncontrollable group’ which was one of ‘the forces in Tajikistan, which try to 
destabilise the peace-building process in the country, and rattle the sabre.’ Such 
forces, she notes, cannot be negotiated with; ‘the terrorists needed not so much 
satisfaction to their demands as showing that they still have power’ (Isamova 2001, no 
pagination). The terms o f the 1997 peace agreement were used in this text as the 
grounds for their criminality in an echo of government accounts of the Sanginov’s 
crimes. Whilst they had been given amnesty in 1997, Isamova notes, they continued 
‘committing crimes. [Thus] persecutions by [the government for] political motives are 
out o f the question,’ and they can be regarded as ‘criminals, who must appear to 
court’ (ibid.). This writing of commanders as criminals is a constructive act in the 
resecuritisation of the state. A further step is to call on others in the international 
community to affirm Tajik sovereignty against non-state threats. Noting that ‘the 
Tajik power structures’ need the cooperation of regional neighbours who have ‘signed 
appropriate agreements on [the] fight against terrorism, and religious extremism,’ 
Isamova is explicit about the importance of ‘Central Asia’ as a community o f like- 
minded statesmen. ‘These agreements would be of declarative nature,’ she 
comments, ‘but they must show a consolidation of neighbors in fighting this evil, 
which face them too’ (ibid.).
147 Asia-Plus Blitz # 159 (821) 21 /08/01.
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This characterisation was increasingly credible, in different ways, to both 
elites and subordinates. The ruling faction hid behind the performance of ‘the state’, 
‘stability’ and ‘authority’ to conceal its own wartime origins in pro-government 
militias, and claim legitimacy for its present actions. While securitisation o f ‘the 
state’ is typical in international relations, for so-called ‘failed states’ or conflict zones 
where the state itself is contested such securitisations are often usurped by claims to 
securitize particular confessions, ethnicities or nations. Thus, the securitisation o f the 
state as guardian constitutes Tajikistan’s return to ‘normal’ post-Soviet politics. This 
process is not only inscribed in terms of the ethics o f ‘authority’ and ‘stability’ but is 
temporally situated as a post-war stage of development: locating the commanders in 
the wartime past (Usmonov 2003b). It is a security campaign, Lavrakos notes, 
‘aiming at preserving all past stages of the transitional period o f the country’s 
development’ (2005: 22). Understood in these terms, the neutralisation o f the 
commanders cannot simply be interpreted as renewed conflict between government 
and opposition -  not least because errant pro-govemment commanders have also been 
neutralised since 2000. The divisions which are now important in Tajikistan are no 
longer ‘pro-govemment’ and ‘opposition’, but ‘state’ and ‘terrorist’.
6.I.H. *Reintegrationperformance and profit
Nourzhanov (2005) has argued for the continued importance of commanders or, aas 
he calls them, ‘warlords’ (jangsollor [Taj.]) in politics and society. However, more 
detailed contemporary studies and accounts indicate that the incorporation of 
commanders into the state and economy has been so comprehensive as to make the 
continuing use of the term ‘warlord’ inappropriate. One study includes several 
‘where are they now?’ tables for former field commanders of both government and 
opposition (Torjesen et al 2005: 77-85). This data indicates limited career options for 
ex-commanders with 14 out of a total o f 25 surveyed being employed by the state 
while the remaining 11 are either dead or incapacitated, have left Tajikistan, are 
imprisoned, or have abandoned military activity and their whereabouts is unknown 
(Ibid.). Ex-commanders now hold senior positions in the military formations o f the 
MCHS, Ministry o f Interior (MVD), or the Committee for the Guarding o f State 
Borders (KOGG). Tajikistan’s most experienced and effective military forces are 
spread primarily across these organisations rather than in the army. This has 
dispersed military power between several commanders, rather than providing a single
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power base which might mobilise against the President.148 Rather than repeat this 
kind o f comprehensive survey this sub-section will analyse the economic and 
representational trends of this process in general before looking at the re-/de- 
integration o f one particular commander, Ghaffor Mirzoyev.
Profit: the political functions o f corruption
As was noted in chapter two, the official reintegration process between 1997 and 2000 
was accompanied by something o f an unofficial process where the Committee for 
State Property, via a post-Soviet process of privatisation, distributed various ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ good between commanders who re-styled themselves as ‘businessmen’ 
(biznezmeni). The new business o f the commanders can be either ‘public’ or ‘private’ 
-  yet the distinction is blurred.149 Hoji Akhbar Turajonzoda, for example, a former 
UTO leader and leading member o f the Islamic clergy, acquired the cotton processing 
plant and department store in the town of Vakhdat, and two flats in Dushanbe.150 
Others register their assets in the name of relatives or associates. Suhrob Kosimov, a 
powerful ‘governmental’ commander during the war, is thought to control the 
‘Sadbarg’ shopping centre, ‘Bordjuma’ factory and holiday resorts in the Varzob 
area.151 Perhaps more important than these initial transfers is the cover or ‘roof 
(krisha) that ‘the state’, and membership of its elite networks, provide for such 
commanders to continue and expand their businesses and dispense positions and 
commodities to their associates through powers o f patronage.
While ‘private’ business may require state protection, equally state enterprises 
can be indirectly run as profit-making businesses. According to Toijesen and 
MacFarlane, this is exacerbated by ‘a choice on the part of the president not to prevent 
corrupt practices and or abuse o f government position for personal enrichment’ (2007: 
no pagination). For lower level commanders and fighters, ‘business’ can simply mean 
the extraction o f fees for permits, or the issuance of fines for ‘traffic violations’ on the 
road. Policemen in Tajikistan will frequently hire out their services in a private
148 However, equally the influence o f former armed groups in state structures seems to be declining.
The MCHS for example receives conscripts from the national draft and ratio o f former fighters to all 
employees is likely dropping gradually. (Toijesen et al 2005: 12)
149 Such information is not publicly available and is difficult to obtain. The following details comes 
from confidential information made available to Toijesen published in Toijesen et al, 2005
150 Interview, political analyst, Dushanbe, July 2004.
151 Ibid.
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security capacity. Business people who are not ex-commanders with networks of 
former fighters must hire MVD protection (Toijesen et al 2005: 30). At the lowest 
level o f all, fighters who would previously have shown up to bazaars at any time and 
used their weapons and status to demand goods without payment, may now be 
policemen who receive in-kind contributions from stall-holders to supplement their 
legal income (p. 33).
While this process of ‘reintegration’ may at first appear as a simple 
reappropriation o f the ‘public’ to the ‘private’, the reality may be more complex. 
Property and protection are practiced politically and socially. Such private networks 
are less devolved than they first appear and the krisha o f official position is vital to 
their functioning. Private security provision of MVD officers and the collection o f 
fees from business people are usually run through an MVD colonel or senior official, 
with everyone getting their cut. The sign of the state is vital among elites. With their 
formal integration into state structures, commanders, even the most powerful ones 
such as Ziyoev, have been unable to remain entirely independent and have had to 
accept strict limits on what they can do militarily, and even economically (Torjesen et 
al 2005: 13). One reason for this might be the gradual nationalisation of their 
patronage networks due to the fact that these economic networks are legitimated by 
the idea o f ‘the state’. Ziyoev’s MCHS soldiers, formerly overwhelmingly from 
Tavildara, are now drawn from across the country by the national draft and the 
employment opportunities he can offer to local youngsters are thus diminished (p. 
112, fn 19). While state economic resources may have been ‘privatised’/outsourced 
to commanders, the military and political power of commanders has been 
‘nationalised’/brought in to the state.
The De-Integration o f  Ghajfor Mirzoyev
The story o f Ghaffor Mirzoyev, head of the presidential guard and a key ally of
Rahmonov, demonstrates the statist dynamics o f inclusion/exclusion. Mirzoyev, from
Kulob, became head o f the presidential guard in 1995 and through his position was
able to acquire for himself or his family a meat processing factory, the ‘Olimp’ bank,
1 ^‘Jomi Jamshed’ casino and over 30 apartments in Dushanbe. He was removed 
from his position on 26 January 2004 whilst rumours circled Dushanbe that he was
152 Asia Plus newspaper, no. 17,18/08/05.
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planning a coup against Rahmonov. Rahmonov’s action may have been prompted by 
Mirzoyev’s close ties with Ubaidulloev, the mayor of Dushanbe and second most 
powerful figure in the Tajik government (Arman 2004b). Unlike many more minor 
officials, when usurped Mirzoyev took a stand against Rahmonov. He publicly 
denounced the President and, for a day, at his instruction, his guardsmen refused to 
step down and accept their patron’s dismissal (Pannier 2004). Behind the scenes he 
called a meeting o f ex-commanders which involved ex-opposition figures as well as
t »former Popular Front warlords. Mirzoyev was soon assuaged with the position of 
head o f the Drugs Control Agency (DCA), an organisation set up under the initiative 
of Western donors, to the chagrin of the International Community who saw him as 
especially corrupt.154
However, this public negation o f Rahmonov’s ‘authority’ -  a rare rupture in 
the public transcript -  and Mirzoyev’s subsequent announcement of his intention to 
run for the presidency in 2006, meant that this move was only temporary. On 6 
August 2004, he was removed as head of the DCA and charged with numerous 
offences including the 1998 murder o f a police official, embezzlement, and the illegal 
possession o f arms. The latter included a cache of 3,000 heavy weapons discovered 
in the basement of the DCA, and two government helicopters leased privately to 
contractors in Afghanistan (Gulomov 2004; Toijesen et al 2005: 74-76).155 Mirzoyev 
was ultimately tried behind closed doors and sentenced to life imprisonment on 11 
August 2006.156 This selective application of the ‘state law’ to one of its 
representatives was clearly triggered by the public affront to Rahmonov’s ‘authority’ 
(Gulomov 2004; Matveeva, 2005: 141). It affirms Scott’s assertion that challenges to 
the public transcript o f the dominant, dissimulations o f the ‘simulacrum of sincere 
obedience’, must not remain unanswered given their ‘political electricty’ and potential 
to incite wider rebellion (Scott 1990: 45-69). Mirzoyev is one of several ex­
commanders, including ex-head of the DPT Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, from both of the 
formerly warring sides whose narrative illustrates the dynamics o f re-integration or 
de-integration. All these cases involved (former) senior representatives o f the state in 
public acts o f insubordination. Together they illustrate an intrinsically ambiguous
153IWPR, RCA No. 262, 03/02/04
154 Ibid.
155 IWPR, RCA, No. 306 (amended story), 11/08/04; RFE/RL CAR 4(31), 17/08/04.
156 RFE/RL Newsline, 14/08/06 10(148).
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Tajik modality o f ‘re-integration’ which demands adherence to ‘the state’ under the 
President via a neo-soviet elite transcript of mirostroitelstvo. On the other hand, it 
allows ‘hidden’ practices which are directly contradictory; the reappropriation of state 
resources via patronage networks.
6.1 Ail Desecuritisation and the politics of forgetting
Mirzoyev’s predicament indicates that even the most powerful commanders have 
become subsumed under not just the personal power o f the President, but the 
performance o f state authority. This indicates a re-securitisation o f ‘the state’ as both 
an object of, and protector from, fear. However, there is also a ‘positive’ side to this 
‘fear’ found in the demilitarisation and desecuritisation o f day-to-day routines of both 
elites and subordinates.
Operation Order: elite discourse and action
Elsewhere I have discussed how presidential decrees on small arms collection and 
‘amnesty’ were important to small arms non-proliferation (2005a). A further 
presidential decree was issued in 2000 banning the public possession o f weapons by all -  
including those with certificates and state representatives -  except the security services 
within their military units. This included the direction to the state security services, ‘to 
prohibit commanders and servicemen from using private guards,’ and was part of a
1 c n
move after 2000 to demilitarize the streets of the country, particularly the capital.
Operation Order was launched in Dushanbe by Ubaidulloyev, who, following his narrow
escape from an attempt on his life in early 2000, sought to implement the 2000 decree
against the illegal carrying of guns, as well as the use o f vehicles by state representatives.
Weapons, uniforms and civilian cars with darkened windows were confiscated from
officers of the MVD, MCHS, KOGG, Ministry of Defence and even from soldiers of
1Russian Federation forces. In September 2000, President Rahmonov issued a further
157 Interestingly, this presidential decree was preceded by a joint UTO-Govemment protocol on 
17/06/99. Khovar, ‘Tajik president decree banning carrying o f arms outside units,’ 18/05/00, [Text of 
report by the Tajik news agency Khovar on 16th May], available at: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/taiikistan/hvpermail/200005/0Q13.html
158 Asia-Plus Blitz #53 (466), 20/03/00; SAS 2005: 97)
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order to remove illegal checkpoints from roads heading east from the capital to Jirgatal 
and Khorog, areas formerly occupied by opposition commanders.159
What is most striking about these initiatives is that they constitute the state 
against the state; where both groups of statesmen battle for authority of ‘the state’. This 
is not simply a request for certain actors to target other actors, both of whom happen to 
be part of the state, but for the very state actors who are violating procedures in the first 
place to police themselves. In such circumstances where it is quite clear that the 
principle providers of security are also one of the principle sources of violence, it may be 
assumed that the image of the leviathan state, the preventor of anarchy, especially 
among elites, might be undermined. However, this is not reflected in elite discourses 
and wider practices. Despite several high profile assassinations in 2000 and 2001, 
opposition leaders and state representatives continued to speak uniformly of the threat to 
the state and ‘stability’ from ‘terrorism’.160 For example, following the killing o f a 
presidential advisor in July 2001, Shodi Shabdolov, head of the CPT, commented,
those forces that committed the terrorist act evidently are not aware of [the] political and 
social situation in Tajikistan. It is not Tajikistan of 1990-1991, when one newspaper or 
slogan could bring disturbances in the country, now it is not that Tajikistan, which could 
be easily brought to civil confrontation. [The] self-consciousness of Tajiks, having 
learnt a bitter experience of a civil war, will not allow the recurrence of such events. 
Therefore I think that these terrorists acts are useless -  no force is capable to destabilise 
[sic.] the social and political situation in Tajikistan.161
IRPT leaders made similar statements. Few people in Tajikistan may know why the 
advisor was killed; personal dispute, criminal rivalries, or something more directly 
political are all possibilties. However, this reiteration of a public transcript of 
mirostroitelstvo indicates the discursive reconstruction of ‘the state’ as a solidarity group 
and imagined community o f elites.
Popular memories: everyone will forget, everything is forgotten
Popular discourses from 2000-2005 also largely conform to this desecuritising trend 
of downplaying ‘threat’ and speaking against war. Often, this resignation to an unjust
159 Asia-Plus Blitz #180 (593), 21/09/00.
160 This included the Minister of Culture, Deputy Minister of the Interior and the State Adviser to the 
President for International Issues.
161 Asia-Plus Blitz #135 (797), 18/07/01.
162 Ibid.
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‘peace’ is labeled ‘war weariness’. To those who don’t take discourse seriously ‘war 
weariness’ can be a trope which serves as an excuse not to further explore popular 
testimonies. However, I would argue that ‘war weariness’, represented differentially 
in mirostroitelstvo and tinji, and constituted intertextually, is productive of the 
desecuritisation of (public) space in terms of ‘unity’, and base on an ethic o f 
forgetting. Elites and subordinates make frequent proclamations o f the stability and 
calmness of Tajikistan163 and often object to the association of Tajikistan with 
conflict.164 There is an empirical basis for these claims. Since 2002, public violence 
has decreased substantially, the after-dark curfew has been lifted and more people are 
seen to walk in the streets and travel from one part o f the country to another. Public 
opinion surveys show both a low perception of threat from guns and an increased 
sense of security (Toijesen et al 2005: 28, 32).
Such an increased sense of safety seems to be facilitated by a popular politics 
o f forgetting where people are disinclined to talk about the events o f the war -  events 
which are in the memories but not in the lives of the increasing proportion o f Tajiks 
bom after 1990. Moreover, there is a pervasive social ethic against public discussion 
of the conflict. This forgetting has been actively encouraged by elites who see the 
political functions o f such collective ‘forgetting’. Rahmonov, in 1998, for example, 
asserted that Tajikistan must ‘bid farewell to the past’ (cited in Safarov 2003: 131). 
The country has not been through a process of post-conflict justice or truth and 
reconciliation commissions, there is no authoritative history o f the war available in a 
local language, and anniversaries o f the peace agreement are marked by 
choreographed displays o f unity, rather than discussions o f the causes and 
consequences of the conflict. Tajik TV shows film o f the horrific events of 1992 
without elaboration or discussion to serve as a warning against the return to that time 
-  a time which must be associated with the past, ‘opposition’ and ‘political parties’ 
leaving little room for discord or even discussion from this pubic transcript.
Once again then, Tajikistan provides the counter-example to peacebuilding as 
communal forgetting usurps the very idea of any initiative for post-conflict justice or 
truth and reconciliation. In a fascinating contrast, in 2005 the country, along with 
most of the rest of the former Soviet Union, remembered the sixtieth anniversary of
163 ‘Nothing poses threat to security of Tajikistan,’ Asia-Plus Blitz #179 (841), 20/09/01.
164 Tajikistan's Foreign Ministry noted that the association of Tajikistan with civil strife is ‘politically 
incorrect.’ See RFE/RL, CAR, 5(17), 10/05/05.
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May 9 Victory Day with the familiar Soviet pledge, ‘no one will forget, nothing is 
forgotten’ ( ‘nikto ni zabit, nichto ni zabito  Posters, such as the one above, went up 
in many towns across the country in exhortation to remember the events and the 
sacrifices made by the citizens of the Soviet Union (see figure 21).
Fig. 21: Second world war anniversary billboard, Khujond, June 2005
Not long after this event, was the eighth anniversary o f the 27 June 1997 peace 
accords. They were remembered in quite different terms, with the solemn and 
uniform public pledges o f ‘no return’ by elites and extremely muted public 
ceremonies. The public transcript o f ‘peace and friendship’ (see figure 22) remains 
static. This mantra to forget the war is axiomatic o f elite-popular relations in 
Tajikistan. ‘War weariness’ and its political functions are reproduced by a collective 
discourse o f silence about the war itself. Further research would be required to probe 
popular discourses o f desecuritisation. To what extent, for example, is war weariness 
a product o f fear and fantasy? Clearly ‘desecuritisation’ is symbiotic with re­
securitisation and, to a degree, generated by a discourse o f danger. Such discourses 
are deeply linked to the identity o f the peaceful Tajik citizen -  a ‘nation o f poets’ it is
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often said by leaders and citizens alike. Yet this peaceful poet is overshadowed by a 
gargantuan concept o f ‘the state’.
Fig. 22: ‘Peace and Friendship’: a peace memorial, Khorog, July 2005
6.2 Re-securitising the Tajik-Afghan Border: three representations
The above findings, along with those from chapters four and five, indicate that the 
Tajik government has been remarkably successful in having its representation and 
performance of ‘authority’ affirmed by subordinates, elites and, to a lesser extent, 
internationals, however precarious ‘the state’ might be made by hidden decentralising 
practices. However, authoritarian elites generally face a much more difficulty 
controlling representations o f their state sovereignty -  the international image o f the 
authority o f them and their governments. Often the primary site for claims about 
security and community is the border and the nature o f trans-border dynamics. If  a 
piece o f its territory (e.g. Kosovo, Iraqi Kurdistan) is represented as a political 
community o f its own, beyond the control o f the state, then the state may lose 
representational and, ultimately, physical control o f that territory. As we have seen, 
some observers in the 1990s feared that Tajikistan might break up, perhaps losing 
control o f the Northern province o f Leninabod (now Sughd) or the Pamiri
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autonomous region of GBAO. In fact, irredentism has failed to materialize despite 
continued corruption and a lack of devolution of powers from central government. 
The idea o f a single Tajik political community survived and even strengthened over 
the 2000-2005 period. This section charts how by 2004-2005, both elite and 
international representations of Tajikistan community/security affirmed Tajikistan’s 
territorial boundaries and the claim o f its government to police them. On the other 
hand they offer contrasting accounts o f how this is and should be done.
In 2004, an agreement was reached with the government of the Russian 
Federation to transfer responsibility for, and control of, the Tajik-Afghan border to the 
government o f Tajikistan. Following a friendship treaty signed in 1993, Russian 
troops had continued to patrol almost the entire length of the 1,344-kilometre frontier, 
with just 70km guarded by the Tajik troops.165 By 2004, Russia had approximately
11,000 troops in Tajikistan and while article 9 of the 1993 agreement had always 
envisioned a gradual handover to local control, this had never been seen as feasible 
given the weakness of the Tajik state. While border management was supposed to be 
financed jointly and equally, in 2003 Dushanbe made only 2.4% o f its installment and 
never made more than 5% in any year (Matveeva 2005: 146). Despite these 
unpromising circumstances, the hand-over began in late-2004, with the transfer o f the 
900-kilometre GBAO section o f the border to be phased in over two years166 (see 
fig.7 below). The agreement allowed for the presence of Russian advisors, who were 
envisaged to have substantial authority, and the training of Tajik officers in Russia 
(Matveeva 2005: 145-147). Yet the hand-over was clearly about something other 
than ensuring efficient border management. Many of the personnel guarding the 
border up to 2004 were Tajik citizens; yet they wore the uniform of the Russian state. 
After 2005 they would wear and fly the Tajik flag. The transfer implicated political 
discourses which inscribed the sovereignty o f the Tajik government, its authority over 
its territory and people, its place in the region, and its status in the international 
community. In the context o f Tajikistan, we see three distinct but intersecting 
representations o f the border: as a frontier o f national, regional or international 
community/security.
165 IWPR, RCA, No.284, 15/03/04.
166 RFE/RL, CAR, Vol.4, No.42, 16/11/04.
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Fig. 23: UN slide showing border handover from Russian to Tajik control, 2004-2005 (UNODC 
2004:12)
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6.2.i. International Security/Community
‘International security’ is the first transcript through which the Tajik-Afghan border 
was represented. The picture o f a sovereign Tajikistan is performed through its 
representation in the International Community, particularly the US, under the maxims 
o f ‘statebuilding’ and the ‘War on Terror’. This is shown in the writings o f a 
Washington-based community o f security analysts who are part of, or act as 
consultants for, US defence establishments.
The ‘global war on terror internationalising Tajikistan as a security object
Tajikistan’s significance for international security derives from spatial imagination 
and territorial reasoning where Central Asia is on the ‘frontline’ with Afghanistan, 
and even part o f the same region (MacFarlane 2004; Hill 2002: 17; Wishnick 2004: 
1). International security discourse on Tajikistan thus inscribes it with two features: 
danger and contiguous spatiality. By such accounts, it is part o f ‘Central Asia’, an 
especially perilous and porous region of the world. Central Asia has been described 
by the head o f the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army W ar College as a ‘key 
theatre in the war on terror’ (Lovelace 2004: iii) which according to Giragosian, ‘has
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acquired a new strategic relevance’ (2006: 133). In the US Secretary of Defence’s 
2002 report to Congress it was identified as part of an ‘arc of instability’ from the 
Middle East to North East Asia (Cited in Wishnick 2004: 6). Wishnick, familiarly, 
adds that it is part o f the ‘Great Game’ (p. 29). Such representations o f the danger of 
collapsed or weak states can lead to hyperbolic analyses of Tajikistan’s political 
dynamics. Plater-Zyberk, for example, speculates that a breakdown in the 
relationship with Russia is possible and this might lead to state failure (Plater-Zyberk 
2004). For one US diplomat in Dushanbe, there are ‘shallow roots to stability’ in 
Tajikistan and the country remains a ‘tinderbox.’ As such it is at risk o f ‘violent
167Islamisation’ or the danger that ‘narco-traffickers could take the government out.’ 
Under discourses o f the ‘failed state’/statebuilding, such societal forces are set up as 
both ‘strong’ and in opposition to a government which is ‘weak’. That organized 
criminals might be constitutive or supportive of many Central Asian regimes is rarely 
discussed (ICG 2003, Marat 2006), and is not part of the testimonies of diplomats and 
international officials.
This spatial imaginary has had a dramatic effect on foreign policy approaches to 
the region. According to Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Elizabeth Jones, ‘since 9/11 US strategic interests in the region have focused on anti-
168terrorism, especially the elimination of terrorist and other destabilising groups.’ 
This has led to a massive increase in US strategic involvement following 9/11 in the 
establishment of the Ganci and Kharshi-Khanabad military bases, and overflight 
rights across Tajikistan. Hill notes,
The primary American interest is in security, in preventing the “Afghanicisation” of 
Central Asia and the spawning of more terrorist groups with transnational reach that 
can threaten the stability of the interlocking regions and strike the United States (p. 18).
Such thinking has even contributed to an internal re-organisation o f the US state 
department. By late-2005, Jones’ department o f European and Eurasian affairs had 
lost responsibility for the region which had been incorporated into a South and 
Central Asian section. In itself this bureaucratic change reflects US thinking about 
Central Asia as a region apart from other Former Soviet Slavic states. The move is a 
particularly fascinating one which reveals much about how discourse shapes even the
167 Interview, Amanda Cranmer, 2nd Secretary, US Embassy, Dushanbe, 01/03/05
168 A paraphrasing of the testimony in Wishnick (2004: 4).
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structure o f foreign policy-making institutions. It is easier, for example, to understand 
why US analysts may believe Russia’s role in the region is decreasing and peripheral 
if  they see Central Asian states as cognate with Pakistan and Afghanistan. As we 
shall see below, however, such spatial imaginaries are vehemently opposed within the 
region by elites who often present themselves as more European than Asian.
Statebuilding: policies o f international community/security
As a part of a ‘Central Asia’ or ‘South and Central Asia’, Tajikistan is inscribed as a 
state which requires building. Before 9/11, Tajikistan committed to joining NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace programme and received a visit from the Commander of the US 
Central Command (CENTCOM) Tommy Franks.169 In the months following 9/11, 
some confusion ensued as to whether Tajikistan would provide the US with basing 
rights as its neighbours had done. The US went through Russia to negotiate but in the 
end settled on over-flight rights, perhaps partly because o f the lack of appropriate 
facilities. Tajikistan instead hosted a small French air force detachment o f around 20 
men which provided logistical support to operations in Afghanistan170
In a performative sense, Tajikistan is both represented and policy-practised in 
terms o f statebuilding. Inter-textual relations between democratic peacebuilding (for 
liberalising reform) and ‘statebuilding’ (for institutional order) shape policy-making. 
For Hill, Central Asian states are challenged by ‘extreme domestic fragility’ (2002: 
19). Mihalka, a US Army War College professor, laments the lack of political will in 
Central Asia to introduce the necessary reforms ‘to counter insurgency and terrorism’ 
(2006: 150). ‘The sustained exercise of arbitrary power by the government,’ he notes, 
‘reflects the state’s weakness, not its strength’ (p. 133). For Giragosian, the central 
problem is ‘the vulnerability o f illegitimate governance’ (2006: 150). These 
reasonable but thin analyses feed into official announcements and policy statements. 
Richard Boucher, the Assistant Secretary of State for the new bureau o f South and 
Central Asian Affairs, remarked in his 2006 testimony to Congress:
Central Asia faces numerous threats to its stability, including Islamic extremism, a 
population that remains poor and has little economic opportunity, the post-Soviet 
legacy of authoritarianism, public perceptions of injustice, and high levels of 
corruption (cited in Mihalka 2006: 133).
169 Asia-Plus Blitz No. 754, 17/05/01.
170 Personal communication with French military attache in Dushanbe, July 2003
235
Discursively underwriting such outlooks is the assumption that ‘they’ ought to be 
more like ‘us’ -  that is more like who we imagine ourselves to be. Therefore, while 
the initiatives o f regional governments are assumed to be ineffective, US officials and 
analysts furthermore imagine their own government to provide the solutions. 
Giragosian notes, ‘what is essential for Central Asia is a continued and even greater 
US commitment’, and specifically argues against regional coalitions such as the SCO 
(2006: 152).
6.2.ii Tajikistan’s National Security/Community
Such overtures elicit enthusiastic responses from a Tajik government eager to be 
accepted into the International Community. Elites seized on the increased anti-terror 
discourse as an invitation to assert its sovereignty and crack down on transnational 
dissident groups whilst representing themselves as a part of the International 
Community in ‘the war on terror’. The government banned Hizb-ut-Tahrir in 2001 
(before 9/11) and was quick to associate them with the ‘war on terror’ following the 
attacks. As early as October 2001, Minister o f Security, Khayriddin Abdurahimov, 
noted that Hizb-ut-Tahrir was ‘undoubtedly connected with those terrorist centers 
being prosecuted by world community.’171 While up to 2001, Tajikistan had arrested 
just 120 members, far fewer than its neighbours in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the 
suppression of the organisation intensified following the launch of the ‘war on terror.’ 
172 Such actions are frequently cited to international researchers and policymakers in 
terms of working together against Islamic extremism and drugs. For example, 
Asozoda reminded me of these ‘common’ problems:
Indeed, we mustn’t forget that in Tajikistan 90% of the population is Muslim, and this 
is the only state where there is an Islamic Party. And their only aim is the creation of 
an Islamic state. But we say that religion is separated from the state. We accepted a 
unified constitution, and whoever comes to power must observe this. But we need help: 
from the USA, China, Russia -  our strategic partners. If they support us, this will be 
good for them and for us. We were the first to speak at the UN and say that we need to 
create an anti-terrorist ring around the Talibs. Emomoli Rahmonov called to everyone 
from the platform of the UN. But they didn’t listen to us and as a result they got 
September 11th. Now we say that in Afghanistan 90% of agriculture is narcotics. We 
say, “let’s create a belt around Afghanistan,” so that they don’t produce opium or drugs
171 Asia-Plus Blitz #188 (850) 03/10/01.
172 IWPR, RCA, No. 271, 17/03/04
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but something else. If they listen to us this time then we will do everything possible to 
keep out the drugs. ( [T2]: 10)
Here, the definition o f threat widens to potentially include legal political parties 
within the country, and the identification o f proportionate response expands to a 
suggested blockade o f the country. In this manner, with its particular contrasts to 
international discourse, Tajikistan articulates its sovereign position in the International 
Community under the ‘war on terror’.
The first prism through which the Tajik elite read international security is their 
conception o f ‘national security’ and an imagined national community. They 
explicitly represented the takeover of the southern border from 2004 as a triumph of 
national sovereignty. Official discourse exhibits four representational strategies 
which serve to reinscribe ‘us’ and ‘them’ onto the border:
1. The imperative o f ‘national security’ for a unitary Tajik state-nation
2. The specific location o f authority over the border with President Rahmonov
3. A broad definition of a transnational ‘terrorist’ threat
4. The specific location o f the threat of drugs and terrorism in Afghanistan
The first two o f these relate to the representation of ‘inside’, while the second two 
concern the ‘outside’.
‘Inside V’Us ’
An elite performance o f sovereignty in terms o f the imperative of state ‘authority’ and 
‘stability’ led to the economically costly and strategically dubious shift to exclusively 
national border protection. The move was predicated in discursive trends leading up 
to the handover. Rahmonov, for example, stated that ‘the border is one o f the most 
important symbols o f a state, and its defence is [the] honourable debt o f every citizen
173of the state.’ The national press provided extensive coverage o f the various stages 
o f the handover which largely supported this version of events. Prior to 2004, it was 
frequently emphasised that ‘2,912 of 4,183 kilometres o f the Tajik border is being 
defended by Tajik border guards’ and that ‘80% of Russian border guards are Tajik
173 Jumhuriyat 53, 14/05/05. [transl. Otabek Sindarov]
237
citizens.’174 Following the 2004 decision, it was often repeated that ‘from the 
beginning o f 2006 the Tajik flag will be waving along the whole Tajik border of 4183 
km ’, thus showing that the Tajik guards are ‘ready to defend their border
17^themselves.’ A report by the state newspaper, Jumhuriyat, o f 28 May 2005, official 
Border Guards Day, entitled ‘We are able to defend our border’ [Mo sorhadoti hudro 
hifz karda metavonem (Taj.)], nicely summarises the official discourse on the border 
handover.
The Tajik state and government is always concerned about strengthening the border.
The passing of the law, “Border Military Forces of Tajikistan” increases the 
responsibility of Tajik border guards. Until taking over the defence of the border with 
Afghanistan, the border forces of Tajikistan were second behind Russian border guards. 
Now they have taken the first place, i.e. they took the defence of the state border upon 
them. It is right that the challenges of state border defence are plenty, but it is our 
motherland. Every independent state should defend its borders itself.176
Such understandings unite the Tajik people under the state, as in Zuhurov’s 
interpretation that according to the Law on the State Border o f the Republic, ‘all 
citizens o f Tajikistan are obliged to participate in border security.’177
Secondly, discourse highlights the personal authority of the President over the 
national border. President Rahmonov performs his own authority over Tajikistan by 
making frequent speeches on and sometimes at the border.178 In a 2000 speech, he 
argued that ‘half-measures’ and ‘not enough orderliness’ on the Central Asian 
continent are ‘inadmissible.’179 The concept o f ‘authority’ which underlies such 
statements is one which suggests maximum credit to, and minimum debit from, the 
President’s personal power. This is affirmed by Rahmonov’s inferiors. The Chairman 
of KOGG, Colonel-General Saidamir Zuhurov tied the integrity of the national border 
to the personal authority o f the President. He noted at an international conference on 
the border in February 2005 that ‘the President personally checks on the status o f
174 Jumhuriyat, 113, 05/10/04. [transl. Otabek Sindarov]
175 See Jumhuriyat 136,02/12/04. [transl. Otabek Sindarov]
176 Jumhuriyat 59, 28/05/05. [transl. Otabek Sindarov]
177 Official transcript of conference, ‘Response of the international community to assist the 
Government o f Tajikistan on the Tajik-Afghan Border,’ 15-16 February 2005.
178 Asia-Plus Blitz # 172 (585), 08/09/00.
179 Asia-Plus Blitz # 170 (583), 06/09/00.
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achievements.’180 The President thus has the authority to identify those responsible 
for violations o f the border, rather than take personal responsibility for any failings. 
For example, the President has threatened to forcibly relocate border residents who 
are ‘involved in drugs trafficking.’181 Moreover, he will occasionally purge the Tajik 
border forces (KOGG) not just to distribute patronage but to illustrate his authority as
1 89head of state. Such practices may not constitute an effective counter-narcotics 
strategy but they do serve purposes for Rahmonov who is able to practice intra-elite 
rotations in terms o f the ideal o f state ‘authority’.
'Outside 7 ‘Them *
The third representational strategy of elite discourse is the creation of a transnational 
terrorist other, which encompasses both criminal and political groups. The 
construction o f the unresolved transnationalism of ‘them’ is the mirror image of ‘us’ 
who are peacefully united under the Tajik state, where all citizens are enclosed within 
their respective states. Thus, the threat is ‘located as both ‘foreign’ and refusing to 
abide by state boundaries which, it is implied, are natural. Commenting on joint CIS 
military exercises in April 2000, the President noted that, ‘we must remember that 
international terrorism, extremism and national separatism do not recognise borders 
and act at their [sic.] will. Therefore [the] armed forces must be ready to resist any 
threat to our security, no matter where it originates from.’183 This invocation of 
‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’ discursively links all oppositional, criminal and
1 fid  Jmilitant activity. It is commonly deployed across post-Soviet Central Asia. The 
definition is invoked particularly against Hizb ut-Tahrir, a militant group with no 
confirmed record of violence.185 Such discursive strategies create space between ‘the 
state’ and criminal and militant groups which in practice are very closely linked to 
state officials (Marat 2006: 103-108).
18° offjciai transcript the conference, ‘Response of the international community to assist the 
Government o f Tajikistan on the Tajik-Afghan Border,’ 15-16 February 2005.
181 See Jumhuriyat 99,21/08/02. [transl. Otabek Sindarov]
182 One such purge o f KOGG occurred in January-February 2002. See Asia-Plus Blitz #014 (923), 
21/01/02; Asia-Plus Blitz # 039 (948), 26/02/02.
183 See Asia-Plus Blitz # 61 (474), 03/04/00.
184 See for example, SCO statement on first anniversary of 9/11. See Asia-Plus Blitz # 174 (1083), 
12/09/02
185 See for example, Asia-Plus Blitz #188, (850) 03/10/01.
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Fourthly, in elite discourse the threat especially emanates from Afghanistan. 
Tajikistan has typically been portrayed by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as the haven 
for the IMU, for example;186 in turn, Tajikistan has sought to locate that threat in 
Afghanistan.187 The specific threat of Afghanistan as ‘the source o f international
1 Rftterrorism’ and an ‘outpost o f extremism’ and of Taliban incursions into Central 
Asia was articulated by Rahmonov both before and after September 11th. In May 
2001, in an interview with the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Rahmonov 
remarked that ‘not all realise the threat coming from the situation in Afghanistan and
1RQthey try to make do “economically” with small means.’ Moreover, Afghanistan is 
inscribed as a backward and primitive place -  a place which post-conflict Tajikistan 
must leave in the past.190 Drugs trafficking and extremism are thus the ‘Afghan 
problem’, a problem fo r  Tajikistan, the region and the international community rather 
than a problem which deeply implicates Tajikistan’s elite themselves. For example, a 
Security Council statement noted that ‘many foreign mass media portray Tajikistan as 
a drug-trafficking country. However, they fail to mention that the drugs come from 
Afghanistan that Tajikistan has common borders with.’ These drugs, the Security 
Council noted, are trafficked across the CIS and Europe. Thus, ‘the international 
community should not view Afghan drugs as solely a problem for Tajikistan.’191
6.2.HL Central Asia’s Regional Community/Security
A third representation of Tajik sovereignty, which disaggregates a regional space o f 
the elite level, is that ‘Tajikistan’ is a part o f ‘Central Asia’, a regional which includes 
a leading role for Russia. This is perhaps the most significant of the three 
performances in the border handover. It would have been implausible for Tajikistan 
to present national control o f the southern border without articulating a continuing and 
strong role for Russia whose troops have remained in the country throughout
186 Eurasianet, ‘Tajik minister tells Iranian radio Uzbek militants agreed to leave Tajikistan,’ Source: 
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mashhad, in Persian 1600 gmt, 25/04/00; Asia-Plus Blitz # 85 
(498) 06/05/00.
187 At times the government has also sought to portray the threat as emanating from Uzbekistan. See 
Asia-Plus Blitz #149 (562), 08/08/00; Asia-Plus Blitz #104 (1013), 04/06/02; RFE/RL, ‘Central Asia: Is 
the IMU still a threat to regional security?,’ 24/01/04.
188 See, Asia-Plus Blitz #27 (440) 09/02/00, #170 (583) 06/09/00.
189 Asia-Plus Blitz #102 (764) 31/05/01.
190 See Asia-Plus Blitz #18 (431), 27/01/00, #170 (1079), 05/09/02.
191 Jumhuriyat 20, 25/02/00. [transl. Otabek Sindarov]
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independence. However, this is not merely instrumental but highlights a certain and 
irresolvable ambiguity in the representations of sovereignty. For example, the state 
newspaper Jumhurriyat in December 2004, tells the audience that ‘we longed for 
many years [for the Russian border control] to come to an end’, whilst simultaneously
1 M
being told that Russian guards ‘made a great contribution to protecting the region,’ 
and in a subsequent edition that ‘the beginning of activity o f the Russian military base
1Q1on the territory of Tajikistan provides for regional security.’ In earlier accounts too 
the Russian border forces themselves were cast as ‘necessary’ for regional security.194 
Moreover, testimonies o f national independence in border management are habitually 
supplemented with the caveat that Russians will remain as advisors and trainers o f 
Tajik guards.195
In chapter four and elsewhere (Heathershaw 2006), I have made the argument 
for an imagined community o f ‘Central Asia’, not as an isntitutional basis for regional 
integration but as an imagined basis for ad hoc events o f cooperation which are 
primarily expressive rather than institutional. This Central Asia is quite different to 
that o f the US state department’s ‘South and Central Asia.’ The basic discourse of 
Tajik national security and border control shares much in common with articulations 
found among its neighbours (Horsmann 2005; Karagulova and Megoran 2006), and I 
would argue represents a regional neo-Soviet political imaginary. In particular, 
Central Asian states share a common fear of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir ‘threat’, and act 
together and in parallel to construct it. Over the period from 2000, Tajikistan has 
increasingly been cast among leaders less as regional bogeyman and more as a 
sovereign member o f ‘Central Asia.’ Thus, the handover was one event of numerous 
acts which re-inscribe and relocate the region onto the political landscape. Such 
events involve the mutual recognition of one another as authoritative political leaders, 
for example, in the Rahmonov’s 2000 nomination of Putin -  who had just taken the 
presidency in Russia several weeks before -  as Chairman of Council of Heads o f CIS 
states.196 They also witness a degree of shared ethics, temporal and spatial 
understandings, postulated a ‘modem’ and ‘stable’ future for the region.
192 Jumhuriyat 138, 07/12/04. [transl. Otabek Sindarov]
193 Jumhuriyat 121, 2/10/04. [transl. Otabek Sindarov]
194 Asia-Plus Blitz #170, 06/09/01.
195 Jumhuriyat 126, 03/12/05.
196 Asia-Plus Blitz # 16 (429), 25/01/00.
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The shared political ethics and spatial imaginaries o f Rahmonov and Putin 
underpinned the 2004 Tajik-Russian agreement. While the beginning o f the hand­
over was announced in March, sparking local and international concern, it became 
clear that the exact terms were linked to other negotiations between the two 
governments related to the establishment of a permanent Russian base to house the
5,000 troops of the 201st Motorised Rifle Division, the status o f the Nurek space 
facility, Russian investment into hydro-power, and relief o f Tajikistan’s bi-lateral 
debt. After a meeting between Rahmonov and Putin in Sochi on 4 July, an agreement 
was signed on 17 October 2004 (Arman 2004). Moreover, following the
t l iestablishment o f US bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan following September 11 , 
the news o f the permanent Russian base in Tajikistan was greeted as an example of 
the renewal of Russian influence by its national press. For example, the Moscow 
daily Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote that the base will act as ‘a firm fist to protect 
Russian interests abroad’ (cited in Arman 2004). Initially the negotiations over the 
base had been held up by Tajikistan’s demand that the President be able to take over 
command o f Russian troops ‘under extraordinary circumstances’.197 However, as an 
alternative, the agreement eventually reached included an informal security guarantee 
from Putin to Rahmonov (Epkenhans [T5]; Matveeva 2006: 142). Here ‘hard’ power 
issues o f military cooperation are interdependent with ‘soft’ power issues o f trust, 
prestige and performance.
6.3. ‘Border Management9: Simulating and Dissimulating Sovereignty
‘[A state] depends not only on political representation but also upon symbolic representation’.
-Cynthia Weber (1995:124-125)
The three performances above show how discourse generates the security policies of 
national, international and regional actors in Tajikistan. Linking security practices to 
community via securitisation clearly raises the bigger question o f sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is the supreme form of authority; in modem times it has been increasingly 
attributed to the state. Succinctly, and in Schmittian terms, the sovereign decides on 
the exception. This implies that, unlike authority, sovereignty cannot be multiple, 
ambiguous or dispersed. It is either absent or present. However, the contrasting
197 IWPR, RCA, No. 270, 12/03/04.
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representations o f the Tajik-Afghan border outlined above indicate that a myriad of 
actors in national, regional and international spaces together negotiate exceptions and, 
in doing so, draw the line o f sovereignty/intervention. There are clear overlaps in the 
three performances of security/community outlined above which provide the basis for 
the Tajik elite’s sovereignty, yet their fundamental differences indicate that, unlike 
authority, sovereignty is not singularly performed but is ultimately simulated and 
dissimulated.
6.3.L International Assistance to Border Management
International assistance to the security sector in Tajikistan continued to expand to 
pursue the goals o f statebuilding following the announcement o f the Russian 
withdrawal. As one former German diplomat noted, news o f the shift to Tajik control 
meant, ‘the western community in Dushanbe was all turned upside down for a couple 
of days’ (Epkenhans [T5]). Similarly, a US diplomat acknowledged that they were 
‘caught off guard’ by the Russian border guards withdrawal and that it was ‘not in our
1 Qftinterests for them not to be there.’ Thus, events accelerated a shift towards a 
statebuilding following disappointment with democratisation initiatives. According 
to Epkenhans,
the attention of the International Community shifted from this intra-Tajikistan dialogue, 
peace and reconciliation of the Civil War and [with the] IRP, to other problems in the 
country, mainly drug trafficking -  definitely for the Americans, the Germans, the 
British, they are all focused on this right now. (Epkenhans [T5]: 3)
Matveeva contends that it was Rahmonov’s visit to Washington in January 2002, 
shortly after the launching of the ‘war on terror’, which ‘provided impetus for 
development of a relationship in the security field’ (2005: 149). Such a shift reflects 
inter-textual international relations (the post-9/11 global trends towards statebuilding, 
as discussed in chapter one), as well as a certain degree o f responsiveness to context 
(the need to find ‘common ground’ with local elites).
However, the shift to security and statebuilding issues did not signal 
conformity with mirostroitelstvo discourse. International initiatives mixed, to varying 
degrees, a liberal-reformist plank with capacity-building. Two very large EU regional 
programmes, initiated by Austria, including Border Management in Central Asia
198 Interview, Amanda Cranmer, 2nd Secretary, US Embassy, Dushanbe, 01/03/05
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(BOMCA), had been launched and funded prior to the announcement o f the Russian 
withdrawal in March 2004.199 Subsequent to this, the International Community found 
US$4 million of new funding specifically for projects at the Tajik-Afghan border. 200 
As shown in figure 24, the new project emphasised capacity rather than reform 
(UNODC 2005: 28-33). A large international assessment mission in August 2004 
highlighted primarily the technical deficiencies of the border posts (EC 2004). For 
donors and programme managers this reformist element was not, however, completely 
absent but more indirect. European donors in particular publicly reiterated 
‘multilateral cooperation’ and ‘integrated border management’ with the international
9ft1community in order to introduce ‘legal and institutional reforms’. Such
programmes aimed not just at building the government’s capacity but socialising it 
into better practices.
However, for the Tajik elite, border management is not about reform but 
retrenchment. This is reflected in the maxim that, according to a DCA official, 
‘Tajikistan is the main barrier to prevent [Afghan] drugs reaching markets’ and ‘that
*709only joint efforts can be effective.’ It is in the inseparability of action from 
cooperation where Tajik authorities and international donors find a very limited 
common ground. Yet through such ‘thin simplification’ Tajikistan becomes an 
increasingly important member of the International Community for the first time in its 
history as an independent state. The Tajik authorities have responded in kind with 
performances o f sovereignty which feign international standards. KOGG, the border 
guards, make monthly and annual reports on drug seizures (despite their seizure rates 
being much lower than other countries neighbouring Afghanistan) and comments on
199 The latter was worth €23.5mln, 5 million of which was earmarked for Tajikistan, over 2003 to 2008. 
BOMCA worked in legal assistance, staff development, infrastructure and social integration with the 
following objectives: to increase effectiveness of border management systems; to improve cross-border 
cooperation; to facilitate the movement of people and goods; to ensure border protection while easing 
border tension. Two smaller projects in 2004 were by IOM (worth USD 400,000 and aimed at 
improving legislative and technical facilities for migrants) and UNHCR (worth USD 350,000 and 
aimed at making asylum procedures more efficient). (UNODC 2005; UNDP 2005a).
200 Hoagland, US Ambassador to Tajikistan, noted that the US was interested in establishing air 
surveillance of the border and even salary support to Tajik border guards, although this would require 
‘anticorruption programmes’. This included an increase from USD6.87 to 9.5mil in funding from 2004 
to 2005, the majority o f which was for ‘strengthening border posts’. Financed primarily by new US 
funding, UNODC added the project AD/TAJ/E24, ‘Strengthening Control along the Tajik-Afghan 
Border’ to BOMCA in April 2004 (EC 2005).
201 Comments by Pierre Cleostrate (European Commission), Stephen Lysaght (UK), and Harold 
Loeschner (Germany) in, EC 2005, meeting minutes. See also, Odyssey Migration Control 2005.
202 See speech by Faizullo Abdulloev, First Deputy Director, Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan, in EC 
2005.
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the nature o f the trafficking threat.203 The most common reports in state newspapers 
relate to successful interdiction of drugs and terrorists from across the Afghan border. 
In these reports Tajikistan is presented as an ‘obstacle’ or ‘barrier’ to Afghan 
terrorism and drugs.204
Fig.24: UN slide showing objectives of SSR project, ‘Strengthening Control Along the Tajik 
Afghan Border’, April 2004 (UNODC 2004: 26)
UNODC activities
AD/TAJ/E24 "Strengthening Control along the  Tajik/Afghan Border"
Project
objectives
> S trengthening se lec ted  
border control units
> Im provem ent o f law  
en forcem en t un its capacity  
in D ushanbe and o th er  
se lec ted  railw ay sta tio n s
> S trengthening drug control 
capacity o f international 
airports in D ushanbe, 
Khujand and Kulyab
> Strengthening National 
Forensic Laboratory
> E stablishm ent o f drug 
scen tin g  d etecto r  d o g s unit
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Such reports create a public transcript o f state border protection which denies 
hidden practices o f collusion with drugs traffickers. In the press conference following 
a major international meeting in February 2005, General Zuhurov, via a public 
transcript o f mirostroitelstvo, summarised the two days o f talks:
I have been talking about the projects and wishes of the country donors that are 
interested to equip the Tajik-Afghan border. Everybody is interested about how this 
border will be equipped and secured and this depends not only on the security of 
Tajikistan but other neighbouring countries.205
203 See for example, Asia-Plus Blitz # 12 (425), 19/01/00.
204 All copies o f the state newspaper Jumhuriyat which I reviewed from 2002 to 2003 contained one 
account o f the arrest or killing o f border violators. See Jumhuriyat: 21, 19/02/02; 56, 18/05/02; 99, 
21/08/02; 20, 18/05/03; 54, 17/05/03. For a more recent account see, ‘We are able to defend our 
border,’ [Mo sorhadoti hudro hifz karda metavonem], Jumhuriyat 59, 28/05/05.
205 See ‘press conference’ and speech by Col-Gen. Saidamir Zuhurov, Director, Drug Control Agency 
o f Tajikistan, in EC (2005).
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In the same press conference Zuhurov departed from the international consensus in 
defending Tajikistan’s right to fixed border outposts {zastava), in the face of donor 
calls for mobile units which would be better equipped to interdict highly mobile 
smuggling gangs. ‘I know better the status on the border than regional reps of 
UNODC,’ he noted, adding theat effective border posts in Tajikistan ‘must be 
physical.’ This dispute gets to the heart of the different conceptions o f Tajikistan 
as a barrier and the different notions of Tajik sovereignty being performed. While 
Zuhurov is widely respected in the International Community for being an ‘honest 
guy’, it is also acknowledged that zastava are integral for institutionalised corruption 
as fixed outposts provide points for the collection of bribes from legal as well as 
illegal travelers and traders.207 Moreover, because of its inability to intervene without 
the support o f the government, the International Community must tolerate this.
Here, the state-led terriotrialisation o f space proves resilient. Matveeva argues 
that the Tajik regime was able to play international actors off against each other in 
order ‘to gain institutional resources without seriously committing themselves to or 
implementing necessary political reforms’ (2006: 145). However, there is little 
alternative for the International Community but to work within the local system. 
‘People who are corrupt are experienced in dealing with border management,’ one 
international representative working on BOMCA privately noted. ‘I f  we remove them 
there will be none left.’208 An OSCE officer admitted that corruption was too deeply 
ingrained.
Tajiks know who the donors are. It’s an excellent idea [BOMCA] but how can it be 
executed because it doesn’t work to just give money. The main problem is the 
mentality of the people. They are already used to many years of corruption. The 
people do not expect anything different from the border guards. They know that by 
letting traffickers through they can get money for their family.209
Thus, for internationals, a public solution (reformed border management) is found in 
the problem (corrupt border management). ‘Hidden transcripts’ reverse this logic: the
206 Ibid.
207 Interview, Suhrob Kaharov, Country Manager for Tajikistan (BOMCA), UNDP, Dushanbe, 
02/08/05
208 Interview, international programme officer, Dushanbe, March 2005
209 Interview, international programme officer, Kulob, June 2005
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problem is found in the solution. They reveal the inauthentic character o f such SSR 
programmes; they are often practised not because of real belief that they will work but 
because the programme is justified discursively (it makes sense to international 
donors whose priorities are ‘statebuilding’) and there is an institutional interest in 
seeing it through for its own sake.
6.3.0. Simulating Sovereignty
Thus whilst programmes such as BOMCA may largely fail to reform border 
management, they demand that Tajik border management is shared with the 
international community. In doing so they simulate Tajik sovereignty. From the 
analysis provided above we can summarise two primary functions o f sovereignty 
simulation (under international intervention). Firstly, as argued by Matveeva, with 
the financing, infrastructure and training for border security and anti-drugs operations 
being ‘outsourced to external powers’, the ruling elite is able ‘to concentrate on the 
challenges it considers important’ (2005: 134). These include suppressing internal 
dissent, in particular that o f Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Secondly, and more importantly, such 
international intervention in the name o f Tajikistan’s borders provides powerful 
demonstrations of its sovereignty. Asadulloev, a Tajik political scientist, describes 
this as,
the transition from declared to real independence, which is continuing to this day. The 
transition of Tajikistan to a full international standing [sic.] in relation to other Central 
Asian countries as well as in relation to regional and international organisations such as 
UNTOP, OSCE, and OIC [Organisation of the Islamic Conference] (2004: 7).
Achieving respect and recognition regionally and internationally is particularly valued 
by Tajik elites.
Yet ‘real independence’ here must be understood to be contingent upon wider 
regional and international acceptance of the government’s performance in terms of 
anti-terrorism and drugs control. To this extent, rather than sovereignty being 
cooperatively shared (singly represented) or competed for (contradictorily 
represented), contrasting representations are, to a limited extent, complementary as 
they allow representations (and, by extension, different communities) to exist in 
parallel. Sovereignty over the state border is simulated (as opposed to singly 
represented) as a consequence of the contrasting, yet not contradicting, performances
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outlined in 6.2. Simulation is a product of this ambiguity: the persistence of multiple 
interpretations over a single interpretation (Weber 1995: xii). Sovereignty carries 
different meanings nationally (where it supposes self-sufficiency) compared to 
regionally and internationally (where, in different ways, it requires intervention). 
Such judgements about the nature of sovereignty in this empirical case are based upon 
a substantial shift in theoretical thinking.
Traditional international relations theory, particularly realism and neo-realism, 
takes the sovereignty of the state as an essential given, axiomatic to the field itself 
(Krasner 1992: 39). However, there is now a well-developed theoretical literature to 
overcome this dead-end. Walker, for example, notes:
State sovereignty works because it has come to seem to be simply there, out in the 
world, demarcating the national orders of here and there. But the lessons that 
theorists of international relations have consistently refused to leam since Hobbes is 
that sovereignty is never simply there. And what was never simply there can never 
simply disappear. (Walker 1995: 322)
It is not simply some tendency towards stasis or tradition that reproduces this 
centrality o f the state, but continuous processes of representation. I f  a government is 
represented as fostering conflict in other countries, or failing to prevent such 
‘spillover’ o f extremism, then it can find itself subject to the beginnings o f a discourse 
of intervention and the loss of a constructed image of sovereignty. I f  a state is unable 
politically or symbolically to represent its people, then its risks losing its source of 
sovereign authority. It therefore risks losing the legitimacy attached to its claim to 
speak for its source of sovereign authority in international affairs. Only by 
maintaining control over the depiction of its people can the state authoritatively claim 
to be the agent o f its people (Weber 1995: 28). However, today sovereignty in ‘weak’ 
and ‘failed’ states seems to be under siege by both discourses o f statebuilding and 
humanitarianism. What explains the survival of state sovereignty as the political ideal 
despite its practical incoherence and unevenness?
The answer for Weber (1995) is found via Baudrillard’s ‘simulation’. She 
argues that it is no longer possible to fix sovereignty according to a single 
representation of an ideal-type. Sovereignty and intervention, for example in the case 
o f border management in Tajikistan, have been so saturated by multiple and 
contrasting representations that as signifiers they have lost all meaning. The world 
has simply become so complex that the principles of international law that may have
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made it easier to ‘fix’ or ‘mark’ the sovereign state are no longer widely accepted. 
Moreover, when ‘sovereignty’ and ‘intervention’ are used interchangeably, a state can 
lose control o f its claim to legitimacy (p. 41). Weber argues that such competing and 
co-existing representations of sovereignty displace a ‘logic or representation’ with a 
‘logic o f simulation’ (p.xi-xii). In cases o f simulation, discourses constantly shift in 
their use o f referent objects, where any o f inter alia ‘the people’, ‘the state’, ‘the 
region’ or ‘the International Community’ may be inscribed as sovereign. These 
shifting sets of norms and symbols comprise a ‘code’ (p. 127) o f norms and symbols 
for statesmen to adopt in their representations to various audiences. Yet despite this 
lack, Der Derian with Baudrillard, argues that such simulations are affective: they 
‘produce real symptons, hyper-real effects’ (2001: 214). It is an ‘order o f simulation’ 
which ‘marks the legitimate range of its legitimate powers and competencies’ (Weber 
1995: 129). Via this ‘common ground’, international actors are able to simulate 
border management whilst elites simulate their own sovereignty over the border. A 
regime which is the object of statebuilding may be simulated among local, elite and 
global actors who, in different ways, contend that the regime represents ‘a state’ and 
thus can claim sovereignty, an authority to speak internationally on behalf o f those 
within a given territory.
Yet while these public practices are intrinsic to peace/legitimacy, as simulcra 
they are simultaneously deconstructed by hidden practices. As sovereignty is 
simulated it is concomitantly dissimulated by elite and popular practices (as will be 
shown below). Under simulation it is the indirect affects o f interventions for the 
power and authority o f the ruling elite which are important. Simulation allows the 
elite to manipulate international assistance for their own ends, such as in the case o f 
border assistance under the ‘war on terror’. Often agents are able to avoid the 
functional fulfillment o f agreements, but simultaneously adhere to contrasting ‘codes’ 
o f sovereignty and intervention. Tajik elites are well practised in this, having signed 
dozens o f international agreements which remain unfulfilled (Lavrakas: 2004: 18). 
However, elite actors will increasingly seek to gain control for themselves of these 
representations o f sovereign authority. Strong states are thus able to effect, and to a 
greater degree than others ‘fix’ the representations of their ‘source’ of authority, and 
the location o f their boundaries (what’s ‘inside’ and ‘outside’). The ability to shape 
these representations and make them conform to one’s own sense o f ‘se lf  is for the 
leaders o f a state intrinsic to their agency and their authority, locally and globally.
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Indeed, it relates to the very ability to control what is local (‘domestic’, ‘internal’, 
‘national’, ‘inside’) and what is global (‘external’, ‘international’, ‘outside’). By 
2005, with its increasing acceptance as an equal by regional partners and the increased 
emphasis on statebuilding by the International Community, Tajikistan regained some 
ability to perform a sovereignty/intervention boundary to determine how the country 
is represented in regional and international relations.
Therefore, rather than a technical process of state-building via security sector 
reform, where the referent object o f the state is objectively given, ‘security’ entails the 
discursive simulation of sovereignty as a product of the contrasting representations of 
national, regional and international community. This justifies and makes hegemonic 
the use o f state violence by one group (the regime representing the ‘the state’) over 
everyone else (the ‘citizens’). In Tajikistan, between 2000 and 2005 ‘security’ has 
been recast as external threats to the state are identified, demonised and -  to a certain 
extent -  suppressed. But security has been practised in different ways with different 
partners: national, regional and international. Thus, ‘security’ and sovereignty 
remains essentially ambiguous and simulated: their referent object -  ‘the state’ -  and 
its ‘threat’ shifting across popular, elite, regional and international ‘selves’. Herewith 
the state is imagined as a security provider for various wider constituencies while the 
iterative reproduction o f such an image justifies the unassailable position o f an elite 
who service themselves from the rent garnered via their position of hegemony.
6.3.UL Dissimulating Sovereignty
Discussion at the representational level of analysis inevitably raise questions about the 
reception o f discourse, and the reaction to it via dissenting practices by both elites and 
subordinates. We must go beyond simulation to dissimulation. What does simulation 
allow agents to do? How does it beget dissimulation? Moreover, what do both 
processes o f simulation and dissimulation do for the state and for peace?
Dissimulation is concomitant to simulation. In Baudrillard’s terms, cited by 
Der Derian, ‘dissimulation is to feign not to have what one has* (1992: 214). If  what 
one has is not real in an objective sense but publicly simulated, it is almost inevitable 
that it will be dissimulated in hidden spacs. Agents who are attentive to the 
ambiguities o f their claims to sovereignty or intervention, can begin to adapt and work 
around these representations. They can also easily become cynical or sceptical.
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Weber argues that sovereignty and intervention as concepts o f international relations 
‘no longer produce meaning’ (p. 121). The two are frequently invoked in the same 
sentence.
If in the same discursive locale where one finds a “legitimate” claim to sovereignty, 
one finds a “legitimate” example of intervention, sovereignty and intervention cannot 
be opposed to one another. Rather they can be substituted for one another. 
Sovereignty is intervention, and intervention is sovereignty. (1995: 121)
In such a way, sovereignty loses its meaning. It becomes a thin representation, a trope 
used to convey its very antonym. Elite acts o f dissimulation allow hegemons to act 
illegally under the shadow of the state. Popular dissimulations challenge state 
sovereignty by highlighting the continual failure of the elite to represent national or 
public interests. However, as Baudrillard notes, to dissimulate something ‘implies a 
presence’ (Cited in Der Derian 1992: 213). As will be discussed in the conclusion, 
one dynamic o f the practices o f dissimulation is inherently conservative: the 
reproduction o f the (artificial) reality -  state sovereignty.
Trafficking and the corruption o f the state
The Tajik-Afghan border as a site which is manipulated by state actors (both elite, 
senior officers and subordinate foot soldiers) as it is guarded as the boundary o f ‘the 
state’. Tajikistan is a key transit country for Afghan opium on its way to be processed 
as heroin and shipped to the markets o f Europe. In the mid-1990s, Khorog in GBAO 
was a major entry point of drugs, which were then shipped on to Osh in southern 
Kyrgyzstan; more recently Panj and Moskovskii in Khatlon province have become 
key entry points (International Crisis Group 2001b: 2, 6). Production of opiates has 
risen since the defeat of the Taleban in Afghanistan in 2001, with the subsequent 
weakening o f central control, despite international intervention -  2004, in particular, 
was a bumper year. Both Tajik and Afghan state representatives are deeply bound up 
in the trade. Much of the violence in the latter stages of the civil war and the post-war
910period can be linked to drugs trafficking . Moreover, the extent o f drugs trafficking 
networks challenges the very notion o f a separation of public and private spheres
2,0 For example, incursions into Khujond, November 1998 were allegedly linked to a failed drugs deal. 
See Akiner (2001: 72-74).
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(McDermott 2002: 12). Testimony from traffickers and drugs control officers 
indicates that both Russian and Tajik efforts at interdiction are less than
1^1
comprehensive. Organised crime groupings are very powerful in Tajikistan, 
include high-level government officials and therefore retain significant political 
influence (Marat 2006: 107-108; Akiner 2001: 72-76). High-level officials carry 
‘virtual immunity’ from prosecution and thus there are few public examples o f their 
complicity. One exception concerns the Tajik Ambassador to Kazakhstan, twice 
caught for trafficking (ICG 2001: 15-16). Occasionally ‘turf wars’ between official 
actors simmer to the surface with recriminations and accusations of trafficking
919between elites.
Such analyses suggest that border management in Tajikistan cannot be 
insulated from organised crime and may in fact be inseparable from the dynamics of 
the black economy. Representatives o f the International Community do not question 
the degree o f organised crime in the country but they would question its inseparability 
from border management. International programmes are premised upon the 
possibility o f demarcating a non-corrupt or at least considerably less corrupt space. It 
assumes that newly trained units o f guards, or new institutions such as the Drug 
Control Agency (DCA) under Zuhurov, can operate relatively honestly and 
effectively within an extremely dishonest system. However, the sheer extent and 
nature o f the trade suggests that this is overly optimistic. The drugs trade (see figure 
25) produces massive profits whilst border guards, even internationally funded ones, 
earn very little. The direct profits o f trafficking are so great as to make such 
institutionalised corruption a comfortable business cost. UNODC estimated in 2003 
that drugs smuggling was worth USD2.27bn to Central Asian gangs, the majority of 
which are Tajik. By these statistics, it is possible that the profits from drugs 
trafficking to Tajik gangs exceed the country’s official GDP of USD1.64bn in 2003
91-5
(UNODC 2003: 167). Unsurprisingly then interdiction rates are low. Traffickers 
report that it is relatively easy to pass checkpoints with bribes (Toijesen et al 2005: 
43). One study reports how little resistance traffickers face noting, ‘it is striking how 
little violence is associated with the multibillion dollar drugs business in Tajikistan’
2,1 IWPR, RCA, No. 374, 07/05/05.
212 For example, in 2005, in Moskovskiy district, Tajik and Russian guards publicly accused each other 
of drugs trafficking. Interview, Bojidor Dmitrov, regional representative, OSCE, Kulob, 02/06/05.
2,3 For GDP figures see USAID data sheet, available at: 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe eurasia/pdfs/taiprofile.pdf.)
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(ibid: 29). UNODC figures suggest that Tajikistan, despite a dramatic increase from 
the mid-1990s when it did not seize any narcotics, is doing less than it could in 
comparison with neighbouring countries. While they estimate that 23% of Afghan 
heroine and morphine transit through Tajikistan, only 16% o f all seizures were made 
there (2003: 161, 167). In short, despite increasing international assistance, 
traffickers and state officials continue to transport drugs through Tajikistan on a grand 
scale, thus dissimulating the sovereignty that contributes to the latter’s privileged 
position.
Fig. 25: UN slide showing drug trafficking routes through Tajikistan (UNODC 2004: 6)
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Daily life at the border
Everyday life at the border also serves to dissimulate the sovereign authority o f a state 
elite who claim to be protecting Tajikistan’s territory and people. Consequent to the 
high volumes o f drugs trafficked through the country, drug abuse in Tajikistan is on 
the rise, although exact figures are hard to determine.214 Moreover, hidden 
testimonies o f life at the border represent this murky picture, with concerns about
214 UNODC cites 1.1% o f  Central Asia aged 15 and above as ‘problem users’ (2003: 168).
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poverty, the reappropriation o f the state for personal enrichment, and accounts of state 
violence against communities.
The reaction in borderlands to the Russian withdrawal was couched primarily 
in terms o f livelihoods, both the wages that Tajik contract soldiers received directly 
from their Russian paymasters, and the benefits to the economy of the extra 
consumption of soldiers. In 2004, most ‘Russian’ troops were contract soldiers 
(kontraktniki) recruited locally. They typically earned USD200-300 per month whilst 
the head o f the Tajik border forces earned USD42 a month. ‘Where can you find a 
salary like that in Tajikistan?’ one kontraktnik complained to reporters from the 
Institute from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR). ‘Tajik soldiers get 
30 somoni [USD 10], which is laughable - one person can't even live on this money, 
let alone feed five children.’ Among soldiers themselves, it is widely believed that 
poverty wages, poor quality equipment and training will mean that Tajik soldiers are 
even less likely to interdict drugs than the ‘Russian’ troops were. IWPR quotes a 
former soldier with the RBF,
I have lost my job, but I don't intend to join the Committee for State Border Protection 
of Tajikistan - and not just because of the low salary. Our poorly-off officers will 
probably not be averse to cooperating with the drug traffickers, so the war on drugs will 
be nothing but words [..]. As an experienced border guard, I can say for certain that the 
Tajik armed forces do not have the experience or the equipment necessary for effective 
border protection.216
Thus, a further concern was that the handover to Tajik control would increase the 
flow o f drugs across the border. ‘If the Russian border guards leave for good, it's hard 
to imagine the amount of drugs that will arrive here,’ commented one villager from 
Buni, near Khorog. ‘A lot of young people here have become addicts, and it's terrible 
to think of what will happen. Our politicians should think about this when making 
decisions.’
State violence in Tajikistan can be physical but it is often economic or 
‘structural’. With contract soldiers unlikely to sign up to vastly reduced salaries, the 
Tajik government has had to rely on rounding up conscripts to patrol the border. At a 
GBAO checkpoint, one young man from Dushanbe, without the requisite stamp in his
2.5 IWPR, RCA, 316,28/09/04.
2.6 Cited in, IWPR, RCA, 374,07/05/05
2.7 Ibid.
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passport to show completion of military service, was removed from our marshrutka 
(mini-bus taxi) as it made its way on the 20-hour journey from Khorog to
'y | o
Dushanbe. However, those recruited into the armed forces are not necessarily 
bound to be used exclusively in public service. Families complain that their sons are 
being used as free labour by officers to renovate houses and other construction 
jobs.219 These proceeds go straight into the pockets o f an elite which claims to 
represent the state. Traveling along the remote Badakhshoni stretch o f the border in 
2005, I talked to numerous conscripts, mainly teenagers from Khatlon province, who 
were walking along the road with only their weapons (see figure 26). They 
complained of not having enough to eat and asked for food and cigarettes from us.
Fig. 26: Teenage conscripts patrolling the Tajik-Afghan border between Khorog and Ishkashim, 
July 2005
Such ‘dissimulation’ of sovereignty creates subordinate hidden transcripts of 
skepticism and cynicism, and hidden practices o f avoidance. IWPR reports one 
informant who was shocked by the poor conditions that his grandson suffered at his 
base.
2.8 He was arrested after his passport revealed that he had not completed military service.
2.9 Cited in, IWPR, RCA, 374, 07/05/05
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When I visited my grandson at his military unit, I saw soldiers who could hardly walk
from hunger and were wearing threadbare uniforms [...]. I thought, how can an army
220like this protect Tajikistan?
Poor food and living conditions and widespread bullying are reported and lead to
^  1
resistance or evasion by families during government conscription campaigns. The 
authorities, in turn, sometimes use extreme tactics to conscript young people. Such 
popular testimonies indicate that the boundary between security providers and
999‘threats’ is a largely a constructed one. International discourses o f the Tajik ‘other’ 
and national elite ideals of ‘us’ maintain this ideal o f state protection, whilst acts of 
state violence against its own people continue without redress. Such practices 
dissimulate sovereignty and make the divide between ‘state’ and ‘terrorist’ which 
state actors are seeking to re-inscribe extremely thin indeed; maintained by 
inconsistent and limited adherence to multiple public transcripts (or simulated ‘code’) 
of sovereignty.
However, simulation and dissimulation are more than parallel processes. I 
argue they are concomitant. Simulating sovereignty through ‘border management’ 
and ‘reintegration’ allows sovereignty to be dissimulated by state actors’ complicity 
in trafficking and the looting of official resources. Such conclusions are supported by 
more detailed studies of the Tajik security sector. For example, the process o f border 
guarding in Tajikistan provides a means of extraction for guards and officials, as 
described by Matveeva:
Presently, corrupt networks of border guards/policemen/customs officials are firmly 
entrenched and are interested in the preservation of a status quo of closed borders.
They also have a lobbying capacity in the capital to argue the case for ‘better security’ 
which in reality means more barriers to the movement of goods and people, and more 
extraction opportunities. (2005: 138)
To another former international officer, security assistance by the International 
Community has, ‘helped the government to tighten control and to react more
220 See, IWPR, RCA, 324 part 2, 05/11/04
221 See, IWPR, RCA, 324 part 2, 05/11/04
222 Locals report that when IMU fighters camping in the Tavildara region between 1999 and 2001 were 
well-behaved and even paid for goods, unlike some government troops stationed nearby in Garm 
(Matveeva 2005: 141).
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repressively’ (Epkenhans[T5]: 3). Thus, in broad terms, it seems a matter of 
interpretation as to whether ‘the state’ should be seen as part o f the problem or part of 
the solution for ‘porous’ borders in Tajikistan. It illustrates the limited power and 
political imagination of the International Community if  international actors cannot 
find alternative allies in combating trafficking in Tajikistan to the very people who are 
benefiting from the illegal trade.
Conclusions
If we see both security and sovereignty as fixed, objectively existing phenomena, we 
lose the ability to see how they constitute the very things they seek to protect (the 
state and its community). If  we recognise security in terms of processes o f (de-/re-) 
securitisation, and sovereignty (and the state itself) as simulated, then we begin to 
grasp how practices o f security can simulate or dissimulate peace/legitimacy. The 
unintended or indirect consequences o f international assistance (in terms of 
sovereignty) are more significant than cosmetic changes that may be achieved in 
border management. In addition to (re-/de-centralised) authority, this chapter has 
introduced (dis/simulated) sovereignty as a second attribute o f complex legitimacy.
The varying discourses of security inscribed on Tajikistan act to legitimate 
statehood and sovereignty with differentiated accounts of whom and what the Tajik 
state represents. But importantly the degree of contradiction between these discourses 
remains low. In neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, representations o f the border 
have been the subject o f significant political dispute as powerful opposition 
discourses have emerged against the government while defending the ideal of ‘the 
state’. The Tajik government gave more land away to China in the demarcation and 
delimitation negotiations than did Kyrgyzstan. Whereas in Kyrgyzstan ‘the border’ 
became a hotly contested site where the government’s representations o f its 
sovereignty were openly challenged in numerous opposition newspapers (Megoran 
2002: 112-167), in Tajikistan articles in the infrequently published opposition paper 
Ruzi Nav did not impact public discourse. Even opposition representatives were 
unsure o f the details of what had happened and whether the government had ‘sold’ 
land to China.223 This comparative lack o f dissent illustrates the powerful
223 SDPT representative Samadova comments that people did not believe the news: ‘You know that last 
year in the newspaper ‘Ruzi Nav’ they printed about our parliament selling a portion o f land to China. 
But when we were speaking about this to the common folk (prostomu narodu), no one believed us! Is
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performance of state authority in Tajikistan which makes its elite better placed to 
mediate the simulation o f sovereignty.
Practices o f dissimulation are begotten by the ‘logic of simulation’ but do not 
supercede it. As Reeves has perceptively claimed (Reeves 2006), it is this intrinsic 
ambiguity o f (Central Asian) state formation which produces paradoxes such as 
McMann’s (2004) ‘strong-weak’ states in Central Asia, and Migdal’s (2001) ‘states 
against themselves’. ‘These paradoxes and puzzles arise,’ Reeves argues, ‘from an 
initial assumption that the state “ought”, in both a normative and descriptive sense, to 
be a singular rather than multiple entity’ (2006: 11, emphasis added). However, 
Reeves goes further, via extensive ethnographic study and notes that these 
multiplicitous acts -  what I call practices of dissimulation -  are themselves 
reproductive o f state sovereignty. ‘What initially appears,’ she notes, ‘as a violation 
o f a pre-existing boundary between “state” and “society”, “legal” and “illegal” can 
rather be understood as constitutive acts’ (p. 12). They constitute the state but not one 
that exists in an ideal form. Thus, both simulation (of its ‘presence’) and 
dissimulation (in its ‘absence’) make the state appear as if  it is real, in both the daily 
life o f subordinates and discursive and representational practices o f elites and 
internationals. This, once again, points to the inherently ambiguous and precarious 
nature of statehood and peacefulness in post-conflict Tajikistan.
This thesis has thus far focused on the conceptualisation o f an ontology of 
peace through an empirical inquiry into its practice in Tajikistan. However, there is a 
deeper, epistemological tension underlying the steps I have taken in my analysis. 
Chapters three and four developed a representational analysis of peace. Chapter five 
explored this empirically, showing how such representation produce performances of 
authority/peace. However, this chapter has sought to take the argument beyond 
representation to show how multiple performances or securitisations beget processes 
o f simulation and dissimulation. As representational constructs break down so wider 
hidden practices which undermine public performances become more important. This 
sets the scene for the final empirical chapter, on community development, which 
weaves both discourse analysis and ethnography to consider how practices o f physical 
and structural violence, and acts of departing from Tajikistan, are concealed by 
performances o f peace.
there actually that policy?’ ([T18]: 5)
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Development and Decentralisation: Livelihoods and ‘Community9
In each case, the necessarily thin, schematic model of social organisation and production 
animating the planning was inadequate as a set of instructions for creating a successful social 
order. By themselves the simplified rules can never generate a functioning community, city, or 
economy. Formal order, to be more explicit, is always and to some considerable degree 
parasitic on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not recognise, without which it 
could not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain.
-  James C. Scott (1998:310)
This chapter considers the efforts o f the International Community to facilitate 
decentralisation and community development, particularly by the means o f 
establishing community based organisations (CBOs). It moves the debate on from the 
elite levels o f national and international politics to political relationships in local 
spaces. Furthermore, it seeks to emphasise the extra-representational (economic and 
physical) practices o f elites, subordinates and internationals which create an interest in 
territory and livelihoods as well as those acts which undermine this ideal. I show how 
livelihoods are re-/de-territorialised, where elite networks are increasingly regaining 
dominance o f the land and subordinate actors are increasingly relying on labour 
migration. Moreover, not only are peacebuilding actors not facilitating ‘self- 
government’ and indirectly supporting increased dependency on networked elites, but 
-  at a senior level -  they are intrinsically unready to learn from these failings.
Tajik livelihoods must be examined in the context o f the dynamics of authority 
and sovereignty discussed in chapters five and six. In particular, the re-centralisation 
o f authority is most visible at a local level. This has formal, informal and 
performative dimensions. Tajik laws determine that the expenditures and 
administrative functions o f local government, including staffing levels and wages, are 
set by the centre (Urban Institute 2003). One of the most direct is the President’s 
power to summarily dismiss and appoint heads of oblasts and raiyons. This 
constitutionally enshrined function o f the presidential office was used frequently 
throughout the period from 2000 to 2005 .224. Regular turnovers keep appointees 
strictly loyal to their patrons and prevent too much power from being accumulated by 
any particular local fief (Weigman 2004: 14-16). Moreover, given the indivisibility of
224 See, for example: Asia-Plus Blitz, #188 (601), 03/10/00; Burke 2005b.
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political and economic power in Tajikistan, central control over the general 
functioning of local government serves to bolster control by elite networks over 
economic goods, foremost o f which is cotton. New raiyon and oblast heads quickly 
gain a piece o f the pie as state structures are deeply intertwined with the cotton 
business in the south and parts of the north of the country (ICG 2004: 14). Production 
targets, as during Soviet times, are set centrally but it is localised coalitions o f future 
companies and local authorities which lock local farmers into producing cotton at 
below market rates. Finally, there is also a strong performative element to re­
centralisation. Both appointments and dismissals are enacted on national television 
with each act of dismissal and appointment followed by the speaking of the name of 
the President, embodying the power o f the state (See Burke 2005a). National or 
religious festivals and special anniversaries are also public performances of 
recentralisation. According to a governmental resolution, the celebration of cultural 
festivals and the anniversaries of significant events must be conducted only with the 
permission of central government.225 For example, the preparations for the 2006 
celebration o f 2,700 years of the city of Kulob, which began in 2003, have been 
directed as an all-Republic celebration under a steering committee established in 
Dushanbe, presided over by the Prime Minister Akilov.
It was these strong ‘centralising’ trends which the International Community 
sought to address via community development and decentralisation programmes. In 
2004 and 200 5 ,1 conducted research in communities and centres located in three of 
Tajikistan’s four administrative regions (see figure 27): Sugd oblast (Veloyati Sughd, 
formerly Veloyati Leninabod [Taj.])226, in both Asht and Panjikent raiyons; Khatlon 
oblast (Veloyati Khatlon), particularly districts around the south-western town of 
Sharituz ; and in the centrally-controlled raiyons (Nohyiahoi Tobei Jumhuri [Taj.J), 
including the Rasht Valley districts o f Nurabad, Garm and Jirgatal. I visited
225 Asia-Plus Blitz, #118 (531) 23/06/00.
226 Sugd oblast (formerly Leninabad) includes the Zerafshon and Ferghana valley areas, including 
Tajikistan’s second city of Khujond, and contains around 2 million people. It is the most industrialised 
region and provided most political leaders during the Soviet era.
227 Khatlon oblast was created in 1992 when the regions of Kurghonteppa (where most of the intense 
fighting took place during the civil war) and Kulob were merged to form a giant region with just over 2 
million people under the control of Kulobi elites. It is the primary cotton-growing region of the 
country.
228 The opposition established remote bases in the mountainous Rasht Valley between late-1992 and the 
1997 peace treaty. Indeed, ‘warlords’ operated independent of the authorities in the region until late- 
2001, especially in the district of Tavildara. See chapter 6.1.
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each of these areas several times during this period spending around six weeks in each 
o f the three oblasts, sometimes as an employee o f an international organisation, 
sometimes as an independent researcher accompanying internal organisations -  
although this distinction was of little significance to locals. I conducted research in a 
total o f nineteen ‘communities,’ visiting most o f them several times (see figure 28).
Fig. 27: Map of Tajikistan by administrative region
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229 The fourth is the eastern Mountainous Badakhshon Autonomous Oblast (GBAO [ Veloyati 
Avtonomii Badakshoni Koni (Taj.)]), the largest and most sparsely populated region, including Pamiri 
groups speaking different local dialects in the valleys and ethnic Kyrgyz communities on the mountain 
plains.
230 International organisations refer to their target locations as ‘com m unities’. Tajik people rarely 
define the boundaries o f their community unambiguously. ‘Com m unity’ can denote a single 
neighbourhood (mahalla), the area served by a particular mosque/teahouse (choihona), or a village
(kishlak). For example, in Garm which has one Jamoat and several mahalla committees, Mercy Corps 
created two ‘com m unities’, Garm-1 and Garm-2. The division created two clusters o f  mahallas w ith no 
basis in local practice. Local government officials had requested the two ‘com m unities’.
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Fig. 28: Communities in which I conducted research, 2004-2005
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The chapter is divided into three sections. The first investigates the practical 
impact o f the international decentralisation programmes of Mercy Corps in this wider 
context. It explores the resilience of local spaces, the avoidance and accommodation 
strategies o f subordinates, and the hybrid forms o f local governance that, ironically, 
have strengthened the discursive and informal institutional structures of an 
authoritarian elite. Section two outlines the importance of livelihoods in the actual 
practising of building peace, looking specifically at the case o f Rasht state farm. 
Building on the argument from chapter five, it shows how livelihoods are being de- 
/re-territorialised. The final section of the chapter looks at how ‘community 
development’ and ‘self-government’ are simulated by the (mis)representations o f 
INGOs and the discursive mediation of their local staff and subcontractors.
7.1 Democratising the Mahalla or Mahallising Democracy?
I think [the Community Action Groups] will not last., actually it’s not that I think, I know, 
because when I came back to some communities a month after the end of the programme they 
did not exist, they were not meeting.
- Programme coordinator, Mercy Corps, Rasht valley, May 2005
On the face of it, Tajikistan seems ripe for decentralisation. As the country lacks an 
abundance o f natural resources, it has not succumbed to the resource conflicts that
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have beset other developing states and complicate decentralisation initiatives. 
Furthermore decentralisation seems necessary to attenuate the country’s regional 
divisions. However, Tajik communities relate to elite and international practices in 
their own communities in light of the discourse of tinji. This section provides an 
analysis o f local practices in response to the goals and stages envisioned in 
international programmes in order to assess their impact on what local people are 
actually doing. Put somewhat crudely, is the international community democratising 
the mahalla, or are locals acting to ‘mahallise’ democracy?
7.1.L Development, ‘Decentralisation * and Peacebuilding
International actors invoke decentralisation to convey a fundamentally different 
meaning to that o f the ‘de-centralisation’ of authority that I deployed in chapter five. 
The international concept of the CBQ has emerged partly as an antidote to the 
centralising demands o f the post-conflict state and the corruption o f elites (Ball 2002: 
37). Decentralisation entails the distribution of decision-making and budgetary 
control from local government to local or regional level actors, including CBOs 
(Debiel 2002: 9). Abdullaev and Freizer’s ‘peace building framework’ for Tajikistan, 
identified people’s opportunities to ‘participate in local decision making and policy 
formulation through reform of local self governance bodies and the development of 
more efficient community development institutions’ (2003: 53). Promoting 
community-based development must -  it seems -  be a priority goal o f the 
International Community (DeMartino 2004). Such exhortations express the ethical 
priorities of both democratic peacebuilding and humanitarianism, while the emphasis 
on ‘grassroots’ and ‘bottom-up’ development performs their spatial imaginaries 
(Jeong 2005).
Donors, Contractors and CBO Concepts
Donors including USAID and GTZ have prioritised community-based development 
since the formal end o f peace implementation in 2000. By Spring 2004 the rapid 
expansion in the volume of ‘peacebuilding’ programmes conducted in Tajikistan via 
the capacity-building o f CBOs encouraged the UNDP to bring the various agencies 
together to share information about ‘community-linked development’ and coordinate 
activities to ‘promote decentralisation and provide a stronger framework for
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governance at the municipal level’ (UNDP 2004). CBOs, as idealised in the 
programme proposals and ‘success stories’ or international organisations, represent 
the first steps of a nascent democracy. Indeed, in rural Central Asia, they seem to 
offer unparalleled opportunities for devolving power whilst respecting local customs.
USAID is the largest donor in support o f local self-government and has 
several major INGO contractors in Tajikistan. Its Community Action Investment 
Program (CAIP) is the largest ever community-based programme in Tajikistan and is 
imbued with specific peacebuilding objectives. CAIP’s stated goal was to ‘help 
prevent conflicts and promote broad based-citizen dialogue and participation’, to 
achieve ‘improved standards of living, more active and engaged citizens and more 
open, accountable local government’ (MCCAR 2005: 1). The methodology of CAIP, 
as implemented by Mercy Corps, entailed ‘the democratic election o f Community 
Action Groups (CAG), transparent, sustainable, and accountable management of 
projects, and advocacy for support from local government and community 
residents.’ USAID was also one o f the financiers of the Village Organisation (VO). 
Aga Khan Foundation’s Mountain Societies Development Support Programme 
(MSDSP)233, which set up and oversees VOs defines them as, ‘a body of 
representatives from households in a given rural geographic locality’, which is 
‘transparent’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘self-directed’ (MSDSP 2001: 4).234
231 CAIP, running from 2002-2005 was a three-year, USD27mil regional reconstruction programme 
which also worked in other perceived ‘conflict-prone’ areas in the Ferghana valley of Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan.
232 Mercy Corps, as one o f four contractors for CAIP, established a community action group (CAG) in 
thirty-five communities in Khatlon and Rasht regions. The CAG model was based on the community 
initiative group (CIG) employed by Mercy Corps under another USAID programme, the Peaceful 
Communities Initiative (PCI) in Sugd oblast. Phase one of PCI ran from 2001-2004 in thirty-six 
communities in Tajikistan while a two-year follow-up began in thirty-one new communities from 2004 
to 2006. Both CAIP and PCI were also employed in the Ferghana Valley of Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, also considered ‘conflict prone’ according to the International Community.
233 The Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) is the charitable movement of His Highness the Aga Khan, the 
spiritual leader of the Ismaili Shia Muslims who, in Tajikistan, are largely located in the Pamirs, 
GBAO. As an autonomous entity of AKF, MSDSP it is the largest International NGO in Tajikistan. It 
has an overwhelmingly national staff o f450 nationwide.
234 The VO model is more conservative and contextually-rooted than Mercy Corps’ variant. MSDSP 
accepts a VO as a ‘development partner’ when it includes as members over 80% of households in the 
village (MSDSP 2001). VOs began in GBAO eight years ago; every village there now has one and 
many are into their ninth year. In 2004, MSDSP had a $6 million budget and ran 800 VOs. VOs are 
envisioned as standing bodies which ‘enhance social unity in the village’ and ‘become internalised to 
the social reality of the village, to truly become an indigenous institution (not to be just ‘oil on water’) 
(Tetlay 2001). They are seen as complementary to government, in that they are called to ‘maintain 
relationships’ with government and ‘lobby and access resources’ from it (MSDSP 2001). Former 
MSDSP General Manager, and now AKF Head for Tajikistan, Yogdor Faizov, boasts ‘We made the 
VO stronger than local government.’ See, Interview, Yogdor Faizov, General Manager, MSDSP,
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The vital links between the INGO and the CBO are local NGO contracting 
partners. With multiple organisations and models working in Tajik communities in 
recent years, numerous partnerships and collaborations have been launched. Literally 
dozens o f local NGOs have sprung up to work as subcontractors for international 
NGOs in implementing donor-funded programmes. They undertake trainings in 
conflict resolution, project management and a myriad o f other general and specialist 
areas o f community mobilisation. Ittifok, for example, in Sugd province, is one of the 
largest and gains significant business from Mercy Corps and UNDP amongst others. 
Over time, these institutions develop off-the-shelf packages which they can adapt to 
offer what is essentially the same product for ostensibly distinct programmes. Thus, 
while their relationship with donors and INGOs is subservient they are able to operate 
as efficient businesses based on economies of scale.
Levels o f  engagement: adapting civil society to the state
Despite conceptual and operational similarities among different international 
programmes, international NGOs are keen to develop and protect their distinctive 
approach. In Tajikistan such rivalries have primarily been played out with regard to
235‘level* o f engagement. The UNDP alone has sought to work at the Jamoat-level 
with their Jamoat Development Committee (JDC).236 The PA has supported the JDC 
drive and directed heads of Khukumats to facilitate the UNDP’s efforts. Similarly, 
the UNDP emphasises that JDCs must support government and not be an alternative 
to it. In some cases funding goes straight to Jamoats and there is deemed to be no 
need to set up a JDC.237 By contrast, international NGOs, given their mandates and 
identities as representatives o f ‘civil society’, have taken a different tack, preferring to 
work directly in villages. They adopt a humanitarian discourse o f peacebuilding with 
its emphasis on the ‘grassroots’. Local social organisation in Tajikistan begins with
13/07/04. See also, Interview, Khaleel Tetlay, Social Development Advisor, MSDSP, 13/07/04.
235 401 Jamoats, each representing approximately 10-15,000 citizens, constitute the foundational level 
of government in Tajikistan. (Ilolov & Hudoyev 2002: 608-9)
236 The Jamoat Development Committee (JDC; in 2005 renamed Jamoat Resource Centre, JRC) was 
launched in 2002 as a public association involving governmental and non-governmental representatives 
elected by communities (usually indirectly, by representatives o f communities) to select and administer 
projects using revolving funds. In 2004 there were 90 JDCs (covering approximately 23% of Jamoats) 
and it was hoped there would be 300 by 2007 (with 75% coverage). Interview, Igor Bose, Programme 
Manager, Communities Programme, UNDP, 13/07/04.
237 Interview, Mia Seppo, Deputy Regional Representative, UNDP, 13/07/04.
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the mahalla, a local neighbourhood group o f which there may be several per kishlak 
(village). Freizer articulates the idealised image of the mahalla which is widely 
shared by many international actors in Tajikistan:
Mahallas brought people living on the same territory together on a voluntary basis, 
along interest lines based on profession or good neighbourliness. They created a 
forum where local values, rules of behaviour, and common interests were defined, 
through which group interests were protected and joint actions organised (2004:18).
This notion of the benign and voluntary nature of action under the mahalla is 
strikingly depoliticised in that it does not question who wins and loses in ‘group 
interests’ and ‘joint actions’. In such a way, this ideal of the mahalla needed rescuing 
from its post-conflict, post-Soviet predicament, with Freizer arguing that ‘they are 
increasingly passive and risk withering away’ (ibid: 19).
This raises a much greater issue which will be explored through the rest of this 
chapter: how the boundary between ‘state’ and ‘society’ gets lost in the ambiguities of 
‘community’ and the material necessities o f scratching out a living. On the one hand, 
this is an aspect which is present in Tajik communities regardless o f international 
intervention due to the dual societal and state roles of local elites. This is evidenced 
in the ambiguous nature o f the mahalla committee which was surprisingly absent from 
Tajikistan’s foundational local government legislation of 1994 (Urban Institute 2003), 
despite being an important part o f the state apparatus during the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, international NGOs explicitly blur the boundary in their discourses in 
order to express positive engagement between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ -  the dual 
subjects o f peacebuilding. Mercy Corps, for example, includes state civilian bodies 
(presumably including the Presidential Administration) in its definition o f civil 
society. Country Director for Mercy Corps Tajikistan Gary Bumiske remarked, ‘you 
may ask “well, what isn’t civil society?” Well, I ’d answer that the military isn’t civil 
society and, in some countries, they are a large part o f the state.’238 In reality both the 
merging and dividing of ‘civil society’ and ‘state’ is problematic. When the same 
individual represents both the ‘state’, as a member of the district administration, and 
‘civil society’, as a member o f the CAG, we have to question to what extent state and 
civil society are actually institutionally separable in the first place. At the same tiem
238 Personal communication, Gary Bumiske, Country Director, Mercy Corps, Dushanbe, April 2005.
266
their discursive separation is vital for the practice o f international community 
development.
The rest o f this section comprises a (re)interpretation o f the impact o f CBO’s on 
communities, particularly those of Mercy Corps’ CAIP. Below I investigate its three 
principal phases: establishing and training the CBO; community decision-making; 
and, conducting social and infrastructure projects. I contrast the claims of the official 
Mercy Corps (MCCAR 2005) evaluation of the programme (o f which I was part) with 
local practices, which were indirectly affected by international intervention. These 
indirect effects will be considered in more depth in section three in terms o f the re- 
/de-territorialisation o f livelihoods. This raises an interesting question of evaluation -  
how we got it so wrong? -  that I will discuss in the final section of this chapter.
7.1AL Establishing self-government: pre-existing beliefs and re-formation of 
leadership
The methodology o f CAIP called for the establishment o f the CAG via an election. 
Towards the end of the three-year programme the CAG was encouraged to continue 
its activities by continuing to act and seek registration as an NGO. The final 
evaluation argued that CAIP was ‘moderately successful in institutionalising the 
organisational arrangements’ o f the CAG.’239
However, underlying both the programme methodology and the evaluation is a 
particular approach to community development which considers context to be a 
matter of secondary consideration. As Giffen and Earle note, while rhetorical 
recognition o f ‘local culture’ is standard, assumptions about post-war and traditional 
society mean that in practice a methodological assumption o f carte blanche is 
dominant (2005: 37).240 The problem with this analytical step is that one cannot 
necessarily expect it to be shared by community members who may let their ‘non-
239 The Final Evaluation noted that the level o f awareness of the CAG -  as measured by a survey 
conducted in CAIP communities -  was ‘much lower’ in Tajikistan than in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
(where the programme also operated), and, in terms of ‘sustainability’, only about half of the CAGs 
had clear plans to continue their work (MCU 2005: 15-16,26-27).
240 This type of approach is common among NGOs and sometimes even publicly acknowledged. 
MSDSP, which also administered the CAIP programme, prides itself on its ability to ‘indigenise’ the 
VO and argues that ‘[our] analysis o f the institutional framework at the village level showed that there 
was a “vacuum”.’ MSDSP argues that pre-existing institutions could be disregarded given that they 
‘were not particularly development oriented and were not what could be called “participatory”.’ (Tetlay 
2001:3)
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participatory’ practices into the ‘vacuum’ that is the ‘institutional framework’ o f the 
community. This is confirmed by the private testimonies o f programme staff. One 
CAIP manager reflected after the end o f the programme,
Is it really sustainable to create new groups rather than work with existing structures, 
like these elders committees? The problem is that the relationship between the two 
was not planned for in the programme.241
Thus, in effect, Mercy Corps tried to introduce formal institutions into Tajik 
communities in which informal institutions of self-governance were already quite well 
established. This meant that the processes of forming CBOs were distorted by those 
institutions and ideas to the extent that Mercy Corps’ intervention served to re-form 
pre-existing institutions.
In the ten CAIP communities which I studied there was considerable evidence 
in each to indicate that the CAG was in fact the re-formation o f the local mahalla 
committee or groups o f elders (aksakals [Taj.]). For example, in the village of Shule, 
in Garm district, CAG members noted that ‘the raisi mahalla is the head o f the CAG. 
When he wants to do something for the village he can go through the CAG to achieve 
it.’ While they cited that they were ‘elected’, when asked about term limits and future 
elections they noted, ‘for now there’s no need for change.’ Moreover, they added 
they were selected on the basis of ability and that, while they didn’t have formal rules, 
they had ‘mutual understanding’.242 The CAIP women’s committee in the village of 
Dombrachi, Jirgatal district, shed more light on how the process o f re-forming takes 
place. ‘In a general meeting,’ one woman noted, ‘the community voted on previously 
nominated candidates. We nominated each other ourselves.’ Another commented 
that ‘we have an informal selection process and are accepting new members.’243
In addition to such pre-existing local institutions, international interventions 
were often faced with numerous pre-existing donor-supported formations. This was 
especially true in the Rasht valley which is sparsely populated with people yet densely 
populated with international agencies. Consequently, within communities the practice 
o f ‘double-hatting’ is common. Under double-hatting the same group o f people serve 
as the members of several ‘institutions’, the VO and the CAG, and perhaps also the
241 Interview, Programme Officer, Mercy Corps, 31/05/05.
242 Group interview, CAG, Shule, 27/04/05.
243 Group interview, Women’s Committee, Dombrachi, 21/04/05.
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JDC. In the town of Garm, ‘CAG members’, for example, noted that the VO predated 
the CAG, so that the group simply took on the institutional identity of the CAG as 
well. They deal with VO and CAG business in the same meetings and see no 
difference between the two organisations. When asked how they decide through 
which institutional identity they do projects the group replied that, ‘we go to 
whichever will support what we want to do: if  Aga Khan says no then we go to Mercy 
Corps.’244 This testimony indicates the possibility that the process of intervention can 
be reversed: rather than the utilisation of a particular donor-supported methodology 
into numerous communities, there is the use of a single community methodology in 
relationship to multiple donor-funded projects.
Thus, the formation o f CBOs over the course o f 2002-2005 was often 
conducted on top of both pre-existing local and international structures -  beset by 
both ‘mahallisation’ and ‘double-hatting’. This meant that while local pre-existing 
values and norms remained salient, a direct translation o f the mahalla committee en 
masse to the CAG is rare. The key qualification for membership of the group is less 
the formal membership of another group but the qualities of being ‘respected’ and 
having ‘authority’ in the community. The CAG in Bedak, for example, was formed 
out o f a collaboration of six mahallas which were present in the ‘community’ which 
Mercy Corps had selected. Members o f the group were quite open about their 
institutional ambiguities and how they sought to manage them. Bedak hosted a CAG, 
VO and JDC -  although the CAG had arrived first -  from which they had formed a 
single committee. The head of the village (raisi kishlak) was made leader because he 
is ‘our leader.’ While, in principle, the committee could be reelected this had yet to 
happen. ‘Every two years we could have an election for the one committee,’ they 
noted. ‘If people are not happy we will do this.’ Under this arrangement the rais 
‘works directly’ with Mercy Corps and the other international organisations.245 Such 
a harmonisation and consolidation of the CAG chimes with subordinate ethics of 
‘unity’ and ‘cohesion’, and with elite discourses o f the ‘necessity to have a uniform 
situation (tipovoye polozheniye) in order to define the status o f mahalla 
committees’246 and ‘unification of these territorial organs of self-government’.247
244 Group Interview, CAG, Garm, 26/04/05.
245 Group interview, CAG, Bedak, 28/04/05.
246 UNTOP/NAPST, 2002: Dushanbe (1): 2.
247 UNTOP/NAPST, 2002: Dushanbe (1): 23.
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7.1 ML Community decision-making: mahalla rules
The imperative to homogenise the CAG under mahalla leadership derives from a 
mode of elite dominance over subordinates which has been re-established in 
peripheral regions o f Tajikistan following the peace agreement. This process has 
reconstituted hegemonic authority in the regions and has been inadvertently advanced 
by international assistance. In the Bedak case, group members note that 100% o f the 
attendees to formal community meetings are generally male heads o f households; 
occasionally a small group o f women would come and sit apart from the men in their 
own group. The Rais, emboldened by his access to foreign funding, receives requests
*yAQ
for support direct from heads of households and then discusses it with the group.
This kind o f re-formation in communities challenges the idea that 
interventions can institutionalise new procedures of decision-making in communities. 
CAIP’s methodology entailed conducting social and infrastructure projects using 
‘participatory cycles o f problem identification, project selection, planning, and 
implementation’ (MCU 2005: 3). Hence, the process of decision-making was deemed 
to be more important than the conducting of projects itself. Programme managers 
repeatedly referred to the maxim that ‘the means are more important than the ends’ 
and ‘it’s not so much what is achieved but how.’249 In particular, communities were 
to gain new beliefs and rules via a training process, ‘using a curriculum including 
modules on development principles, transparency and accountability, the value of 
public meetings, community participation and mobilisation, conflict resolution skills, 
creating sustainable communities, project management and related topics depending 
on circumstances’ (MCU 2005: 3). Overall, the programme evaluation gave a positive 
conclusion regarding the inculcation of new decision-making rules. CAIP was, it 
argued, ‘highly successful in engaging the local population in participatory and 
democratic change processes at the community level’ (p.26), but was ‘less successful 
in transferring a “CAIP methodology” and ensuring the sustainability o f program 
approaches and processes (p.26). My independent findings indicate that this moderate 
criticism is not nearly radical enough.
CAIP decision-making ostensibly begins with community meetings to identify 
problems and select projects. However, participation in these meetings is not on an 
equal basis; from my own observation of such meetings it is clear that some voices
248 Ibid.
249 Personal communication, Kevin Grubb, Mercy Corps, Khujond, 20/06/05
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are dominant whilst others are unheard. Meetings are often directed by a head who 
makes proposals to the community to receive their approval. Moreover, such a formal 
setting may be superseded by prior informal agreements made in the community 
meeting place or choihona. Groups of men informally discuss community and family 
matters. As one CAG member in the village o f Humdon noted, when asked how they 
receive requests from the community, ‘o f course since we live in the village and talk 
to people, and meet in the choihona every evening we know what the problems are.’ 
Another said, ‘we meet each other five times a day for prayers (namaz) -  people
A
know.’ In such conditions the formal meetings can simply serve to validate pre­
ordained, informal decisions. ‘[The meetings],’ one group member in Sharituz 
admitted, ‘are for the purpose of asking in the community for contribution and
Af i
mobilizing them for voluntary work (subbotnik).'’ Sometimes this leads to 
resentment from those who feel excluded from the process, and are thus not willing to 
take part in the meetings. In the village of Jailghan one group member explained that 
in one case, ‘the poor did not want to make community contributions. Some did not 
want to come to community meetings. We told them it was obligatory to be at the 
meeting for the sake of the project.’ In this case, ‘participation’ in formal meetings 
can become something orchestrated from above.
The inequities o f community ‘participation’ are evident from the responses of 
community members during the survey that was conducted as part o f the CAIP 
evaluation. Ninety-two people were interviewed to form a statistically valid 
sample. O f the remaining 60 interviewees, 35 (58%) had heard o f the ‘CAG’ and 
36 (60%) were aware o f the ‘Transparency Board’ which is placed in a prominent 
position in the village and which CAGs used to advertise the programme and their 
activities. However, these figures decline when people are asked more about what it 
actually does. For example,
250 Group interview, CAG, Humdon, 27/04/05
251 In Soviet times subotnik was mass voluntary service on Saturdays which mobilised many workers 
and students. This group which used the term was quite ‘russified’ and ‘urbanised’, located in a 
regional centre. Group interview, CAG, Sharituz, 12/04/05.
252 Group interview, CAG, Humdon, 19/04/05.
253 Results are based on 60 respondents in eight communities across the Rasht valley and Shartuz areas. 
Answers were open and have been grouped into categories by the author. A total of 92 people were 
surveyed but the 32 respondents from the large town of Shartuz were excluded as their answers 
distorted results. Overall, Shartuz residents had an extremely low awareness of the programme which 
was attributed by Mercy Corps staff to the size of the town and the number of organisations working 
there.
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o Question 1. What is the purpose of the Board? 42% could describe
o Question 2. What kind of information is on it? 25% could describe
o Question 3. Do you know the cost of any single project? 13% could describe
This poor level o f knowledge is extraordinary since most o f the communities are 
extremely poor, very small and close-knit (less than 1,000 residents) and that CAIP 
represented the largest modernisation project conducted in these villages in their 
history (an investment of up to USD 75,000 in material and in-kind resources per 
community). However, knowledge is mediated by power relations. Gender 
differences indicate that level of awareness is quite closely correlated to one’s 
influence on the re-formed power structures. Figure 29 below shows the answers of 
respondents to a question about how the CAG was formed. While the most popular 
answer for women was that they did not know (20 or two-thirds o f respondents), less 
than one-fifth of men (6 respondents) said this. This indicates both actual levels of 
knowledge and inscribed roles of masculine-leader and feminine-follower.
Figure 29: ‘How was the CAG formed?1 Responses by gender254
Don't know
Through an 
election
Mercy Corps 
selected 
community 
leaders Other Grand Total
Female 20 9 2 0 31
Male 6 10 12 1 29
Grand Total 26 19 13 1 60
7.1.iv. Conducting projects: performing consent
Whilst the processes of forming and decision-making were superseded by the re­
forming process and pre-existing beliefs and rules, the conducting o f projects made a 
powerful impact of the physical infrastructure on communities, at least in the short­
term. The thirty-five CAIP communities in Tajikistan conducted 231 infrastructure 
and 23 social projects during the three years o f the programme and contributed an 
average of 45% of the costs of these projects through the in-kind provision o f labour. 
They conducted far more projects (especially in infrastructure) and made greater 
community contribution (mostly in-kind in the form of labour) than the communities 
in the more urbanised Ferghana valley of Uzbekistan which also underwent the CAIP
254 See fh. 252
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programme (MCU 2005: 16). However, for international peacebuilding the 
preponderance o f project implementation over processes is understood as a real 
difficulty. One programme manager noted that it is ‘very difficult to separate the idea 
of a complete infrastructure project to the process it takes to get there.’
Local elites were more instrumentalist with respect to infrastructure projects. 
Elite-led projects serve purposes beyond whatever social and economic legacy they 
may or may not bring. Such projects also serve to perform ‘authority’ as getting 
projects done requires the support of local informal authorities. One representative of 
a sub-contracted NGO working on Mercy Corps’ PCI programme in Sugd province 
noted that it was crucial to find leaders with ‘their own authority (sobstvennyi 
avtoritety. ‘In principle,’ she noted,
when such people come with us and begin to work with us it’s not difficult [to conduct 
projects]. But there were also naturally such incidents when we weren’t able to find 
such people. These were difficult incidents. [These leaders have] this authority from 
the population. They respect and trust these people and are attentive to the opinions of 
these people (Safarova [T16]: 3).
When local elites are brought on side they can organise khashar -  a ‘traditional’ 
institution o f community mobilisation -  in order to provide a labour force. However, 
two quite contradictory misunderstandings o f khashar are often held by foreign 
observers.
Firstly, khashar can be romanticised as an entirely voluntary, kinship-based 
institution which can simply be ‘harnessed’ by NGOs. However, my findings 
indicate it is led by those with ‘authority’. In the town of Garm, CAG leaders 
explained how they mobilise the people for non-CAIP social projects using Mercy 
Corps methodology: ‘for example, we say we are having a wrestling match and tell 
people they must come to khashar. ’ The deputy chair o f the Jamoat in the same 
community noted that the aim of the programme was to ‘direct (napravit) the young 
people for the development of the community’ and that the role of the chair o f the 
CAG is as the ‘main organiser o f people’.257 Such conceptions belie the idea of 
consensus-based mobilisation found in international discourses. Giffen and Earle 
have characterised this as a form of ‘obligatory voluntarism’ found commonly in
255 Interview, Kevin Grubb, Programme Manager PCI, Mercy Corps, KKhujond.
256 Group interview, CAG, Garm, 26/04/05.
257 Interview, Jamoat Deputy Head, Garm, 26/04/05.
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khashar across Central Asia. ‘Donors may be able to report, quite truthfully,’ they 
note, ‘that projects achieved close to “full participation” since, from our research, it 
would appear there is still considerable social pressure for everyone in a particular 
community to contribute to khashar in some way’ (2005: 85).
Secondly, and somewhat in tension with the first assumption, it is often 
assumed that it is exclusively led by ‘traditional’ leaders -  those possessing 
charismatic authority (such as a mullah) or age (an aksakal). Yet my research 
indicated that ‘authority’ is not exclusively ‘charismatic’ or traditional but can be very 
modem, understood in terms of the control and administration o f resources. In the 
village o f Margedar, where a PCI group had recently been established, the group 
noted the importance o f having the head of the local farm on the group. While the 
explanation of the leader of the group as to why the group is listened to began with a 
testimony to authority for authority’s sake it quickly evolved to link this authority to 
resources. ‘They respect us because we are respected,’ one man noted,
but they don’t listen often because they know we have no financial means to build a 
new sportsground or new classrooms. It depends on what we can provide. If, for 
example, a donor buys pipes for a water system all the people will listen to us as they 
will see we’ve been able to do this.258
While economic power often accords with social status, particularly with respect to 
land ownership, Tajik society is fluid and contingent as wealth is accumulated by a 
small minority o f labour migrants (usually in their twenties and thirties). As a 
consequence, social and political hierarchies can change in a village.
In practice the mobilisation of communities through CAIP meant that 
hegemonic local elites, whatever their precise sources o f authority, were handed an 
opportunity to perform. One NGO representative described how he hit a dead-end in 
a community where they could not get the local leadership on side and explained how 
the problem was resolved with the help o f a relatively wealthy migrant:
When we decided that we will conduct a meeting behind closed doors, that we would 
no longer work here, and would make this known to people, there was one person who 
participated [in that meeting], who had for a long time been working in Russia. He 
said: “guys, I am sitting over here listening and am not able to understand what’s been 
going on here.” And when we told him he said: “okay, so here there’s such people.”
258 Group interview, CIG, Margedar, 27/06/05
259 This will be explored further in section 7.3.
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Everyone still closed their eyes and didn’t understand this but in the course of literally 
two weeks this person organised everything. He organised everything and in the course 
of a year they were outstripping other communities. All depends on the authorities 
(avtoritetov) and the person who takes responsibility for others (yedyot za soboi 
drugikh). (Safarova [T16]: 3)
In this sense, international interventions reproduce power relations in post-conflict 
communities. Local leaderships re-produce their evolving authority through khashar's
renaissance. In the village of Dombrachi, this was particularly evident. One CAG
*}(\(\member noted, that prior to the projects khashar ‘just had spiritual power’. Local 
elites in control o f the CAG are, in effect, the conduit through which international 
assistance is administered. One youth committee member noted that ‘the realisation 
o f projects is based on CAG telling us a time and a place for us to come to undertake 
physical labour.’261 The secretary of the local Jamoat remarked that through CAIP, 
‘we realise how khashar can be combined with international funding to complete a 
project.’ This conception of CAIP by leaders who now felt themselves more 
authoritative in their communities was common across communities.
These testimonies support my general findings that elite hegemony and 
patriarchal leadership were reinforced by international interventions. The graph 
compares communities (see figure 30) at the beginning o f PCI with those at the end of 
CAG and shows two main response categories to the open question ‘How are 
decisions made in the community?’ The first category, ‘together’ includes those 
answers which emphasise the community as a whole, or the community with its 
leaders making decisions (in accordance with tinji discourse). The second category of 
answer, ‘by leaders’, includes those answers which emphasise an independent 
decision being made by leaders (including ‘by the mahalla committee’, ‘by the men’, 
‘by aksakals’, ‘by local authorities’, or some combination of these groups, in 
accordance with mirostroitelstvo). Research conducted at the beginning o f the PCI 
programme showed an overwhelming majority of villagers (47 out of 60) answering 
‘together’ and affirming the maxim of ‘unity’ of the tinji discourse. Research 
conducted at the end o f the CAIP programme, however, showed many fewer 
respondents giving this response (31 out of 60) and many more saying they were 
taken by ‘leaders’ (25 out o f 60). There are many context-specific factors which
260 Interview, CAG, Dombrachi, 21/04/05.
261 Interview, Youth group, Dombrachi, 22/04/05.
262 Interview, Jamoat Secretary, Dombrachi, 22/04/05.
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might explain this contrast -  PCI and CAIP are different programmes, with different 
staff, working in different regions -  however, the findings for CAIP mark a 
significant shift in perceptions o f authority from the norms o f tinji described in 
chapter 4.3 towards the renewal of elite hegemony and the acceptance of 
mirostroitelstvo.
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Fig. 30: Graph: ‘How are decisions taken in the community? A comparison between the beginning and end of international programmes263
How are decisions take in the community?
HI PCI (6 months) 
■  CAIP (3 years)
;
Together (community and Leaders (mahalla committee, Vote Don't Know/No one
leaders) men, local government)
Response category
263 CAIP findings from a survey o f 60 vilalges in April/M ay 2005, at the end o f the three-year programme. See footnote x (figure 23); PCI findings from a survey o f  the same 
number o f respondents across five villages in Asht and Panjakent raiyons in June 2005, six months into the programme.
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7.2. Peasants, Migrants and Elites: Re-/De-territorialising Livelihoods
Anything that people do in life may cause conflict, but as I was saying things are going in such 
a way that if you point this out to someone it means that you are against national unity and 
accord (natsionalnovo edinstva i soglasiya). That’s how everyone holds each other in check. 
Well, look, there’s no work, however no one demands work, because if 3 million people 
demand work then we may go off our heads. [...] That’s why everyone knows that you 
shouldn’t demand work but you need to go to Russia, Kazakhstan, and it’s not important if 
[there] they kill you or they don’t.
-  Turko Dinkayev ([T4]: 10)
To make more sense of the indirect effects of international programmes for 
community self-governance and decentralisation we must broaden our analysis to 
consider both elite-subordinate local dynamics (discussed in 7.1) and intra-elite 
regional dynamics in the context of local livelihoods. More prosaically put we must 
investigate how the poor scratch out a living. Livelihoods, as I consider them, are 
thus products of ‘everyday economies’ rather than referring to any specific mode of 
accumulation (Humphrey 2002). Discursively, the primacy o f livelihoods is 
expressed in demands for modernisation, industrialisation and employment. Yet 
discourse analysis alone is insufficient here. In the post-conflict era the link between 
livelihoods and territory is at once being re-established (among the rural peasantry) 
and disestablished (through the making o f ‘translocaT spaces of labour migration). 
Through ethnographic research we can observe opposing forces of both re- 
territorialisation and de-territorialisation.
7.2.L Re-territorialisingpeasants: water and ‘the state* in Abdulhanon
The livelihoods of rural Tajiks have suffered at the hands o f inequitable land reform 
and an exploitative cotton sector. Many communities have only been able to 
rehabilitate the subsistence economy and begin to produce saleable crops due to 
international assistance. However, as interventions are made through local authorities 
they serve to embolden forms of domination and exploitation. Ztircher finds 
particular cause for concern in the Rasht valley where,
a rural elite that consists of an amalgam of former fighters, religious leaders 
and state officials has emerged. This elite has been successful in gaining 
control over a large percentage of the available land. The actual mode of 
governance protects an unfair, illegal and even informal control over land 
(2004: iv).
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By injecting material and symbolic resources into this context international actors are 
in specific indirect ways facilitating such processes.
The example of the new water usage association (WUA) o f Abdulhanon in the 
Rasht valley witnesses to the formal and informal re-territorialisation o f livelihoods 
under the state, and how this process is affected by international assistance.264 WUAs 
are an increasingly important aspect of community development and local-level 
peacebuilding by the International Community. MSDSP and GTZ in the Abdulhanon 
area o f Rasht valley followed a model similar to that found in GTZ interventions 
elsewhere as they established their pilot WUAs in 2005265. Their vision was for 
WUAs to serve as an NGO to lobby for the interests of community members against 
the state, and seek to redress some o f the inequities of post-Soviet privatisation and 
land reform. However, the WUA is in no sense independent o f the informal and 
patriarchal management processes of the community. Informal processes were also, 
commonly, cited as the means by which people resolved any conflicts between them 
over water. More common is informal agreements between neighbours, and even 
villages. Much like in the case of other CBOs, the leadership o f the community 
regards the WUA as a tool to undertake projects which require outside funding. For 
example, a fifty-five-year-old male teacher in the village of Kalanak described how 
decisions were made by the village:
We meet in the choihona every evening and discuss upcoming issues. For some 
issues we must go to the Jamoat. Other questions we can ask to an international 
organisation like the VO. For example, for drinking water, we identify responsible 
people in the choihona and address the VO.268
264 For an overview of water management in Rasht valley, see Heathershaw (2005c) and Zurcher 
(2004).
265 In the case o f the Abdulhanon association, the WUA was built on a pre-existing informal group set 
up to manage the canal after its redevelopment and collect money from users whenever further 
maintenance was needed. The association manages irrigation water for 5 villages (including the 
villages of Kadara and Kalai Surkh), including around 400 households and 3,000 people. For each 
village there is a water users group, which consists of members o f the VO, and a mirob (water 
manager) who is responsible for basic maintenance and, crucially, collecting the money from users. So 
far 800 US dollars has been collected and invested with a ‘local businessman’. The WUA collected 0.3 
somoni (10 US cents) per month per sotka (0.01 hectare) of irrigated land, as established by law, for the 
five months of the ‘irrigation season’, roughly April-August.
266 Interview, Hukumatsho Sharipov, MSDSP, Dushanbe, 04/08/05
267 Street interviews, Abdulhanon sovkhoz, August 2005.
268 Interview, Kalanak, 11/08/05.
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W hat’s interesting here is the specific way in which the state is supplanted by 
‘an international organisation’ as the source o f economic assistance, but not in terms 
o f political authority. WUA members do not expect the state to assist in the provision 
and maintenance of water systems, but they do require its political backing. This is 
very much reflective o f the post-conflict and post-Soviet condition o f Tajik 
agriculture. During the Soviet Union, the authorities pumped water up the hillside at 
considerable expense in order to irrigate the state farm. Today communities are criss­
crossed by a dilapidated water infrastructure which has not worked since the end of 
the Soviet Union -  a powerful symbol o f state economic weakness and public squalor. 
However, in another sense ‘the state’ is deemed essential to the management o f 
livelihoods and the suppression of economic disputes. The role of local government 
is thus largely confined to watching over, approving and granting permission for the 
activities o f subordinates. If water disputes escalate, authoritative figures linked to 
the state will intervene. According to one farmer, the aksakals can solve the problem
9^Qand ‘even kick this person out of the village.’ The head o f the sovkhoz (state farm) 
in the Abdulhanon region noted that he solved a dispute over the rights to pasture land 
between two villages by declaring it owned by the sovkhoz and whoever wanted to 
use it must pay rent.270 Thus, re-territorialisation occurs as international economic 
resources are utilised according to elites who constitute local state organs and they 
have the political resources to veto subordinate and international actions.
‘The state’ here is used as the legitimating idea for the re-territorialisation o f 
political and economic space, as well as an alliance o f elite networks whose 
membership is constantly shifting. The question o f the registration o f WUAs 
illustrates this role of ‘the state’. While communities do not pay local government 
directly for the provision of water -  and the government does nothing to provide it -  
members must pay a USD 300 registration fee to the ministry o f justice in Dushanbe 
in order to legally establish a WUA with the power to collect revenue. It is highly
971likely that ‘additional payments’ will be required to facilitate registration. Such 
forms of hegemony require that WUAs become part o f the elite/state if  they are to 
function. Members o f WU A/VOs reported that it was necessary to have status in their
269 Interview, Shahrinav, 10/08/05.
270 Ownership was actually unclear and neither party had previously paid any rent.
271 Interview, mirob, Kadara, 12/08/05.
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relations with local government, as well as to demand compliance from community 
members and ‘punish’ those who do not pay. The head of the WUA in Shulonak 
noted:
Now, I am the head, but not according to the law. Anyone in the village can reject 
me if we are not legally-established.... In such a case we would have power to punish 
people who do not pay and even cut them off. If the association is voluntary they can
272just ignore us.
Here ‘the law’ and ‘the state’ become the essential signifiers of ‘authority’. W hat’s 
interesting here is how this move has been backed by GTZ’s local partner in their 
attempts at developing of ‘civil society’. It is MSDSP practice to recommend that 
WUAs attain such status to achieve legal backing for their rules and procedures, and 
in order for them to undertake some of the functions of the Soviet-era water 
committee (vodkhoz) .273
MSDSP is not unaware of some o f these difficulties and claims to support 
WUAs only in areas where land reform is taking place.274 However, reform has been 
extremely weak: territories are not privately owned, nor are they truly independently 
managed, as ‘privatisation’ has involved the leasing o f land to individuals who are 
connected to state-based elite networks (Porteous 2003; Ziircher 2004: 16-24). 
Abdulhanon sovkhoz is a state-owned collective farm. In other areas a smaller, quasi­
state collective dekon (‘peasant’ [Taj.]) farm has been established, alongside several 
‘private’ dekon farms (of several hectares each). Private dekon farm plots were sold 
off in a late-1990s land-reform when few could afford land. Buyers tended to have 
influence and foresight. Thus, even private farmers legally manage, not own, their 
land and the amount of their control varies.275 ‘The state’ (the legitimating signifier 
o f a local hegemonic elite) plays a largely opportunistic, rent-seeking role in terms of
272 Interview, WUA, Shulonak, 10/08/05.
273 Email communication, Hukumasho Sharipov (MSDSP) and Daniel Passon (GTZ), September 2005.
274 Ibid.
275 Discussions with farmers suggested that they felt that they had considerable freedom over what to 
grow yet they understood that the government could, at any time, repossess the land. ‘Private’ dekon 
farmers do not own their land but rather have it on a long-term lease from the state. This is 
complicated by unclear leasehold rights to land. Many farmers said that they discuss with the Jamoat 
or VO head what they should grow, which can lead to a collective village decision that it is not possible 
to grow thirstier crops in certain years. See also, Ziircher, 2004:16-25
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water management in the Rasht valley. Elite practices -  strengthened by international 
programmes -  act to re-territorialise Tajik livelihoods under ‘the state’.
These findings confirm earlier research which has shown that there is a 
demand for more state in the Rasht valley in the post-conflict period (Ziircher 2004: 
iii). But this demand needs unpacking. It is clear that WUAs feel they are unable to 
influence local government on water issues, or solve problems completely alone, 
without becoming part o f the state itself. However, Humphrey’s judgement of Soviet- 
era Siberian collective farms {kolkhoz), that ‘the private is not as “private” as it may 
seem, nor is the “public” as public’ (1998: 1), holds true for contemporary Tajikistan. 
Those who constitute the state trade in ‘manipulable resources’ of products (including 
access to irrigation water and land) and money (p. 435). Although these resources are 
greatly diminished, it is to be expected that both elites and subordinates would seek to 
ape a hierarchical and kinship-based model of the rural economy which, to a degree, 
‘worked’ for both. As Humphrey notes with respect to post-Soviet Siberia, returning 
to the region twenty years after her original research, ‘the collective often still acts as 
the substitute for the state, and where it does not, it is felt that it should do’ (p. 503). 
Similarly in Tajikistan, ‘the state’ is the essential signifier of a hegemonic process o f 
re-territorialisation which unites local elites who might, as they did during the state 
breakdown of the early- and mid-1990s, have battled for resources.
7.2JL De-territorialising migrants: from the local to the translocal
As Humphrey notes, o f particular importance in the everyday economies o f post­
socialist spaces is the creation of new ‘localities’ which challenge territorial notions o f 
community (2002; see also Humphrey and Mandel 2002). Thus, one cannot fully 
comprehend re-territorialisation without grasping how Tajik livelihoods are 
undergoing de-territorialisation. This takes the form of labour migration which breaks 
the link between livelihoods and the land, particularly the exploitation o f a given 
territory. It constitutes the re-location of livelihoods to the ‘shadow’ or ‘hidden’ 
spaces of the grey economy. There has been a huge rise in migration since the late- 
1990s to the extent that by 2003 somewhere between a quarter and a half o f working 
age men spent part of the year working overseas (see chapter 2.2.iii, also Olimova and 
Bose 2003).
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Migration is not merely an economic practice but is socially and discursively 
constituted. International and popular discourses affirm the importance of labour 
migration (zarabotka). It is a ‘safety valve’ which delays a return to civil war, 
according to peacebuilding (Malekzade [T il]: 7), and is simply a consequence of the 
lack o f employment opportunities, in tinji (Rahmonova [T15]: 7). However, migrants 
themselves are located on the margins of local spaces. Their transcripts often express 
a mixture o f hope and lament, dissenting from the public transcript of harmony. In 
answer to the question o f what would make life easier, young people often referred to 
migration. In Kizil Ketmen testimonies oscillated between disenchantment with the 
effects o f migration and desire for a better life:
JH: What changes would make your life easier?
18-year-old, male, unemployed: ‘For it to be fun in the village, for all my friends to 
live in the community and not in Russia. For young people to be listened to and 
helped to find work.’
20-year-old, female, housewife: ‘If there were work places in our community that 
would make our life easier. I would undertake any work as a migrant and with this 
earn myself something to live off.’
26-year-old, male, unemployed: ‘A way out (yyezd) to Russia’
Such responses express a sense o f powerlessness within the community that can be 
somewhat alleviated by employment abroad and imply that the village leadership is 
unable to do anything about this. The first respondent laments this social reality.
In such a way, the practical realities of scratching out a living and avoiding 
domination practised by many Tajiks undermine the efforts of central authority to re- 
territorialise the economy, to discipline it to become a system which can be controlled 
by government and a wealthy network of elites. New, cross-border spaces are 
reproduced in everyday life through migration, shuttle-trading and other business 
links which provide links, typically, between a Tajik village and a Russian provincial 
city. Labour migration can be characterised as a process o f making ‘translocal’ 
spaces. Kaiser defines translocalism in terms o f the linking of local spaces across 
borders that provides an alternative community to that provided by the territory and 
identity in the nation-state. He argues that,
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new nationalist endeavours have to coexist, if not compete, with the trans-border, 
translocal patterns of sociation. There are undeniable tensions: on the one hand, 
social reality contradicts the efforts at national separation, and on the other, the 
organisation of the national state is constantly influenced by (translocally structured) 
groups in the national state context that operate successfully across borders. (Kaiser 
2003:317)
He remarks that ‘a common world beyond borders and differences is being created’ 
which represents a ‘removing of the spatial component from the social’ (p. 327, 315). 
However, I would argue that it represents not a ‘despatialisation’ but a 
deterritorialisation o f identity. Identity is thus increasingly heterogenous -  where 
multiple translocal spaces may constitute local, national and regional identities.
Moreover, despite the increased opportunities which migration offers, the 
process is nevertheless governed by translocal authority structures extending from 
home village to destination workplace. Bose and Olimova note that familial avlod 
structures determine the character o f migration as it is the collective unit in which 
decisions about who will migrate are made, and it provides a space to stay and work 
whilst in Russia. A foreman o f a work brigade in Russia -  a senior member o f the 
avlod -  may ‘play the role’ of head of the avlod in Russia and thus ‘exercises 
undisputed authority over the brigade’ (Bose and Olimova 2003: 58). The 
normalising effects o f these discourses and networks are conveyed by one NGO 
worker in Sugd who told me:
You know, people used to say that all the men are at the front fighting, now they say 
that all the men are ‘in town’ (v gorode) -  they mean Russia, but they say it as if  it’s 
just nearby. (Kurbonkhojaev [T9]: 10)
Labour migration is thus ‘part of the normal life of society’ (Bose and Olimova 2003: 
100). According to Bose and Olimova it is, thus, ‘impossible to exaggerate the role 
of ethno-regional solidarity (mahalgaro’y  [Taj.]) in Tajik political and social life’ (p. 
58). However, what’s interesting here is how labour migration discursively and 
spatially practices avoidance and apartness, from the state and from other regions, as 
opposed to a form of regionalism which would lead to violent competition. By such 
social processes, regionalism in Tajikistan has been reconstituted in a non-violent and, 
to the extent that it has been translocalised, relatively non-competitive manner. In this 
sense, processes o f de-territorialisation, though exploitative, are dialectically 
produced by re-territorialisation and are intrinsic to the Tajik peace.
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7.2.UL The inter-dependence o f territory and space
The consequences o f the above analysis for peace/complex legitimacy in Tajikistan 
need unpacking further. It is difficult to find consent or resistance to this process of 
de-/re-territorialisation. Rather strategies of avoidance and accommodation constitute 
a resignation to hegemony. Both localised (re-territorialised) peasants and 
translocalised (de-territorialised) migrants remain preoccupied with survival strategies 
which prove able to accommodate the territorialising demands o f the elite, and avoid 
them through de-territorialising practices of migration. It is tempting to view these 
two sets o f practices in dichotomous terms: that an individual is forced to choose 
between accommodating local hegemons or avoiding them and subjecting oneself to 
the forms of hegemony and exploitation constructed at state borders. However, as 
individuals whose potential choices are socially constituted by their location in 
groups, peasants and migrants find that their role is determined relationally. A 
migrant’s income-generating potential is strongly connected to his support from his 
avlod who finance the migration, provide accommodation and a first job. Moreover, 
the ‘choice’ to be a migrant is often out of the hands o f young men and women; each 
avlod unit exists both in local and translocal spaces, and it is often its patriarchs who 
send migrants (Olimova and Bose 2003: 58-61). Labour migration is thus a vital part 
of the Tajik peace. Moreover, if  it were inhibited or prevented by the elite, this might 
jeopardise the precarious legitimacy which they have garnered.
This conclusion is increasingly made by international actors in Tajikistan who 
consequently attempt to reconcile and mange these economic processes through 
international programmes aimed at agricultural reform locally (often unsuccessfully, 
as shown above) and migration management transnationally and translocally. While 
there is no single grand strategy of the International Community there is considerable 
consensus regarding the need to incorporate both a reformed agriculture and managed 
migration to facilitate Tajikistan’s transition into the world economy (EBRD 2005: 
23-27; Porteous 2003; UNDP 2003: 60-61). The International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) holds out hope that the state should not simply be avoided but can 
itself accommodate the needs o f migrants. In other words, they attempt to resolve the 
dialectic o f re-/de-territorialisation generated by the Tajik peace. The IOM argues 
against government efforts to curtail the export of manpower and for a proactive 
government policy o f assisting migrants through information provision and its 
diplomatic offices and introducing a system of guarantees for money transfers o f
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remittances (Olimova and Bose 2003: 125). There is some evidence to suggest that 
the Tajik government is aware o f the importance of labour migration to the peace and 
has made some policy adjustments accordingly (Usmonov [T20]: 15). Neoliberal 
thinking, however, would go further and suggest that such marketisation is natural and 
might lead to poverty alleviation locally as migrants can invest remittances in 
agriculture back home. Labour migrants who have expanded the livelihoods o f their 
avlod through de-territorialised migration might be expected to feed such income 
back into processes o f re-territorialisation and buy land in ongoing land reform.
However, there are at least two problems with such thinking. Firstly, the 
nature o f hegemony and authority in Tajikistan precludes the realisation of a law- 
based free market. Research on the Rasht valley indicates that future distribution of 
land is likely to remain highly ‘politicised’ in that it depends on connections to local 
networks and on having the means to work through them (Ziircher 2004: 16-25). The 
wealthier rent a few hectares o f land from the sovkhoz or collective dekon farm. All 
those who rent, ‘own’ or manage (in the case of the Sovkhoz)216 such ‘irrigated’ land 
must pay an expensive ‘unified tax’ of around 120 somoni (38 US dollars) per 
hectare, per year.277 Secondly, the International Community, whilst idealised as a 
cooperative and coordinated group of actors, in fact acts extremely inconsistently and 
contentiously. Actors working for statebuilding can often undermine humanitarian 
projects. Anti-drugs projects and anti-terror initiatives advocate and fund a stiffening 
o f defences against informal economic activity, and thus embolden elite/state actors 
who control borders and take a part in the illegal economy, as discussed in chapter 6. 
Even humanitarian projects, as shown above, can achieve the opposite o f their 
intended effects. Under these dynamics of national and international hegemony it is 
difficult to see how de-/re-territorialisation can be reconciled in a ‘free market’ which 
allows de-territorialised migrants to be reterritorialised agricultural entrepreneurs. 
Today, the overwhelming majority of both migrants and peasants remain in poverty, 
maintaining a precarious existence where they are subject to exploitation and 
domination by elites within and beyond the borders of Tajikistan.
These conclusions about re-/de-territorialised livelihoods have conceptual 
implications for ‘peace’. Whilst not a headline element o f Beetham’s ‘legitimacy’,
276 Like tenants and ‘private’ dekon fanners, the Sovkhoz -  although a state institution -  must also pay 
the ‘unified tax’ to local government.
277 Interviews with farmers, Abdulhanon, August 2005
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livelihoods are deemed central to the social life of subordinates in his work. In a 
relationship of landlords and peasants, he notes, where the latter depend on the 
former, ‘it is the failure to guarantee subsistence and the means o f livelihood that is 
destructive to legitimacy, rather than the extent of any exactions made, since it 
infringes the basic interests that are presupposed in the relationship’ (p. 84). Scott, 
similarly argues that it is the existence of absolute poverty rather than inequality that 
is crucial to the perception o f exploitation:
If the balance of exchange is deteriorating but the material situation of the cultivator’s 
family is stable or even improving, discontent may be evident, but it is unlikely to 
provoke massive unrest. It is when a worsening balance of exchange menaces crucial 
elements of subsistence routines, when it stretches existing subsistence patterns to 
breaking point, that we expect explosions of rage or anger (1976: 177).
Similarly, in Tajikistan, while peasants remain impoverished, they testify that post- 
conflict order and increased opportunities for migration have improved their 
livelihoods.278 This reaffirms the conclusion that peace can be constituted by 
economic exploitation and political domination.
7.3. M ediating ‘Com m unity’: M onitoring and Evaluation Stories
Politics is equally theatrical, and progressive politics in particular requires a certain kind of 
rhetoric. It deploys a willing suspension of disbelief of citizens in their own accumulated 
experience... What’s missing in the hope for progressive change is an understanding of the 
profoundly enervating role that illusion plays in modem society. I mean here to propound a 
paradox, that people can actively enter their own passivity.
-  Richard Sennett (2006:161)
We have seen how international analyses of ‘community self-government’ (this 
chapter), ‘border management’ (chapter 6) and ‘elections’ (chapter 5) contradict with 
realities for elites and subordinates. These contrasts raise questions about how 
peacebuilding’s ambiguity is sustained and whether the various representations can 
either be reconciled into a single discourse or come into conflict with one another. 
This is particularly important as it is this differentiation which constitutes the nature 
of peace as a contrastingly represented and performed social reality. To speculate 
somewhat, community peacebuilding programmes such as CAIP would not get
278 Villagers frequently commented how material conditions have improved since the 1990s. Street 
interviews, Rasht valley, April-August 2005.
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funded if  they were believed to be part of the re-constitution of elite domination and 
manipulated by elites in the ways argued here. For the international Community, such 
discourses are functional to their legitimacy and, by extension, their very existence in 
Tajikistan. It would be tempting to argue that some privileged agent, a grand master 
o f discourse, must be consciously reproducing such representations. This would be an 
overly agential explanation and lacks evidence. In my explanation, agency remains, 
but in a much more interdependent form. To remain discursively differentiated 
international representations must be discursively mediated. This final section looks 
at the nature o f programme evaluation, the role of discursive mediators and how they 
both act to simulate ‘community’.
7.3.L Quantifying success
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is an integral component of any major, donor- 
funded programme. International staff spend a considerable proportion o f their time 
producing various images and texts to represent their programme in terms which will 
be appreciated by an audience in Washington, London or Berlin. It is these practices 
which explain how an intervention which has had very little impact on the pre­
existing practices of communities can plausibly be considered to have transformed a 
community and be worth millions of dollars of assistance. This also gets to the heart 
o f complex legitimacy and the central place of ambiguity in it: how multiple, 
contrasting representations of the same object can co-exist.
I was part of the final evaluation of the multi-million dollar CAIP programme 
which assessed sixteen communities (out of a total of seventy-five) across three
70ft
countries in terms of the measurable objectives of the programme. The final 
report, which we produced, inscribed CAIP as a qualified success using neutral 
language which is not obviously neoliberal. ‘Among the most significant changes 
brought about by CAIP,’ it argues, ‘are increased trust and cooperation in the 
communities, changed outlook and increased capacity to solve problems’ (MCCAR
279 Nine of these communities were in Tajikistan. The other seven were in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
This reflected the overall distribution of the sixty-five CAIP communities managed by Mercy Corps. I 
led the research team which studied the nine Tajik cases.
280 The evaluation looked at six ‘perspectives’ of community mobilisation: (i) Awareness by the 
community at large, and (ii) Level of community contribution to the projects; (iii) Level of training and 
human resource development; (iv) Level of activity; (v) Level of collaboration with cluster 
communities, and (vi) Perceptions of government officials (MCCAR 2005: 12-27).
288
2005: 14). The report acknowledges that impact on Tajik communities was less than 
anticipated. However, the reasons for the lack of complete success in this area were 
deemed to be internal programmatic issues where Mercy Corps had not paid sufficient 
heed to institutionalising the CBO after it was up and running. Thus it argues a ‘much 
higher level o f achievement’ could have been reached by ‘a clearer articulation of the 
process o f capacity building’ (p. 39).
In such a way a considerable degree o f success was rescued success for the 
programme and, more importantly, for the idea of the CBO and the identity o f the 
International Community as a whole. Interventionism, we are told, largely works and, 
where it fails to achieve its objectives, it can be improved through endogenous factors 
such as ‘articulation o f the process’ by international actors. The report does not even 
consider exogenous factors arising from the context. Community development, as 
discussed at the beginnning of this chapter, is thus written as something which can be 
made intelligible and managed by the International Community. In this sense, the 
report depoliticises and objectifies the highly political and relational processes of 
change taking place in Tajik communities. This account mirrors that provided by 
peacebuilding: a post-conflict process which is non-ideological and apolitical, driven 
by the objective requirements o f peace. In cases where international agencies are 
examining themselves -  as was the case with CAIP281 -  quantitative analysis is all the 
more subjective. However, it is not a mere reflection o f discourse, but constitutes 
peacebuilding by providing certain kinds o f facts which reproduce the ethical, spatial 
and temporal maxims of the International Community. How is such knowledge 
produced? I argue that two processes of power-knowledge are at work here: 
quantification (discussed in this sub-section) and narration (sub-section 7.3.ii).
The reduction and distortion o f local practice is particularly acute in 
quantitative analyses. In accordance with the principles o f new public management 
(NPM) thinking common to the International Community, CAIP was designed with 
SMART objectives. SMART objectives are the foundational act o f reducing a 
complex social and political environment to a set of quantifiable indicators in order to 
achieve objectivity, transparency and accountability for the programme. In the final
281 All three ‘external’ evaluators, including myself, became Mercy Corps employees and over the 
course of the evaluation worked very closely with mercy corps staff.
282 SMART objectives are those which are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Timed. They 
are a standard element of project management in Western countries.
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evaluation we conducted a social survey according to a statistically valid sample of 
respondents as well as focus groups and elite interviews according to standard 
interview forms. Many o f the questions asked required closed answers which could 
be numerically represented. The evaluation was designed this way in order to make 
our data quantifiable according to the requirements o f the donor, USAID, who kept an 
index to rank communities across the region according to their degree o f success in 
terms of programme objectives. Quantification can thus provide standardisation 
where the same attributes can be measures across the world. Moreover, it demands a 
method and model which is universal and can be applied to any context. An M&E 
consultancy business has mushroomed to meet this demand, where individuals who 
know a model can ‘parachute’ in to conduct a programme in a region which they have 
never visited before. This was the case in our evaluation where the lead consultant 
had not previously visited Central Asia and did not visit Tajikistan -  where 60% o f 
the programme resources were invested -  at all during the exercise.
The problem with such a standard or ‘objective’ approach is that it requires 
numerous ‘subjective’ judgements by the researcher. As a member o f the evaluation 
team I was very much a participant in this process o f categorising and re-categorising 
data in terms o f types, and then into larger categories. There are many degrees of 
separation from the original collection of data. Quantitative analysis requires that 
meaning be transposed across several media:
(i) original speech in vernacular by respondent
(ii) written record of this by researcher
(iii) translation into English by translator
(iv) classification by data type by researchers, and
(v) aggregation into data category by researchers.
Accordingly much is left open to interpretation at all stages. Data can be shaped by 
considerations such as how the respondent views the researcher (and vice-versa). 
Responses reflect a particularly positive public transcript o f their experience o f the 
programme given by members of CAGs, and CAIP youth and women’s group; the 
questions asked reflect certain assumptions about local people.
283 In the evaluation we collected data in four different languages: Tajik, Uzbek, Russian, and Kyrgyz.
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For example, ‘how have you changed during the programme?’ assumed that 
the respondent would interpret ‘you’ as ‘I ’ the individual (rarely the case), that they 
would accept ‘change’ and not find this idea unsettling (often not the case). 
Demanding a written answer to such a question also assumed that (often semi-literate) 
respondents would be comfortable answering alone without consulting their 
colleagues. This was never the case (see figure 31).
Fig.31: Respondents completing ‘individual’ questionnaires, Jirgatol district, April 2005
Questions often received collective and defensive answers. A closer look at original 
completed questionnaires indicates an interesting usage o f the maxims o f both the 
discourse o f subordinate tinji (among all respondents) and that of elite 
mirostroitelstvo (more common among older men). The categorisation of data was 
also shaped by how the reader viewed the data. I observed in numerous meetings of 
the research team and programme staff how those who worked on the programme 
would understandably try and represent it in the best possible terms. To a certain 
extent this inter-subjectivity o f findings is a feature common to all social research but 
it is a particular problem with quantitative M&E exercises.
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An illustration o f the differences this inter-subjective, inter-personal process 
can make is shown in two attempts to classify data on community ‘change’ graphed in 
figures 32 and 33.284 Version one of that chart shows a version done by my 
colleague, according to the instructions of the lead consultant. It finds 39% of 
respondents say ‘I’ am ‘committed to work with community using democratic 
principles’. Version two shows my version, composed -  in a more discretionary and 
less ‘scientific’ manner -  having seen chart one and found it to be a distortion o f what 
I had heard from community members. It finds 42% of respondents saying ‘we’ are 
‘more united [in our] approach to development in the community.’ It is not clear how 
we judge which of these representations is more valid. Both charts necessarily reduce 
a huge range of data, gathered in and translated from four languages, to just five 
categories. For example, my category of ‘Increased Ability to Manage Projects’ (fig. 
33) is a category around three times more common among (overwhelmingly male) 
local government leaders than women’s group members. It includes both statements 
about authority (e.g. ‘I think that my authority has been increased among people’) and 
those implying acquired skills (e.g. ‘project selection’). While our research sought to 
account for these validity questions by conducting several exercises of classification 
and re-classification, the social conditions o f inter-subjectivity can never be 
circumvented.285 Moreover, while the two charts give very different pictures, neither 
shed much light on what actually happened in communities and why. In short, much 
is left to the eye of the beholder. He/she may discern from fig. 32 that 39% of 
community leaders in CAIP communities are ‘democratic’. It is via this kind o f inter­
subjectivity and inter-textuality that (mis)representative international norms and 
symbols are reproduced.
284 Data was based on 331 completed questionnaires filled out by CAG, Youth and Womens’ group 
members in Tajikisatn Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Around 60% of the data is from Tajikistan (MCU 
2005: 7).
285 Following my involvement in this evaluation I worked to try and develop my own methodology to 
M&E using the qualitative techniques of ethnography and discourse analysis similar to what has been 
used throughout this research. I subsequently conducted mini-evaluations for Mercy Corps and GTZ 
during the midway point of their programmes. See Heathershaw (2005c, 2005d).
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Fig.32: ‘How have you changed?’ chart version one
Com m unity Action Group m em bers: How have you changed?
Commitment to work with community 
using democratic principles
Improved outlook/well-being
Improved living conditions/infrastructure
Gained skills in problem-solving/confliction 
prevention/resolution
Better Understanding and Application of 
Project Cycle
Improved Communication/Public Relations 
Skills
Acquired Leadership/Organizational Skills
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
293
Fig.33: ‘How have you changed?’ chart version two
Community Action Group members: How have you changed?
A More United Approach to 
Development in the Community
Improved Personal Outlook
Increased Ability to Manage 
Projects, Problems and Conflicts
Improved living 
conditions/infrastructure
Other
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
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73.ii. Narrating ‘success stories’
Reproducing ‘community development’ in ‘peacebuilding’ involves more than just 
numbers. Stories and images from CAIP communities were a hugely important part 
of Mercy Corps’ narration of the programme. Photographs and ‘success stories’ 
were crucial accompaniments of quarterly reports to donors. They are particularly 
important as the decision-makers o f donor agencies are unlikely to spend much time 
reading formal M&E reports. Photos and anecdotes then make a significant 
contribution to the perception o f the programme by donors. ‘Success stories’ are 
told in such a way which inscribes a clear distinction between ‘state’ or 
‘government’ and ‘civil society’ or ‘community’. One ‘success story’ from the 
village o f Jailghan in the Rasht valley (MCT 2005) recounted the case o f the 
covering o f an open-top, fast-running irrigation canal which had been responsible 
for the drowning o f several children in recent years. ‘During the project’s 
implementation,’ the Mercy Corps version notes, ‘Jailghan’s Community Action 
Group mobilised extensive support from the local government and community 
members’ (MCT 2005, no pagination). This discursive separation o f ‘government’ 
from ‘community’ reinforces a state/society dichotomy which does not exist in 
Tajikistan. This is justifiable only when one considers that by Mercy Corps’ 
definition the civilian organs of the state are part of civil society. Under such 
discourse, the dual subject, which is integral to the justification for a community 
development programme, is inscribed even if, paradoxically, the ‘state’ must be 
subsumed into ‘civil society’.
During my fieldwork I had personal experience o f this phenomenon. In 
June o f 2005, I was asked by Mercy Corps to study one o f the cases considered 
most successful from the thirty-five CAIP communities in order to provide a 
‘success story’ for the programme’s final report. I chose the community o f Kizil 
Ketmen, near Sharituz, close to the Afghan border, and opted to spend a week there 
conducting research and living with the head of the CAG. Compared to previous 
CAIP communities where I had conducted research, Kizil Ketmen was, indeed, a 
flagship case where a large number o f projects had been completed over the course
286 My living arrangements in the community were somewhat unavoidable as living with a poorer 
family would have offiided the local leadership. My experience of the village was partly shaped by 
CAG head. However, my position offered me privileged insights into how leadership worked in the 
village.
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f y o n  _
o f the programme. Thus, I wrote and photographed a story o f success, ‘The 
Village o f Kizil Ketmen: on an Upward Trend’ (Heathershaw 2005b). In the 
account I tried to explore this story of success with quotes and examples which 
showed how local leaders had to work amid a corrupt government and exploitative 
economy. Nevertheless I wrote for an audience. My account introduced Kizil 
Ketmen in terms such as ‘progress’, ‘challenges’ and ‘change’, and was illustrated 
with pleasing phtotographs (such as the one in figure 34).
Fig. 34: Girl and child, Kizil Ketmen
According to my portrayal, as was the case in peacebuilding discourse, the CAG 
was written as an institution independent o f ‘the state’ that functioned as an agent of 
change. I gave stories of the CAG deputy chair -  also the Director o f the School 
where the group met -  who worked busily for the community. I profiled the
287 In particular, a m ajor project to clear out an irrigation canal had allowed villagers to grow fruit 
and vegetables in their gardens and land-plots around the village for the first time in several years, 
making a substantial difference to their livelihoods.
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members of the women’s group and recounted their public testimonies: ‘We have 
our rights and we know them. When we have different meetings we find that we 
have the ability to analyze and solve problems.’ I explained the CAG’s flagship 
project o f clearing out an irrigation canal. The case study concluded:
Like many other grassroots leaders and community members, they have been begun 
to see that change for the better can really impact their own lives and that of their 
fellow community members. Hope, like water, is beginning to flow through Kizil 
Ketmen again.
The point here is not that I deliberately misrepresented the village. Rather, I did not 
tell the whole story. Indeed it is not possible to tell the whole story. Knowledge is 
not produced in laboratory conditions but a social space.
As a consequence, M&E might tell us more about us, the evaluators, than 
about them, the evaluated. As an evaluator I was in a certain sense ‘trapped’ by 
peacebuilding discourse. This ‘entrapment’ took place due to the broader context o f 
the International Community: I understood that I was paid to produce a story which 
would show-case the successes of CAIP to an audience of paymasters; I was part of 
a team of dedicated international and local staff many o f whom believed in the 
programme (albeit for different reasons); I myself had developed a personal 
perspective that CAIP had achieved some socio-economic good for poor 
communities (despite failing to achieve it peacebuilding objectives) and did not 
want to denigrate its achievements. Thus, M&E tells us a considerable amount 
about the social and political relationships between evaluator and evaluated. In this 
sense, as a form o f (mis)representation, it serves a very important function: it keeps 
international cash coming for ‘community development’ in the sincere hope that 
such programmes are benefiting communities. Whilst the discursive practices of 
M&E do not necessarily constitute direct manipulation or fabrication by agents 
(although at times they can), programme coordinators are often quite ambivalent 
about their work in private. In conversation with one Mercy Corps programme 
coordinator I remarked that such programmes might work better if  they had more 
realistic aims. He/she noted that ‘if  you wrote a realistic proposal the donors are 
not interested -  so you have to write something that interests them and then you end
< io o
up with a programme which is really hard to implement.’ Such testimonies
288 Interview, programme officer, Mercy Corps, Dushanbe, 31/05/05
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exhibit a certain amount o f cynicism and scepticism in private, but not do not 
constitute the widespread public disclosure that would challenge the whole idea o f 
‘community self-government’. This in itself witnesses to the power of discourse to 
shape how ‘community’ is written, imagined and read.
7.3.iii. The discursive mediators: negotiating ‘community' and ‘authority'
The way monitoring and evaluation is practised reveals a great deal about the 
character o f international interventions: their unquestioned maxim to develop or 
transform their subject forces them to disregard or downplay those local practices 
which may be inconsistent with their model, despite claiming to be capacity 
building or facilitating that subject. This raises questions o f agency. In many 
contexts where governance is based on broadly authoritarian practices, international 
organisations can find their intervention is not welcome as it seeks to directly 
challenge the authority o f the government. However, in Tajikistan the International 
Community has maintained good relations with the government and has continued 
to put substantial resources into communities. I argue that this requires discursive 
mediation and, moreover, agents which function as discursive mediators.
In the context o f community development and decentralisation programmes 
the local staff and sub-contractors of INGOs fulfill the role of discursive mediators. 
They work for the International Community but grew up and exist in a Tajik social 
and political context. During 2005 I spent considerable time with these people, 
conducting individual and group interviews, and making ethnographic 
interpretations of their testimonies; local staff discourses became an important part 
of two mini-evaluation exercises (Heathershaw 2005c, 2005d). I became 
increasingly aware of how elite practices of domination and subordinate practices o f 
avoidance and accommodation are often explained in different terms to ex-pat 
international NGO officers as positive aspects for the completion o f projects. 
Equally, they represent international de-centralising interventions in terms of re­
centralisation and re-territorialisation for a local elite audience. Thus peacebuilding 
is re-written through the ethical, spatial and temporal assumptions of tinji and 
mirostroitelstvo; ‘community’ is practised in order to perform ‘authority’. I will 
highlight three discursive strategies which bring ‘peacebuilding’ into local spaces; 
the process, it should be remembered, also works in reverse.
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Firstly, the risk of conflict is reduced to an absolute lack o f resources. 
Democratisation, conflict resolution, and other transformational interventions are 
transposed into economic development initiatives. Mercy Corps PCI local teams in 
Sughd oblast cited the stated conflict resolution aims o f the programme when 
communicating with community leaders whilst at the same time, like community 
leaders, denying that conflicts exist and citing economic ‘threats’ such as 
unemployment. One noted that tension comes from ‘the lack o f general resources’. 
Another staff member noted that lack of finances is the most important weakness o f 
communities (see fig. 35 below). Thus, local staff represented community 
problems in terms similar to local elites. Unlike ex-pat programme managers, local 
staff did not acknowledge an inequality of access to resources (either between 
villages or between groups within a village) as part o f the problem but rather cited 
an absolute insufficiency. This is an important difference as it indicates a de­
politicisation o f the nature of conflict.
Fig. 35: SWOT Analysis, Teams 4 and 5, Panjakent, 28/06/05
Strengths
■ Hard-workingness
■ Work experience
■ Desire to work
■ Tolerance to each other
■ Ability to work in a team
Weaknesses
■ Distrust and misunderstandings
■ Lack of skills
■ Absence of financial means -  the main 
thing.
■ Absence of work places
■ Absence of technical equipment
Opportunities
■ Knowledge which they received in 
trainings
■ To mobilize to address needs
■ An improvement in the conditions for living 
and welfare
Threats
■ Labour migration (zarabotka)
■ Drug addiction
■ Extreme poverty
■ Increase in various diseases
■ Illiteracy of youth
Secondly, interventions are represented to local audiences largely in terms 
o f conducting infrastructure projects. The following conversation between team 
members in Asht is revealing:
One team member: What are we doing setting up women’s groups, youth groups, 
mixed-sex groups or whatever? We should just set up one good group with the 
power to get things done in the community. After the projects are finished the 
groups just close down. They’re only there when the projects are going. I think we 
should set up one group with one fund to keep working after the program -  some 
contribution would come from the community, some from Mercy Corps.
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Another team member: But we have different groups because different groups 
have different views. There are various views. Some may want to renovate the 
water system, others may want to do the school -  that’s why we need different 
groups.289
While one team member may be slightly more aware of hetrogeneity than the other, 
as the conversation continued they both failed to acknowledge that certain sections 
o f the community may be marginalised, partly due to the actions o f the other. This 
was apparent to some international programme managers and a source o f frustration 
for them.
Thirdly, the unquestionable authority of elites is explicitly affirmed. 
According to one member of the Asht team, the CIG is a group o f ‘respected people 
who are heeded.’ While program staff share mangers’ concerns regarding cross- 
border problems, they were very positive about the permission-granting role of 
local government. One told me that, ‘the role o f local government is positive. 
Without the permission o f local government it’s not possible to work in 
communities. They are the masters o f their territory [hozayeva svoikh territori]'. 
Moreover, ‘we coordinate our work together’.290 Following from this 
representation o f ‘authority’, women and youth were re-interpreted as passive, 
needing to be led. This was by contrast to international managers who, in 
accordance with the aims of the PCI program, saw such marginalization, 
particularly of women, as a social problem (this volume, p. 139). One member o f 
the Asht team disagreed that the lack o f female participation was a real concern in 
the communities. For another -  the only woman on the team -  the problem was the 
‘inactivity’ for which ‘training of women’ was needed to attract and mobilise them. 
A male team member added that the problem was that local women conform to 
stereotypes. During many hours of discussion, inequality was never mentioned as 
an issue. In response to the question o f what’s best about the program, the Asht 
team replied: ‘what’s best about the program is the coming together o f the team 
with the community, ‘to become kindred spirits (rodstvenni dushi) and one family.’ 
In contrast, it is often argued by international staff that if  development is about
901change some tension in communities is desirable and inevitable.
289 Personal communication, Mercy Corps staff, Asht, 22/06/05
290 Personal communications, Mercy Corps staff, Asht, 22/06/05
291 Group interview, Mercy Corps staff, Panjakent, 28/06/05
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In summary, local staff discourse translates peacebuilding programmes 
through an ethics o f mirostroitelstvo to a tinji audience. The local NGO programme 
staff reinterpret peacebuilding programmes in terms of a technocratic, 
modernisation approach to development, as illustrated by a SWOT analysis 
conducted with Mercy Corps staff in Panjakent (see figure 35). It bears significant 
similarity to that shown in figure 13 for the discourses o f village leaders. This is 
has far-reaching consequences for international assistance. Regardless o f what is 
written in programme documents, it is these staff who know the context and speak 
the relevant languages who represent what the programme means to the target 
community (see figure 36).
Fig. 36: Community meeting, Kizil Ketmen: mixed small group in the background with 
facilitator from a local NGO, a sub-contractor for Mercy Corps.
In reverse, skilful staff can explain local practices in ways which make international 
staff modify their expectations of what constitutes ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘success’ in
292 This is not true in all cases. I have worked with russified, urbanized NGO staff who struggle to 
speak the vernacular and, as I was, were received as an ‘o ther’, in the local spaces where we were 
working.
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context. They thus stabilise basic discourse, minimising or avoiding the points o f 
conflict between them. With such discursive mediation the inter-textual relations 
between basic, contrasting discourses are reduced and a kind o f parallel universes is 
created. This has the overall effect of moderating international programmes and 
gutting them o f their ‘otherness’ -  which for international peacebuilding represents 
their transformative quality.
Some critical analyses of peacebuilding have argued that international 
interventions impose ‘democracy’ and the ‘free market’ on post-conflict politics, 
and then ‘fake’ their practical existence (Chandler 1999). This may be true in some 
cases where international intervention has been far greater, such as Bosnia. In 
Tajikistan, as chapters five and six suggest, it is the local context which is imposed 
on peacebuilding: that through the discursive mediation o f local staff discourses and 
elite practices o f mirostroitelstvo international programmes are gutted of their 
transformative content. Moreover, via public and hidden transcripts o f tinji, 
subordinate actors avoid and accommodate both elite and international 
interventions. In Tsing’s terms they reinforce their ‘marginality’; they ‘respond, 
reinterpret, and challenge even as they accept and are shaped by these forms of 
knowledge’ (1993: 8).
Conclusions
The findings above are consistent with a growing body of literature which provides 
a critical perspective on the ‘business’ o f civil society (Strathem 2000), especially 
its practising by donors in Central Asia. Many NGOs are concerned with 
educational and women’s issues, which are considered less politically sensitive 
issues. They are often dependent on donors, yet have ‘very limited’ or ‘inadequate’ 
impact in terms of their transformative goals (Akiner 2001: 58). Furthermore, Liu 
and Megoran inter alia have argued that ‘civil society’ in Central Asia expresses 
local and international power relations (Bichsel 2005, Earle 2005, Liu 2003, 
Megoran 2005). The ‘donor-organised NGO’ model, Liu notes, is fundamentally 
disempowering to micro-level reform and may indeed be subverted by local clients. 
As such, ‘attempts to encourage “grassroots” initiatives may end up reinforcing 
such illiberal institutions as patriarchy and clientelism’ (Liu 2003: 3-4). Such
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programmes do not run parallel but themselves contribute to the remaking o f 
hegemony and legitimacy in local spaces.
In such a way, as argued in this chapter, the simulation o f ‘community’ has 
consequences for the re-/de-territorialising of livelihoods. As long as ‘community 
development’ still seems a plausible goal or endpoint, international assistance to 
local spaces in this form will keep coming. Such assistance creates meeting points 
o f international, elite and popular discourse through which legitimacy is remade. 
Whilst international programmes have sought to form new groups, introduce new 
norms, and perform this decentralised governance, in intersubjective practice their 
interventions have in fact served to re-form pre-existing institutions, renew evolving 
local norms and perform the power o f hegemonic local elites. As governmental 
representatives have sought to increase central control over local governments using 
administrative resources, donor interventions have facilitated this by providing the 
resources for greater material interaction between elites and subordinates. Together 
they have recrafted local political space, reinforced patriarchal rule and legitimated 
a new elite. To focus on the ambiguous practising o f sovereignty, livelihoods and 
authority is to look radically at what ‘security’ and ‘peace’ mean in a post-conflict 
environment. I now seek to bring together the findings inductively derived through 
chapters five to seven to reflect upon the nature of peace as complex legitimacy.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusions and Implications
Politics, economics and global structures have become so inauthentic that few of us truly 
believe in them. We live in this paradox: the things most omnipresent that govern our lives 
are the very things from which we feel distant. We hold fast to myths that what we have 
created to govern our lives is responsive to whom we are as human beings and to our 
communities. Yet at the same time these creations seem to have lives of their own 
independent of us, foreign to us, and distant from us. An inquiry that seeks to understand 
how cycles of violence can be broken and transcended is precisely one that must infuse 
politics, political discourse and governing structures with a capacity for responsiveness to 
our human community.
-  John Paul Lederach (2005:28-29)
Official elite accounts o f Tajikistan’s peace seek to present a government which is 
not just legitimate, but destined to lead national progress (Fatoev 2001: 104). 
International testimonies, by contrast, increasingly losing hope in Tajikistan, 
present a government which is ‘weak’, illegitimate and maintained largely by the 
‘war weariness’ o f the population293. As this thesis has shown, the reality is both 
more complex and more ambiguous. The puzzle with which we started this thesis is 
not a paradox but can be understood if we avoid the temptation to discipline peace 
to a single account, representation, performance, or even a single logic of 
simulation. It can at times appear that the public transcript o f the powerful is being 
endorsed without reservation or re-presentation. Indeed, it can appear to 
subordinates and internationals that their understandings too are being validated by 
events. However, this dissertation has refuted such a univocal account. Tajikistan’s 
peace is neither an objective condition o f order, nor the subjective self-image o f the 
government o f ‘authority’ and ‘stability’. Rather, it is built on an inter-subjective 
process o f complex legitimacy. This process produces hybrid forms where order is 
never complete, and multiple transcripts and diverse practices constitute a complex 
peace. The Tajik government is legitimate but its legitimacy is ambiguous -  
producing contrasting registers of discursive resignation among elites, subordinates 
and internationals. Its legitimacy is contingent upon practices beyond its control, 
but subject to its mediation.
293 US embassy official Amanda Cranmer notes, for example, that ‘[stability is] based on war­
weariness -  people just trying to live’, adding ‘it won’t go on forever -  there’s an undercurrent of 
anger.’ Interview, Dushanbe, 01/03/05.
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In this final chapter I will clarify the conclusions and implications o f my 
analysis for peacebuilding in Tajikistan. I believe this analysis can contribute to a 
greater understanding o f peacebuilding in theory and speak to a wide range o f cases 
beyond Tajikistan. However, this dissertation does not afford the space to situate 
my findings within broader comparative and theoretical contexts. Section one 
considers possible objections and qualifications to my radical reinterpretation o f the 
international discourse o f peacebuilding in Tajikistan, its deceptions and indirect 
effects. Section two clarifies the nature o f peace as complex legitimacy via 
inductive insights from part two of this thesis. It holds that what is taking place in 
the country is a process of legitimation, differentiated by dynamics of space and 
discourse, and constitutive of dialectics of authority, livelihoods, and sovereignty. 
It is neither positive or negative peace. Section three considers the ramifications o f 
the argument for politics and ethics. What, it asks, should agents do?
8.1. On Tajikistan’s Peace: objections and qualifications
This dissertation argued that the ascriptions and prescriptions o f international post­
conflict peacebuilding produce a peril/promise dichotomy which is refuted by the 
messy cases of peacebuilding. From this point I could have dismissed 
peacebuilding as mere normative theory (the ought) and picked out better tools of 
analysis (the is). However, convinced that the ought is an important part o f the is, I 
argued that peacebuilding, as the hegemonic international discourse o f post-conflict 
intervention, was an important part o f the picture. This led to the theoretical 
exploration o f peace as complex legitimacy (chapters 1-4) grounded in the case of 
Tajikistan. By such an account peace is mediated through the dynamics o f politics 
(how power is centralised and legitimated in the form of authority), space (how 
such hegemony is differentiated by the constructed boundaries o f community) and 
discourse (the relatively stable, ideologically-informed means by which 
communities interpret the world through language). I then furthered this argument 
through detailed contextual argument focusing on its application to Tajikistan 
(chapters 4-7).
This approach to peace building is a substantial departure ontologically, 
epistemologically and methodologically from international peacebuilding. It is 
likely to face objections from those pragmatists and reformers who eschew radical
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critiques o f the international community. In this section I will consider some of the 
possible reservations to my argument that might emanate from practitioners and 
academics within the mainstream of peace studies.
The ‘first steps * o f peacebuilding?
A standard refrain from practitioners is that we are merely at the beginning of a 
long-term process o f democratisation and the limited ‘progress’ which can be seen 
represents a ‘first step’. One variation of this argument suggests that the process 
takes place over decades. Another contends that if  peacebuilders had committed 
more money and resources to Tajikistan, and if the International Community had 
been more united in its approach, the country’s reform might take place more 
quickly and more substantively. The deputy head of UNTOP, Jan Malekzade, 
articulated the reasons why the office had achieved less than it could have.
There would have been a lot more room, a lot more possibilities. But I don’t think 
UNTOP as such could have initiated this. One of the issues is that peacebuilding is a 
very comprehensive process. It affects government institutions, security agencies, 
parliament, and the local administration, the whole public sector. If you want to 
address this in a credible way you need resources to do this. There’s less than 5 
internationals and an office with about 1.5 million dollars per year. It’s a task which 
is not adequate to the resources. It’s a task which has not received enough attention 
(Malekzade [Til]: 3)
The relative lack o f resources for peacebuilding in Tajikistan is not an unimportant 
consideration. However, the idea o f a ‘first step’ is based upon illusory teleological 
notions o f progress contained within liberal peacebuilding discourse. If this point 
seems overly abstract, let us put it more prosaically: there’s just no evidence in the 
specific case of Tajikistan to support the idea that it is going in this ‘direction’. 
Factoring space and politics into our analysis reveals the biases o f such discourse. 
Scott’s work (1998), in particular, illustrates the pitfalls of such grandiose modem 
projects and how such projects are forced to adapt to the local context, rather than 
the other way around. This is illustrated in a number of examples from this study 
where resource allocations from the International Community were not 
inconsiderable; for reforming the legal framework and conducting o f elections 
(sections 5.1 and 5.2), support to political parties (5.3), the guarding o f borders 
(6.3), and community development (chapter 7.1). In such a case, it is more credible
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to argue that ‘peace’ is moving towards Tajikistan, rather than Tajikistan moving 
towards ‘peace’.
Is such weak legitimacy sustainable?
By contrast to the promise rescued above, pessimists or cynics, from a 
peacebuilding perspective, assume while it may have held together this long, ‘peril’ 
is just around the comer for Tajikistan. Abdullaev, for example, provides a 
plausible portrayal of why peace will not hold:
Bom in crisis and chaos, the current system assimilated deep seated traditional 
political loyalties, Soviet standards and recent rational-legal requirements. Beyond 
the fa?ade of Western patterned legal arrangements in Tajikistan hides a remarkable 
blend of secular and traditional features that can poorly connect civil and political 
society, promote the perceived interests of individuals and different solidarity groups. 
Quasi-democratic rule is being built on a highly fragmented society with yet 
declared, but unabled [sic.] protection of civil liberties. This foundation feeds 
growing violence, and corruption in society and government (2004: 8).
This account has much more merit to it than that in the ‘promise’ view above. This 
dissertation has argued that while a certain legitimacy is present in Tajikistan, it is 
contingent. Tajiks resign to authoritarian government not because they appreciate it 
but because they see no meaningful alternative. Some analysts speculate that as the 
new generation which does not remember the war grows up, they will be less bound 
to tinji discourse. Moreover, the country is dependent on international assistance 
and, should that be withdrawn, social and political order would break down. 
However, the content of peacebuilding’s performances and hidden practices 
disputes such conclusions. Subordinate discourses contain very strong ethical, 
spatial and temporal dimensions which mitigate against future violence, 
understanding it to be wholly implausible and self-defeating. If such discourses 
continue to be reproduced, militancy and political violence are likely to remain the 
preserve of marginal groups which can be suppressed by the elite.
Correlation does not equal causation!
The arguments of the social scientist, about method and how knowledge is 
produced, provide the most important objections and qualifications. In short, the 
correlations that I have described do not equal a causal explanation. There are
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indeed weaknesses to my methodology and things I have been simply unable or 
unprepared to do. My Tajik is not fluent and, had I been able to live in the country 
for several years and develop the language better, I may have had access to a hidden 
world o f radical discourses which reveal a militant and [ripe] Islamic ‘threat’ to the 
state, which some claim (Karagiannis 2006) but I consider over-blown. Moreover, 
while migration (section 7.3) and drug-trafficking (6.2), in particular, seem to be 
dynamics potentially corrosive to public transcripts of central authority, state 
sovereignty and territorial livelihoods, I was unable to undertake substantial original 
research in these areas. They both involve enormous material resources which 
sustain livelihoods in Tajikistan and could potentially challenge the authority and 
sovereignty of the elite. One of these factors may be overwhelmingly important in 
creating the complex legitimacy which Tajikistan experiences today. If, we might 
wonder counterfactually, Tajikistan’s borders were ‘sealed’ -  although it is difficult 
to imagine the circumstances under which this would be possible -  the whole 
symbolic and material order o f complex legitimacy might quickly erode. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine areas such as these two in great depth.
Despite the quite understandable frailties of this or any other study, I am confident 
that I have not misrepresented the nature of peace in Tajikistan from 2000 to 2005. 
It is space which explains why political order in Tajikistan is played out differently 
in the International Community, between elites and amongst subordinates. It is 
discourse which assures that these spaces will not collapse in the foreseeable future 
but will remain subject to one another. The gradual move from a military conflict 
to political order, which began in 1993 and went through significant moments o f 
crystallisation between 1996 and 2000, has matured from 2000 to 2005. It 
represents the legitimation of power and the recreation of authority, livelihoods, and 
sovereignty. I call this complex legitimacy.
8.2. On Complex Legitimacy: inductive insights
David Beetham’s inter-subjective approach to legitimacy served as the basis to 
launch the reconceptualisation o f ‘peace’ in chapter three. His three dimensions 
(beliefs, rules and forms of consent) made me aware of the contextual practices 
which legitimate and delegitmate power in Tajikistan. However, attentive to Scott’s
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public and hidden transcripts, I became increasingly sensitive to the irresolvable 
ambiguity of Tajikistan’s peace/legitimacy. Its sheer complexity refuses any single 
model o f ‘peace’ and insists on a summary o f Tajikistan which takes account of its 
countervailing yet concomitant elements. In investigating the Tajik case in some 
depth, part two of this dissertation has sought not just to apply but to develop the 
constitutive analytical framework developed in part one. This has done this in two 
respects; in terms of both the (i) dialectical and productive processes and, (ii) 
constitutive attributes of building peace. Therefore, peace as complex legitimacy, 
or peace building as ‘legitimation’, has been broadened to include the re-/de- 
centralisation of authority (section 5.4), the (dis-)simulation of sovereignty (6.3), 
and the re-/de-territorialisation o f livelihoods (7.2).
The constitution ofpeace: three attributes and processes
The three processes/attributes which were deduced from key theoretical insights 
from Beetham, Scott and Weber inter alia, as well as induced from the empirical 
work of chapters five to seven.
Authority, the differentiation of the dominant from the subordinate, is both 
re-centralised and de-centralised under the process of peacebuilding. The principal 
triumph of ‘peacebuilding’ for the Tajik elite has been its ability to recentralise the 
legitimate terrain o f political authority -  to become the state. In this process certain 
individuals have fallen by the way side due to their unwillingness to accept the 
‘authority’ of the ruling clique around Rahmonov. Thus, among elites, the power of 
the regime -  however parasitic on the rule o f law -  has been justified by widespread 
beliefs, made plausible by dominant rules, and performed in modes o f consent. 
However, the Tajik elite should not be credited directly with this achievement. It 
has been done by means of complex legitimacy; elite power has become legitimated 
in a process where international actors and subordinates have at times been 
complicit, and at others times implicit in their resignation and acquiescence. 
Moreover, elite practices might themselves provide the greatest threat to central 
authority. Hidden transcripts, o f both the elite and subordinate, express a discontent 
and avoidance of authority through concomitant processes of decentralisation, 
where a singular authority can be subverted through localised practices of 
clientelism or familial ties.
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Such processes are mirrored in the second attribute: simulated and 
dissimulated sovereignty. Here, the idea o f Beetham’s ‘common interest’ or Max 
W eber’s ‘source’ o f authority risks conflating ‘common interest with ‘sovereignty’. 
Simulated state sovereingty is produced by the competing representations o f 
sovereignty in the international system. Chapter 6.3 considered how dissimulations 
are necessarily simulated as sovereignty, and how a singular image of the state is 
necessarily dissimulated by hidden practices which favour private or familial 
interests.
Finally, in Tajikistan today, livelihoods are re-territorialised (to local 
authorities) and de-territorialised (through parallel, illegal practices, especially 
migrant networks). They produce a minimum of subsistence and are weakly 
legitimate. In local and translocal spaces, Tajik citizens have been able to survive 
and, indeed, seen their standard of living improve, despite the centralisation of 
authority by the state. As the economy has been re-territorialised under the elite 
through processes o f privatisation and land reform, labour migration across 
translocal spaces has produced alternative incomes for peasants and migrants 
respectively. This constitutes the re-/de-territorialisation of livelihoods for 
Tajikistan’s poor who survive on a combination of subsistence from their private 
gardens and remittances from migrant relatives.
Interventions, such as those described in chapters 5 to 7, act ‘in the 
production and re-stabilisation of concepts like the state and sovereignty’ (Weber 
1995: 125). Simulated, ‘elections’ and an ‘opposition’ (5.2 and 5.3), ‘border 
management’ (6.3), and ‘community self-government’ (7.2) feign the existence o f a 
sovereign and legitimate state to the International Community, however ‘weak’. 
While these representations hold in international public spaces, in hidden spaces 
they are often admitted to be implausible by sceptical or cynical international 
actors. However, the failure to challenge the public transcripts serves to reproduce 
peacebuilding in the International Community -  a thin representation of reality but 
a very real influence on donor decisions and practices.
However, as discussed above, my focus is on what these interventions do to 
the local contexts in which they operate, affectively and indirectly. In short, 
Tajikistan would not have the particular extent and form of labour migration it does 
today without the exploitation o f land and water by a small elite, which in turn 
would not be had to the same extent without international assistance for
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‘community development’. It would not have corruption the way it is today without 
simulated sovereignty and internationally-assisted ‘border management’. Tajikistan 
would not have the particular de-centralised patronage system which it has today 
without the dominant conception of ‘authority’ that exists in Tajik politics or 
without internationally-supported ‘political parties’ and ‘elections’. In the chapters 
above, I explicitly linked political party building and election monitoring to the 
authority, community development to livelihoods, and SSR and DDR to 
sovereignty. Yet, in practice, the processes also work in reverse and sideways; this 
is the nature of an inter-subjective order. All these interventions have effects and 
affects on all three attributes: authority, livelihoods, and sovereignty. Equally, the 
practices associated with all three attributes help simulate all international 
interventions. This is the co-constitutive nature o f building peace, and the 
dialectical character o f hegemony. It is schematically represented in figure 37 
below.
Fig. 37: Complex legitimacy in practice
International 
Representation 
of Intervention
ATTRIBUTE 
OF PEACE
Public performance 
of peacebuilding
Hidden practices of 
peacebuilding
‘Political parties’, 
‘Elections’
Authority Re-centralising (by 
dominant discursive 
practice)
De-centralising (by 
self-serving acts of 
manipulation of elites)
‘Community
Development’,
‘Decentralisation’
Livelihoods Re-territorialising (to 
local authorities)
De-territorialising 
(through labour 
migration)
‘DDR’,
‘SSR’
Sovereignty Simulating (a single 
authority from multiple 
performances)
Dissimulating (a single 
authority from multiple 
practices)
The degree o f peace: neither positive or negative
Tajikistan may be one of the most stable and legitimate post-conflict spaces found 
anywhere in the world today. Yet this is not much of a claim. Part of the purpose 
o f this thesis is to challenge the dichotomous portrayal o f war/peace and and note 
that the latter looks a lot like the former, even in best-case scenarios. Moreover, it 
also wishes to challenge the notion that peace is either positive or negative. 
Normatively it can be both; analytical neither approach provides a convincing
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paradigm for the study of peace. Such a dichotomy provides a neat normative 
distinction but is analytically of little use. Cases where large-scale physical 
(political) violence has been vastly reduced, yet structural and cultural violence 
continues, belie the idea that they are illegitimate. This assumption can only be 
supposed via an objective conception of legitimacy. Yet I have argued that 
legitimacy is inter-subjective. Negative peace over the longer-term is never just 
‘peace as order’. Rather it requires that authorities be legitimated. Legitimacy 
constitutes the quantitative reduction of physical violence, and the qualitative 
transformation of cultural and physical violence. Order is never simply order. In 
its discursive, political and spatial dimensions it is constituted as more or less 
legitimate.
8.3. Peacebuilding, Politics and Ethics
The kind of radical analysis I have proposed demands some reflection on what 
might constitute responsible action. However, analytical and normative theory, as 
well as politics and ethics are extremely uneasy bedfellows. Moreover, we live in a 
time where ethics are being deployed to serve politics, and vice-versa, in extremely 
spurious ways. Recent trends in peacebuilding continue in the direction of Boutros- 
Ghali’s call to ‘redouble our efforts’ (Boutros-Ghali [UN] 1995). Thus, we find 
calls by liberal thinkers for ‘empire-lite’ in Afghanistan and Iraq (Ignatieff 2002), 
and the advice of the most recent UN High-Level panel for a ‘peacebuilding 
commission’ (2004). Such accounts mirror colonial-era arguments for systematic 
intervention into weak states. However, a radical orientation questions the very 
basis for these claims.
How to act?
Having spent close to 100,000-words insisting on the complexities of 
peacebuilding, I will now, only slightly ironically, simplify my response in just 
three: do less better. As indicated by the discursive trends charted in 
‘peacebuilding’, such a maxim would seem counter-intuitive to most in the 
International Community. To clarify, this exhortation refers to that post-agreement, 
post-implementation period where the high-intensity period of the conflict has 
ended. Even in cases where significant episodes of violence continue
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intermittently, limited and targeted action may be much better than a major 
peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention whose resources can be reappropriated 
for violence by ‘statesmen’ or ‘warlords’.
‘Less’ here requires a more humble programme which might work in 5 
communities over 20 years, rather than 50 over 2 years. ‘Better’ means a 
contextual approach led by individuals who are ethnographic in outlook, prepared 
to accept that not everyone thinks the same way and that ‘human rights’, if  indeed 
they are some how transcendental, are at least not interpreted in the same terms all 
over the world. This involves a readiness to be humble and to listen. It requires a 
greater appreciation of discursive mediation (chapter 7.3); of thinking in terms of 
relationships rather than objects. Interventions which do less better would seek to 
mediate discursively and understand ambiguity but not discipline. It could involve 
agents in attempting to adjust the boundaries of space, the assumptions of discourse 
and the practices of politics at any place or time relevant to a given post-conflict 
context. Lederach (2005) has attempted to theorise this in terms o f strategic 
peacebuilding. I would argue that Lederach’s peacebuilding practices are far too 
contextual, contingent, sublime and reflexive to really be ‘strategic’. As he 
describes them, they are more subtle and nuanced than that; more o f an art than a 
science.
What does this mean in practice? Complex peacebuilding in Tajikistan 
would involve all kinds o f actions that cannot necessarily be knitted into a single, 
logical whole. For example, it would insist that pressure be applied to the state to 
relax border controls and facilitate migration. The IOM has led the way on this in 
Dushanbe (Bose and Olimova 2003). Beyond these highly contingent acts, it would 
insist upon radical changes to the way projects and programmes are designed, 
implemented and evaluated. In reverse order, it would require much improved 
evaluation techniques which involve discourse analysis and ethnography in addition 
to quantitative surveys. This would allow for a greater understanding o f a 
programmes’ direct and indirect consequences for the legitimacy o f certain 
practices, the authority of certain individuals. Implementation must be genuinely 
reflexive and, thus, time-consuming, involving the building o f intimate 
relationships with members o f target communities. Moreover, programmes could 
be designed with objectives set by target beneficiaries. I have suggested the use of
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Consistent, Realistic and Participant-planned (CRAP) objectives to replace SMART 
ones (2005e).
The ramifications o f such evaluations for the way projects are designed and 
implemented would be radical, perhaps too radical for most in the international 
community. Many donors pay lip service to this, but few actually make meaningful 
attempts at participatory planning. I made an attempt to design a qualitative study of 
community peacebuilding programmes whilst working with Mercy Corps and GTZ 
in Tajikistan (2005c; 2005d). My analysis showed that, for example, despite a 
formal emphasis on gender and age in the programme, the women’s and youth 
groups had been de facto marginalised in communities (ibid). Thus, participatory 
planning even where it formally includes women and youth might find that, due to 
the powerful dynamics o f age and gender, programmes are characterised by 
patriarchal practices which contrast sharply with the rhetoric o f UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325. The response o f the international community to this 
seems, unwittingly, to simulate ‘women in peacebuilding’ and carry on regardless. 
A discursive mediation approach under complex peacebuilding might set more 
realistic goals of identifying a small number of female leaders -  in post-conflict 
contexts which are highly patriarchal -  who have the talents to ameliorate 
patriarchal structures. It would raise the issue for discussion and seek to perform 
the powers o f female leaders who were truly worthy o f the name. I believe I saw 
such leaders in the exceptional CAIP community of Kizil Ketmen (Heathershaw 
2005b).
However, these are exceptions to the rule and indicate the role that 
hegemonic discourse, space and politics plays in producing more of the same. 
Thus, such exhortations to act contextually presuppose genuinely exceptional 
individuals with the ability to make a difference who are few and far between. In 
contrast to anti-foundationalist approaches to humanitarian action (Campbell 1998)' 
, such individuals are invariably motivated by a profound sense that they must act 
for some idea or identity which has more authentic and meaningful than ‘alterity’. 
I would argue that the localised and contextualised practices o f such positive peace 
offer the most meaningful examples of social and political life in post-conflict 
settings. They offer a strident challenge to the inauthenticities o f  peacebuilding as 
propounded by the International Community. They do not disavow discursive
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foundations, in fact they insist upon them. But they demand that each voice is 
heard and negotiated.
Final remarks
The objective o f this thesis has been to understand what has made peace hold, in 
Tajikistan, and contribute to a conceptual debate about what ‘peace’ is. It has been 
argued, that this requires an approach of complex legitimacy: the inter-textual, 
inter-spatial and political relations o f authority, livelihoods, and sovereignty. This 
constitutes an inter-subjective approach where we must make relationships o f 
‘peace’ the subject o f peace.
Studying peace thus requires a critical orientation; yet practising peace -  its 
unavoidable partner -  demands a commitment to a point of reference. This final 
chapter has insisted on a moral imperative to retain the practice o f building peace 
alongside the study o f building peace. The project is thus situated in that broader 
quest to challenge the forms o f domination which popular, elite and international 
practices together reproduce. The results of international peacebuilding are an 
increasingly familiar mix of ‘poverty reduction strategies’ and high-level 
corruption, ‘multiparty elections’ and increasingly authoritarian government, 
‘border management’ and state violence. Ideals of peace and practices o f structural 
and physical violence are intersubjective of one another.
Thus, this thesis ends with a call to humility on the part o f the international 
community. As the events of 2006 in Afghanistan, Darfur, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Tajikistan, and countless other cases o f conflict and ‘peace’ show, international 
actors are highly reliant on others in their ability to support livelihoods, rebuild 
authority, and reconstitute sovereignty let alone achieve the ambitious goals of 
peace operations. Failing to grasp the governing dynamics o f discourse, politics, 
and space, they are often seduced by their own power and think o f local dynamics 
as mere responses to their actions. This thesis has sought to reveal the reductions, 
seductions and deceptions o f subordinate, elite and international discourses; and 
what such representations can and cannot produce. The better we comprehend how 
peace is grounded in both complexity and legitimacy, the better we can imagine the 
limits of international intervention and the possibilities for alternative communities.
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